Securitization and Sinicization: An Analysis of China’s Practices and Mechanisms
National security has long been a priority for China, particularly in its five autonomous regions and two special administrative regions. Since the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Mao set out to unify the ‘five nationalities’ – Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui (including Uyghur), and Tibetan – under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and maintain a political hold on these territories. Among these regions, Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Hong Kong have been focal sites of conflict and violence, and have seen the implementation of policies aimed at securitization, sinicization, and integration of their populations into the Han majority.
Sinicization, in particular, is a process or policy that seeks to assimilate ethnic minorities in China or neighbouring Asian communities into the culture, norms, language, lifestyle, and ethnic identity of Han Chinese. It is also carried out in the form of a nationwide campaign (specifically Xi’s ‘religious sinicization’ since 2017) in the hope of strengthening Chinese identity among diverse populations. China’s nation-building framework, modernisation, and marketisation since the 1980s have increased the pressure for sinicization and securitization efforts.
This article will analyse and compare the CCP’s mechanisms and practices in Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Hong Kong, including militarisation and policing, reeducation, cultural and linguistic repression/assimilation, educational reform, religious repression, demographic control, and surveillance technologies. This article focuses only on securitization and sinicization practices, and it is not the author’s intention to oversimplify the complex situations and histories of each of these regions.
Uyghurs in Xinjiang
In 2020, more than 12 million Uyghurs lived in the Xinjiang region of northwest China. The Turkic ethnic group is native to the region and culturally affiliated with Central and East Asia. The CCP considers the Turkic-speaking ethnic group, which is predominantly Muslim, a threat to national security because of “terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism” in northwestern Xinjiang. Efforts to combat these threats through sinicization and securitization have intensified under Xi’s 2014 ‘Strike Hard’ campaign’, pushing Uyghurs to conform to the party’s atheist doctrines and Han Chinese society. Repression against the Uyghurs can be traced back to the military occupations of the Han (206 BCE-220 CE) and Tang periods (618-907), which turned the region into a military garrison.
The economic relevance of the Xinjiang region
The economic importance of Xinjiang plays a role in China’s securitization and sinicization policies. China’s ‘One Black and One White Strategy’ in Xinjiang, – black for oil and white for cotton production –, is strongly linked to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The region is home to China’s largest oil and gas reserves: 16 billion tonnes are held in the Tarim Basin, and 1 billion tonnes were recently discovered in addition to the explored 100 million tonnes reserve in the Junggar Basin. 17 million tonnes of crude oil and natural gas were produced in 2022 alone. Xinjiang is also China’s largest cotton producer, supplying about 90% of the country’s cotton and about 6.1 million tonnes in 2022. The ‘Western Development Programme’(WDP), which has promoted urban industrialisation since the 1950s, has also been implemented more intensively in recent times. It aimed at a da kaifa (great development) to improve the conditions of minority populations and reduce the regional economic gap. On paper, the WDP has been a success, with Xinjiang's GDP taking off since 2000 and overall rising by 470%. However, observers note that the economic benefits of state-owned enterprises and the WDP primarily benefit Han settlers and that Uyghurs are mostly marginalised. The average income of Hans was RMB1,141 (US$165 in February 2023) compared to RMB892 (US$129) per month for Uyghurs in 2011. Many Uyghurs are also employed as forced labourers in textile manufacturing as part of poverty alleviation programmes. This shows the Han Chinese disproportionately benefit from and dominate the Xinjiang economy. This has led many to believe that the WDP is an instrument of sinicization.
Demographic control
Demographic control through the resettlement of Han Chinese in the region began during the Qing occupation period between the 1750s to the early 1900s, long before the CCP was established and Xinjiang became an autonomous region. The Qing regime hoped that resettlement would consolidate its authority over the region, expand its tax base, and improve the living conditions of some Han Chinese. While the Han made up only 7% of Xinjiang’s population in 1949, the de facto Han population in Xinjiang exceeded 45% by 1990 (other minority groups such as Miao, Yi and Buyi have mostly assimilated into Han society) as the lucrative opportunities of the WDP attracted settlers. Han resettlement has been concentrated in Xinjiang’s eight largest cities (with over 300, 000 population– Urumchi, Shihanza, Aksu, Kumul, Sanji, Korla, Gulja, and Kashgar), which were 67% Han, compared to 23.1% Uyghurs in 2000. Some cities, such as Shihanza even had a Han population of over 95%. These cities are the developed urban centres of Xinjiang, where most industrial and economic enterprises are located. In contrast, 85.4% of Uyghurs lived in Xinjiang’s poorest rural areas (Hotan, Kizilsu, Aksu, and Kashgar), compared to only 11.3% of Han Chinese in 2000. Uyghurs make up the majority of the rural population of Xinjiang. Their traditional agricultural lifestyle and economy also depend on the needs of the Han-dominated urban areas, which set the prices for the raw materials produced by the Uyghurs. The rapid urbanisation of Xinjiang’s cities, the preponderance of Han Chinese in these cities, and the use of Uyghur labour in economic enterprises are exploiting and displacing the Uyghur way of life. In addition, the average annual income per capita was RMB1,600 (US$232 in February 2023) in the rural areas, only 32% of the urban income of RMB5,000 (US$725). The demarcation of two types of economies shows the stated objectives of the WDP may have been a facade.
Furthermore, the state-owned Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) manages about one-sixth of the region’s territories and population, making it one of the largest economic, political, and paramilitary entities in the region. With at least 2,873 companies operating within it, the XPCC coordinates agriculture, construction, commerce, mining, and most of the state’s economic activities in Xinjiang. The XPCC expansion and the mobilisation of Han settlers are estimated to have contributed to 18.3% of the region’s population growth in the last decade.
Population control is another mechanism used to reduce the proportion of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. In addition to birth-control orders, many Uyghur women, including those in re-education centres, have reported being subjected to forced sterilisations and intrauterine device insertions. Various reports have revealed that population growth rates have declined by 84% between 2015 and 2018, and continue to decline in areas with the highest Uyghur populations.
Securitization and surveillance
China’s advanced surveillance systems have been widely implemented to securitise the region. Observers and journalists have reported the implementation of a grid management system and a multitude of facial-recognition cameras, where squares of 500 inhabitants are closely monitored by a police station. In Kashgar and Hotan, poles with eight to ten cameras can be found every 100 to 200 metres on the streets. Police checkpoints were also found every hundred metres in Kashgar. Police officers routinely scan identity documents, take photographs and fingerprints, and inspect residents' mobile phones. Citizens' biometric data is also stored under the ‘Physicals for All’ programme and collected in a database called the ‘Integrated Joint Operations Programme’. Artificial intelligence is used to report any illegal activity. As a result, over 15,000 residents were placed into week-long detentions after being targeted by the software in June 2017. Information is also collected on Uyghurs abroad, and more than 1,500 Uyghurs have been detained, deported to China, and arrested by foreign governments under pressure from Beijing.
The CCP is investing heavily in securitization and policing in Xinjiang. Since 2014, party members have been staying in Uyghur homes to monitor any “extremist” behaviour and report religious activities. Officials have destroyed mosques and the selling of halal food has been discouraged. Apart from being an economic entity, the XPCC is also a paramilitary organisation. It has its own military force, which could be easily mobilised alongside the many People’s Liberation Army units stationed there. Residents fear them for their violent tactics and their power to jail dissidents. In addition to running prisons, they are also responsible for building and running re-education centres and forced labour programmes. Observers believe that Uyghurs have been placed in “reeducation centres” since 2014 and that these re-education efforts intensified in 2017. Human Rights Watch estimates that more than one million people have been convicted since 2017, often on terrorism-related charges.
Cultural assimilation
Linguistic repression and assimilation are other sinicization and securitization mechanisms used to gradually eliminate all Central Asian, Soviet, and religious influences in the region. The Uyghur language, based on the Arabic system and tinged with Islamic influence, underwent a process of reform, and was slowly suppressed as part of Chinese policies. Since 1956, the minority languages have been reformed to the Soviet Cyrillic alphabet, and then the New Alphabet in the 1960s, to bring them closer to the Chinese phonetic alphabet and writing system. Eventually, the Chinese alphabet (pinyin) and Chinese loan words were introduced into the Uyghur language to get rid of words with religious connotations. The teaching of Chinese in schools became compulsory in the 1970s, and teenagers were encouraged to attend Han schools, thus facilitating assimilation. Uyghurs were further pressured to learn Chinese as the Uyghur language was discouraged from everyday use, and no longer accepted in the economic and public sectors, in local universities, and even in institutional documents. Even in Uyghur academic circles and primary and secondary schools, the use of the language is rapidly declining. Han schools generally have better resources, teaching staff, funding, infrastructure and a higher teacher/student ratio than Uyghur schools. While Han schools may provide better quality education for Uyghur children, the lack of improvement in the Uyghur education system shows that the CCP's policies on minority education are not concerned with protecting minority languages and lifestyles.
Conclusion
As discussed above, the mechanisms of sinicization and securitisation of Uyghurs in Xinjiang have been implemented under the guise of modernisation and urbanisation. They have led to marginalisation, poverty, inequality and environmental degradation, thus seriously undermining the Uyghur way of life. While the benefits that modern facilities have brought to the region should not be overlooked, the Uyghurs have been little consulted or included in the process.
Tibet
Religious and Cultural Repression
Since Mao’s invasion of Tibet in the 1950s, the CCP has attempted to securitise and sinicise the region. Religious and cultural repression has intensified since 2010, particularly the repression of Tibetan Buddhism. More than 6,000 monasteries have been destroyed, notably during the Cultural Revolution. The crackdown extended to mainland China, where thousands of residences were destroyed in a Tibetan Buddhist centre in Sichuan, displacing 6,000 monks and nuns. Furthermore, the selection of the fifteenth Dalai Lama was controlled, and other religious sect leaders were groomed by Chinese officials. In the past 2 decades, citizens have been punished for attending monasteries or engaging in religious activities, such as the withdrawal of social assistance and subsidies. Local officials also banned the possession or display of images of the Dalai Lama and monitored religious festivals. Authorities launched a “behavioural reform” programme in 2020 with the aim of eradicating Tibetan traditions. As a result, the authorities ordered the destruction of all prayer flags.
Population Control
Population control and resettlement were also implemented for securitization and sinicization purposes in Tibet. The resettlement of Tibetans to urban housing began in 2003 under the ‘Build a New Socialist Countryside’ plan and accelerated in 2009. The expropriated land was mostly used for infrastructure development and resource extraction projects to meet China’s energy production and carbon reduction goals, such as the building of a dam in Yennom and a highway in Dechen. Over two million Tibetans were rehoused in new townhouses and 50,000 Tibetan nomadic herders were settled in ‘New Socialist Villages’ by 2013.
Although Tibetans have access to schools, electricity, and healthcare in the relocated areas, Human Rights Watch and the United Nations Human Rights Council have criticised the policy as coercive and lacking in consultation, arguing that it failed to provide adequate compensation, failed to restore livelihoods, and “increased poverty, environmental degradation, and social breakdown.” Many relocated Tibetans were displaced again in 2016 when the authorities turned their homes into tourist centres and housing for government employees. Deprived of their original land, communities, and ways of life, Tibetans, especially nomads who rely on pastures and forests for their livelihood, struggled as they were forced to settle in cities with a Han majority. Government-sponsored Han resettlement in Tibet was similarly implemented through the WDP in the 1980s. Although there is no official data on the proportion of Han Chinese resettled, many locals claim that the Han population and signs of Han Chinese life in Tibet continue to grow.
Linguistic Assimilation
Since 1985, Tibetan students have been encouraged to receive an education in Han Chinese in state-run boarding schools (neidi), thus isolating them from Tibetan religious and cultural influences. The Tibetan language was reformed to bring it closer to the Chinese writing system in the 1960s, and Chinese language instruction was made compulsory. Although the Tibetan language has been subject to less reform and repression than the Uyghur languages, its use is strongly discouraged. For instance, a man was arrested and placed in a re-education centre after police intercepted a call in which he discussed the importance of preserving the Tibetan language. The Tibetan language remains marginalised in education and public arenas, which pushes young people to learn Chinese as they risk reducing their chances of employment if they choose to stay on the Tibetan education path. Many also believe that the Tibetan education system, which benefits from China’s aid programmes, is increasingly assimilative and neglects local languages, histories, and ethnic identities.
Securitization and Surveillance
Chinese police forces and surveillance personnel have been found to be monitoring residents and monasteries for any opposition activity. This surveillance extends to digital spaces. As part of the ‘Benefit the Masses’ campaign launched in 2011 to improve the living standards of people living in rural areas, the CCP sent over 20,000 officials and party members to live in more than 5,000 Tibetan villages as “village-based cadres”. They collect information on residents, develop security schemes, and discuss topics about the CCP with residents. The DNA of residents of the Tibetan municipalities is also collected for policing purposes, and facial recognition software was implemented for monitoring.
Conclusion
While surveillance and religious repression are commonplace, linguistic repression and “cultural genocide”, in the words of the Dalai Lama, seem less extreme than in Xinjiang. To some extent, Tibetan cultural life is preserved in the diaspora communities, but the CCP’s securitization and sinicization efforts have and continue to subvert many Tibetan traditions and ways of life.
Inner Mongolia
Inner Mongolia was colonised by Chinese warlords in the early 1900s, and integration mechanisms were put in place during the Republican period (1912-1949). There were about 4.61 million Mongols living in Inner Mongolia in 2020, only 18% of the region’s 25.7 million inhabitants. Land reforms in the early 1900s redistributed Mongol land to the majority Han Chinese in Inner Mongolia, displacing many Mongols from their homes and eroding their nomadic herding lifestyle. During the Cultural Revolution, mass violence was committed against the Mongols, mostly against members of the self-determination and independence Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party – a party promoting self-determination and independence and supported by Outer Mongolia – and symbols of Mongol culture were destroyed. Accused of separatism, an estimated 2 million Mongols were arrested and tens of thousands were killed. The Cultural Revolution subverted Mongolian pastoral society, Mongolian nationalism, and traditional customs and cultures. Lamaism practices and traditional dresses were practically eradicated as a result.
Cultural and Linguistic Repression
Although there have been no re-education camps or violent mass arrests in Inner Mongolia, cultural and linguistic repression has prevailed. More and more Mongolian language inscriptions, statues, and cultural symbols have been altered or destroyed since 2020. Further education reforms were also enforced in 2020: Mongolian materials were removed, Chinese replaced Mongolian as the medium of instruction, and patriotism classes were introduced. Protests, boycotts and sit-ins following these reforms led to arrests and intimidation. 129 protesters identified by security cameras in Horqin district were sought by police, four were arrested in Bayun Nur city, parents of children involved in the boycotts in Tongliao were threatened with suspension of pay and investigation, and six officials from the Xilin Gol League were sanctioned for failing to quell the protests. As in Xinjiang and Tibet, pressure was put on students to learn Chinese to remain competitive in the labour market.
Securitization and Sinicization
Securitizing and sinicizing the Inner Mongols may have been less challenging for the CCP than securing and sinicising the Uyghurs in Xinjiang or the Tibetans for several reasons. The dispersed nature of nomadic Mongols potentially affects their capacity to mobilise on a large scale. Even in the eastern part of Inner Mongolia where most Mongols are concentrated, they make up less than half the population. For example, in 1995, Tongliao city had only 36.6% Mongolians and Hinggan prefecture 17.6%. They also lived among the Han and were integrated into their culture early on. Furthermore, the Mongols do not have a central political leader like the Muslim Uyghur leaders or the Tibetan Dalai Lama. Besides the lack of a strong religious identity, it was difficult for anyone to rally and build strong Mongol influence or resistance. Lastly, the Mongols are one of two ethnic groups to have exercised dynastic power over China and to have been part of China since the Qing Dynasty in the 17th century, which gives them a greater historical affinity. Inner Mongolia is also geographically closer to Beijing, and the long history of Inner Mongolia being a separate state from Mongolia has allowed the Mongols to have a different trajectory in constructing their identity. As a result, Inner Mongolians’ belief that they enjoy better economic well-being than (Outer) Mongolia, the Outer Mongolians’ rejection of Inner Mongolians as proper Mongols, and a closer affiliation with Chinese national identity and citizenship have resulted in a unique Chinese-Inner Mongolian identity. However, although the Inner Mongolians are perceived as less of a separatist threat, China continues its securitization and sinicization efforts in the region.
Hong Kong
Since Hong Kong's return to China in 1997, after 99 years as a British colony, the Chinese government has increasingly focused on the securitization and sinicization of the territory for national security reasons. Most Hong Kong residents are not ethnic minorities, have no strong religious affiliations, and many identify as Chinese culturally. However, since the 2000s, the Special Administrative Region has seen a growth in localist identities, a decline in political identification as Chinese, and protests for democratic reforms, which the CCP sees as a threat.
Education Reforms and Linguistic Assimilation
Education reform, nationalistic practices, and perceived linguistic assimilation have been implemented in Hong Kong. Putonghua (Mandarin) as the medium of instruction was introduced in 2009 to replace the use of traditional Cantonese to teach Chinese. While it was optional for schools, many saw it as an attempt to replace Cantonese. This view was reinforced after the removal of the Cantonese language from the local university entrance exam (Diploma of Secondary Education) in 2020. The CCP has also tried to introduce a national education curriculum since 2012, similar to the patriotism courses introduced in Inner Mongolia. This led to mass protests, with many fearing that the curriculum would brainwash students with nationalist and patriotic ideas. Although the government withdrew the curriculum after the protests, it re-launched the implementation of national education in 2021, starting with universities. This was accompanied by ordinances making flag-raising ceremonies and the singing of the national anthem in schools mandatory.
Securitization and Surveillance
The degree of security was higher in the 2000s, as pro-democracy protests and protests against CCP encroachment policies affected the city. The National Security Law introduced in 2019 allowed the CCP to jail dissidents and tightened control over the media, electoral, and legal systems. More than a million protesters were arrested. In addition to a higher degree of policing, observers believe that surveillance has been widely used in the wake of the backlash, including filming protests and using facial recognition technology to identify protesters. There have also been instances of anti-government, doxxing, and protest-related websites, such as those of advocacy groups Hong Kong Democracy Council, HKChronicles, and Hong Kong Watch, and phone signals being blocked. In 2023, residents were also required to provide identification and register their real names to purchase SIM cards. Although the securitisation and sinicization of Hong Kong are still in their early stages compared to other regions, citizens are concerned about the increased surveillance and securitization efforts.
‘Mainlandization’ and Regional Assimilation
‘Mainlander’ settlement and economic assimilation have also been implemented in Hong Kong. Scholars argue that the CCP is attempting to assimilate Hong Kong in a process known as ‘mainlandization’. In the 1980s, 150 daily quotas of ‘one-way permits’ were introduced to allow mainlanders to settle in Hong Kong. There were around 50,000 new settlers per year between 2016 and 2018. The Guangdong-HK-Macau Greater Bay Area was introduced in 2017 to create an integrated economic powerhouse of nine Chinese cities. This framework encourages residents to study and work within the area, facilitating greater regional and economic assimilation. The Individual Visit Scheme introduced in 2003 had a similar result, allowing travellers from most cities in China to visit Hong Kong for up to seven days. This has increased mobility between the mainland and Hong Kong: in March 2004, 1.47 million mainland travellers visited Hong Kong. The number increased tenfold, reaching 17.2 million in December 2006 and exceeding 40 million in 2013. These policies sparked fear of a decline in Hong Kong’s economic autonomy as the economies of Hong Kong and China became increasingly intertwined, and mainlanders were allowed to buy properties and run businesses in Hong Kong. Even if these policies are politically motivated, they blur the “physical, social, cultural and psychological border between Mainland China and Hong Kong.”
Conclusion
Over the years, the Chinese government has sought to increase securitization, sinicization and ‘mainlandization’, and to centralise state control over Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Hong Kong. These efforts have been characterised by mechanisms of resettlement, demographic control, religious repression, cultural and linguistic repression/assimilation, education reforms, as well as policing and surveillance – whether or not their original aims were political.
Critics have argued that these practices resemble internal colonialism or modern colonialism, where state practices are legitimised through groups being represented as sources of insecurity or through the use of official narratives of cultural backwardness. Others argue that these policies are simply about nation-building to safeguard national unity and social stability. Despite efforts to modernise infrastructure and increase economic activities in these regions, they often result in the marginalisation of minority groups and the erosion of their traditional customs and ways of living, both in the past and present. It is important to recognise that the realities of China’s mechanisms and their effects on the regions’ inhabitants are multiple and cannot be reduced to simplistic narratives.
The CCP’s securitization and assimilation efforts in these regions have drawn international attention and strained China’s bilateral and global relations, particularly with Western nations such as the US and UK. In addition to repeated condemnations by governments and international organisations for human rights violations, China has also suffered economic repercussions. G7 trade ministers, the European Parliament, and UN joint statements have taken steps to stop trade with any “...use of forced labour in global supply chains.” The US has sanctioned Chinese officials and companies in Xinjiang, and the UK and other Western countries banned imports of goods made in the region. Many international corporations have also ended cooperation with Xinjiang companies or left Hong Kong to avoid compromising their economic autonomy. While the deterrence and boycotts by governments and companies may indicate a decrease in trade and foreign investments in China, its economy remains strong as its annual foreign direct investment has continued to grow in recent years.
Lastly, the importance of understanding these mechanisms extends beyond China’s borders. As one of the leading developers, producers and exporters of AI, China has exported many of these surveillance technologies to governments and private companies around the world, particularly in the Belt and Road countries. This poses another security concern, as autocracies and fragile democracies, especially those with little domestic AI investment or experiencing political unrest, are more likely to import Chinese surveillance technologies. If they are used for mass surveillance or repression of political dissent as in Xinjiang, Pakistan, or Zimbabwe, China’s leadership in the global AI trade risks strengthening surveillance regimes and autocracies.