Why the West will not stop India from buying Russian oil (and why it might not want to)
With the valuable assistance of Nicholas Ferrara and Blake Majerczak
Overview
Amid the global oil unrest, India is the largest buyer of Russian oil products. The population giant makes up 51% of purchases for Russian oil; significantly more than China, one of Russia’s strongest supporters in the war in Ukraine. Prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, India only made up a small percentage of the purchases because it mainly imported oil from the Middle East, but post-invasion seized upon the now significantly cheaper Russian alternative. Subrahmanyan Jaishankar, India’s foreign minister, explained India’s reasoning for deciding to buy more Russian oil after the invasion by stating: “It is a sensible policy to go where we get the best deal in the interest of the Indian people.” For the West, this is problematic as it undermines its elaborate and sustained sanctions against Russia over the war in Ukraine. In this piece of writing, we assess what (and if) the West can do by exploring different scenarios for the future of Indian consumption of Russian oil.
Sanctions on India?
The most straightforward action by the West would be to pressure India into discontinuing or lessening its consumption of Russian oil, possibly through sanctions. However, the current appetite for this approach is low among Western policymakers.
In a meeting between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of India, Biden allegedly told Modi that the U.S. could help India diversify its energy sources. This highlights that the U.S. is willing to help India lessen Russian oil consumption through incentivisation, but no further actions have been taken thus far. Subsequently, when asked about India-US relations, Karen Donfried, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, said that the Biden administration accepts India’s purchases of Russian oil and is not going to sanction India. Sanctions then, are clearly not on the table.
Part of why the US will not impose sanctions is that the Indian elite are already very closely invested with Russian oil. The Jamnagar Refinery in India is the biggest oil refinery in the world. It clears over 1.2 million barrels of oil a day and is owned by Reliance Industries, CEO Mukesh Ambani’s multi-billion-dollar oil company. Over half of the refinery's crude oil input comes from Russia now. Mukesh Ambani, the wealthiest man in India, is a strong supporter and ally of Prime Minister Modi and his government. It is alleged that he helped the BJP, Modi’s party, win the parliamentary election in 2019, by spreading disinformation in the BJP’s favour. The Vadinar complex, the second-largest oil refinery in India, is less than 10 miles away from Jamnagar. Both refineries are owned by Nayara Energy, which in turn is owned by Rosneft, a Russian company.
If the West imposes sanctions on Reliance Industries and Rosneft for trading Russian oil, it will likely lead to counter-sanctions. Such counter-sanctions could range from Indian medications for the U.S. market, or, ironically enough, less India refined petroleum for the American market (explored later in the article). In addition, India will likely halt its current deals with the West. For instance, India has recently diversified its weapon purchases by buying Western-made
Ongoing Business (as usual)
It is thus highly unlikely that India will stop consuming Russian oil, at least in the short term. Simple math shows us why India is so keen on purchasing Russian oil. Crude oil from Russia is 60 dollars a barrel compared to the global benchmark of 75 dollars. India buys 2.09 million barrels of oil a day, after one day they can save 30 million dollars when buying Russian oil. This means that there is little to no incentive for India to lessen its consumption. In addition, India is adamant about stressing its neutral stance in the war. The only other incentive would be that another country offers cheaper oil than Russia. It is however very unlikely that any country will dive underneath the bottom prices of Russia for the foreseeable future. It is most likely then, that India continues to purchase Russian oil, either to the same amount or in even larger quantities. Furthermore, India benefits from having Russia as an ally in a geopolitical sense too, specifically as it could leverage Russia’s role as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council.
Western complacency?
What is more, India is profiting from the resale of Russian oil to Western countries at a higher price. Western countries are actually buying relatively cheap oil from India, which is very likely from Russian origin. The United States buys 15% of its oil and refined petroleum products from India, according to the Wilson Center. This trade virtually ensures that some of the gasoline and diesel that the US buys from India contain Russian molecules, according to Global Witness.
One way that the United States could make sure that they are not buying Russian oil is to make a law to ban the import of oil or petroleum products from refineries that have bought crude oil from Russia within a certain date. This would signal to refineries that the United States will not buy oil that originates from Russia. Through coordination with partners like the EU, the US could ensure that the banning of imports from other oil laundering operations that successfully go around their sanctions on Russia are also implemented and shored up.
For now, intentionally, or not, the West is profiting from Russia’s bottom prices. On top of this, India’s shifting oil consumption has freed up parts of the market for the Western countries that do boycott Russian oil and needed alternatives. Had India not shifted its oil policy, other suppliers would not have been able to meet the demand, with prices soaring even higher and oil shortages in many parts of the world. In addition, many of the crude oil India has imported from Russia left the country as refined petroleum products, including to Western countries. This has prevented a major economic crash.
Conclusion
It is unlikely that India will stop buying oil from Russia for anything other than a change in its financial considerations. It remains unclear how desirable such a stop would even be for Western countries as the market would see a significant contraction in available supply, causing potential shortages, because India’s consumption of Russian oil frees up the oil market. Given that the market is stabilizing again and prices are broadly dropping, India is considering slightly lessening its importation of Russian oil. Such a move would be ideal for India as it retains access to cheap prices while politically pleasing the US and its partners.
From Early Warning to Early Response in Conflict Prevention
The last decades have been marked by instability of the international scene due to the increasing number of inter- and intra-state conflicts. These conflicts are caused by violent extremism, climate change, the deterioration of a state's socio-economic situation, a shortage of resources and, last but not least, civilians' growing distrust of its institutions. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 56 States suffered armed conflict in 2022 in the Americas, Asia and Oceania, Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa, 10 more than in 2021.
The concept of conflict prevention was coined in the 1960s. It refers to diplomatic approaches through multiple activities and strategies aimed at anticipating conflict or neutralising violence before it escalates into conflict. It is a broad term that includes early warning and early response systems. The concept has grown in popularity to become a strategy within international organisations such as the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and within national governments. Early warning and response systems are subject to specific regulations and commitments by countries depending on the context and the circumstances. With multiple definitions depending on the type of crisis to be managed, this article focuses on the conceptualisation of systems aimed at avoiding armed conflict and on the observation that, despite this, conflicts continue to break out between different state and non-state actors, particularly in Africa.
The concept of early warning
Early warning consists of identifying factors that predict the onset of violence. It comprises five main mechanisms: data collection, data analysis, assessment of different scenarios, formulation of possible actions, and the transmission of recommendations to decision-makers. This comprehensive monitoring is carried out by internal and external analysts in the region concerned, who focus on political leaders, political groups, armed groups, and other relevant stakeholders likely to jeopardise order. The spectrum assessment areas is broad and can focus on economic, political, demographical, social, ethnic, environmental, health, or safety factors. In practical terms, intelligence gathering and analysis provide an in-depth understanding of the social dynamics of the area threatened by conflict and the interests of the involved actors involved. By identifying potential scenarios and presenting them to decision-makers, they can anticipate the deterioration of a situation and develop a coherent strategy and effective intervention.
To make the early warning system more effective, four considerations need to be taken into account in addition to the overall monitoring. Firstly, the political analysis should identify the parties involved in the conflict who are in favour of peace. This targeting would make it possible to establish a relationship of trust with actors who have the potential to promote non-violent solutions to the crisis. Secondly, analysts should keep observing the situation to foresee unexpected developments during and after the warning. In addition, analysing the behaviours of the stakeholders involved could help to understand the actions taken and the causes of the instability. Finally, when elaborating the strategy, it should be essential for analysts to determine the actors best qualified to lead the resolution of the conflict. These considerations would make early warning credible and help to understand if and how political actors can exacerbate a crisis, what actions can accelerate tensions, and what form a crisis might take if left unchecked.
As the early warning system only serves to alert and advise on a possible crisis, it is often combined with an early response system to make conflict prevention comprehensive and effective.
The concept of early response
Early response consists of proposing timely and appropriate initiatives to ease tensions or put an end to the outbreak of violence. It brings together available tools and instruments from government, regional, and international organisations. This system is classified into three levels of action:
Facilitative - high-level diplomacy, mediation, and confidence-building measures;
Coercive - diplomatic penalties, sanctions, threats of international justice, and the use of force in extreme cases; and
Incentive - financial aid, security guarantees, and institutional support.
The classification of responses allows decision-makers to react in the short and long term, which would define the outcome of the conflict. Short-term measures cover interventions during an election, within civil society groups or representative authorities, joint peace missions, military deployment, or the conduct of mediation and negotiation between conflicting parties. Long-term measures cover the management of interactive peace dialogues, the organisation of problem-solving workshops, or the sensitisation of policy-makers and civil parties to a potential danger. It is therefore the type of crisis that will determine the form of the response.
This system is complementary to the early warning system, which enables conflicts to be predicted and prevented. Following the early warning assessment, researchers, academics, and external organisations submit a range of responses that could be implemented by national government, local, regional and international organisations. This allows decision-makers to tackle the real sources of conflict and prevent them not only on the surface but also in depth. Responses elaborated tend to be more structural over time by targeting the key socio-economic, political, and institutional factors that can lead to a crisis such as addressing marginalisation and inequality, strengthening social cohesion and social capacities, promoting local development, ensuring legitimate and equitable justice, and building security institutions. Therefore, early response helps to persuade and encourage decision-makers to pursue actions aimed at avoiding or minimising violence and to propose solutions to contain it.
The effectiveness of these systems: a case study of the African Union’s early warning and response system and the Sudan conflict
As mentioned above, an early warning and early response system can also be implemented at regional level. This section focuses on these systems within the African Union and their effectiveness. The organisation establishes policies and provides political and financial instruments to prevent conflicts within the continent.
Africa has always been confronted with cycles of conflict, the origins and degree of violence of which vary from one region to another. In 2012, the African Union set up the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) to gather information, monitor situations and formulate responses for decision-makers. In 2017, institutional reforms were undertaken to make the system more effective and address financial dependence on international donors. The reform resulted in the creation of a new department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security, and a Situation Room supervising early warning and early response in Africa. It has strengthened cooperation and coordination between economic communities and Member States at regional level. However, despite the implementation of the CEWS, Africa recorded its highest number of conflicts on the continent in 2019. The Peace Research Institute Oslo counted 25 state conflicts including ethnic, religious, environmental, or societal issues. Consequently, it can be said that the new departments created do not fulfil their mandates. Instead of focusing on early warning and response, they are concentrating more on crisis management of ongoing conflicts, thus losing sight of their purpose.
Despite the existence of the CEWS, Sudan has been facing a violent conflict since April 2023. This conflict opposes General Dagalo, leader of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, and General al-Burhan, commander of the Sudan national military force, due to institutional disagreements, economic and security instability, humanitarian needs, and poverty following their military coup in October 2021. Nevertheless, Sudan is a member of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) which operates the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), an early warning system implemented in 2022. As part of this regional community, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda have promoted a system that seeks to collect information from religious and civil society leaders, youth, and women to avoid crises. This strategy allows a greater number of factors to be gathered and used, enabling analysts to decipher potential tensions. However, this mechanism operates under a strict mandate, including the prevention of pastoralist conflicts in which governments are not involved, and the non-management of civil conflict between government and rebel groups supported by neighbouring governments. Furthermore, within this mandate, CEWARN can only provide accurate and verified information to the states concerned in order to enable them to take appropriate measures to prevent conflict. Consequently, the most competent body that could have prevented the conflict in Sudan was limited in terms of action, geographical scope and conflicting interests.
Since the coup in October 2021, the international community has been striving to restore civil democracy. At that time, UN Special Envoy Volker Perthes warned of the possibility of a further fragmentation of Sudan if no inclusive dialogue was initiated. He also advised rebuilding trust with the Sudanese people and regaining economic, financial and political support from the international arena. A return to the path of democratic transition in Sudan would have reduced tensions and the risk of escalating violence, and enabled international donors to restore their financial support for development, which had a major impact on early warning and response monitoring. After alerting to the situation, Volker Perthes proposed short- and medium-term actions such as stopping arbitrary arrests, releasing political detainees, and guaranteeing civilians’ rights to protest and assemble. Despite these proposals for rapid intervention to prevent the escalation of violence, the conflict that broke out in April 2023 is still ongoing, with no end in sight. Regional early warning and response systems did not prevent the conflict from breaking out, despite the existence of obvious factors such as institutional instability following a coup d'état, the country's poor economic situation, deplorable health, climatic and living conditions, and security instability in various parts of the country.
What is making these systems uncertain?
Several factors can make early warning and response systems uncertain. Having or benefiting from such systems does not guarantee that the tensions observed will not turn into conflict. Three factors can be taken into consideration when a conflict emerges despite the presence of an early warning and response system:
human unpredictability,
the country’s socio-economic situation, and
the strengthening of the country's institutional capacities.
Firstly, the stress faced by decision-makers is an important factor that needs to be taken into consideration in conflict prevention. Stress can be seen as a response resulting in positive or negative outcomes, based on a cognitive interpretation of a situation. Lazarus and Folkmans introduced a strategy called “stress coping”, which can be associated with a possible outbreak of conflict. Depending on the situation, this involves adopting a problem-focused response, an emotion-focused response or a self-esteem-focused approach. Thanks to this analysis, in the case of a possible crisis and a stressful challenge, it is possible to identify three types of responses.
Acknowledgement of a lack of control over the situation, which may lead to a lack of appropriate decisions.
Emotional outburst, which can lead to subjective decisions.
Confidence that tensions can be managed using available means, which can lead to unmeasured decisions.
As a result, human and psychological factors in times of crisis make the early warning and response system unpredictable. The decisions of decision-makers are indirectly influenced by their beliefs, convictions, emotions, and their advisors, which can compromise the effectiveness and certainty of the early warning and response system.
Second, violent conflicts frequently erupt in states with fragile economies and social structures. National budgets are distributed differently across countries and, since the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015, the level of national budget execution is an indicator of the government's ability to deliver public services and achieve development goals. With the overriding objective of ending poverty, promoting prosperity for people, and supporting sustainable development, decision-makers are seeking to strengthen institutional and organisational capacities. Therefore, conflict prevention is becoming a secondary concern, particularly for developing countries. Even if conflict prevention is less costly than conflict management, decision-makers may remain reluctant to intervene before violence escalates, undermining the effectiveness of the early warning and response systems.
Last but not least, early warning and response systems can be uncertain due to a lack of efficient institutional capacity building. Institutions are key actors in conflict prevention because they collect and analyse relevant information, identify threats, and assess warnings and appropriate responses for decision-makers. The escalation of violence is mainly due to a lack of substantial information or the inability to deploy the necessary resources to prevent conflict from breaking out. Consequently, early warning and response systems are difficult to implement, both for the country concerned and for external actors involved in conflict prevention.
How to make early warning and early response systems more efficient?
The current operation of early warning and response systems has shortcomings and therefore needs to be adjusted and reinforced on an ad-hoc basis. Four recommendations can be made to make these systems more effective.
The first recommendation concerns strengthening cooperation between national governments and external stakeholders to promote conflict prevention. To be more effective, it is important to focus on the exchange of information, strategies and materials. This will help to create coordinated and rapid responses in the field of conflict prevention. In this way, early warning and response systems will be more comprehensive, targeted, and responsive.
The second recommendation is about the effectiveness of actions taken under the rapid reaction system. National governments are on the front line when domestic tensions escalate into violent conflict. Therefore, governments must have available and flexible emergency funds that can be deployed in the event of an imminent crisis. The availability of the fund allows the decision-maker to react quickly, without worrying about prioritising socio-economic issues. The flexibility of the fund means that responses can be tailored to specific situations. In this way, less developed countries will reduce their dependence on international partners.
The third recommendation concerns the inclusion of civil society in conflict prevention, particularly women and youth. Women have an important voice due to their involvement at community level, since they are involved at all levels of the local population, organising the community. Young people are seen as the future of the community because they are at the heart of public policy and the first to be sensitised to enable long-term action. Together, they have a strong voice, could be agents of change in conflict prevention, be a valuable source of information, make early warning analysis more accurate, and enable appropriate responses. Moreover, by increasing their visibility and influence in the decision-making process, national government and external actors could seize the opportunity to raise awareness and prevent tensions from flaring up again.
Combined with the previous point, the fourth and final recommendation highlights the importance of reintegrating communities into society. As institutions in fragile countries struggle to provide adequate services and maintain a growing economy, civilians tend to gravitate towards organisations capable of performing government functions. These organisations are sometimes illegal armed groups. This is a practical relationship in which communities give their loyalty to illegal groups in exchange for the provision of necessary resources and security. The challenge is to reintegrate civilians into society by re-establishing a relationship of trust with the government. This requires effective institutions, strong democratic governance and economic growth for civil society.
Georgia Walking a Fine Line between Russia and the West
On 20 May 2023, news broke out that the daughter of Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, had arrived in Georgia and was attending a wedding; just as protests were being held across the country over the resumption of direct flights between Georgia and Russia following a four-year hiatus. Both of these events increased the frustrations of the majority of the Georgian population who strive for their country’s Euro-Atlantic integration.
Since the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008, which resulted in the military occupation of 20% of Georgian land by Russia, the government of Georgia has walked a thin line trying to maintain strong relations with the West, all the while appeasing Russia in more recent years. Direct flights between the two countries were banned by Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin, in 2019 following violent clashes between the police and protesters in Georgia after a Russian lawmaker visited the country. After the 4-year break, the decision of President Putin on 10 May to lift visa requirements for Georgian citizens and to resume direct flights between the two countries was announced by the Russian Transport Ministry, also triggering large protests across the country, most significantly at Tbilisi International Airport. Importantly, even though this decision was unilateral, it is suggested that an agreement from the Georgian government would have been necessary for its implementation. The Georgian government’s involvement in this is even more evident through the Georgian ruling party’s, Georgian Dream’s, claims of ‘xenophobic’ protests. The latter statement was criticised by the President of Georgia, Salome Zourabichvili, claiming that “This is an insult to the Georgian people” and that it is unacceptable to accuse Georgians of xenophobia, given that the public has accepted hundreds of thousands of migrants from Russia in the last 18 months.
The arrival of the daughter of Sergey Lavrov to Georgia, reportedly by land, added fuel to the fire and brought further condemnations from President Zourabichvili who expressed disbelief that the Georgian government was unaware of the presence of “the daughter of the highest-ranking official, from Putin’s immediate circle, who is under sanctions”, urging the government to protect Georgia from Russian individuals on the sanctioned list. Furthermore, politically, this decision was met with strong discontent by EU diplomats in Georgia, arguing that if Georgia is set on EU integration in the future, they should follow the decisions made by the 27 EU Member States with regards to sanctions. However, Georgian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economic and Sustainable Development, Levan Davitashvili, pointed out that Georgia is not yet an EU member State and therefore the country’s actions and decisions, be it political or economic, cannot be equated to that of EU members. The Minister further noted that the EU position with regards to trade with Russia is not clearly defined, pointing to the supposed EU-Russia trade increase of over $5 billion in 2022, and therefore called for an open dialogue with the EU to discuss any issues within this context. However, it must be noted that conflicting reports exist with regards to the amount of trade between Russia and the EU following the invasion of Ukraine and the establishment of sanctions; this is mostly due to the varying trade relations between Russia and the individual 27 EU Member States.
With regards to the resumption of direct flights, several interests exist in increased relations between the two countries. For the Russian government it is clear; they seek to promote their efforts in improving relations with Georgia, simultaneously strengthening transit opportunities, and establishing shipment prospects of prohibited and sanctioned items. Whereas for Georgia, the direct flights provide benefits with regards to increased trade and tourism as well as diffusion of tensions following the 2008 war. However, these benefits are not met with as much enthusiasm by the general public as by the Georgian government. Although taken in isolation, the resumption of flights and the lift of visa requirements may not be alarming, it is however when they are coupled with the recent more pro-Russian approaches of the Georgian Dream party that the government is put under heavy scrutiny.
Recent Pro-Russian Movements
Although the Georgian government has condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, expressed solidarity, and has provided humanitarian aid and shelter for Ukrainian refugees, following the invasion, Georgian Prime Minister, Irakli Garibashvili, announced, and has stuck by his announcement, that “considering [Georgia’s] national interests and interests of the people, Georgia does not plan to participate in the financial and economic sanctions [on Russia], as this would only damage our country and populace more.” Furthermore, other politicians such as Irakli Kobakhidze, head of the Georgian Dream party, can also be seen to have a pro-Russian sentiment through his public statements. Between February and July 2022, he has criticised Russia nine times mainly on its invasion of Ukraine, whereas his criticisms towards Ukraine equated to 26, mainly focusing on Ukraine’s condemning comments of Georgian officials, and 57 towards the West, including criticisms towards the EU Ambassador in Georgia, as well as accusing the US Ambassador in Georgia, Kelly Degnan, of pushing the country to go to war with Russia.
More pro-Russian acts within Georgia can be traced back to the Foreign Agent Bill that was announced by the Georgian Parliament on 9 March 2023, which included the requirement for any organisation within the country receiving more than 20% of its annual funding from overseas to be declared as "agents of foreign influence". Criticism stemmed from the similarity of the aforementioned legislation to one introduced by President Putin aimed at silencing his opponents. The draft legislation was coined as the “Russian law” in Georgia and resulted in mass protests in Tbilisi denouncing the bill. The Georgian Dream party subsequently withdrew it. Russia claimed that these mass protests were an attempted coup orchestrated from abroad. What the protests in fact demonstrated is the growing distrust in the government, as identified by President Zourabichvili, and demonstrated the Georgian public’s desire for the country to remain on a pro-Western path and to be part of the European family. In light of this, the Georgian government has been receiving criticisms over the state of its democracy, and has somewhat damaged its ties with the EU.
Hence the resumption of direct flights and the case of Lavrov’s daughter in Georgia are not isolated instances and have evidently further exacerbated the criticisms and raised concerns over “Georgia's EU path and Georgia's commitment to align with the EU decisions in foreign policy”, as stated by EU Spokesman Peter Sano. The Georgian government, for the most part, has downplayed the political implications of the most recent events and has focused more on the economic benefits of the $400 million a year that Russian tourism would bring to the country. Hence Russia’s attempts of harming Georgia’s European integration through the normalisation of relations between the two countries, as identified by the US Ambassador to Georgia, Kelly Degnan, have been arguably ignored by the government and are more of a concern for the Georgian public and President Zourabichvili.
Georgia’s Western Path
Following Georgia’s Independence in 1991, the European path was enshrined in the country’s constitution, emphasising the country’s pro-Western aspiration. This is precisely why as a response to the recent actions by the government that during her speech on Georgia’s Independence Day on 26 May 20203, President Zourabichvili called on the government to meet the Georgian public's “will to strengthen the country's independence, establish democracy, and join the European family”. This call is vital for Georgia’s application for EU candidacy and its “perspective” position (rather than the candidacy status that was granted to Ukraine and Moldova) which includes following and implementing the reforms suggested by the EU; among them judicial reform, de-oligarchisation, addressing organised crime, improving the media sources, addressing political polarisation, and considering independent individuals in the appointment of a new Public Defender. However, reports have identified that only two of the twelve suggested reforms have been addressed. In this vein, it is important to note that for Georgia and its population, Euro-Atlantic integration, or EU and NATO membership, is not just a desire but a need for Georgia’s national security, even more in light of the war in Ukraine. The recent decision undertaken by the ruling party, Georgian Dream, can be seen to be drastically different from that of the population's wishes. This can be seen through the protests held in Georgia over the past couple of years as well as through recent studies that identified that 89% of the Georgia population supports EU membership, and 80% wish to join NATO in the near future. This is precisely why the recent protests have seen as many as 160,000 participants chanting the slogan “Home to Europe'' and carrying EU flags.
Bigger Picture
When looking at the most recent developments with direct flight resumption, it is important to question why these efforts from Russia to increase relations with Georgia are being made now, and what this means for Georgia. Essentially, experts have claimed that Russia is employing a carrot-and-stick approach, the carrot being economic benefits for Georgia, and the stick being the spread of fear of the same situation as what Ukraine has found itself in. Ultimately, there is no denying that Russia is employing a long-term strategy for Georgia, part of which relies on the maintenance of power and the loyalty of the current government and the ruling party, Georgian Dream, who is also in turn benefiting from increasing relations with Russia and branding itself as a party looking for a resolution to the Russo-Georgian conflict. The start of the flights between the two countries have even been followed by bilateral talks on the resumption of railway traffic through the occupied region of Abkhazia. There are probably one-sided hopes that this may even lead to the recognition of Abkhazia’s sovereignty by Georgia, which will further deepen the country’s ties to Russia and will also deepen the divide between Georgia and the West. Furthermore, there is a likelihood that these decisions may be implemented by the Georgian government against the population’s will, labelling the actions as restorations of relations with the occupied regions.
Overall, with the increasing relations between Georgia and Russia, it may be questioned what these decisions, which may be coined as confidence building measures or conflict resolution, would mean for Georgia’s overall security. Evidently, if Georgia strives for EU candidacy status and eventual EU and NATO membership, and hence the security that this guarantees, one would expect the government to comply with the existing sanctions against Russia, implement the reforms suggested by the EU and not be distracted by Russian influence. However, the resumption of flights may only be the start of the increasing distance away from Georgia’s Western path and towards closer ties to Moscow.
The European Defence Fund: Political Impact and Challenges
The European Defence Fund
The European Defence Fund (EDF) is an initiative launched by the European Commission in 2017 under the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). For the 2021-2027 MFF, the main objective is to promote defence cooperation between EU Member States through the coordination, complementarity and amplification of national defence investments, to encourage an innovative and competitive defence industry, to enhance cooperation between companies and stakeholder states, and to support research and development in defence technology. The EDF is divided into two windows. One part of the fund is allocated to collaborative defence research projects. The other part is to provide capability levels and incentives for companies and EU Member States to cooperate on joint defence projects. This fund enables multi-level cooperation in the security and defence sector and increases competitiveness with other military powers in a global dynamic where all nations are seeking to remilitarise their territory and strengthen their defence industry. As a matter of fact, since the end of the Cold War, global military spending has risen considerably due to the volatility of the international scene. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, global military expenditures for 2018 reached $1,82 billion or 2,6% more in real terms compared to the $1,73 billion spent in 2017. In the context of this fast-changing development, the European Union attempts to assert itself through the European Defence Fund and the biggest military spenders, namely the United States (US), China, and Russia.
A changing security landscape
In response to the international arms race, the EDF was initially allocated a budget of €13 billion for the period 2021-2027. In the meantime, European priorities and challenges have shifted towards public health, research, and on the fight against climate change. The budget allocated to the EDF was subsequently revised downwards. The EDF budget was fixed at €8 billion, including €2,7 billion for collaborative defence research and €5,3 billion to fund capability development projects.
However, since its adoption, threats have evolved, as have the challenges to European security. The use of conventional and unconventional means to jeopardise security stability has increased on the international scene, as have the actors who use them. In addition to existing threats in its neighbourhood, such as armed conflict sor civil wars, Europe faces a wide range of hybrid threats, including terrorist threats, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber-attacks, propaganda, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) attacks, and disinformation. Given the volatility of the international scene and the danger facing European territory, the mid-term review of the MFF on 20 June 2023 was an opportunity for the European Commission to propose a revision of the MFF. The strengthening of EU defence research and development through an increase in the budget was accepted following the review. An additional €1.5 billion will be allocated to the EDF, bringing the total to €9.5 billion. In a long-term financial plan, the review is an opportunity to reassess European needs regarding new and current security and defence issues and provide common responses to them. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine having an immediate impact on European countries' decisions on military spending, the European Union should allocate more defence funds to Member State industries to enable the pooling and harmonisation of the European defence industry, particularly in the field of research and technological innovation. This will enable Europe's small military powers to overcome their gap with the major military powers and give the strongest defence industries the means to go further in innovation and capability design. This would simultaneously strengthen Europe's strategic autonomy.
Reinforcing the status of the European Union on the international stage
The implementation of the EDF is closely linked to the strengthening of Europe's strategic autonomy, and consequently to the consolidation of the EU's position on the international stage. Adopted in June 2016, the EU’s Global Strategy introduces the concept of an EU autonomy strategy. It is rooted in the idea of making the EU capable of conducting operations and crisis management missions within the EU, in its neighbourhood and in other regions of the world, of being well equipped militarily and of operating independently of the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The fund, combined with the strategy, would enable the EU to assert itself politically on the international stage, where the preservation of stability and security is increasingly under threat. As the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, has said, strategic autonomy is also a “process of political survival” for the EU. This process could have consequences at three levels.
It would allow the EU to protect itself from its volatile neighbourhood environment. Indeed, all the crises happening in the southern and eastern neighbourhoods of Europe are having a strong impact on the EU’s internal security due to ripple effects. This is the case of the security situation in Sahel, which has led the EU to notice terrorist threats growing on its territory and to set up training missions -such as EUCAP Sahel Niger or EUCAP Sahel Mali- to prevent the spread of terrorist groups within and outside the region.
It would enhance EU action for international crisis management, and give a new dynamic to the Schuman Declaration which stated that “world peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it.” The economic interdependence that used to be enough to guarantee peace is no longer sufficient. To avoid conflict, the EU must have the means to ensure its own protection, defend its territory, and deter the enemy from destabilising international security by adjusting its strategies.
Progressively, the European Union could become more competitive with powers such as the US, China, and Russia, which are constantly increasing their defence investment in terms of research, innovation and technology. Indeed, the US ranks first in the world in terms of military spending. Its defence expenditures reached $877 billion in 2022. This was an increase of 0,7% in real terms on the 2021 budget of $801 billion. As the world's second largest military spender, China has been increasing its defence budget for 28 consecutive years, allocating $292 billion in 2022 to its military budget. This is 4,2% more than in 2021, with an estimated budget of $279,74 billion. Russia is the world's third largest military power, with a budget of $86,4 billion in 2022. It is 9,2% more than the 2021 budget (estimated at $78,45 billion).
The increasing complexity of the world, the changing nature of internal and external threats, the emergence of transnationalism in international relations and growing interconnectivity have altered the international balance of power and had an impact on international stability. This adaptation has had an impact on the EU's internal policy. These impacts have challenged the unity of European Member States before bringing them together.
What the EDF has triggered in the EU
A two-speed Europe
The cut in the EDF budget by the European Commission has relegated the reinforcement of European security and defence capabilities to a secondary position, due to the remote idea of war reappearing on the European continent and the need to consolidate the different defence and security policy perspectives of the Member States of the European Union. This has also led to a diversification of opinion on the desire to strengthen European defence and security capacities independent of NATO and the US, and in the political project of developing a strategic autonomy for the European Union. This was demonstrated through the negotiation of the MFF during the Finnish presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2019 and the French presidency in 2021. Finland proposed to cut the EDF budget in half for 2021-2027 and allocate it an amount of €6 million. On the contrary, France proposed a budget of €924 million. As a result, the notion of a two-speed Europe in terms of security objectives and means was reinforced. On one hand, some Member States were reluctant to have a stronger military role for the EU in order to avoid the duplication of NATO’s role. They were confident about NATO and the US ensuring security over their countries. This was the case of the Baltic States constantly warning that they were under threat from Russia due to the sharing of borders and the Russian military district in the enclave of Kaliningrad. On the other hand, some EU governments, mainly the major military powers such as France or Germany, were pressing for increased national spending to guarantee Europe’s security and defence. There was a clear divergence of vision between European countries with fewer security and defence capabilities, relying on others to protect them, and those capable of securing their own territory and defending themselves.
The EU Battle Groups have demonstrated this lack of common vision within the EU. Created in 2007, the EU Battle Groups consist of troops made available by European Member States and deployable within 10 days. These groups are not controlled by a centralised authority and generate unequal expenditure between countries with the means to deploy equipped troops. The gap between military strategies and threats assessment have discouraged European countries from getting involved in deploying the Battle Groups. As a result, they have never been used but are still active with the aim of overcoming obstacles and being deployed. However, due to the increase in common threats, national foreign, security and defence policy strategies, which previously differed, are tending to coincide between European Member States and within the institutions of the European Union.
Improved interoperability
Two instruments have been created to reduce the aforementioned divergences and extend the scope of European foreign security and defence actions. In 2017, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was launched, allowing EU Member States to integrate their defence capabilities on a voluntary basis, and with legally binding commitment. While this means can accentuate the division between Member States, it can also enable integration and cooperation, and serves to demonstrate the benefits and effectiveness of European defence capabilities. PESCO is a crucial mechanism for achieving strategic autonomy through closer cooperation between EU Member States and political preparedness. To complement this momentum, the European Peace Facility (EPF) was launched in 2021. This new financing instrument has a budget of €5 billion for the periods 2021-2027. The EPF guarantees the supply of military equipment and humanitarian aid, increases EU military mobility, and supports increased defence spending by EU countries. In this way, the European Union gives its Member States the financial resources they need to strengthen security and defence cooperation and increase the EU's influence on the international stage. In the context of recent security events and the reassessment of threats facing the EU, a consensus has emerged on cooperation and coordination of actions. The European Defence Fund, the Permanent Structured Cooperation, and the European Peace Facility are part of a package of defence measures offering Member States complementarity in maintaining security.
A “de facto solidarity” - Robert Schuman
From Robert Schuman to Ursula Von der Leyen, the European project has always been synonymous with solidarity, cooperation and interoperability. Initially to consolidate peace, today to manage crises and maintain European and international stability, the European project is adjusted and consolidated through European unity. The new and multiple security challenges are too great for individual Member States to tackle alone. Over time, European Member States have increased their national security capabilities and strengthened their cooperation and coordination. The Baltic States' willingness to devote 3% of their GDP to defence spending and the EU's provision of arms and assistance to Ukraine through the European Peace Facility are just two examples. This demonstrates the willingness of EU Member States to work together to maintain safety and security. The EDF, initially relegated to the background due to the multiple crises the EU has gone through, is regaining its importance. The initial project of a united Europe is present. The project of an interoperable Europe is progressing. The implementation of the EDF has consolidated the idea of the European concept described by Robert Schuman: “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.”
Four challenges facing the EDF
These concrete achievements linked to the EDF have raised a number of challenges that the European institutions and the EU Member States must address. Four of them, among many others, are highlighted here:
The first concern relates to the traceability of weapons manufactured as part of a common defence industry and their delivery in support of partners affected by conflict. In order to develop the European defence industry and prevent such a situation from recurring, a European body should develop a system of checks and balances, as well as a means of tracing weapons so that they can be easily found and tracked.
The second concern is the development of new technologies and critical weapons. Given that the fund will be allocated to defence industry stakeholders on a project basis, the innovation of new technological weapons should be monitored. The European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of the EU have agreed in an inter-institutional agreement not to fund Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) to ensure that new technologies remain human-centred. This is why the European Commission must set up a control authority capable of supervising the projects it funds through a system of monitoring, control, and audit. This will also enable the money invested to be tracked and will emphasise transparency between the European institutions, private players and European citizens.
The aforementioned challenge is closely linked to the direct arms financing in EU legislation. As the Lisbon Treaty forbids “expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications”, the EU provides money to Member States through public funds such as the EDF, the Cohesion Fund or the Recovery Fund to finance their military and defence industries. By authorising the use of these funds for defence spending, the EU is indirectly helping to finance weapons and bring them into line with Community law. This subtlety caused concern among EU diplomats, who stated that “the treaty explicitly excludes funding for weaponry” and wondered whether this strategy would work. Thierry Breton, European Commissioner for Internal Market, insisted on the “drastically, dramatically changed” European security context to justify using EU money to finance arms directly or indirectly. As the Cohesion Fund and the Recovery Fund were set up to help EU countries recover from the avian flu pandemic, the European Union should clarify the use of these funds and consider a strict plan on how they can be spent.
Finally, the mid-term review of the EDF could potentially lead to a significant reduction in other areas of the EU's public fund, but this has yet to be confirmed as decisions on the increase in the fund have not yet been made public. Europe is facing an economic and environmental crisis and is trying to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic. If Russia's aggression against Ukraine has convinced European public opinion to strengthen the practical and financial means of European defence and security, the EU must be able to justify the origin of the funds injected and the priority given to this area over others. There is common agreement on the war on European citizens, but the fears and interests of different nationalities are not the same.
Conclusion
As the international security landscape continues to evolve and transform, governments must adapt to meet new threats and ensure their defence. Within the European Union, the creation of the European Defence Fund has helped to address these crucial new security issues. This has had an impact on the European Union by highlighting its potential. Weaknesses that suggested the EU would not work have now become a strength, bringing together ideas and actions to address the common interests of European security. Although these objectives have exacerbated the divergent visions of EU Member States, the threats at Europe's borders and the instability of the international scene have made it essential to find a consensus. Today, there is a political will, which exceeds the financial capacities of the Member States, to move forward and cooperate to maintain security and assert Europe's place in the international system. European institutions, the private sector and public opinion in Europe are currently facing a number of challenges. They concern priorities, vision and action in the field of security and defence. However, these challenges do not seem impossible to meet, since they are based on a common objective: to have a European Union that is secure and capable of protecting itself in a world where security is increasingly fragile.
Cocaine and Canals: The Risk of Drug Trafficking for Businesses Operating in Belgian and Dutch Ports
Over the last decade, the centre of European drug trafficking has shifted from southern Italy to Northern Europe. This is largely due to the FBI's crackdown on Mexican drug lords and their Italian affiliates. Since then, southern American suppliers, like Peru and Colombia, have sought other partners, which they have found in the criminal networks of northern Europe, particularly the Benelux countries. Antwerp and Rotterdam are the ports of choice for drug trafficking.
A new generation of criminals seized this opportunity and took the drug market by storm, cooperating with the Italian ‘Ndrangheta and Camorra clans, the Irish Kinahan group, and Balkan clans in what has been dubbed a “super cartel”. Because of its markedly multicultural make-up, the Dutch chapter of this super cartel has been called the “Mocro Maffia”. It is in fact a collection of different drug trafficking groups that emerged at the same time in the Netherlands and Belgium, giving these two countries the status of Europe’s leading drug hub. As a result, the Benelux has reached new levels of violence, threats and criminal influence, with some commentators referring to “narco states”. Although many high-ranking members have been arrested and are currently before the courts, their operations remain uninterrupted. The organisation is even held responsible for the assassination of lawyers and journalists from prison. This Spotlight assesses the influence of this situation on Benelux societies and economies, focusing on firms working with and in the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam.
Scope
The strength of Northern Europe’s trade infrastructure is a double-edged sword. While it enables large-scale trade, it also makes it vulnerable to exploitation by criminals. This is the case for the ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp, respectively the largest and second largest in Europe. Rotterdam processes about 9 million containers a year, while Antwerp processes nearly 7.5 million. This is where Europe gets its supplies of raw materials, high-tech products and, above all, foodstuffs. This legal economy is exploited by its illegal counterpart, helped by the high-quality infrastructure, good connections with the rest of Europe and impressive processing speed of these ports. Cocaine in particular, with its high profit margins, is placed illegally in containers at the originating destination, to be picked up by traffickers in the port. The ever-increasing demand for cocaine in the European party scene is driving up profits. Currently, only about 1% of all the containers, or 10 per-cent of the fruit containers from Latin America, are scanned. As these are perishable goods and controls take time, it is challenging to check more containers. Additionally, drug traffickers are creative in finding new goods and new ways of transporting their drugs, for example by concealing them inside pineapples. Simultaneously, corruption and extortion among customs officers and port officials are commonplace. Due to the very nature of corruption, exact figures are unknown, but examples of corrupt customs officers in ports abound.
Threat to businesses
This endemic drug trade represents a growing risk for businesses. The first risk is that businesses are used as cover for drug trafficking, which can have devastating effects on them. When cocaine is placed in a company's container and the authorities suspect attempted trafficking, the cargo will inevitably be delayed due to extended searches of the goods and background checks on staff. This has a negative impact on commercial relations. In the case of perishable goods, the delay is even more detrimental. Customers can invoke a breach of contract if they have not received their goods on time. Claims and additional costs are therefore to be expected.
Another consequence is the possibility of a fine. Take the example of MSC, the world's largest shipping company. Over the years, large quantities of cocaine have been found in its cargo. In one major operation, 20 tonnes of cocaine with a street value of $1 billion were seized from the MSC Gayane, one of the largest ships sailing the oceans today. It was found that many crew members were complicit in the trafficking, including the chief mate. Most of them had been recruited by the Balkan Cartel. These shipments usually make a stopover in the United States before continuing on to Rotterdam and Antwerp. This time, the stop was made in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where the American authorities seized the drugs. To set an example and out of frustration at what the American authorities considered to be insufficient efforts on the part of MSC to prevent drug trafficking, the company was fined $600 million. In addition, the Gayane was temporarily seized. Companies face a permanent risk of confiscation.
Businesses can also be subject to threats, extortion, and even violence from drug gangs if their trafficking activities are hindered by the companies affected by the trafficking. The case of fruit importer De Groot in May 2019 is a case in point. their smuggling of 400kg of cocaine. Employees found the drugs and called the police to report it. What should have been the end of the matter was the beginning of two disastrous years for the company. Shortly after the police found the drugs, the director began receiving threatening text messages demanding compensation. In a year-long campaign, (former) employees were threatened, their homes were set on fire, shots were fired and, on one occasion, a grenade was left at an apartment complex.
Finally, companies can also suffer reputational damage. In the case of De Groot, the media and the perpetrators themselves raised the suspicion that the company director was complicit in the trafficking. But even when rumours are not actively spread, companies can still suffer reputational damage. It is not always a question of a normative judgement on the association with drugs. Even the practical consequences of delays due to drug checks and seizures can deter companies from doing business with the company concerned, such as MSC, which was simply unable to handle its normal quantities of cargo because one of its largest ships was confiscated.
Outlook
The growing drug trade in Northern European ports is creating major risks for companies operating with or through these ports. The increasingly reckless behaviour of drug traffickers is putting businesses at risk. Companies need to be aware of this, and prepare accordingly. Measures that can be taken to mitigate the risks range from hiring security guards to minimise the risk of drug gangs placing drugs in containers, to working closely together with authorities and customs officials. Perhaps the most important thing is to exercise caution when recruiting staff. Thorough security checks must become company standards to minimise the effect of corruption. The reasons for engaging in corruption should also be considered. If they are financial, companies could consider increasing their employees' salaries to make them less vulnerable to offers from drug gangs. Investments in legal teams in case of a drug seizure will also prove beneficial.
In conclusion, the global trade that passes through the ports of the Benelux contains a dark side that threatens the economic structures it exploits. There is no straightforward solution to this problem, as the highly profitable drug trade has proved to be adaptable and creative. However, precautionary measures can be taken to minimise the impact on businesses operating legally. This might not dry up European ports of cocaine, but it can keep businesses and drug traffickers on separate lanes.
The Kosovo Clashes - Escalating Tensions in the Balkans
Following the outbreak of violence in northern Kosovo on 26 May, the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo has deteriorated considerably, and fears of it bringing increased instability in Europe, coupled with the war in Ukraine, have been expressed. Tensions have escalated in other parts of the Balkan region, exacerbating long-standing ethnic divisions. On the international stage, there have been conflicting reactions to the tension, with European countries adopting a more balanced approach, while others, such as China and Russia, firmly side with Serbia. How will the conflict develop and what could an escalation of the situation mean?
Background information
A Western-backed plan between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo was verbally agreed in March 2023 with the aim of defusing tensions between the two countries, and specifically granting further autonomy to Serbs living in various regions of Kosovo, with the government in Pristina retaining authority. To this end, local elections were held in four regions of northern Kosovo where Serbian communities are dominant, after Serbian representatives abandoned their posts in protest at the end of 2022. The aim was to improve representation and coordination in education, healthcare, economic development, and land planning between the Serbs and the government of Kosovo at the local level. However, the low turnout in the April 2023 elections, specifically 3.47%, and the election of ethnic Albanians as mayors of the four municipalities, was not favourably received by the 50,000 Serbs living in the regions, who claimed that they did not feel well represented and that demands for increased autonomy had not been met.
Nemanja Starovic, state secretary of Serbia’s Ministry of Defence said the local elections were a “unilateral attempt by Pristina Albanian authorities to forcefully install Albanian mayors in the four municipalities in the north of Kosovo, which does have a Serbian majority.”
Recent developments
On 26 May in Zvecan, one of the towns where the elections were held, the Kosovo police, staffed by ethnic Albanians, fired tear gas in an attempt to disperse the crowd of Serbs who had broken through security barricades to forcefully enter the municipality building, according to one witness, to prevent the newly elected mayor from entering his office. Furthermore, NATO peacekeepers blocked off the municipality of Zubin Potok to prevent the same attempts to enter, with the other four ethnic Albanian mayors being escorted by police to their offices. Additionally, the President of Serbia ordered an urgent movement of troops towards the Kosovo border, which was announced live on television by the Defence Minister, Milos Vucevic.
Violence has since escalated, with Serbian protesters in Zvecan throwing Molotov cocktails and hitting the riot shields of NATO's KFOR troops in Kosovo with metal pipes, setting cars on fire and firing shots. Hundreds of ethnic Serbs alsogathered with a 250-metre-long Serbian flag. However, some have argued that the flag may be Russian, as reports have also identified spray-painted ‘Z’ on NATO vehicles, a reference to a Russian sign that has been frequently used in the war in Ukraine. The significance of this will be explored further in this article.
International responses
The escalation of the situation prompted NATO to announce “prudent steps” by increasing the number of KFOR troops from 700 to 4,000 in order to give it “the forces and capabilities it needs to fulfil its mandate.” Turkey also announced that they will be sending commandos to Kosovo as per NATO’s request. Furthermore, Stoltenberg commented that “such attacks are unacceptable and must stop. KFOR, the NATO forces, will take all necessary actions to maintain a safe and secure environment for all citizens in Kosovo, and will continue to act impartially, in line with our United Nations mandate.”.
The President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vucic, announced that “We have never had a more difficult and bigger crisis” and that Serbia would “not sit idle”. For his part, Kosovo's President, Vjosa Osmani, asserted that the Kosovo police was acting “against Vucic's illegal structures and criminal gangs… in fulfilment of their constitutional duties to defend all citizens without distinction.”
The United States (US) and the European Union (EU) reprimanded Kosovo for the escalation of tensions with Serbia and urged Pristina to put an end to the violence in order to not face “consequences”. In his statement, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, stated that Kosovo’s actions were “sharply and unnecessarily escalated tensions, undermining [Western] efforts to help normalise relations between Kosovo and Serbia and will have consequences for our bilateral relations with Kosovo”. Furthermore, reports have indicated that the relations between Kosovo and the US have deteriorated, with Washington imposing sanctions on Kosovo, such as cancelling Kosovo’s participation in the Defender Europe 2023 military exercise, because of the violence.
Similarly, Britain, France, and Germany issued astatement calling on Kosovo and Serbia to de-escalate the situation and “to immediately step back and de-escalate, and to closely coordinate with EULEX (the EU mission) and KFOR (NATO's mission) in Kosovo.” Furthermore, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz called for new elections in northern Kosovo. These developments resulted in ameeting between Osmani and Vucic on 1 June in Moldova, as requested by the EU. No formal agreement has been reached to end the escalation of the situation.
The bigger picture
Aleksandar Vucic is reportedly facing an unprecedented revolt against him following the two mass shootings that took place in Serbia in early May and in combination with his autocratic rule. The opposition accuses him of causing divisions in Serbia. In addition, opposition supporters have mobilised to demand his resignation. As such, one may predict that the escalations between Serbia and Kosovo may be used by the President to strengthen his political position in the country, as he continues to demand the withdrawal of the mayors in Kosovo, and has proclaimed himself as the defender of the nation. In the same vein, Russia, which remains Serbia’s ally, has accused Kosovo of increasing tensions and exacerbating the conflict, while blaming the growing tensions in the region on the US and the EU. More recently, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared that “a big explosion is looming in the heart of Europe.” Reports claim that Russia has no interest in the issue with Kosovo being resolved. Furthermore, Russia’s involvement in other parts of the Balkans may be worrying, as the pro-nationalist and pro-Russian Bosnian Serb leader, Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik, has expressed his desire to see the Serb Republic become autonomous, independent from the rest of Bosnia, in order to unite with Serbia. This has raised fears of ethnic divisions in Bosnia.
Overall, the impact of the escalations between Serbia and Kosovo and the effects they could have on European stability, combined with the destabilisation caused by the war in Ukraine, are still unclear. The international community, specifically the EU and the US, has made significant efforts to support the negotiation process between Serbia and Kosovo. However, Kosovo has been criticised for provoking tensions by allowing ethnic Albanian mayors to take office in Serb-dominated municipalities, despite the low turnout due to the boycott of elections in northern Kosovo by ethnic Serbs. As well as threatening to end support for international recognition of Kosovo, the US has also excluded Kosovo from the "23 Defender" military exercise. In this context, there has been growing frustration among Serbs living in Kosovo at being used as “bargaining chips” in the negotiation process, according to Tare, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.
It is essential that efforts are made to integrate the Serb minority living in Kosovo in order to normalise relations not only between the two states, but also with the international community, in particular the EU and the US, especially as the creation of an Association of Serb Majority Municipalities was agreed in the 2013 Brussels Agreement between Serbia and Kosovo. With the aim of normalising relations between Kosovo and Serbia, the agreement set out the establishment of the aforementioned Association to integrate Kosovo Serbs from the northern municipalities into Kosovo's institutions. Ethnic Serbs expected the creation of the Association to provide institutional autonomy to the communities concerned and overall integration into Kosovo’s political system. However, the vagueness of the nature and the power of the approved Association was heavily criticised by the opposition and the Kosovar public, leading to mass protests and a petition with 200,000 signatures that was presented to the Parliament. This situation delayed the process of establishing the Association.
Given the current situation and escalating tensions, this Association is all the more essential to ending the violence as it would integrate Serbs living in Kosovo into political institutions and allow a certain level of self-management in Serb-dominated municipalities. Ultimately, the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia is key for their respective paths towards Euro-Atlantic integration, as well as for Kosovo’s bilateral relations with the US. Similarly, neutralising Russian influence in Serbia, and more broadly in the Balkans, is extremely important and dependent on how the current situation develops. Only time will tell how tensions between Kosovo and Serbia will develop and how this will affect the region as a whole.
The Third Nuclear Age: Navigating the Intersection of Strategic Non-Nuclear Weaponry and Evolving Nuclear Threats
In the unfolding scenario of the Third Nuclear Age, the world stands at the threshold of profound transformation, triggered by the changing landscape of military technology and the emergence of strategic non-nuclear weaponry (SNNW) as well as co-evolving nuclear threat perceptions. This pivotal juncture in history also sees the power disparity among nuclear-armed nations, namely the United States, Russia, China, and India, gradually diminish and the global dynamics fragment into regional nuclear dyads, thereby adding another layer of complexity to an already volatile geopolitical and security milieu.
The Ascendancy of Strategic Non-Nuclear Weaponry (SNNW)
This Third Nuclear Age is marked by a brisk rise in advanced non-nuclear military technologies including precision weapons, comprehensive missile defences, cyber technologies, and artificial intelligence (AI). Such weapons–especially adept as a counter-force arsenal–pose substantial challenges, effectively transforming the nuclear landscape and eroding deterrence architecture, mostly informed by frameworks latching onto the American-Soviet nuclear standoff as precedent.
For example, with AI now incorporated into nuclear operations, weapon systems' precision, speed, and efficiency have significantly increased. This SNNW enhancement demands an immediate reassessment of nuclear doctrines and strategies. Within this context, Zala and Futter suggest four potential future trajectories centred around SNNW, each having distinct implications for global stability and nuclear crisis management.
The Arms Race Scenario: Here, the widespread deployment of SNNW triggers a new round of nuclear proliferation and intensifies arms races. This path leads to a perpetually evolving nuclear landscape due to the need for constant modernization and improvement of nuclear arsenals, bringing about increased tensions and posing significant challenges to crisis management and arms control.
High Likeliness: The Heritage Foundation contends that as China's military prowess grows, it necessitates the U.S. to have a robust nuclear force capable of convincingly conveying to China that the risks of nuclear warfare would significantly outweigh any potential gains. This statement underscores an increasing bipartisan urge for expanding procurement plans for current nuclear modernisation programmes. Meanwhile, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimated that as of January 2023, the global inventory of nuclear warheads totalled 12,512, with around 9,576 of these held in military stockpiles for possible use. This marks an increase of 86 warheads from January 2022. China's nuclear arsenal, in particular, has seen a steady uptick, rising from 350 warheads in January 2022 to 410 in January 2023. This escalating trend is expected to persist.
This evolving scenario presents a dilemma. The shifting landscape of nuclear arms ownership and the worrisome rate of proliferation signal an escalating arms race that could substantially alter the world's geopolitical landscape. In the context of this, the strategic competition between the United States and China, wherein the U.S. views China as its main strategic rival, has set off an accelerating arms race in Asia, becoming a pivotal issue in global security.
The rivalry between the U.S. and China not only intensifies the predicament but also heightens the risk of a major conflict brewing in the region. These military expansions are more than isolated contests; they form a complex network of interconnected rivalries that could potentially trigger a broad conflict.
China's rapidly expanding nuclear capabilities have prompted India to speed up its nuclear program. This, in turn, has stimulated Pakistan to augment its weaponry. China is enhancing Pakistan's military capability to counterbalance India, while the U.S. amplifies its arms sales to India to curb China's rising influence, thus fuelling the regional arms race further. It is clear that these dynamics are not isolated, bilateral rivalries but are interlinked, potentially sparking a wider conflict. Thus, they underscore the urgency of international attention and action to prevent a catastrophic escalation.
The Strategic Advantage Scenario: In this outcome, a single nation achieves a dominant position in SNNW in terms of both quality and quantity. This disrupts the secure second-strike capabilities of rival nations, instigating a change in the strategies for managing nuclear crises and potential escalations. The implementation of SNNW establishes a significant advantage over traditional nuclear weapons, although it doesn't necessarily render them obsolete as power instruments. This dynamic, however, breeds instability, as it intensifies the entanglement between the nuclear and non-nuclear realms, making nuclear stockpiles susceptible. As a result, there is an escalation of tension that leans towards aggressive posturing as a means of deterrence amidst this vulnerability.
Moderate-High Likeliness: A deeply isolated state with a turbulent relationship with the international community, North Korea faces an extraordinary level of perceived vulnerability. This perception stems from both internal factors—like the country's faltering economy and the fragility of its political structure—and external factors—such as the heaps of crippling international sanctions and geopolitical pressures. Thus, examining the Strategic Advantage Scenario further could benefit from delving into North Korea's past nuclear exploits to get a grip on the connection between perceived vulnerability and brinkmanship.
Perceived vulnerability, stemming from internal factors such as its faltering economy and fragile political structure, as well as external pressures such as stringent international sanctions and geopolitical stress, has placed North Korea in a position of severe isolation. This perceived vulnerability often fuels the nation's aggressive actions, prominently represented by its pursuit and development of nuclear weaponry and frequent missile testing. Throughout 2022, North Korea engaged in numerous assertive displays, launching 65 ballistic missile tests, including eight intercontinental ballistic missiles. North Korea's leader, Kim Jong Un, seems undeterred from surrendering the military initiatives deemed crucial for his regime's survival, indicating that, unless a strategic shift occurs, Pyongyang will continue its chosen path in the years to come.
North Korea's defence agenda currently focuses on the development of a large range of tactical nuclear weapons. Successful creation and deployment of these weapons would significantly lower the threshold for nuclear warfare on the Korean Peninsula, exacerbating regional vulnerability to nuclear conflict. The nation's strategic pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology has been marked by calculated escalations that ignite international concerns and increase tensions to force negotiations where North Korea is aiming to gain foreign aid, sanctions relief, or security assurances. This cycle of provocation and negotiation enables North Korea to survive its strategic position. But at a high cost, as the fielding of these weapons might necessitate riskier nuclear command-and-control practices, introducing possibilities for unintentional or accidental nuclear engagement.
At its core, North Korea's strategy involves brinkmanship–a willingness to teeter on the brink of war, unfazed by potential catastrophic consequences. This high-risk, high-reward tactic has come to symbolise the nation's foreign policy. From North Korea's perspective, this approach was indispensable, facilitating the growth of its nuclear program while intermittently gaining concessions from the international community to survive despite the (expected) barrage of sanctions. North Korea's nuclear program serves dual purposes in its security policy: deterring perceived threats and amplifying its global standing. Paradoxically, this program, while providing a semblance of a protective shield, enhances the nation's vulnerability due to consequential international isolation and punitive measures. This intricate interplay of vulnerability and aggression forms the crux of North Korea's nuclear policy, highlighting the country's challenging navigation through the global nuclear order.
The Controlled Restraint Scenario: This trajectory sees nations exercising restraint in their development and use of SNNW, aided by arms control and normative frameworks. The focus is primarily on reducing nuclear risks and advancing disarmament. This path attempts to counter the destabilising effects of SNNW, thus retaining nuclear weapons as the primary instrument of power in international politics.
Low-Moderate Likeliness: Viewed from the standpoint of a Nuclear Weapons State (NWS), the Controlled Restraint Scenario is strategically appealing as it offers a way to sustain the current international power structure while simultaneously curtailing the global influence of Strategic Non-Nuclear Weapons (SNNW). This approach stresses the role of nuclear weapons as the primary lever of power in world politics, thereby potentially safeguarding the sway of nuclear-armed states, rather than advancing nuclear disarmament.
The NWS's endorsement of this scenario is motivated by an intent to maintain the power equilibrium between nuclear "haves"—those with nuclear weapons—and "have-nots"—those without. Mexico's UN representative poignantly conveyed this dichotomy in 2022, stating that the 184 non-nuclear-weapon states fulfil their obligations under international non-proliferation and disarmament agreements on a daily basis, yet receive no tangible benefits in return. Rather dishearteningly, they endure a perpetual threat of annihilation by nuclear weapons, despite their commitment to non-proliferation principles.
Furthermore, in the same context, Indonesia's representative drew attention to the lingering challenge of nuclear disarmament, castigating the NWS for their apparent reluctance to commit to the process. The representative underscored that these states often rationalise retaining nuclear stockpiles as a necessary measure for ensuring international security, which underscores the realpolitik approach of the NWS. The tension surrounding this issue has only been heightened by recent moves like the Russian Federation's plan to deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons in Belarus.
In light of these circumstances, the Controlled Restraint Scenario is emerging as a potential strategy for the NWS to retain command over the evolving global nuclear narrative and maintain their dominance in the international system. This method aligns with their strategic interests as it enables them to curb the spread and influence of SNNW while preserving their nuclear weapons stockpiles, thereby supporting the power dynamics underpinned by these weapons.
However, the successful execution of the Controlled Restraint Scenario requires substantial diplomatic outreach, mutual trust, and collaboration among nations—particularly between the NWS and Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS). This shift would necessitate a reorientation of the current global order, moving from a framework of domination to one of shared responsibility. It would involve a leap of faith by NNWS, trusting that they will be duly compensated for not enhancing or even dismantling their SNNW capabilities.
The Non-Nuclear Stability Scenario: The final potential outcome foresees the proliferation of SNNW rendering nuclear weapons and secure second-strike capabilities obsolete. In this scenario, non-nuclear forces reach a state of equilibrium, creating stability rooted in deterrence by non-nuclear denial. This path could potentially lead to a world where nuclear disarmament is driven by technological advancements.
Low-Moderate Likeliness: The steadfast trend of nations to augment and diversify their nuclear arsenals–with the remarkable exception of South Africa, who built and then dismantled their nuclear arsenal–forms one of the primary impediments to the realisation of the Non-Nuclear Stability Scenario. The global inclination towards nuclear armament reaffirms the enduring strategic value of nuclear weaponry, thereby casting a shadow over the potential predominance of strategic non-nuclear weaponry (SNNW) despite their advancements.
The technological revolution in the military sector further dials down the probability of a transition to a non-nuclear world. As artificial intelligence becomes also an integral component of nuclear operations, the strategic worth of nuclear capabilities is rather amplified. The resultant enhancement of weapon systems' precision, speed, and efficiency underscores a transformation within the nuclear domain that could inhibit the shift towards SNNW dominance.
The non-resolution and fluctuating nature of global arms control negotiations accentuate the moderately low probability of this scenario's manifestation. The ambiguity and stagnation that characterise these negotiations suggest an international reluctance to abandon nuclear weaponry despite the accompanying high risks. As a result, the potential for nuclear capabilities to maintain their stranglehold over strategic weaponry persists, thus potentially hindering SNNW's ascendancy. While it's plausible that accelerated technological innovations could outstrip nuclear policymaking and surpass the strategic rivalry, this dynamic primarily heightens nuclear risks rather than establishing the immediate superiority of SNNW and subsequent hard-earned stability through collective effort.
Despite these inhibiting factors, catalysts exist that could potentially steer the world towards the Non-Nuclear Stability Scenario. The escalating global discourse on the urgency of nuclear disarmament could spark a shift towards a global aspiration for non-nuclear stability. Technological innovations that bolster crisis stability, particularly those that improve the accuracy and timeliness of intelligence acquisition, combined with growing international pressure to abolish nuclear weapons, could expedite the transition towards a non-nuclear equilibrium.
Nevertheless, these changes concurrently introduce new risks such as unintended escalation, miscalculation, and potential nuclear use as the nuclear and non-nuclear domains continue to be deeply intertwined. Therefore, it's crucial to explore an array of future scenarios rooted in the ongoing evolution of current trends. We must acknowledge that we are dealing with what Lieber and Press describe as a "new era of counterforce."
We are transitioning into a phase of having to carve out strategic stability from a nuclear order brimming with both nuclear and non-nuclear challenges, regardless which capabilities finally supersede. Weeding out the nuclear part of the equation and consequently forging a durable balance among SNNWs is no doubt a highly complex task.
The Reconfiguration of Strategic Stability
Historically, strategic stability has been firmly anchored onto nuclear weaponry. However, this established paradigm faces upheaval due to the advent of SNNW and shifting perceptions as well as entangled nature of nuclear threats.
The perceived value of nuclear weapons as a coercive “magic wand” in international politics is now being reassessed, with some experts arguing their primary utility is in defensive deterrence. The correlation between nuclear weapons acquisition and geopolitical influence no longer holds true, as exemplified by North Korea. Despite enduring sanctions and isolation, North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons has not resulted in substantial global influence.
Current mechanisms, normative frameworks, and agreements are ill-suited to address the challenges posed by SNNW. The potential for fostering stability through mutual vulnerability, adept crisis management, and addressing the linkages between SNNW and nuclear weapons remains underexplored. This new era requires a departure from the fixed mindsets, and a return to novel, critical thinking to cut through the fog. Meaning, key technological developments in the Third Nuclear Age, such as the advancement of comprehensive missile defence systems, proliferation of non-nuclear weapons, surge in cyber warfare capabilities, and integration of AI in military operations, are collectively reshaping nuclear dynamics. As the lines between offence and defence blur and the nuclear and non-nuclear spheres entangle, a complex and quite likely perilous nuclear order emerges.
Global Security Implications and Future Challenges
Promoting stability in the Third Nuclear Age seems feasible, yet daunting, requiring robust political planning and decisive action. The seismic shift in technology and evolving nuclear threat perceptions inherent to the Third Nuclear Age carry profound and novel implications for global security. Nations may increasingly rely on the development and deployment of SNNW to bolster their national security and global standing, potentially intensifying arms races and destabilising existing power balances.
The global security ramifications, including the increased risk of nuclear warfare and the undermining of nuclear non-proliferation treaties, are substantial and warrant urgent attention. Key policy recommendations should encompass fostering international dialogue on nuclear stability and promoting research and transparency in the development and deployment of SNNW.
However, issues such as the defiance of states like North Korea and Iran, the ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan, and the disintegration of Russo-American nuclear arms control present significant hurdles to nuclear stability. North Korea's refusal to surrender its nuclear program and Iran's potential infractions of the JCPOA complicate diplomatic negotiations. Both nations have consistently displayed a pattern of resistance to international pressure, leading to a myriad of unfulfilled commitments. The volatile relations between nuclear-armed nations Pakistan and India further impede progress, as recurring border disputes and a history of military confrontations often overshadow dialogue on nuclear stability. Compounding these challenges is Russia's recent departure from the New START, a once key pillar of nuclear arms control. This withdrawal threatens to erode mutual trust and oversight between the world's major nuclear powers, hindering constructive discussions.
These significant hurdles illuminate the complex task of fostering dialogue on nuclear stability and transparent SNNW development. As we venture further into the Third Nuclear Age, evolving nuclear threats essentially calls for a redefinition of our conception of global security, leaving many known frameworks behind. Recognizing these novel dynamics, integrating them into policy debates and forging new frameworks is not merely essential—it is vital for international stability.
United for Humanity: Spain’s First Humanitarian Diplomacy Strategy
The Spanish Government has recently, and for the first time, implemented a humanitarian diplomacy strategy that seeks to place the protection of people at the core of every crisis and discussion, making the country, along with Jordan and its strategy for Syrian refugees, one of the pioneers in the field. This new approach demonstrates how the atmosphere of conflict prevailing in the international system, with a strong epicentre in Europe, has prompted a turning point in policy-making where the protection of the most vulnerable has become the centrepiece of diplomacy. The strategy, coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation, and drafted in collaboration with other public authorities, gives Spain a leading role in terms of protection, prevention and mediation for the civilian population.
The strategy has a clear structure, with three key goals structured around 14 pillars. The first objective of the strategy focuses on conflict prevention and resolution. The Spanish Government’s commitment to reducing the suffering of the population has been driven by the emergence of numerous humanitarian crises, which have generated the need to turn the situation around in order to eliminate as quickly as possible the threats that these disasters generate for the more vulnerable. As Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares has stated, the illegal aggression of Ukraine, the food crisis in the Sahel and the earthquake in Türkiye and Syria, are examples that highlight the need to adopt a humanitarian diplomacy strategy. To achieve the first objective, the Ministry has developed a set of measures that should be incorporated and implemented, such as preventive diplomacy, non-proliferation, and counter-terrorism strategies, among others. The intensity and gravity of the humanitarian crises across the globe have imposed standards for the implementation of certain measures aimed at ensuring the security and protection of the population.
The second objective of the humanitarian diplomacy strategy is to promote the respect for International Humanitarian Law (IHL). It stresses the importance of taking appropriate legal action to protect the civilian population against aggressors and to bring the perpetrators of violence to justice. It is highly relevant to mention that the core of International Law is respect for its rules, because without it, the international community will have no protection. The absence of a higher authority in this area of law demonstrates the need for states to follow and respect international law internationally for it to be effective. The Spanish Government has demonstrated this by making respect for international law its second objective of the humanitarian diplomacy strategy. As José Manuel Albares pointed out, respect for IHL must be demanded in every armed conflict. The place of the International Criminal Court should never be questioned, and its position in the legal order should be strengthened to prosecute the perpetrators of crimes and protect the most vulnerable. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has elaborated on these topics through the different pillars that will ensure the promotion of respect for IHL, namely the prosecution of heinous crimes, the fight against impunity and accountability, the protection of medical missions and of boys and girls in armed conflicts. All these pillars have the same objective: to give IHL the place it deserves in the legal system, so that crimes can be prosecuted and humanity protected.
The final objective of the strategy is the protection of people in vulnerable situations. The protection of every human being, regardless of gender or race, is sought, demonstrating that all individuals must be treated equally. This is an important shift towards development and equality in diversity, illustrating the importance of every human being, and representing, as José Manuel Albares stated, Spain’s feminist foreign policy. The final objective demonstrates that, in order to protect humanity, equality must be pursued to avoid distinctions between citizens by eliminating any possibility of leaving certain sectors of the population unprotected. Put differently, this strategy serves as evidence to support the point that everyone has the right to be protected and should feel as such, regardless of personal conditions.
Nevertheless, this strategy also confronts several challenges that Spain will have to address. If in theory it appears to be the solution to some of the world’s issues, in practice the strategy could face serious problems of effectiveness. Although a powerful initiative, the strategy needs to be developed and put into practice so that its successes and failures can be assessed in a coherent way. For now, it mainly reflects a desire to change things and support the most vulnerable.
“It is the first Spanish Humanitarian Diplomacy Strategy. It makes us one of the first countries in the world to adopt such a strategy.” Source: Twitter, Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation
As it has been demonstrated, the development of the humanitarian diplomacy strategy has placed Spain as a protagonist in the protection of the human rights of the world's population. The development of this strategy demonstrates Spain’s willingness, predisposition and commitment to aid those in need when circumstances require humanitarian assistance. As analysed above, the strategy has achieved this by delineating the three main arguments that should guide the diplomatic practice: conflict prevention and resolution, respect for IHL, and protection of the vulnerable, while providing the necessary pillars to succeed. If the crises we are currently experiencing have demonstrated anything, it is that unity can achieve the unexpected, and Spain’s first humanitarian diplomacy strategy is an example of this. Traditional diplomacy has been shown not to have the capacity and ability to reduce tensions when the situation demands it. The war in Ukraine was a determining factor which, on the one hand, demonstrated that developments in the international system were too complicated to be managed by conventional means and, on the other, revealed the stagnation of political capacity in Europe to deal with war. The development of the Spanish Government’s strategy shows that adopting a humanitarian focus to deal with security issues could be the solution to avoid unnecessary suffering, and could shape conflict-resolution practices in the future. All in all, the humanitarian diplomacy strategy is a new step which, if pursued correctly by prioritising the interests of the most vulnerable, could help to strengthen the idea of peace in the world, by bringing the actors of the international community closer to humanity.
The Sudanese Generals’ Conflict - Overview and Possible Outcomes
A violent conflict broke out in Sudan between the Sudanese regular army and a paramilitary force called the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on 15 April 2023. The clashes come at a time of economic and political fragility, as Sudan undergoes a democratic transformation. International and intergovernmental agencies had predicted the conflict after efforts to establish a civilian-led democratic government failed, but tensions have only increased.
Overview of the current situation
This conflict has its roots in the regime of former dictator Omar al-Bashir. In 2003, armed movements in Darfur resisted Bashir’s regime, leading him to create the RSF. This paramilitary was led by Lt. General Mohammad Dagalo. He coordinated military operations with the Sudanese regular armed forces led by Lt General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. The cooperation between the two generals was strengthened in 2019 when a civilian uprising broke out against al-Bashir. They agreed to overthrow the regime and form a military council to rule the country. After three decades of terror, al-Bashir was ousted from power and, at the same time, prosecuted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for genocide and other crimes committed in Darfur in the 2000s. To this day, the ICC is still trying to arrest al-Bashir by cooperating with other states to extradite him.
In opposition to the figures al-Bashir assigned to lead the new civilian government, Dagalo and Burhan staged a coup in 2021 to rule over Sudan. With the country facing a severe economic and security crisis and having failed to establish a democratic government, a military framework between Burhan's regular army, Dagalo's RSF and the pro-democracy group Forces for Freedom and Change was signed in December 2022. However, public disagreements and tensions over the terms of the agreement gradually emerged between the two generals, through indirect statements and sharp accusations. These tensions eventually escalated into today’s violent conflict. The military coup, the failure to establish a democratic civilian government, and the governance of the country by two heavily armed military groups made Sudan a fertile ground for the emergence of armed conflict. It is not clear who initiated the fight, but both armed forces were militarily prepared for a confrontation.
The Generals’ fight
Before the conflict, Sudan was politically and economically weakened. Dagalo and Burhan saw the alliance as an opportunity to rule the country, protect their interests, strengthen their forces, and develop political ambitions. However, the military framework failed to bring about a common agreement between the two most powerful actors. The agreement provided for a transfer of power to civilians, the integration of the RSF into the regular army, the release of their lucrative control over agriculture, trade and other sectors, and the return of military forces to their headquarters. But, the framework was an obstacle to the interests and ambitions of the generals. By complying with it, both parties would have lost power and leadership over the control of the army, weapons, and resources. In addition, the generals' vision differed. On one hand, Dagalo accuses Burhan of being a “radical Islamist” and does not want him to rule the country. On the other hand, Burhan is willing to stop clashes and give back power to civilians only if a government is elected.
The conflict in Sudan clearly illustrates how quickly political alliances change, especially in a period of democratic transition. It also demonstrates the danger of having two heavily armed groups ruling the country and the ease with which the eruption of violence began. Their attitudes prove that this conflict is about power politics. Both generals have the ambition to free Sudan from the other faction. Their personal and professional experiences have accustomed them to always being in control at the top of the hierarchy, to using deterrent and offensive approaches, and to giving orders that include the use of lethal weapons. This idiosyncratic analysis can shed light on how they make decisions and confirm that they are willing to fight, regardless of the safety of the Sudanese.
The consequences and impacts of the conflict in Sudan
The clashes first started in Khartoum and quickly spread to other parts of Sudan, such as the Darfur region, Kassala, Gedaref, Port Sudan, and Omdurman. The conflict will cause a humanitarian crisis if a cease-fire is not reached. Indeed, at least 427 civilian casualties have been reported since the conflict began. The hostilities are destroying public infrastructure and making it impossible to supply basic necessities. Some civilian houses have been requisitioned and transformed into military fortifications. There are also reports of armed men breaking into homes to rob, assault, rape, loot and kill. Sudanese, humanitarian aid and diplomats are targeted. Martin Griffiths, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, confirmed the reports. This raises questions about the ability of the two generals to command and control their soldiers. The inability of the commanders to handle their fighters could prolong the violence and undermine the chances of stability, even if Burhan and Dagalo were willing to reach an agreement.
How would it affect the region?
The conflict in Sudan could spread instability to neighbouring countries through refugee flows and intensify the future humanitarian crisis in Sudan and the wider region. As a result, Chad and Egypt have closed their borders with Sudan, believing that the fight could quickly spread to their countries. However, this does not mean that Sudan will be abandoned. In fact, Sudan is important. Located in a geopolitically important region, it is the third largest country in Africa, sharing borders with seven countries, and has an opening to the Red Sea. Sudan is rich in natural resources - gold, oil, iron, and chromium ore, among others - and has access to the Nile River. All these characteristics make Sudan a strategic country in an optimal but unstable location. Therefore, the involvement of other countries in this conflict can be envisaged, especially if it is prolonged. Dagalo and al-Burhan may seek material assistance from their allies. At present, General Mohammad Dagalo has an alliance with the United Arab Emirates and has close ties with the Wagner Group. For his part, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has an alliance with Egypt. It is important, in the coming days, to pay attention to new or re-established alliances in the region. Without the prospect of peace, other neighbouring and non-neighbouring countries may be tempted to take an interest in Sudan and participate directly or indirectly in the war efforts.
The conflict in Sudan is still at its peak. A 72-hour ceasefire on April 21 2023 came into effect after the emergency session of the UNSC during which the evacuation of foreign citizens occurred. According to Volker Pethers -head of the UN mission in Sudan- the ceasefire was only partially respected and clashes around “strategic locations largely continued and sometimes even intensified.” General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and General Mohammad Dagalo are both convinced of their positions and show no willingness to end the clashes. The time elapsed since the 2021 putsch shows that the generals are not willing to give up their seat of power and any response to international or international interventions has been a formality to which they would respond according to their own goodwill and interests. So far, mediators from the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and Western and Gulf capitals failed to bring Burhan and Dagalo to the negotiation table. An emergency session of the UN Security Council (UNSC) was held on 25 April 2023. António Guterres urged for a respected ceasefire and to end hostilities in order to launch negotiations and bring humanitarian assistance to the Sudanese people.
Possible outcomes
As international and intergovernmental actors have failed to obtain a proper ceasefire and bring the two parties to the negotiation table, several hypotheses on the evolution of this conflict can be envisaged.
Firstly, one of the issues would be the interference by other countries or private actors in this conflict by sending military, financial or human capabilities. Dagalo has a close relationship with Wagner, mainly for the extraction of natural resources. In order to continue to profit from Sudan's natural resources, Wagner could become directly or indirectly involved in the conflict to enable Dagalo to maintain an advantage in the conflict and gain power in the long term. Burhan and al-Sissi are partners and Sudan and Egypt share a common border. To prevent the conflict from spreading beyond his borders, President Abdel Fattah al-Sissi could decide to intervene in the conflict to both protect his territory and support an ally.
Secondly, one of the fighting parties took control of a laboratory in Khartoum on 26 April and “kicked out all of the technicians”, which represents a biological risk. Dangerous biological samples, such as cholera and measles, are isolated in this laboratory. With power cuts in Khartoum, the WHO has expressed concern about “exposure to highly contagious pathogens.” The exposure could reinforce the upcoming humanitarian crisis caused by the conflict and worsens the economic and health conditions in Sudan. Indeed, the spread of these viruses would decimate the Sudanese population, which is already in a critical situation, and would make it even more difficult for international humanitarian aid to intervene in the long term.
Last but not least, if one of the two generals wins, it is possible that the winner will refuse the establishment of a civilian democratic government and impose a dictatorship in his image. The stalemate of the conflict and the non-respect of international laws make them liable to international sanctions and prosecution before the ICC. Al-Bashir, prosecuted by the ICC for war crimes, is an example the generals do not want to follow. The ICC is actively requiring states like Jordan, South Africa, Kenya, and Angola, among others, to arrest the former dictator. However, there is a lack of cooperation and countries refuse to comply. Indeed, a number of countries are either signatories of the Rome Statute but have not ratified it, or are not signatories or State Parties and therefore do not recognise the Court’s jurisdiction. The generals will avoid falling under international warrants. However, the establishment of a civilian government and the opening of the country to international authorities would make them punishable and isolated. In this context, rivalries between generals are likely to persist and the establishment of democracy unlikely for the time being.
Navigating the Eastern Flank: The Role of Poland and the Baltic Countries in EU-NATO Security Strategy
Introducing the Eastern Flank’s deterrence strategy against Russia
When Russia extended its military support to the secessionist paramilitary republics of the Donbas on 21 February 2022, preluding the full-scale invasion of Ukraine three days later, Russian President Vladimir Putin gave a speech denouncing the allegedly historically unjust borders established during and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. From the Russian perspective, this is considered the greatest tragedy of the 20th century, as the “Western liberal order” has deprived Russia of its perceived “historic homeland”. Putin also claimed responsibility for protecting Russians who have been “deprived of their homeland” and Russian-speaking citizens who live far from their nation.
At the Munich conference in 2007, Putin gave one of his most famous speeches, which can now be understood very differently after the start of the war in Ukraine. He notably said: “Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force, military force, in international relations, a force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts, [...] this is extremely dangerous. It results in the fact that no one feels safe.”
Putin’s sense of “injustice” and “insecurity” is the rationale behind the Kremlin’s propaganda and disinformation strategy to justify the invasion of Ukraine. Putin’s rhetoric tends to suggest that he may have wider aspirations to re-establish control over other former parts of the Russian Empire, not only Ukraine. This is why Poland and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) are existentially worried. This region, often referred to as “the eastern flank” by NATO, shares a common history and a geographical space, as well as a common existential threat from Russia’s geopolitical ambitions. However, they also share a common deterrence strategy, which will be explained below.
The eastern flank countries are unique in that they all share borders with Russia, either with the mainland or with the semi-exclave of Kaliningrad. Lithuania and Poland are geographically vulnerable to Russian attempts to assert control across the narrow Suwalki Corridor linking Kaliningrad to Belarus, where Russia has a military presence. In the case of Estonia and Latvia, the sense of threat depends not only on geographical proximity but also on a common identity and cultural struggle within the post-Soviet space. Returning to Putin’s speech, Russia's self-proclaimed right to protect Russian speakers and citizens abroad raises suspicions about Moscow's long-term ambitions toward the Baltic states and Poland. Estonia and Latvia are particularly concerned, as approximately a quarter of their respective populations are native Russian speakers. In this sense, Russia is perceived as a common threat, but with specificities for each country.
Context and chronology of the events
In 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the Baltic states and Poland began to develop a strategy to deter Russia and strengthen their ties with the West. This strategy was based on NATO enlargement and the Article 5 collective security umbrella. Poland joined NATO in 1999 and the Baltic countries in 2004. Despite enlargement, Russia was still seen by many Western European countries as a potential partner in international security efforts, especially on issues related to nuclear non-proliferation and counterterrorism in the framework of the OSCE.
However, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a game-changer, with Polish and Baltic concerns becoming more prominent than before. In particular, Poland and the Baltic States have pushed the EU and NATO to adopt a more confrontational approach towards Russia. The first significant change came at the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014, with NATO countries agreeing to increase their defence spending by 2% of GDP by 2024 in the Summit. This is what the US called a “credible commitment” against declining defence spending and free rider attitudes within the alliance. After the Summit, the NATO Response Force (NRF), which was created in 2003, was upgraded with the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) as a renewed force comprising land, air, and sea, with a focus on improving readiness and responsiveness to Russia.
The requirement to spend 2% of GDP on defence is gaining importance with the war in Ukraine. Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are already complying with the requirement, with the objective to raise it to 3% in 2024. Along with the US, Poland, and the Baltic countries are pushing other NATO member states to invest more in defence, beyond the 2% threshold, as they consider this to be the minimum requirement for NATO and EU members after the invasion of Ukraine. Yet, many of them remain behind the 2% GDP defence spending target.
At the heart of the defence spending imbalance is the difference in approach to the EU strategic autonomy as a political project and its role in European security. The EU Strategic Autonomy was the centrepiece of HRVP Mogherini’s 2016 EU Global Strategy, which was welcomed by all EU member states, but without a clear understanding of what it meant. In reality, not all EU countries are on the same page. This difference is mainly divided between the Western countries, which welcomed the term, and post-Soviet countries, which are more sceptical, as they lean more towards Atlanticism and the US as the guarantor of Europe’s defence. In Poland and the Baltic States, the idea of EU strategic autonomy also relies on a stronger European defence, especially in support of Ukraine. For instance, at the Special European Council in Brussels on 9 February 2023, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas spoke of the need to use an approach comparable to that used for the procurement of COVID-19 vaccines for defence contracts to support Ukraine's military capabilities.
Russia’s alleged interference in the 2016 US elections also fuelled mistrust and tensions between NATO and Russia. That same year, at the NATO Summit in Warsaw, Poland pushed for NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP), which approved the rotation of four multinational battalions in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. This strategy was aimed at deterring potential Russian aggression on NATO's eastern flank.
The Eastern Flank and NATO’s response after February 2022
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the allies adopted a new NATO Force Model (NFM) as well as a new Strategic Concept at the Madrid Summit in June 2022. The NFM is a high-readiness force of more than 300,000 troops, a significant increase from the 40,000 high-readiness troops of the existing NATO Response Force. The NFM, which is expected to be fully operational this year, comprises 100,000 soldiers deployable within 10 days, and a further 200,000 within 10 to 30 days, to have a rapid and reactive military force. The new model calls for an additional 500,000 troops to be deployed between 30 and 180 days, bringing the total number to at least 800,000 troops. In addition, the allies have indicated their intention to increase the number of troops on the ground from battalion-size (between 1,000 and 1,500) to brigade-size (around 4,000) “where and when required”. Once fully operational, the NFM will significantly enhance NATO’s responsiveness to possible threats, especially from Russia. In the context of the war in Ukraine, the NFM is expected to protect NATO’s eastern flank and its borders with Russia.
Poland and the Baltic states have been key partners in achieving such a defence effort within NATO, as evidenced by the VJTF and the NFM. Nevertheless, military mobility remains a topic on which the four countries and NATO disagree. Efforts to deter Russia in the eastern flank rely mainly on rotating multinational battalions. This has been an issue for Poland and the Baltics since the annexation of Crimea. They have been requesting NATO to establish a more substantial and sustained presence on their soil, and on a permanent basis instead of multinational battalions. The White House has been supporting this request since last year and has recently opened its first military garrison in Poland, in line with their demands. This is the first US permanent base on NATO’s eastern flank and can influence the future of the eastern flank’s deterrence strategy against Russia.
The eastern flank is claiming agency and organising itself, both inside and outside NATO. On 31 January 2023, the foreign ministers of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland signed a collective statement in Riga, Latvia, to enhance their cooperation on security matters in the context of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Specifically, the ministers agreed on common positions to be defended within the EU and NATO to ensure sustained assistance to Ukraine and additional sanctions against Russia.
Since joining the European Union in 2004, the eastern flank leaders have warned Europe of the growing danger posed by Russia. Specifically, Poland has taken a leading position in strengthening Europe's response to Putin's ambitions, due to the country's long-standing trauma of Russian expansionism in its tsarist and Soviet forms. Poland also possesses a stronger military than the Baltic States, which explains its central role in deterring Russia and the fact that it has been the EU country that has supplied the most military equipment to Ukraine since the beginning of the war.
Poland and the Baltic states have raised the bar, set standards, and pushed other European countries to strengthen their humanitarian response to Ukrainian refugees and victims of forced displacement. Since the beginning of the invasion, Poland has hosted the largest number of refugees within its borders, with almost 1.6 million refugees benefiting from the Temporary Protection scheme or other forms of national protection. In this sense, we find a causal link in the response: the countries that provide the most military aid to Ukraine in terms of share of GDP are also those most involved in refugee protection. These countries are Poland, the Baltic countries, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and the United States, which demonstrates an integrated and comprehensive response, both military and humanitarian.
Risk assessment and outlooks for European security
Given its strategy to strengthen its defence capabilities, the eastern flank also faces an important cost in terms of the region's economic stability. The European Commission has stated that Poland’s GDP growth will fall from 0.7 to 0.4%, as high inflation rates and low consumer confidence will continue to impact Polish economic cycles. Nevertheless, we should expect to see a GDP growth of 2.4% for the Polish economy in 2024, which gives a good outlook for Poland’s long-term economic performance. The situation is quite different for the Baltic states. They are expected to suffer more severe and greater economic and social repercussions due to their involvement in Ukraine. From military aid to Ukraine to enforcing sanctions against Russia, and even against China in the case of Lithuania, this will come at a cost to the Baltic countries. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are facing declining GDP growth rates due to mounting inflation. There is a substantial reduction in the average GDP growth rate from 5.0% in 2021 to 1.6% in 2022, and a growth rate of 0.4% is forecast for 2023 in the Baltic countries.
Given how the eastern flank is central to the security of the European continent, it is concerning to see the difference between the eastern flank and the western countries in the management of the Ukrainian crisis. This has a cost for the domestic economies of these countries, but also for the traditional powers, the UK, France, and Germany, whose central role in transatlantic relations is changing. The leadership of Poland and the Baltic states in deterring Russia sets an interesting precedent for the future of European security, which will be based in the East for some time to come.
How the Private Security Industry Is Shaping Conflicts Around the World in 2023
During the last 13 months, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has highlighted both the ubiquity and potency of private military contractors (PMCs) as several, led by the now infamous Wagner Group, have garnered international headlines. While Russian PMCs have become prominent, groups based out of other countries are increasingly influencing conflicts around the world. Indeed, the industry still seems to be broadly dominated by Western private security companies. One 2015 study suggested that 27 of the world’s 50 largest security providers originated from the USA, while another 12 operated from the UK and another one from Canada. Meanwhile, as the scope of China’s foreign policy widens, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing, too, is increasingly using private security firms.
There is a vast array of companies operating within the private security industry from security firms and PMCs to mercenaries, and it is important to distinguish between them. Part of the difficulty in defining PMCs lies in their versatility; they are involved in combat, supply lines, logistics and training, among other tasks. And every actor, from powerful states such as the US and Russia to developing states, non-governmental organisations, international organisations and multinational corporations seem to have engaged their services.
PMCs have steadily proliferated since the end of the Cold War, filling in a security gap and adapting to the changing nature of war in the pro-free market conditions of the 1990s and 2000s. Moreover, by their very nature, PMCs normally contain top military experts who exert a genuine influence on the outcome of conflicts.
But, as well as fighting in wars, PMCs can influence conflicts through covert operations, maritime security or by complementing a state’s foreign policy. Given the shadowy nature of the industry, it is difficult to find contemporary open-source intelligence for each individual example but, using recently reported events and openly available data, it is possible to pinpoint these areas as likely trends in the private security industry this year.
Military operations in wars
The roots of the 21st-century private military industry are situated in the American-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, launched in 2001 and 2003 respectively, partly because of public backlash to the deployment of troops. PMCs are still fighting in wars today, notably in Ukraine. As well as Russian PMCs, there are other private groups present in the conflict.
Former US Marine colonel Andrew Milburn founded the Mozart Group – its name a response to the Wagner Group – and was among the private contractors fighting in Ukraine until it imploded in February following infighting among its leadership and a series of allegations against Milburn that included making disparaging comments about Ukraine’s leaders. He and his staff, mostly former special operations soldiers, were involved in many different aspects of fighting from rescuing civilians to conducting frontline training and workshops on drone warfare. However, his group, though largely aligned with American foreign policy, seems independent from it. His biggest donors were hedge fund managers from New York and a humanitarian organisation specialising in evacuations.
The Mozart Group was just one of many Western-led volunteer groups operating in Ukraine where an estimated 1,000 to 3,000 foreign fighters are reported to be active. However, while the aims of these groups largely align with Western states, their methods can end up contradicting NATO and the Biden administration’s efforts to avoid direct involvement in the war.
Maritime security
Anti-piracy has become another central tenet of the private security industry with several companies highlighting their work in the Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean, Gulf of Guinea, Horn of Africa, and Somalia. These groups provide a wide range of services from training crews against piracy attacks to maintaining weapons systems and protecting ships. This has unequivocally succeeded in reducing piracy, but a growing reliance on private contractors has exposed the human rights violations perpetrated by these groups, UN experts said in November 2022. Its use of floating armouries has also intensified weapons proliferation at sea. Such issues are compounded by non-existent or weak regulatory frameworks far away from land-based law enforcement. But this side of the industry seems to be changing of late, due to its very success. Piracy is becoming less of a threat and bandits are increasingly targeting inland waterways instead, creating a different role for PMCs. Guaranteeing security in these situations is becoming hybrid, involving both state navy and PMCs, bound together by highly profitable contracts.
Complementing state foreign policy
The private security industry is also used to complement a state’s foreign policy, helping to protect strategic sites and people abroad in less secure countries.
With the growing footprint left by the BRI, it seems that there will be an increasing role for Chinese private security companies (PSCs), employed to protect strategic interests in other countries, such as mining facilities, ports, and infrastructure projects. Unlike their Western counterparts, however, these groups are closely controlled by the central government, limiting their operations. Once again, it is important to distinguish between PMCs and private security companies as China forbids PMCs but legalised PSCs in 2009. As such, these groups have largely fulfilled security functions rather than engaging in military operations. It seems likely that their role will increase following President Xi Jinping's remarks at the 20th Communist Party Congress in which he said: “We will strengthen our capacity to ensure overseas security and protect the lawful rights and interests of Chinese citizens and legal entities overseas.”
Several other states also use PMCs to augment their foreign policy. As of 2018, dozens of big private British security companies “are all either already involved across either sub-Saharan Africa or north Africa, where there are vast security issues,” John Hilary, executive director at War on Want, told Open Democracy. One British company alone, G4S, employs more than 500,000 people and is present in more than 90 countries, as of 2020. Its role includes providing event security, security systems and running prisons.
Covert operations
The more clandestine side of the private security industry also lends itself to covert operations, offering plausible deniability for those commissioning the work. In one instance, members from a PSC called CTU Security have recently been arrested for assassinating Haiti’s President Jovenel Moise in July 2021. This US-based company recruited 20 Colombians with military training to help storm the president’s home and assassinate him. During the subsequent investigation, CTU Security was also accused of hatching a plot to assassinate Bolivian President Luis Alberto Arce Catacore in October 2020. Representatives from the company reportedly travelled to the country and planned with the Bolivian defence minister Luis Fernandez López to assassinate the president, preventing him from taking power after an election.
Although this example is extreme, it illustrates the wide-ranging effects that PSCs can have on a country’s politics and security, intensifying a pre-existing conflict. The assassination, which prosecutors say was motivated by businessmen who hoped to secure lucrative contracts under a new administration, has plunged Haiti into violence, creating a power vacuum for gangs to fill.
PMCs seem to be involved in the assassinations of other political figures too. Four of the Saudis who participated in the 2018 assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi received paramilitary training in the USA from an Arkansas-based security firm Tier 1 Group in 2017. The company said that the training was defensive rather than offensive, but its links to the assassination still illustrate the impact of the private security industry on political assassinations such as this one.
The private security industry is a wide-ranging one, encompassing everything from providing security for multinational companies to mercenary armies. As such it is capable of influencing conflicts in 2023 in ways beyond simply fighting in wars as has been highlighted during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The industry has carved out an important role for itself in maritime security too, influencing the nature of and reducing the potency of piracy. Moreover, by operating in tandem with more powerful states’ foreign policies, such as China or the UK, the private security industry assists these countries in maintaining a greater global footprint. Finally, the industry’s entanglement with more covert activities plays a direct role in influencing the domestic politics of less stable states and, in the case of Haiti, in perpetuating internal conflict.
Securitization and Sinicization: An Analysis of China’s Practices and Mechanisms
National security has long been a priority for China, particularly in its five autonomous regions and two special administrative regions. Since the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Mao set out to unify the ‘five nationalities’ – Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui (including Uyghur), and Tibetan – under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and maintain a political hold on these territories. Among these regions, Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Hong Kong have been focal sites of conflict and violence, and have seen the implementation of policies aimed at securitization, sinicization, and integration of their populations into the Han majority.
Sinicization, in particular, is a process or policy that seeks to assimilate ethnic minorities in China or neighbouring Asian communities into the culture, norms, language, lifestyle, and ethnic identity of Han Chinese. It is also carried out in the form of a nationwide campaign (specifically Xi’s ‘religious sinicization’ since 2017) in the hope of strengthening Chinese identity among diverse populations. China’s nation-building framework, modernisation, and marketisation since the 1980s have increased the pressure for sinicization and securitization efforts.
This article will analyse and compare the CCP’s mechanisms and practices in Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Hong Kong, including militarisation and policing, reeducation, cultural and linguistic repression/assimilation, educational reform, religious repression, demographic control, and surveillance technologies. This article focuses only on securitization and sinicization practices, and it is not the author’s intention to oversimplify the complex situations and histories of each of these regions.
Uyghurs in Xinjiang
In 2020, more than 12 million Uyghurs lived in the Xinjiang region of northwest China. The Turkic ethnic group is native to the region and culturally affiliated with Central and East Asia. The CCP considers the Turkic-speaking ethnic group, which is predominantly Muslim, a threat to national security because of “terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism” in northwestern Xinjiang. Efforts to combat these threats through sinicization and securitization have intensified under Xi’s 2014 ‘Strike Hard’ campaign’, pushing Uyghurs to conform to the party’s atheist doctrines and Han Chinese society. Repression against the Uyghurs can be traced back to the military occupations of the Han (206 BCE-220 CE) and Tang periods (618-907), which turned the region into a military garrison.
The economic relevance of the Xinjiang region
The economic importance of Xinjiang plays a role in China’s securitization and sinicization policies. China’s ‘One Black and One White Strategy’ in Xinjiang, – black for oil and white for cotton production –, is strongly linked to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The region is home to China’s largest oil and gas reserves: 16 billion tonnes are held in the Tarim Basin, and 1 billion tonnes were recently discovered in addition to the explored 100 million tonnes reserve in the Junggar Basin. 17 million tonnes of crude oil and natural gas were produced in 2022 alone. Xinjiang is also China’s largest cotton producer, supplying about 90% of the country’s cotton and about 6.1 million tonnes in 2022. The ‘Western Development Programme’(WDP), which has promoted urban industrialisation since the 1950s, has also been implemented more intensively in recent times. It aimed at a da kaifa (great development) to improve the conditions of minority populations and reduce the regional economic gap. On paper, the WDP has been a success, with Xinjiang's GDP taking off since 2000 and overall rising by 470%. However, observers note that the economic benefits of state-owned enterprises and the WDP primarily benefit Han settlers and that Uyghurs are mostly marginalised. The average income of Hans was RMB1,141 (US$165 in February 2023) compared to RMB892 (US$129) per month for Uyghurs in 2011. Many Uyghurs are also employed as forced labourers in textile manufacturing as part of poverty alleviation programmes. This shows the Han Chinese disproportionately benefit from and dominate the Xinjiang economy. This has led many to believe that the WDP is an instrument of sinicization.
Demographic control
Demographic control through the resettlement of Han Chinese in the region began during the Qing occupation period between the 1750s to the early 1900s, long before the CCP was established and Xinjiang became an autonomous region. The Qing regime hoped that resettlement would consolidate its authority over the region, expand its tax base, and improve the living conditions of some Han Chinese. While the Han made up only 7% of Xinjiang’s population in 1949, the de facto Han population in Xinjiang exceeded 45% by 1990 (other minority groups such as Miao, Yi and Buyi have mostly assimilated into Han society) as the lucrative opportunities of the WDP attracted settlers. Han resettlement has been concentrated in Xinjiang’s eight largest cities (with over 300, 000 population– Urumchi, Shihanza, Aksu, Kumul, Sanji, Korla, Gulja, and Kashgar), which were 67% Han, compared to 23.1% Uyghurs in 2000. Some cities, such as Shihanza even had a Han population of over 95%. These cities are the developed urban centres of Xinjiang, where most industrial and economic enterprises are located. In contrast, 85.4% of Uyghurs lived in Xinjiang’s poorest rural areas (Hotan, Kizilsu, Aksu, and Kashgar), compared to only 11.3% of Han Chinese in 2000. Uyghurs make up the majority of the rural population of Xinjiang. Their traditional agricultural lifestyle and economy also depend on the needs of the Han-dominated urban areas, which set the prices for the raw materials produced by the Uyghurs. The rapid urbanisation of Xinjiang’s cities, the preponderance of Han Chinese in these cities, and the use of Uyghur labour in economic enterprises are exploiting and displacing the Uyghur way of life. In addition, the average annual income per capita was RMB1,600 (US$232 in February 2023) in the rural areas, only 32% of the urban income of RMB5,000 (US$725). The demarcation of two types of economies shows the stated objectives of the WDP may have been a facade.
Furthermore, the state-owned Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) manages about one-sixth of the region’s territories and population, making it one of the largest economic, political, and paramilitary entities in the region. With at least 2,873 companies operating within it, the XPCC coordinates agriculture, construction, commerce, mining, and most of the state’s economic activities in Xinjiang. The XPCC expansion and the mobilisation of Han settlers are estimated to have contributed to 18.3% of the region’s population growth in the last decade.
Population control is another mechanism used to reduce the proportion of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. In addition to birth-control orders, many Uyghur women, including those in re-education centres, have reported being subjected to forced sterilisations and intrauterine device insertions. Various reports have revealed that population growth rates have declined by 84% between 2015 and 2018, and continue to decline in areas with the highest Uyghur populations.
Securitization and surveillance
China’s advanced surveillance systems have been widely implemented to securitise the region. Observers and journalists have reported the implementation of a grid management system and a multitude of facial-recognition cameras, where squares of 500 inhabitants are closely monitored by a police station. In Kashgar and Hotan, poles with eight to ten cameras can be found every 100 to 200 metres on the streets. Police checkpoints were also found every hundred metres in Kashgar. Police officers routinely scan identity documents, take photographs and fingerprints, and inspect residents' mobile phones. Citizens' biometric data is also stored under the ‘Physicals for All’ programme and collected in a database called the ‘Integrated Joint Operations Programme’. Artificial intelligence is used to report any illegal activity. As a result, over 15,000 residents were placed into week-long detentions after being targeted by the software in June 2017. Information is also collected on Uyghurs abroad, and more than 1,500 Uyghurs have been detained, deported to China, and arrested by foreign governments under pressure from Beijing.
The CCP is investing heavily in securitization and policing in Xinjiang. Since 2014, party members have been staying in Uyghur homes to monitor any “extremist” behaviour and report religious activities. Officials have destroyed mosques and the selling of halal food has been discouraged. Apart from being an economic entity, the XPCC is also a paramilitary organisation. It has its own military force, which could be easily mobilised alongside the many People’s Liberation Army units stationed there. Residents fear them for their violent tactics and their power to jail dissidents. In addition to running prisons, they are also responsible for building and running re-education centres and forced labour programmes. Observers believe that Uyghurs have been placed in “reeducation centres” since 2014 and that these re-education efforts intensified in 2017. Human Rights Watch estimates that more than one million people have been convicted since 2017, often on terrorism-related charges.
Cultural assimilation
Linguistic repression and assimilation are other sinicization and securitization mechanisms used to gradually eliminate all Central Asian, Soviet, and religious influences in the region. The Uyghur language, based on the Arabic system and tinged with Islamic influence, underwent a process of reform, and was slowly suppressed as part of Chinese policies. Since 1956, the minority languages have been reformed to the Soviet Cyrillic alphabet, and then the New Alphabet in the 1960s, to bring them closer to the Chinese phonetic alphabet and writing system. Eventually, the Chinese alphabet (pinyin) and Chinese loan words were introduced into the Uyghur language to get rid of words with religious connotations. The teaching of Chinese in schools became compulsory in the 1970s, and teenagers were encouraged to attend Han schools, thus facilitating assimilation. Uyghurs were further pressured to learn Chinese as the Uyghur language was discouraged from everyday use, and no longer accepted in the economic and public sectors, in local universities, and even in institutional documents. Even in Uyghur academic circles and primary and secondary schools, the use of the language is rapidly declining. Han schools generally have better resources, teaching staff, funding, infrastructure and a higher teacher/student ratio than Uyghur schools. While Han schools may provide better quality education for Uyghur children, the lack of improvement in the Uyghur education system shows that the CCP's policies on minority education are not concerned with protecting minority languages and lifestyles.
Conclusion
As discussed above, the mechanisms of sinicization and securitisation of Uyghurs in Xinjiang have been implemented under the guise of modernisation and urbanisation. They have led to marginalisation, poverty, inequality and environmental degradation, thus seriously undermining the Uyghur way of life. While the benefits that modern facilities have brought to the region should not be overlooked, the Uyghurs have been little consulted or included in the process.
Tibet
Religious and Cultural Repression
Since Mao’s invasion of Tibet in the 1950s, the CCP has attempted to securitise and sinicise the region. Religious and cultural repression has intensified since 2010, particularly the repression of Tibetan Buddhism. More than 6,000 monasteries have been destroyed, notably during the Cultural Revolution. The crackdown extended to mainland China, where thousands of residences were destroyed in a Tibetan Buddhist centre in Sichuan, displacing 6,000 monks and nuns. Furthermore, the selection of the fifteenth Dalai Lama was controlled, and other religious sect leaders were groomed by Chinese officials. In the past 2 decades, citizens have been punished for attending monasteries or engaging in religious activities, such as the withdrawal of social assistance and subsidies. Local officials also banned the possession or display of images of the Dalai Lama and monitored religious festivals. Authorities launched a “behavioural reform” programme in 2020 with the aim of eradicating Tibetan traditions. As a result, the authorities ordered the destruction of all prayer flags.
Population Control
Population control and resettlement were also implemented for securitization and sinicization purposes in Tibet. The resettlement of Tibetans to urban housing began in 2003 under the ‘Build a New Socialist Countryside’ plan and accelerated in 2009. The expropriated land was mostly used for infrastructure development and resource extraction projects to meet China’s energy production and carbon reduction goals, such as the building of a dam in Yennom and a highway in Dechen. Over two million Tibetans were rehoused in new townhouses and 50,000 Tibetan nomadic herders were settled in ‘New Socialist Villages’ by 2013.
Although Tibetans have access to schools, electricity, and healthcare in the relocated areas, Human Rights Watch and the United Nations Human Rights Council have criticised the policy as coercive and lacking in consultation, arguing that it failed to provide adequate compensation, failed to restore livelihoods, and “increased poverty, environmental degradation, and social breakdown.” Many relocated Tibetans were displaced again in 2016 when the authorities turned their homes into tourist centres and housing for government employees. Deprived of their original land, communities, and ways of life, Tibetans, especially nomads who rely on pastures and forests for their livelihood, struggled as they were forced to settle in cities with a Han majority. Government-sponsored Han resettlement in Tibet was similarly implemented through the WDP in the 1980s. Although there is no official data on the proportion of Han Chinese resettled, many locals claim that the Han population and signs of Han Chinese life in Tibet continue to grow.
Linguistic Assimilation
Since 1985, Tibetan students have been encouraged to receive an education in Han Chinese in state-run boarding schools (neidi), thus isolating them from Tibetan religious and cultural influences. The Tibetan language was reformed to bring it closer to the Chinese writing system in the 1960s, and Chinese language instruction was made compulsory. Although the Tibetan language has been subject to less reform and repression than the Uyghur languages, its use is strongly discouraged. For instance, a man was arrested and placed in a re-education centre after police intercepted a call in which he discussed the importance of preserving the Tibetan language. The Tibetan language remains marginalised in education and public arenas, which pushes young people to learn Chinese as they risk reducing their chances of employment if they choose to stay on the Tibetan education path. Many also believe that the Tibetan education system, which benefits from China’s aid programmes, is increasingly assimilative and neglects local languages, histories, and ethnic identities.
Securitization and Surveillance
Chinese police forces and surveillance personnel have been found to be monitoring residents and monasteries for any opposition activity. This surveillance extends to digital spaces. As part of the ‘Benefit the Masses’ campaign launched in 2011 to improve the living standards of people living in rural areas, the CCP sent over 20,000 officials and party members to live in more than 5,000 Tibetan villages as “village-based cadres”. They collect information on residents, develop security schemes, and discuss topics about the CCP with residents. The DNA of residents of the Tibetan municipalities is also collected for policing purposes, and facial recognition software was implemented for monitoring.
Conclusion
While surveillance and religious repression are commonplace, linguistic repression and “cultural genocide”, in the words of the Dalai Lama, seem less extreme than in Xinjiang. To some extent, Tibetan cultural life is preserved in the diaspora communities, but the CCP’s securitization and sinicization efforts have and continue to subvert many Tibetan traditions and ways of life.
Inner Mongolia
Inner Mongolia was colonised by Chinese warlords in the early 1900s, and integration mechanisms were put in place during the Republican period (1912-1949). There were about 4.61 million Mongols living in Inner Mongolia in 2020, only 18% of the region’s 25.7 million inhabitants. Land reforms in the early 1900s redistributed Mongol land to the majority Han Chinese in Inner Mongolia, displacing many Mongols from their homes and eroding their nomadic herding lifestyle. During the Cultural Revolution, mass violence was committed against the Mongols, mostly against members of the self-determination and independence Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party – a party promoting self-determination and independence and supported by Outer Mongolia – and symbols of Mongol culture were destroyed. Accused of separatism, an estimated 2 million Mongols were arrested and tens of thousands were killed. The Cultural Revolution subverted Mongolian pastoral society, Mongolian nationalism, and traditional customs and cultures. Lamaism practices and traditional dresses were practically eradicated as a result.
Cultural and Linguistic Repression
Although there have been no re-education camps or violent mass arrests in Inner Mongolia, cultural and linguistic repression has prevailed. More and more Mongolian language inscriptions, statues, and cultural symbols have been altered or destroyed since 2020. Further education reforms were also enforced in 2020: Mongolian materials were removed, Chinese replaced Mongolian as the medium of instruction, and patriotism classes were introduced. Protests, boycotts and sit-ins following these reforms led to arrests and intimidation. 129 protesters identified by security cameras in Horqin district were sought by police, four were arrested in Bayun Nur city, parents of children involved in the boycotts in Tongliao were threatened with suspension of pay and investigation, and six officials from the Xilin Gol League were sanctioned for failing to quell the protests. As in Xinjiang and Tibet, pressure was put on students to learn Chinese to remain competitive in the labour market.
Securitization and Sinicization
Securitizing and sinicizing the Inner Mongols may have been less challenging for the CCP than securing and sinicising the Uyghurs in Xinjiang or the Tibetans for several reasons. The dispersed nature of nomadic Mongols potentially affects their capacity to mobilise on a large scale. Even in the eastern part of Inner Mongolia where most Mongols are concentrated, they make up less than half the population. For example, in 1995, Tongliao city had only 36.6% Mongolians and Hinggan prefecture 17.6%. They also lived among the Han and were integrated into their culture early on. Furthermore, the Mongols do not have a central political leader like the Muslim Uyghur leaders or the Tibetan Dalai Lama. Besides the lack of a strong religious identity, it was difficult for anyone to rally and build strong Mongol influence or resistance. Lastly, the Mongols are one of two ethnic groups to have exercised dynastic power over China and to have been part of China since the Qing Dynasty in the 17th century, which gives them a greater historical affinity. Inner Mongolia is also geographically closer to Beijing, and the long history of Inner Mongolia being a separate state from Mongolia has allowed the Mongols to have a different trajectory in constructing their identity. As a result, Inner Mongolians’ belief that they enjoy better economic well-being than (Outer) Mongolia, the Outer Mongolians’ rejection of Inner Mongolians as proper Mongols, and a closer affiliation with Chinese national identity and citizenship have resulted in a unique Chinese-Inner Mongolian identity. However, although the Inner Mongolians are perceived as less of a separatist threat, China continues its securitization and sinicization efforts in the region.
Hong Kong
Since Hong Kong's return to China in 1997, after 99 years as a British colony, the Chinese government has increasingly focused on the securitization and sinicization of the territory for national security reasons. Most Hong Kong residents are not ethnic minorities, have no strong religious affiliations, and many identify as Chinese culturally. However, since the 2000s, the Special Administrative Region has seen a growth in localist identities, a decline in political identification as Chinese, and protests for democratic reforms, which the CCP sees as a threat.
Education Reforms and Linguistic Assimilation
Education reform, nationalistic practices, and perceived linguistic assimilation have been implemented in Hong Kong. Putonghua (Mandarin) as the medium of instruction was introduced in 2009 to replace the use of traditional Cantonese to teach Chinese. While it was optional for schools, many saw it as an attempt to replace Cantonese. This view was reinforced after the removal of the Cantonese language from the local university entrance exam (Diploma of Secondary Education) in 2020. The CCP has also tried to introduce a national education curriculum since 2012, similar to the patriotism courses introduced in Inner Mongolia. This led to mass protests, with many fearing that the curriculum would brainwash students with nationalist and patriotic ideas. Although the government withdrew the curriculum after the protests, it re-launched the implementation of national education in 2021, starting with universities. This was accompanied by ordinances making flag-raising ceremonies and the singing of the national anthem in schools mandatory.
Securitization and Surveillance
The degree of security was higher in the 2000s, as pro-democracy protests and protests against CCP encroachment policies affected the city. The National Security Law introduced in 2019 allowed the CCP to jail dissidents and tightened control over the media, electoral, and legal systems. More than a million protesters were arrested. In addition to a higher degree of policing, observers believe that surveillance has been widely used in the wake of the backlash, including filming protests and using facial recognition technology to identify protesters. There have also been instances of anti-government, doxxing, and protest-related websites, such as those of advocacy groups Hong Kong Democracy Council, HKChronicles, and Hong Kong Watch, and phone signals being blocked. In 2023, residents were also required to provide identification and register their real names to purchase SIM cards. Although the securitisation and sinicization of Hong Kong are still in their early stages compared to other regions, citizens are concerned about the increased surveillance and securitization efforts.
‘Mainlandization’ and Regional Assimilation
‘Mainlander’ settlement and economic assimilation have also been implemented in Hong Kong. Scholars argue that the CCP is attempting to assimilate Hong Kong in a process known as ‘mainlandization’. In the 1980s, 150 daily quotas of ‘one-way permits’ were introduced to allow mainlanders to settle in Hong Kong. There were around 50,000 new settlers per year between 2016 and 2018. The Guangdong-HK-Macau Greater Bay Area was introduced in 2017 to create an integrated economic powerhouse of nine Chinese cities. This framework encourages residents to study and work within the area, facilitating greater regional and economic assimilation. The Individual Visit Scheme introduced in 2003 had a similar result, allowing travellers from most cities in China to visit Hong Kong for up to seven days. This has increased mobility between the mainland and Hong Kong: in March 2004, 1.47 million mainland travellers visited Hong Kong. The number increased tenfold, reaching 17.2 million in December 2006 and exceeding 40 million in 2013. These policies sparked fear of a decline in Hong Kong’s economic autonomy as the economies of Hong Kong and China became increasingly intertwined, and mainlanders were allowed to buy properties and run businesses in Hong Kong. Even if these policies are politically motivated, they blur the “physical, social, cultural and psychological border between Mainland China and Hong Kong.”
Conclusion
Over the years, the Chinese government has sought to increase securitization, sinicization and ‘mainlandization’, and to centralise state control over Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Hong Kong. These efforts have been characterised by mechanisms of resettlement, demographic control, religious repression, cultural and linguistic repression/assimilation, education reforms, as well as policing and surveillance – whether or not their original aims were political.
Critics have argued that these practices resemble internal colonialism or modern colonialism, where state practices are legitimised through groups being represented as sources of insecurity or through the use of official narratives of cultural backwardness. Others argue that these policies are simply about nation-building to safeguard national unity and social stability. Despite efforts to modernise infrastructure and increase economic activities in these regions, they often result in the marginalisation of minority groups and the erosion of their traditional customs and ways of living, both in the past and present. It is important to recognise that the realities of China’s mechanisms and their effects on the regions’ inhabitants are multiple and cannot be reduced to simplistic narratives.
The CCP’s securitization and assimilation efforts in these regions have drawn international attention and strained China’s bilateral and global relations, particularly with Western nations such as the US and UK. In addition to repeated condemnations by governments and international organisations for human rights violations, China has also suffered economic repercussions. G7 trade ministers, the European Parliament, and UN joint statements have taken steps to stop trade with any “...use of forced labour in global supply chains.” The US has sanctioned Chinese officials and companies in Xinjiang, and the UK and other Western countries banned imports of goods made in the region. Many international corporations have also ended cooperation with Xinjiang companies or left Hong Kong to avoid compromising their economic autonomy. While the deterrence and boycotts by governments and companies may indicate a decrease in trade and foreign investments in China, its economy remains strong as its annual foreign direct investment has continued to grow in recent years.
Lastly, the importance of understanding these mechanisms extends beyond China’s borders. As one of the leading developers, producers and exporters of AI, China has exported many of these surveillance technologies to governments and private companies around the world, particularly in the Belt and Road countries. This poses another security concern, as autocracies and fragile democracies, especially those with little domestic AI investment or experiencing political unrest, are more likely to import Chinese surveillance technologies. If they are used for mass surveillance or repression of political dissent as in Xinjiang, Pakistan, or Zimbabwe, China’s leadership in the global AI trade risks strengthening surveillance regimes and autocracies.
Congressional Chaos: Will Republican Discord Lead to Productive Governance or Fuel Dangerous Division?
In January 2023, the US House of Representatives attempted to elect a new speaker of the house. The Speaker is important, as the House cannot function without one by law - meaning legislation cannot pass, and budgets unset, leading to a halt on normal governing functions. Historically, the majority party simply elects their party leader to preside over the House. However, this time around, the Republicans have found it difficult to elect Kevin McCarthy as a 20-member faction, ideologically opposed to the majority of the Party, prohibited the election of a Speaker for five days, until their demands on policy, committee seats and rules for the House of Representatives were met.
The lack of a House Speaker for any period is quite unusual. It has only happened twice since the civil war. Most importantly, Congress can only govern with a Speaker. As the rules stand, the House of Representatives cannot pass laws, or respond to emergencies, lawmakers cannot view classified or sensitive materials, or any other government action it needs to in order to oversee other Federal agencies and branches of government until a speaker is elected. The legislative branch is therefore paralysed during that time.
Aside from the difficulty to elect a new Speaker, the event points to further legislative chaos emanating not just from a divided Congress, but a divided Republican Party. What the Speakership election has shown is that a small group of Republicans, known as the Freedom Caucus and ideologically opposed to many in their own party, are willing to stall governing in order to force through their agenda.
Further Congressional Chaos
The rebellion against Kevin McCarthy’s speakership bid was rooted primarily in an ideological drive of the most conservative Republicans to drastically limit the size, scope, and reach of the Federal Government, taking up the banner of the Tea Party.
Many dissidents are focused on balancing the federal budget, coming to blows with senior Republicans and potentially setting up a showdown over the US debt ceiling. The Freedom caucus seeks radical changes such as slashing the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) budget and replacing federal income taxes with ones on consumption. The faction further demands seats on top committees, the cessation of Republican funding primary challengers against Freedom Caucus members, and even limiting US aid to Ukraine.
In order to achieve all of this, the Freedom Caucus has used their small numbers, and the Party’s overall slim majority, to hold the speakership hostage if concessions were not made. For instance, the threshold to call a vote of no confidence in a sitting Speaker has been lowered, meaning that if McCarthy tries to keep the Freedom Caucus at bay, they could now more easily trigger a vote of no confidence and remove him. The Freedom Caucus members have also demanded changes in the reading of bills - they can no longer be rushed to a vote, but a 72 hours notice must be given to give members of the House time to read the legislation.
The Freedom Caucus’ demands place the country in an unstable position. As demonstrated, the group does not hesitate to hold up the legislative process if their demands are not met. As a result, the changes to Congress could potentially slow down the legislative process, hampering any ability to respond quickly to crises. The actions of the Republican faction threatens to make an already divided government, as the House of Representatives and the Senate are controlled by competing parties, even more divisive and unresponsive to the country’s issues.
What it means for Congress
With the breakdown of Republican Party discipline, some are worried about what it will mean for Congress's ability to govern over the next two years. “This concerns me that we might end up in some deals that might not pass and then possible shutdowns,” said Rep. Henry Cuellar, a Democrat from Texas and a member of the House Appropriations Committee. Cuellar’s statement illustrates how Democrats and some Republicans are worried that the conflict over the speakership is a sign of the majority’s inability to govern and ultimately its instability.
McCarthy’s difficulty to be elected shows how fragile the Republican Party and by extension the US government are. Working with a Democratic-controlled Senate and Presidency was always going to pose a challenge for House Republicans. But the power of the Freedom Caucus means they can hold up key policy decisions and hinder important government functions - passing budgets, raising the debt ceiling, and scrutinising the work of governing branches and departments - in addition to preventing compromise with Democrats.
A divided Republican Party will only enhance the division present in American Government. Following the midterm election in the Autumn of 2022, Congress found itself divided, with Democrats holding the Senate and the House held by the Republicans. The division means that making laws, overseeing the other governing branches and enacting spending bills will be increasingly difficult. In the void left by government inaction, partisan divisions are likely to be heightened, as each side blames the other for the inability to get anything done. Tensions are likely to heat up around critical debates, such as the one around whether or not to raise the debt ceiling.
One of the key issues facing Congress, and maybe the most important decision it will make in the next 12 months, is whether or not to raise the debt ceiling. The debt ceiling is the maximum amount of debt the Federal Government can accrue. Once the ceiling is hit, the government is no longer allowed to issue any more debt. In the short term, extraordinary measures may be taken to meet financial commitments, but if negotiations to raise the ceiling stall, the long-term result may be a default on government debt.
If the US Federal Government defaults or comes close to a default, the result could be economic chaos. Default would mean interest rates rise, investors stop or scale back investments in Treasury securities, and interest rates would rise on car loans, credit cards and mortgages. Even the threat of hitting the ceiling could raise borrowing costs, as The Government Accountability Office (GAO) suggests. The result of a debt limit impasse was estimated by Moody’s Analytics in 2021. The US economy could see a 4% decline in GDP, the loss of 6 million jobs, with unemployment rising to 9% and a $15 trillion loss in household wealth. Ultimately, the result would be a recession on par or worse than the Great Recession in 2008.
If Congressional inactivity leads to economic chaos the results can lead to increases in people turning to extremist movements and ultimately violence to rectify the stressful living situations they find themselves in. As we have seen in the decade after the Great Recession, or the post-Great Depression, extremist parties and factions gained adherents as they claimed they were the only solutions to the issues plaguing their societies. But, with today’s Congress, economic downturns are not the only driver pushing people towards extremism and violence.
Risks of violence
Intra-Party conflict, and Congressional deadlock, leading to economic recession can increase the chances of violence as people turn to extremist groups as outlets. But economic conditions are not the only source of people’s frustration and cause of their turn towards extremism and violence. In the current climate, unresponsive governing institutions, including the established political parties, are used as points in party rhetoric to stoke polarisation and existential fears.
The Senate and House are controlled by opposing parties who refuse to work together, and the Republican Party in the House of Representatives is internally divided. All of the division leads to a legislative branch that is unable to enact legislation that may positively shape people’s lives and respond to crises. Historically, government inaction on key issues has led to a response by citizens who believe they have no other choice: The French Revolution is a famous example, as is the Arab Spring.
Historically, The US has experienced periods where divided governments have led to inaction over policy issues and resulted in violence. The most prominent example is the division over slavery in the run-up to the Civil war, in which neither side could compromise on the issue, making violent conflict inevitable. During the Gilded Age (1877-1896) Congress found itself split between Democrats and Republicans for 13 years. Division in Congress also came at a time when a bargain was struck to end reconstruction in the southern states, allowing those states to roll back rights for former slaves without any resulting Federal Government reaction. Without a federal presence, violence reigned as whites attempted to take the rights of former slaves away from them. However, continued division in Congress meant a concerted effort to protect Black Americans and their rights were impossible and led to Jim Crow laws being adopted across the South. A divided Congress was also at the centre of attention in 1932, when they were slow to provide bonuses to WWI veterans during the Depression. As a result, the veterans and their families protested in Washington, with the government calling in the military to deal with the unrest. The violence resulted in the deaths of several protesters, including two infants, and injured hundreds of others.
When the government becomes unable to respond to issues impacting people’s everyday lives, party rhetoric aims to blame the other side, framing them as a threat to their perceived way of life. For example, Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene spoke about a “national divorce” between red and blue states, stemming from a belief that Democratic politics pose a threat to Republicans. The result is that people cluster into ideological groups, fueled by their side’s messages demonising their political opponents. The result is a deeply polarised political landscape.
Polarisation is further amplified by a sense that if the other side wins the next election, “our way of life will be threatened”. If people buy into the thought that they are threatened, they may lash out in a violent way. The most well-known example of political polarisation leading to violence is the January 6 insurrection. On January 6, followers of Donald Trump perceived the victories of Joe Biden and the Democrats in the House and Senate as an existential threat. Supporters believed that the election had been stolen from them by establishment political figures that had conspired to get rid of Donald Trump. Some of his supporters saw Trump as a saviour that would protect America from immoral people at the top of society. The result was a group of Trump’s supporters attempting to overturn the election with violence.
The political landscape in the United States is at its most divisive since the civil war. Neither side of the aisle has worked with the other in many constructive ways on domestic policy. However, there is hope that a partnership is being foraged in foreign policy that may lead the parties to work together elsewhere. Yet, polarisation in a deadlocked Congress may be exacerbated by a divided Republican Party, held captive by a small internal faction, which is unable to legislate or respond to a crisis. These tensions are building upon one another and could lead to violence if one side loses to the other and members of the losing faction fear what it will mean for their way of life.
With recent history showing that some groups are willing to commit themselves to violence for the political cause, the situation over the next two years may prove to be exceptionally difficult. Multiple societal stresses and a more relaxed view of political violence mean that conflict is likely to erupt unless the issue is taken seriously and effectively mitigated by the governing authorities.
Greenwashing as a Security Strategy: Clever Shortcut or Hopeless Mistake?
The concept of “greenwashing” — understood as a marketing technique involving the spread of false, unsubstantiated, or outright misleading statements or claims about the sustainability of a product, service, or even an organisation — is now part of the current lexicon that both experts and the general public utilise when discussing climate change mitigation and environmental concerns. Interest in the term has rapidly grown since the early 2000s, being featured not only in academic papers but also in social media posts.
First coined in 1986 by environmentalist Jay Westerveld, greenwashing has traditionally been related to the corporate world. As previously stated, it is often described as a business strategy for marketing a specific product or service. However, the term does not elude other organisations or institutions. In fact, states can also be responsible for greenwashing, and they can even be so deliberately, undertaking such deceitful efforts as a part of their security policy.
As a result of the intensification of global warming and climate change and the ever-accelerating occurrence of natural disasters associated with that trend, the perception of a rising worldwide security threat has consolidated. Accordingly, the international community and its cornerstone institutions have implemented a series of systems and agreements destined to generate incentives for those state actors that commit to becoming environmentally sustainable. Unlike several individual countries, which have themselves enforced policies such as green taxes within their respective jurisdictions, international bodies cannot possibly impose any robust instrument to punish states that harm the environment through their greenhouse emissions. However, there are mechanisms aimed at generating positive incentives for policy reform favoring climate change mitigation. For example, the World Bank has set an Environmental and Social Framework, as approved by its Board of Directors in 2016, which among other things, sets environmental and social requirements for borrowers through the Environmental and Social Standards (ESS).
Additionally, those countries which have implemented environmental policies have become publicly recognised in news media with a predominantly positive framing. Conversely, leaders who have disregarded or even downplayed concerns related to climate change have received substantial negative coverage, while others who have neglected sustainability efforts have been widely criticised. Such is the case of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. Notably, the indifference of his administration toward the environment was so blunt that leaders from the European Union refrained from signing a trade deal with its Southern Cone counterpart, the MERCOSUR – a free-trade zone encompassing not only Brazil but also Uruguay, Paraguay, and Argentina – until Bolsonaro committed to tackling Amazonian deforestation following a record number of fires in 2019.
Furthermore, while it seems apparent that the pursuit of climate change mitigation actions carries significant benefits, it might also imply several costs, at least initially, most of them related to the efforts needed to replace traditional sources of non-renewable energy and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Consequently, most countries face incentives to portray themselves as “green” before the international community without bearing the associated costs, thus leading to greenwashing practices at the state level.
At a more superficial level, states might sign international treaties and protocols on topics related to the environment and climate change without an intention to comply with them or even ratify them. Such was the case of the United States with the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and Iran with the 2015 Paris Agreement. Moreover, states might engage with greenwashing corporations or local governments, condoning or supporting their misleading practices. An example of “state-sponsored greenwashing” is denounced by The Australia Institute in a 2022 report. The authors suggest that “the Australian Government doesn’t just turn a blind eye to dubious net zero commitments by corporations, it also actively endorses them through its policies and programmes.”
A further and much more unsettling instance of greenwashing at the state level is closely related to national security. As explained by Naomi Klein in her “Greenwashing a Police State” article, authoritarian regimes can undertake greenwashing strategies to improve their international image by deviating attention from human rights violations and political oppression tactics towards environmental pledges and policies. The case of Egypt hosting the COP27 Summit in November 2022 is a clear example of the latter. While climate activists and political opponents were arbitrarily imprisoned, with a 2019 NGO Law enforcing a ban on transparent and facts-based reporting on the environmental situation of Egypt for considering the topic “too sensitive,” and after it has become “impossible” to work in the field for local environmental groups due to political constraints, leaders from all over the world traveled to Sharm el-Sheikh. There, President Al-Sisi was praised for his role in the Summit, as values such as “transparency” and “justice” were proclaimed.
Besides strategic and reputational benefits, material advantages can also be derived from greenwashing practices. In the case of Egypt, this concentrates on key sectors for national security, such as energy, transportation, and water management. Even prior to the COP27, the German giant Siemens Mobility announced a “historic” multibillion-dollar contract to build electrified high-speed trains across Egypt, and the government-backed British International Investment (BII) disclosed a $100m investment to support local startups. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Summit, it was reported that Egypt secured $2.24bn in funds for sustainability projects, including a grant from the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) for the Nile Delta Water Management Program project.
Finally, the often divorced topics of national security and environmental policy interweave when considering the impact of armed forces and the military industry's greenhouse gas emissions. Dr. Stuart Parkinson, Executive Director of the organisation Scientists for Global Responsibility (SGR), estimates that “the carbon emissions of the world’s armed forces and the industries that provide their equipment are in the region of 5% of the global total”. This figure, however, does not include the carbon emissions of the impacts of war – covering sources such as fires, deforestation, health care for survivors, and post-conflict reconstruction. A 2022 SGR report highlights how the international instruments that underpin the efforts for climate change mitigation, such as the Paris Agreement, often bypass this concern by making military emissions reporting a voluntary rather than a mandatory action. Even some countries that have presented themselves as avid participants of the “green agenda,” such as Canada, seem to have purposely sidelined the issue of the impact of security forces, assets, and exercises on climate change.
Notably, these “legal loopholes” and “information gaps” might not be the byproduct of a lack of interest in climate change by defence policy officials. The case of the United States illustrates the awareness and deep strategic knowledge that the military establishment often has regarding climate change as a critical issue. According to Alejandro de la Garza for TIME, the U.S. military “has been talking about climate change for a long time, even as the issue has fallen in and out of political favor.” However, it has done so in tactical terms, focusing on “climate adaptation — finding ways to protect military installations like Navy bases from rising seas and extreme weather — or on a changing geo-strategic landscape — like new theaters of conflict in newly opened Arctic waterways.” As also shown in a NATO publication from July 2022 titled “Environment, Climate Change, and Security,” the securitisation of climate change and its associated risks is also a concerning possibility.
Interestingly, some emerging initiatives from the Army and the Air Force have considered incorporating “green technologies,” proposing a win-win approach for fighting ability and reducing carbon emissions. Nevertheless, de la Garza sustains that “the military isn’t interested in emissions reductions that run counter to its broader aims.”
Greenwashing might be a deliberate security-driven action, although it might not likely be the sole component of a country’s national strategy. Moreover, it is unlikely that greenwashing efforts at the state level stem exclusively from security preoccupations: financial considerations and domestic policy calculations might also be prominent factors to consider. The most distressing thoughts come to mind when considering the missed opportunities and the misused time spent advancing such greenwashing tactics instead of conceiving meaningful and legitimate plans to tackle climate change, which is undoubtedly an urgent matter.
This becomes even more striking when considering that several assumptions that underpin greenwashing as an effective alternative can be seriously challenged. As an example, the cost of renewable energies remained competitive in the international markets in 2022, according to a report from the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). According to the Agency, the costs for renewables have been falling since 2021 amid a fossil fuel crisis caused by supply chain challenges and rising commodity prices. A study from Oxford University also suggests that, for these reasons, switching from fossil fuels to renewable energy could save the world as much as $12tn by 2050. Moreover, a 2018 study from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) indicates that every dollar spent on reducing pre-disaster risk, which includes community climate action, saves between $6 and $13 in damages. The often widespread notion that expects greenwashing to be a more accessible, cheaper, and savvier strategy becomes questionable at best and senseless at worst.
Barcelona Summit: A New Era for France and Spain's Energy and Defence Cooperation
On 23 January, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez and French President Emmanuel Macron signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Kingdom of Spain and the French Republic within the framework of the 27th Spanish-French Summit held in Barcelona.
The summit aimed to strengthen the relationship between Spain and France and to address the common challenges facing the European Union. The treaty contains two important points - the development of renewable energy channels and grids, and defence cooperation. The signing of the treaty also means that France now considers Spain as its most important ally after Italy and Germany. This suggests a shift in France's foreign policy priorities towards the southern and western regions of Europe. France acknowledges the growing importance of Spain, especially as a key player in energy governance in Europe and as a strategic location for potential gas pipelines or liquified natural gas (LNG) imports, mostly coming from the US.
One of the main developments at the summit was the signing of an agreement to strengthen cooperation on energy. Spain is connected to the rest of Europe by two gas pipelines that cross the Pyrenees and reach France, making Spain an important energy provider to France. The first of these, Larrau-Calahorra, was commissioned in 1993. In 2013, the Spanish company Eneagás began the construction and management of the Irún gas pipeline, bringing the number of pipelines between Spain and France to two. Both pipelines are mainly managed by Enagás. French companies are also regularly involved in the Spanish electricity, natural gas and renewable energy markets. In 2021, Spain initiated negotiations with France over the construction of a new pipeline across the Pyrenees, the Midcat, as they considered the current pipeline infrastructures outdated and insufficient to meet the energy needs of both countries. The project was initially proposed as a way to improve energy security and reduce dependence on imported natural gas. France, however, did not actively support it, mostly due to the environmental impacts of such a project and its well-developed natural gas infrastructure.
The recent H2MED project has revived the energy governance relationship between France and Spain. H2MED is a corridor that also connects Portugal and unites the Iberian peninsula with France. The initial plan to build the H2MED corridor included the term "renewable hydrogen", which left the door open to interpretation, as it did not mention green hydrogen per se. France, which relies heavily on nuclear energy, pushed for pink and yellow hydrogen produced by their nuclear plants and generators to be included, as it regards hydrogen produced from low-carbon energy sources, such as nuclear, as green hydrogen. Paris considers low-carbon hydrogen essential for the EU to meet its emission reduction targets and create a competitive industry, but its lack of distinction between pink/yellow hydrogen and green hydrogen from renewable energy sources has led Spain to oppose the idea, as Madrid views green hydrogen as the only sustainable energy source.
Tensions over the construction of a gas pipeline between the two countries to export energy to the rest of Europe eased when Paris and Madrid committed to transporting green hydrogen and other renewable gases between Barcelona and Marseille through the H2MED. Both countries pledged not only to energy governance and cooperation with the H2MED, but also to work together to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Paris and Madrid bridged their differences in energy governance and committed to working together to increase the use of renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind power, and to promote the use of electric vehicles.
It is necessary to contextualise this cooperation by taking into account the energy governance group between Portugal and Spain. Both countries have been less dependent on Russia for gas and fossil fuels, and now pay lower prices for gas and electricity thanks to the Iberian exception approved in June 2022 by the European Commission and technically due to expire in May 2023. The Iberian exception temporarily introduces a cap on the price of electricity produced by combined cycle power plants in the daily energy auctions of the Iberian Peninsula. As a result, electricity prices in the Iberian pool have fallen from €332/MWh to €149/MWh. Taking into account the levy paid to gas power plants, the net benefit of lower prices overall is €54.25/MWh. Under these circumstances, Spain’s role in geopolitics and energy security is important, given its energy independence from Russia and its geographical position. This may partly explain France's decision to strengthen its ties with Spain.
Another objective of the summit was to reach a consensus on a comprehensive defence and foreign policy agenda. Notably, Macron and Sánchez discussed the need to strengthen defence cooperation between Spain and France. They pledged to cooperate, coordinate, and establish defence standards by increasing the number of joint military exercises and possibly creating a joint military unit for crisis management. They also discussed the need for better coordination of defence procurement in order to use resources in the most efficient way.
Several defence-related issues require further integration between the two countries. First of all, military spending and capabilities have always been major issues between Paris and Madrid. France has traditionally had a higher level of defence spending and a more advanced military than Spain. In 2021, French military spending amounted to 1.95% of GDP. Under a new budget proposal, France's defence budget in 2023 would increase by €3 billion, or 7.4%. This shift in defence spending began in 2017 to meet the NATO requirement to spend 2% of GDP on defence. From the French perspective, the aim is clearly to position Europe as a defence actor through an increase in the defence budget. Macron has pushed to re-energize Europe’s defence policy by insisting on the need for “a common intervention force, a common defence budget and common doctrine to act.”
In contrast, Spanish military spending was 1.37 % in 2021. At the NATO summit in June 2022, Spain agreed to increase its defence spending from 1% to 2% of GDP by 2029, using part of this increase to modernise military equipment, giving priority to Spanish companies for contracts. As we can see, France and Spain still have a significant divergence in defence spending and capabilities. This will hamper cooperation between Spain and France, not only bilaterally, but also in the framework of NATO-EU cooperation and security. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Poland and Baltic countries have been pushing for European countries to raise their defence spending criteria to 2% of GDP criteria, which Spain is far from meeting.
France and Spain have also faced some difficulties coordinating joint military operations. For example, the two countries had different approaches to the 2011 NATO-led intervention in Libya, with France taking a more active role in the conflict, while Spain took a more cautious stance. France's permanent seat at the UN Security Council also plays into the fact that the bilateral relation between Spain and France might appear unbalanced. Despite these challenges and differences, France and Spain continue to cooperate closely on security and defence industry matters, both bilaterally and within the EU and NATO framework.
Since coming to office in 2019, Sánchez has attempted to promote a more ambitious foreign policy than his predecessors. The energy and defence developments discussed at the Barcelona summit should be contextualised in the context of Spain’s fifth Council Presidency, from July to December 2023. A strengthened relationship with France will further establish Spain among the club of Europe's most important member states due to France's influence and presence on the international stage, which Spain may not enjoy as much. Given the economic size and political involvement of both countries in the European Union, this commitment to bilateral cooperation should benefit not only the two countries, but also the European Union as a whole.
Insecurity as the propulsor for cooperation between the United Kingdom and Japan
The international system is suffering from intense insecurity and instability, but besides the difficulties, democracies have been working in unison to counter tremendous threats. An example of this, amongst other cases, is the signature of the UK-Japan defence agreement on 11 January 2023. This agreement marks a turning point in history, as the United Kingdom has become the first European country to sign a Reciprocal Access Agreement with Japan, sharing this status internationally with Australia. After years of negotiations, Rishi Sunak and Fumio Kishida finally signed the agreement, thus accelerating defence and security cooperation between both nations and facilitating the accomplishment of the UK’s “tilt to the Indo-Pacific”, at a critical time.
Japan has recently been amending its defensive strategy due to the level of unsteadiness that is being sensed in Asia. The state of affairs in East Asia is precarious; insecurity is at its highest and any unusual move could become the catalyst of war. On a first stand, North Korean threats of a nuclear attack, due to its continuous missile testsand Kim Jong Un’s order to exponentially expand its nuclear arsenal, have been increasing the possibility of a conflict, exacerbating Japanese insecurity. On the other hand, Chinese hostilities over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, in addition to Chinese threats to invade Taiwan, have also boosted the Japanese defence agreement with the UK, as Japan seeks to achieve greater protection and strengthen its military alliances. But the Japanese insecurities that have prompted the signing of the agreement are not limited to Asian pressures. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine also played a role in securing the defence pact with the UK. Consequently, Japan’s 2022 White Paper, categorised China and Russia as Japan’s biggest security threats because. After the war in Ukraine, scholars and practitioners debate whether Russia's influence over China could motivate a Chinese attack in East Asia. The focus of Western capabilities and efforts on Ukraine provides China and North Korea with the opportunity to attack, hoping for less retaliation from the United States and other great powers that would take action if a war were to occur in East Asia. The concern that the war in Ukraine is creating a window of opportunity for China and North Korea to attack East Asia has led Japan to diversify its alliances, seeking to reduce its reliance on the United States by expanding its sphere of influence and protection.
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak. Source: Twitter/ @RishiSunak
Although Japan played an active role in the development of the Reciprocal Access Agreement, the United Kingdom also has several motives, sparked by Brexit, for carrying out the negotiations. The UK’s exit from the European Union has obliged the country to increase its diplomatic practices, seeking to develop greater alliances that would support its stance on the international scene. As Chatham House Director Sir Robin Niblett explains, the UK needs to invest in its diplomatic capabilities to “share international challenges” with other powers. This is demonstrated by the many agreements the UK has signed to strengthen its role and ties in the international community; the defence agreement with Japan is one example. The development of Asian countries has pivoted British foreign affairs to Asia, seeking new projects to increase its international legitimacy and protection, now that it sees the world from a “solitary” standpoint.
Contrary to Japan, the United Kingdom’s change in strategy has not only been motivated by security concerns, but economic incentives have also been a catalyst of the UK’s turn to Asia. The economic development in Asia has categorised its territories as the growth area for the UK to burst its economic potential whilst increasing diplomatic and military ties with Asian countries. As such, signing the Reciprocal Access Agreement with Japan, offered the UK greater security, development and legitimacy in the international sphere.
Overall, the signing of the UK-Japan agreement represents, on the one hand, the UK’s tilt towards the Indo-Pacific, and, on the other, illustrates Japan’s desire to strengthen its defence capabilities to counter the Chinese and North Korean threat in the region. The desire to overcome defensive challenges is at the core of this relationship, and has not only removed barriers to enable military cooperation when necessary, but has also given rise to the planning and execution of joint military exercises and deployments. Insecurity has united Japan and the United Kingdom, forging a relationship never before seen, nor expected. This tilt towards the Indo-Pacific, not only on the part of the UK but also of other Western powers, is a clear indication of Asia’s growing importance in the international system. Xi Jinping’s numerous threats over Taiwan and the South China Sea, coupled with Kim Jong Un’s threats to launch a nuclear attack on South Korea, have put Asia high on the agenda of Western states. Western democratic countries support their democratic partners in Asia through the development of agreements, uniting them as never before. In this respect, the defence agreement between Japan and the UK stands out as another example of how insecurity has become the driving force behind cooperation between democracies.
Germany’s Defence Policy: Security Challenges and Adjusted Evolution
German defence policy has been in turmoil in recent weeks. On 16 January, Christine Lambrecht, then-Defence Minister, announced her resignation from Chancellor Olaf Scholz's cabinet, marking both the end of her controversial and much-criticised tenure and the start of a crucial week for the German government in terms of defence policies, particularly with regards to its military involvement in the war in Ukraine. Later, on 25 January, Scholz announced unexpected news to the public: Germany will supply Ukraine with 14 Leopard 2 battle tanks, after a long reluctance to do so.
Lambrecht, who had no previous experience in defence or international affairs, had held the post of defence minister since 8 December 2021, following the inauguration of Scholz’s administration. At the time, the official view and subsequent foreign policy priorities of the new government were those that ensured “continuity” with the compromises adopted by its predecessors, especially those of Angela Merkel; defence and military-related issues were no exception. Prior to Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, analysts suggested that Berlin would once again fail to meet the NATO target of spending at least 2% of GDP on defence.
Nonetheless, the emergence, escalation, and prolongation of the conflict on the Ukrainian territory led to some significant deviations from Scholz’s original plans. Only a few days after the Russian invasion, the chancellor announced his decision to spend €100 billion on military investments in 2022, roughly doubling the funds allocated to this purpose in 2021 (€47 billion), in order to meet NATO’s annual defence spending target. This decision is remarkably striking, considering that, according to a 2019 pledge by Merkel, German compliance with the latter could only be expected after 2030.
In February 2022, Scholz’s statements mentioned the need to “invest more in the security of our country to protect our freedom and democracy” and introduced a pledge to provide further assistance to Ukraine in terms of “anti-tank weapons, surface-to-air missiles, and ammunition” after the country’s reluctance to send weapons to conflict zones. Several articles referred to a “revolution” or “U-turn” in the country’s defence policy. At the time, the Chancellor himself introduced the German concept of Zeitenwende (a turning point) to describe what the Russian invasion of Ukraine meant for Europe.
In this context, several challenges emerged for the then-Minister of Defence, given the strategic, logistical, and operational aspects of the German government’s new defence policy and its commitments to support Ukraine’s war efforts. On several occasions, Lambrecht has been questioned on her role as minister after a series of “blunders” and “missteps.” The criticism mostly focused on her management of the Bundeswehr (German armed forces), especially on matters related to their modernisation. However, other scandals intensified public objections to her. Lambrecht reportedly used a military helicopter for a private trip with her 21-year-old son in mid-April 2022. She also recently posted a “tone-deaf” video on her social media in which she discussed the "war raging in the middle of Europe" as fireworks rang out behind her during New Year’s celebrations in Berlin.
For Chancellor Scholz, the timing of her resignation was critical: that same week, representatives and senior defence officials from 51 countries were due to meet at the U.S. Ramstein Air Base, in the German province of Rhineland-Palatinate, following an official visit to Berlin by U.S. Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin.
On 17 January, just one day after Lambrecht stepped down from her role as defence minister, Scholz disclosed his choice for her successor: Boris Pistorius, who had, until then, served as interior minister of Lower Saxony. Upon his nomination, the German head of government emphasised Pistorious’ “experience, competence, and assertiveness” in a statement posted on Twitter, eloquently expressing his confidence in him, as he had done with Lambrecht when she was in office. However, Pistorius has “no defense experience, has never held senior federal office, and is not well known outside Germany.”
Pistorius officially took office on 19 January, one day before the Ramstein conference, while facing mounting international pressure to end the country’s reluctance to provide Ukraine with German-made Leopard 2 tanks. Despite comments by a senior U.S. defence official indicating that Washington would press Germany on the issue, given the possibility of a Russian spring offensive, the Ramstein talks yielded no clear results.
Notably, the hopes of several Western allies for a policy shift after the arrival of a new minister were quickly shattered. It was Chancellor Scholz himself who had repeatedly refused to allow his country and others to export Leopard tanks to Ukraine. Among his arguments was the consideration that supplying arms could potentially draw NATO into a wider conflict with Moscow.
Nevertheless, expectations remained high. On the one hand, on 20 January the government had not yet ruled out supplying Ukraine with Leopard 2 tanks. On the other hand, the Scholz administration had signalled on 23 January that it would not block other countries’ efforts to deliver these tanks, following statements by Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock indicating that Germany would not “stand in the way” should Poland decide to supply Ukraine with its national fleet of Leopard 2s.
The commitment not to interfere with other countries’ willingness to assist Kyiv by supplying tanks not only meant a compromise with the allies who demanded greater German involvement on the matter, but it was also a first sign of a change in Berlin’s posture. Eventually, Scholz announced his decision to supply Ukraine with 14 Leopard 2 battle tanks on 25 January. He did so alongside Joe Biden, who in turn announced a donation of 31 Abrams tanks. With this announcement, both countries have significantly asserted their stance on the war, as the tanks represent the most powerful direct offensive weapon provided to Ukraine so far. Given the scope of this decision and the implications it could have for German national security, it could be said that Scholz took this step reluctantly and in response to the pressures he and his cabinet have been under from several NATO members in recent weeks. Conversely, Russian officials have announced that bilateral ties with Berlin have been irreparably damaged and that this move has changed the nature of the war.
All in all, since Scholz’s Zeitenwende speech, Germany has provided €2 billion in aid to Ukraine, including border protection vehicles, reconnaissance drones, ambulances, tents, clothing, meals, and mine clearing systems, among others. Moreover, the country is expected to supply a further €2.2 billion in 2023 for security capacity building. The 14 Leopard 2 tanks also contribute to this effort.
Nevertheless, Germany’s foreign and defence policy has many aspects of continuity, even after undertaking a “U-turn”. Scholz has balanced his approach with a strong commitment to maintaining other German traditions in these policy areas. These key elements are encapsulated in the post-Cold War efforts to support international cooperation, European integration, and a rules-based international order, while remaining deeply committed to international institutions such as the UN and even the North Atlantic Treaty.
In the words of U.S. scholar Hal Brands, the German approach has been “evolutionary rather than revolutionary.” The concept of the Zeitenwende, even after the recent decisions on battle tanks, might actually be better understood as a 'turning point' in the speed of decision-making in public policy, in this case defence and security, rather than as a complete and unambiguous revolution. In addition, further obstacles to major change are likely to emerge when it comes to modernising the German military. According to Judy Dempsey, a Carnegie Europe non-resident Senior Fellow, the Ministry of Defence is affected by “deep structural issues”, such as “its bureaucracy, lack of a strategic military doctrine, and reluctance to embrace modernization.”
Meanwhile, several issues that pertain to German national security remain unresolved. Some are closely linked to the war in Ukraine, such as the question of energy supply. Beyond the dependence on Russian gas, which has officially ended according to Finance Minister Christian Lindner, a deeper crisis affecting the whole region has fueled local demand for candles, coal, and wood. Other pressing issues relate to relations with China: China's ambassador to Germany, Wu Ken, recently expressed concerns that the emergence of a new “ideology-based” German strategy towards Beijing could hamper bilateral cooperation and strain diplomatic ties.
Besides some of the novelties that the German defence policy has displayed, the traditional channels and means of shaping its direction remain in place. The Scholz-Macron meeting on 21 January was a public display of the chancellor’s and its counterpart's commitment to European unity and cooperation. Such demonstrations might reassure those concerned about Germany’s geopolitical position in a post-Ukraine war scenario, and might even reassure domestic stakeholders about the future stability of a responsible and timely implementation of the €100 billion Zeitenwende pledge.
Two months after the ceasefire, how has the situation in Tigray changed?
For nearly two years, Ethiopia’s Tigray region has been plagued by a conflict that has claimed the lives of an estimated 600,000 people, according to Olusegun Obasanjo, the African Union’s chief mediator in the peace talks.
From 1991 to 2018, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) – Tigray’s main political party – dominated Ethiopian national politics despite representing an ethnic minority in the country. The TPLF’ power began to wane in 2018 after Abiy Ahmed Ali became prime minister. Initially heralded as a peacemaker who could transcend ethnic divisions within Ethiopia, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for reaching a peace agreement with Eritrea. However, Abiy, while weakening the TPLF, began to consolidate his own power by delaying national elections and extending his first term as prime minister in June 2020. Three months later, the Tigray State Council defied federal orders and held parliamentary elections, raising concerns that it was preparing to become a breakaway state, thus increasing tensions between the region and the federal government. After the elections, Abiy accused Tigrayan troops of looting weapons from a federal military camp and began an offensive against regional troops in Tigray on 4 November 2020.
The war in Tigray is marked by its brutality. The UN Human Rights Council issued a report concluding that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Ethiopian federal governmen and its allies have committed crimes against humanity in Tigray, pointing to the withdrawal of basic services from the region, striking a refugee camp with an armed drone, and perpetrating sexual violence against Tigrayan civilians. The commission added that it also has reasonable grounds to believe that Tigrayan forces have committed war crimes and human rights violations during the conflict.
The conflict escalated in August 2022, but on 2 November 2022, the Ethiopian government and Tigrayan rebels signed a peace agreement in the hope of ending the war. Brokered by the African Union, the November ceasefire goes further than any other settlement attempt, with the TPLF and the Ethiopian federal government agreeing to a disarmament plan and the restoration of essential services. Since then, the situation has changed somewhat, with humanitarian aid reaching some, but not all, of the region, basic services restored, and the military ceasefire largely respected.
The ceasefire has been greeted with cautious optimism as previous settlements had failed, and Eritrea – a party in the conflict – was not represented at the peace talks. The ceasefire makes little provision for the role of Eritrea, which is neither a party to the agreement nor mentioned by name in the text. Jeffrey Feltman, former US special envoy for the Horn of Africa, argues that the international community should monitor the withdrawal of Eritrean troops from Ethiopia, as Asmara views the TPLF as “an existential threat and may not be content with a peace deal that leaves the organization intact and its leaders alive.” The Embassy of Eritrea in the USA responded to Feltman in an open letter, saying that his “underlying and transparent intentions are to stoke a new and wider war in the region.”
There are conflicting reports as to whether all Eritrean troops are withdrawing from Tigray. According to Obasanjo, “ all Eritreans are at the border,” but not all troops have left the country. His words were contradicted by Getachew Reda, the advisor to the President of Tigray, who tweeted “No; Eritrean forces are digging in their heels big time. And the #AU-JVMC are nowhere near. Let them go there & do their job first before such remarks are made!” In early December 2022, Eritrean troops were reported seizing food, vehicles and gold from more than two dozen towns in northern Tigray despite the ceasefire. Nonetheless, on 30 December 2022, Eritrean soldiers, who fought in support of Ethiopia’s federal government, reportedly withdrew from two major towns and headed for the border. This is indicative of what appears to be a military de-escalation. Political leaders are also taking steps to signal it. On 26 December 2022, a delegation from the Ethiopian federal government, led by the speaker of the House of Representatives, Tagesse Chafo, travelled to the northern region of Tigray to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement. It was the first high-level federal delegation to visit the region in two years.
As a result of the ceasefire, Obasanjo estimates that “we have stopped 1,000 deaths every day,” although the media reported that civilians were still being killed in early December 2022, a month after the ceasefire.
Some Tigrayans, according to Foreign Policy, have expressed dissatisfaction that the agreement stipulates the disarmament of the TPLF without addressing the root causes of the war. In their view, this will only create a weak Tigray, with the causes of the war still present and latent. Moreover, while the TPLF claims to have withdrawn 65 percent of its forces from the front lines, Tadesse Wereda, the TPLF’s commander-in-chief said that the organisation was still maintaining fighters in some places “where there is a presence of anti-peace forces.” He did not name these locations. Nevertheless, Tigrayan forces began handing over their heavy weapons in mid-January, with Getachew Reda tweeting that the Tigray government “hope[s] & expect[s] this will go a long way in expediting the full implementation of the agreement.”
The war in Tigray has created a humanitarian catastrophe that leaves more than 13 million people in northern Ethiopia dependent on humanitarian aid, including more than 90 percent of Tigray’s 6 million inhabitants. When the peace deal was announced, the World Health Organization estimated that there were around 5.2 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in Tigray, of whom 3.8 million required healthcare. No humanitarian assistance had reached the region for two months. Following the peace agreement, the World Food Programme (WFP) delivered more than 2,400 tonnes of food – enough to feed about 170,000 people – as well as medical, nutritional and other essential supplies, while the UN Humanitarian Air Service is operating in the region for the first time, carrying passengers and humanitarian aid. However, according to the WFP, deliveries were still below requirements on 25 November 2022. As of mid-January, humanitarian access, “particularly in border areas, areas off the main roads and locations requiring cross-line movements, continues to be challenging,” according to Tghat, a data collecting body in Tigray.
Banking services were suspended in Tigray during the war, further cutting the region off from international aid. Following the ceasefire, limited banking services returned in some parts of the region, allowing people to deposit money and receive it from abroad. The Commercial Bank of Ethiopia plans to restore services in all its branches if the conditions permit. Tigray’s dire economic situation extends beyond the banks, as large parts of the region need to be completely rebuilt. According to some estimates, reconstruction over the next three years is expected to cost more than $20 billion.
For much of the war, Tigray experienced a communications blackout that resulted in the “world’s longest uninterrupted shutdown,” according to the Internet rights group Access Now. In early December, Ethiopia’s electricity provider announced that the regional capital, Mekele, had been reconnected to the national power grid after more than a year of power cuts. Phone lines are beginning to be restored in the region, although areas under the control of Tigrayan forces are still cut off, while commercial flights have resumed between the Ethiopian federal capital Addis Ababa and Mekele. With some communication channels restored, people outside the region are only now beginning to learn what happened to their relatives. Restoring the social links between Tigray and the rest of Ethiopia is indicative of the overall changes taking place as a result of the ceasefire.
The security situation seems to be evolving as soldiers are withdrawing and the TPLF is disarming. Humanitarian aid is re-entering the region and the political structures overseeing the ceasefire seem to be respecting it. Nevertheless, the situation remains fraught. A ceasefire agreed upon in March 2022 reduced violence and allowed humanitarian aid to reach Tigray for five months until hostilities resumed.
In August 2022, as the first ceasefire collapsed, the TPLF demanded that the federal government restore essential services in Tigray, allow complete humanitarian access, be held accountable for war crimes, the withdrawal of foreign forces and the return of Western Tigray, which was under Amhara control. Some of these conditions appear stable under the current ceasefire, suggesting that it will be more durable than the one reached in August, but points of tension remain. The territorial dispute over Western Tigray remains unresolved, conflicting reports concerning the withdrawal of Eritrean troops suggest some are still present in the region, and the question of how to administer justice for alleged war crimes remains unanswered. Each of these elements could constitute a potential flashpoint in the future.
United in Hybridity - EU-NATO create a task force on resilience and critical infrastructure to face potential hybrid threats from Russia
As the proliferation of non-state actors, critical technologies, and energy markets have gained crucial leverage in international affairs, security concerns on both sides of the Atlantic have been multiplied and redefined. Hyper-connectivity between states has increased vulnerability worldwide. New emerging domains such as cyberspace have revisited fundamental ideas and concepts of security, conflict, and war. As a result, hybrid threats have become central to political agendas, particularly in the context of EU-NATO cooperation. According to Frank Hoffman, hybrid warfare mixes and blends conventional warfare with other sources of irregular warfare, such as cyber warfare, energy and financial markets, as well as disinformation, diplomacy, lawfare, and foreign electoral intervention. Unpredictability and transversality are fundamental characteristics of hybrid threats.
Hybrid threats have recently been recalled in the recent NATO and EU discourses. In fact, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept specifically mentions them 7 times as a priority for the Atlantic Alliance. That is why, on 10 January, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen agreed on a joint task force on resilience and critical infrastructure protection as part of their third joint declaration. “Resilience and the protection of critical infrastructure are a key part of our joint efforts, as we have seen both with President Putin’s weaponizing of energy and […] the sabotage of the North Stream pipelines,” Stoltenberg announced.
Both Stoltenberg and von der Leyen put this decision in the context of the sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines in September 2022, which was the result of the EU’s position in the face of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Hybrid warfare has fundamentally changed how war is waged - it now includes cyberattacks, export controls, economic sanctions, and disinformation, among other means. Nevertheless, the most concerning aspect of hybrid warfare is that Russia and China have increased their assertiveness through it. And NATO and the EU are aware of this.
As a direct response, both the Alliance and the EU have taken the initiative to ensure the energy security of the European continent. In 2021, the EU greatly depended on external energy markets, importing 83% of its natural gas. Since then, imports from Russia to the EU have been significantly reduced, and the EU has redefined and diversified its relations with other energy partners, such as Norway or Algeria. In order to support this decision, Washington has strategically increased its liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to the EU by more than 137% in almost a year. The White House and the Commission also announced last year the creation of a joint Task Force to reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels. It is important to note that countries like Portugal or Spain are not as dependent on the Russian energy market as Germany, which has led to differences in how to find a common response to the energy crisis. Solutions like the ‘Iberian exception’ to cap energy prices have been fundamental in addressing these differences.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO developed a new Strategic Concept at the 2022 Madrid Summit. It identifies Russia as the most significant and direct threat to the Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, which is the strongest concept used to describe Russia since 1991. It is also not the first time the EU has acted on hybrid threats: in November 2016, the European Commission and the High Representative adopted a Joint Framework to counter hybrid threats to foster the resilience of the EU. The vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure may differ from one Member State to another. Nevertheless, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, the EU Joint Framework, and the new EU-NATO task force have all agreed that energy security, space infrastructure, maritime security, public health, transport, cyber security, communications, and financial systems are the “critical infrastructures” vulnerable to hybrid threats.
The term hybrid is expected to be reinterpreted and revised over time. It should be perceived as an all-encompassing and evolving term aimed at addressing current security challenges, as opposed to conventional means. Hybrid threats break these well-defined guidelines of what is and what is not war. In 2010, when NATO introduced the term, there was no initial common understanding of what "hybrid warfare" meant within the Alliance.
This common understanding of hybrid threats is reflected in the document that the EU and NATO presented. The mutual understanding represents a political and diplomatic achievement, as it also integrates the EU’s strategic autonomy in the framework of Euro-Atlantic security and protection. Nevertheless, opinions within EU-NATO coordination have been diverse and often contradictory. Over the years, France has intended to boost the EU's defence industry with the clear aim of making the EU more strategically autonomous. Conversely, some Central and Eastern European countries, like Poland, do not agree with this. These Member States still see the US as the main guarantor of security on the European continent.
EU and NATO members (and allies) should expect to live with the uncertainty surrounding hybrid threats for some time, as there is now a risk of not measuring conflict and instability properly. Hybrid threats allow us to rethink some of the most pressing issues in international security under a different lens, such as the causes of terrorism and violent extremism around the world, as well as civil wars and social unrest in unstable political regimes.
If anything can be considered a threat, then what makes a threat significant? This question should be addressed in a transatlantic and comprehensive approach that can integrate deterrence and the military as well as the social and economic perspectives of states. What makes hybrid threats so unpredictable is that their causes are not short-term based, or solved by increased defence spending. They very often stem from structural causes: climate migration, economic inequality, unequal access to technologies, and lack of digital skills, as well as populism and far-right extremism, among others. In this sense, increasing national GDP in defence spending should not be the only solution to the development of European defence, as resilience in the face of hybrid threats requires a more integrated and transversal security perspective.
As a final assessment, the EU-NATO task force still needs to be properly developed, but a first step has been taken. As Madeleine Albright once stated, the debate on NATO's future has too often reduced the alliance's raison d'être to a one-dimensional international military organisation. Nevertheless, the political aspect cannot be forgotten. It is not only the EU that has served as a force for integration and reconciliation across the European continent. Not only did NATO contain the Soviet threat, but it also helped the EU deal with most of the internal conflicts within the Union: between France and Germany, Greece and Turkey, and Central and Eastern Europe in the post-Soviet space. Now, at the beginning of 2023, while the war in Ukraine is still going on, the EU and NATO have come together again with their third joint declaration. With a specific and dedicated space to harmonise all these differences, hybrid threats have become fundamental to political agendas, including creating a resilient European energy market and cyberspace. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fostered the transatlantic partnership in an unprecedented way, making it clear that NATO remains the backbone of the collective defence of the European continent and the Euro-Atlantic area.
War in Europe Accelerates Nordic Defence Cooperation - A Comprehensive Analysis of a Changing Nordic Region
As the war in Ukraine enters its tenth month, the geopolitical landscape of Europe is rapidly changing in response to the aggression. In particular, the war is fundamentally changing security policies in the Nordic region, strengthening beliefs in common security interests and investment priorities, and accelerating Nordic security and defence cooperation. These developments indicate a shift towards a higher level of geostrategic awareness among the Nordic countries, which shapes the dynamics of the regional security discourse.
These regional changes come at a time when Russia is increasing its efforts to taunt its Nordic neighbours. Relations between Norway and Russia have deteriorated in recent years due to increased hostile Russian activities. Norway has seen a surge of Russian drone activity around its critical infrastructure and sensitive facilities, which has resulted in diplomatic disputes between the two countries’ ambassadors. Furthermore, the sabotage of the Nord Stream II gas pipeline in September has increased the vigilance of the Nordic nations. Thus, the threat of infrastructure sabotage by an adversary strengthens the need to coordinate security policies between countries.
One of the measurable effects of the war is the increase in defence spending seen in all new budgets in the Nordic countries. The Norwegian government, led by Labour Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, recently released its new budget, providing for an increase of 7.2 billion Norwegian kroner (around USD 665 million) for its national defence. The country has also demonstrated its commitment to deterring Russia by circumventing its own laws and joining the EU in providing arms to Ukraine, justifying it by the extraordinary situation. Sweden seeks to increase its military spending to meet the NATO target of 2% of GDP by 2026, increasing its defence budget by USD 800 million for the 2023 budget. Finland has decided on a large boost of USD 2.2 billion over the next four years, as it considers that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally changed its security environment
The most important change seen after 24 February 2022, is the joint NATO application of Sweden and Finland. The accession of these two countries to the transatlantic defence alliance fundamentally changes the geopolitical orientation of European security and broadens the dimensions of security concerns of NATO members from Norway to the entire Nordic region. The increase in the number of countries operating within the NATO framework produces many opportunities to strengthen deterrence capabilities against an aggressive Russia and simplifies the ability of countries to integrate their defence capabilities to ensure a more secure Nordic region. Swedish and Finnish NATO membership will strengthen the voice of Northern European nations in the organisation and will increase the capability of other Atlantic-oriented members to promote their interests. This means that a geographical focus on the North could develop into a strategic priority for the organisation in the coming years, determined in large part by developments in the war in Ukraine.
However, other interesting developments illustrate accelerated Nordic efforts outside NATO. The five Nordic prime ministers met in Oslo on 15 August and issued a joint statement on increased cooperation in security and defence. In the statement, the countries listed their ambitions for further cooperation, including exploring opportunities for political cooperation on security issues in the region, actively contributing to the development and strengthening of NATO, and strengthening classified communication channels between relevant ministries and institutions. The statement explicitly mentions Russia’s war of aggression as a primary reason for the need to strengthen Nordic defence cooperation. This demonstrates how changing geopolitical circumstances are both transforming foreign and security policy doctrines within the EU, but also accelerating increased cooperation between the Nordic countries. Furthermore, a week before the meeting, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden established a framework for cooperation on matters of military equipment. This framework builds on a treaty ratified by the five countries in 2015, which at the time only regulated the main principles of cooperation related to military equipment.
Security cooperation in the Nordic region is not new. The process of integrating the Nordic military forces has been an objective since the formalisation of the NORDEFCO in November 2009. NORDEFCO was established in the wake of the 2009 financial crisis as an austerity measure to optimise defence expenditure. Nordic security and defence cooperation has traditionally been seen as a supplement to existing security frameworks rather than a necessity for the countries, as Norwegian and Danish defence coordination has been embedded within NATO, while Sweden and Finland have sought to operate independently. This has led to NORDEFCO being treated as a secondary structure in Nordic security and defence policy. However, following the war in Ukraine, Nordic countries are showing a renewed commitment to cooperate with each other. The Presidium of the Nordic Council recently hosted a meeting with the chair of NORDEFCO, Norwegian Minister of Defence Bjørn Arild Gram, along with the leaders of the Nordic parliamentary defence committees. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the future of Nordic defence cooperation, stressing that NORDEFCO should be updated within the framework of NATO.
The accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO will provide new opportunities for Nordic cooperation. Their expected membership will provide new areas for Nordic forces to operate in, more military bases, and aircraft. The Nordic countries alone will have 250 fighter jets, including about 150 F-35 jets and a considerable number of Swedish JAS 39 Gripen. Currently, the individual forces are coordinated separately by the air forces of their respective states. However, to further strengthen Nordic defence cooperation, military officials have called for an assessment of the possibilities of establishing a NATO military air headquarters in the Nordic region. Already in June 2022, a joint NATO air defence exercise involving Sweden and Finland was held, indicating optimism for further integration of Nordic air defence.
In addition to multilateral cooperation under NORDEFCO, bi- and trilateral agreements are also being negotiated to further integrate the Nordic militaries. On 22 November, Norway signed an agreement with Sweden and Finland, with the central objective of planning operations between the parties in strategically vulnerable areas, discussions, and scenario-based exercises in accordance with national operational plans and common security challenges. The possibilities for deepening ties between the Nordic defence institutions thus appear to be dynamic and multi-layered, providing flexibility for the different states to formalise their cooperation interests on different platforms.
In sum, developments in the region indicate a paradigm shift in the perception of the Nordic nations as a geopolitical region, which proves that there is a before and after 24 February 2022 in Europe. Although Nordic security cooperation in its current form is more of an alignment than an alliance, the evidence from this analysis suggests that the deepening of the cooperation through formal institutions offers opportunities to become a central element of European security collaboration in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine. Simultaneously, a more integrated common Nordic security and defence policy also has the potential to contribute to a stronger security community outside the region, as it can place the Nordic countries in a common European framework outside NATO. If this can be achieved, the region could experience an increased level of security, which is needed given its geostrategic situation.