Navigating the Eastern Flank: The Role of Poland and the Baltic Countries in EU-NATO Security Strategy
Introducing the Eastern Flank’s deterrence strategy against Russia
When Russia extended its military support to the secessionist paramilitary republics of the Donbas on 21 February 2022, preluding the full-scale invasion of Ukraine three days later, Russian President Vladimir Putin gave a speech denouncing the allegedly historically unjust borders established during and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. From the Russian perspective, this is considered the greatest tragedy of the 20th century, as the “Western liberal order” has deprived Russia of its perceived “historic homeland”. Putin also claimed responsibility for protecting Russians who have been “deprived of their homeland” and Russian-speaking citizens who live far from their nation.
At the Munich conference in 2007, Putin gave one of his most famous speeches, which can now be understood very differently after the start of the war in Ukraine. He notably said: “Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force, military force, in international relations, a force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts, [...] this is extremely dangerous. It results in the fact that no one feels safe.”
Putin’s sense of “injustice” and “insecurity” is the rationale behind the Kremlin’s propaganda and disinformation strategy to justify the invasion of Ukraine. Putin’s rhetoric tends to suggest that he may have wider aspirations to re-establish control over other former parts of the Russian Empire, not only Ukraine. This is why Poland and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) are existentially worried. This region, often referred to as “the eastern flank” by NATO, shares a common history and a geographical space, as well as a common existential threat from Russia’s geopolitical ambitions. However, they also share a common deterrence strategy, which will be explained below.
The eastern flank countries are unique in that they all share borders with Russia, either with the mainland or with the semi-exclave of Kaliningrad. Lithuania and Poland are geographically vulnerable to Russian attempts to assert control across the narrow Suwalki Corridor linking Kaliningrad to Belarus, where Russia has a military presence. In the case of Estonia and Latvia, the sense of threat depends not only on geographical proximity but also on a common identity and cultural struggle within the post-Soviet space. Returning to Putin’s speech, Russia's self-proclaimed right to protect Russian speakers and citizens abroad raises suspicions about Moscow's long-term ambitions toward the Baltic states and Poland. Estonia and Latvia are particularly concerned, as approximately a quarter of their respective populations are native Russian speakers. In this sense, Russia is perceived as a common threat, but with specificities for each country.
Context and chronology of the events
In 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the Baltic states and Poland began to develop a strategy to deter Russia and strengthen their ties with the West. This strategy was based on NATO enlargement and the Article 5 collective security umbrella. Poland joined NATO in 1999 and the Baltic countries in 2004. Despite enlargement, Russia was still seen by many Western European countries as a potential partner in international security efforts, especially on issues related to nuclear non-proliferation and counterterrorism in the framework of the OSCE.
However, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a game-changer, with Polish and Baltic concerns becoming more prominent than before. In particular, Poland and the Baltic States have pushed the EU and NATO to adopt a more confrontational approach towards Russia. The first significant change came at the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014, with NATO countries agreeing to increase their defence spending by 2% of GDP by 2024 in the Summit. This is what the US called a “credible commitment” against declining defence spending and free rider attitudes within the alliance. After the Summit, the NATO Response Force (NRF), which was created in 2003, was upgraded with the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) as a renewed force comprising land, air, and sea, with a focus on improving readiness and responsiveness to Russia.
The requirement to spend 2% of GDP on defence is gaining importance with the war in Ukraine. Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are already complying with the requirement, with the objective to raise it to 3% in 2024. Along with the US, Poland, and the Baltic countries are pushing other NATO member states to invest more in defence, beyond the 2% threshold, as they consider this to be the minimum requirement for NATO and EU members after the invasion of Ukraine. Yet, many of them remain behind the 2% GDP defence spending target.
At the heart of the defence spending imbalance is the difference in approach to the EU strategic autonomy as a political project and its role in European security. The EU Strategic Autonomy was the centrepiece of HRVP Mogherini’s 2016 EU Global Strategy, which was welcomed by all EU member states, but without a clear understanding of what it meant. In reality, not all EU countries are on the same page. This difference is mainly divided between the Western countries, which welcomed the term, and post-Soviet countries, which are more sceptical, as they lean more towards Atlanticism and the US as the guarantor of Europe’s defence. In Poland and the Baltic States, the idea of EU strategic autonomy also relies on a stronger European defence, especially in support of Ukraine. For instance, at the Special European Council in Brussels on 9 February 2023, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas spoke of the need to use an approach comparable to that used for the procurement of COVID-19 vaccines for defence contracts to support Ukraine's military capabilities.
Russia’s alleged interference in the 2016 US elections also fuelled mistrust and tensions between NATO and Russia. That same year, at the NATO Summit in Warsaw, Poland pushed for NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP), which approved the rotation of four multinational battalions in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. This strategy was aimed at deterring potential Russian aggression on NATO's eastern flank.
The Eastern Flank and NATO’s response after February 2022
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the allies adopted a new NATO Force Model (NFM) as well as a new Strategic Concept at the Madrid Summit in June 2022. The NFM is a high-readiness force of more than 300,000 troops, a significant increase from the 40,000 high-readiness troops of the existing NATO Response Force. The NFM, which is expected to be fully operational this year, comprises 100,000 soldiers deployable within 10 days, and a further 200,000 within 10 to 30 days, to have a rapid and reactive military force. The new model calls for an additional 500,000 troops to be deployed between 30 and 180 days, bringing the total number to at least 800,000 troops. In addition, the allies have indicated their intention to increase the number of troops on the ground from battalion-size (between 1,000 and 1,500) to brigade-size (around 4,000) “where and when required”. Once fully operational, the NFM will significantly enhance NATO’s responsiveness to possible threats, especially from Russia. In the context of the war in Ukraine, the NFM is expected to protect NATO’s eastern flank and its borders with Russia.
Poland and the Baltic states have been key partners in achieving such a defence effort within NATO, as evidenced by the VJTF and the NFM. Nevertheless, military mobility remains a topic on which the four countries and NATO disagree. Efforts to deter Russia in the eastern flank rely mainly on rotating multinational battalions. This has been an issue for Poland and the Baltics since the annexation of Crimea. They have been requesting NATO to establish a more substantial and sustained presence on their soil, and on a permanent basis instead of multinational battalions. The White House has been supporting this request since last year and has recently opened its first military garrison in Poland, in line with their demands. This is the first US permanent base on NATO’s eastern flank and can influence the future of the eastern flank’s deterrence strategy against Russia.
The eastern flank is claiming agency and organising itself, both inside and outside NATO. On 31 January 2023, the foreign ministers of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland signed a collective statement in Riga, Latvia, to enhance their cooperation on security matters in the context of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Specifically, the ministers agreed on common positions to be defended within the EU and NATO to ensure sustained assistance to Ukraine and additional sanctions against Russia.
Since joining the European Union in 2004, the eastern flank leaders have warned Europe of the growing danger posed by Russia. Specifically, Poland has taken a leading position in strengthening Europe's response to Putin's ambitions, due to the country's long-standing trauma of Russian expansionism in its tsarist and Soviet forms. Poland also possesses a stronger military than the Baltic States, which explains its central role in deterring Russia and the fact that it has been the EU country that has supplied the most military equipment to Ukraine since the beginning of the war.
Poland and the Baltic states have raised the bar, set standards, and pushed other European countries to strengthen their humanitarian response to Ukrainian refugees and victims of forced displacement. Since the beginning of the invasion, Poland has hosted the largest number of refugees within its borders, with almost 1.6 million refugees benefiting from the Temporary Protection scheme or other forms of national protection. In this sense, we find a causal link in the response: the countries that provide the most military aid to Ukraine in terms of share of GDP are also those most involved in refugee protection. These countries are Poland, the Baltic countries, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and the United States, which demonstrates an integrated and comprehensive response, both military and humanitarian.
Risk assessment and outlooks for European security
Given its strategy to strengthen its defence capabilities, the eastern flank also faces an important cost in terms of the region's economic stability. The European Commission has stated that Poland’s GDP growth will fall from 0.7 to 0.4%, as high inflation rates and low consumer confidence will continue to impact Polish economic cycles. Nevertheless, we should expect to see a GDP growth of 2.4% for the Polish economy in 2024, which gives a good outlook for Poland’s long-term economic performance. The situation is quite different for the Baltic states. They are expected to suffer more severe and greater economic and social repercussions due to their involvement in Ukraine. From military aid to Ukraine to enforcing sanctions against Russia, and even against China in the case of Lithuania, this will come at a cost to the Baltic countries. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are facing declining GDP growth rates due to mounting inflation. There is a substantial reduction in the average GDP growth rate from 5.0% in 2021 to 1.6% in 2022, and a growth rate of 0.4% is forecast for 2023 in the Baltic countries.
Given how the eastern flank is central to the security of the European continent, it is concerning to see the difference between the eastern flank and the western countries in the management of the Ukrainian crisis. This has a cost for the domestic economies of these countries, but also for the traditional powers, the UK, France, and Germany, whose central role in transatlantic relations is changing. The leadership of Poland and the Baltic states in deterring Russia sets an interesting precedent for the future of European security, which will be based in the East for some time to come.