Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Border Clashes: Another Opportunistic Advance?
Nearly 100 have been killed in border clashes between the two Central Asian states of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the past week, a significant escalation in a decades-long tension. The conflict arose primarily in the Batken and Osh regions, which Tajikistan has invaded, according to Kyrgyz state media. However, around half of the 970km-long border area has been contested by both states since their independence from the Soviet Union.
The border clashes began on 14 September, and death tolls on both sides have been rising since. The latest official number from Kyrgyz authorities from Sunday, 18 September indicate that 46 have died, meanwhile Tajik authorities have been less transparent, although Facebook posts from the Foreign Ministry indicate 35 have died. Tajik authorities claim civilians have been wounded, but have not published numbers. In addition to official deaths, hundreds have been wounded and both sides have accused each other of using tanks, mortars, rocket artillery, and drones against civilian areas and settlements. In response, Kyrgyzstan evacuated 136,000 people from conflict areas, in what state media calls an invasion, alleging that those without military insignia participated on the Tajik side in the attacks.
A ceasefire was achieved on Friday, 16 September although both sides continued fighting and accusing one another of breaching the agreement. The night of September 17 passed without significant fighting, and Kyrgyz state media reported that some evacuees started returning home on Sunday.
Both Russian President Vladimir Putin and UN Secretary-General António Guterres have called for an end to the violence and upkeep of the ceasefire, with Putin phoning both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s leaders to urge them to find a diplomatic resolution. Russia has historically played a mediating role in the tension, even after both states’ independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. A similar international outcry occurred just last year when another set of clashes erupted – the deadliest in the pair’s history – with 160 Kyrgyz casualties and fears of a full-fledged conflict.
While the most recent border clashes are of significant concern, the history of conflict between the two Central Asian states indicates a somewhat routine and expected outbreak of conflict. However, for both the 2021 and last week’s clashes, no official explanation has been provided by either side, although Kyrgyz state media continues to say that the most recent attacks constituted a planned military action that violates international law. Given the lack of published data from the Tajik authorities on casualties and explanations for the conflict, it remains challenging to interpret the position of Tajikistan apart from continually blaming Kyrgyzstan for escalation.
Yet, the timing of the border clashes alludes to a larger trend in using Russia’s preoccupation in Ukraine to advance the position of regional alliances and individual states’ territorial aspirations. The recent and continuing violence between Azerbaijan and Armenia is a prime example of this. Although not as direct as Azerbaijan and Armenia’s conflict, Moscow’s historic mediating power between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan could very well be a core pillar that allowed this round of clashes to be so deadly. Furthermore, the striking similarities with the 2021 outburst could suggest that Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are becoming used to more routine violence; if this is the case, the region could see more semi-permanent evacuations and a reshaping of the contested border landscape. Both states are members of the Russian-led CSTO, which has condemned both sides for continued violence, meaning that either state cannot overstep its regional influence without serious intervention from the transnational body.
Looking at the short term, the ceasefire achieved on Friday night shows signs of becoming gradually more stable as Kyrgyz communities move back into homes from evacuation and reports from both sides of violence are decreasing significantly. While Russia played a larger role in the 2021 conflict, it is unlikely that current conditions will require sustained diplomatic intervention from Moscow. However, the trend of regional players taking advantage of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to launch small-scale conflicts over territory is troubling and highlights the weakness of the region in relying primarily on Moscow as a diplomatic hegemon. While long-term sustained conflict between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is unlikely, the regional and global position of Russia in the ongoing Ukraine war will send shockwaves across former Soviet Union territories. The continued weakening of Russia through sanctions and international condemnation could likely translate into a more unstable region that becomes more focused on local territory battles in favour of regional stability – a stability once upheld by Moscow.
Receding Water and Growing Tensions in Central Asia
In the 30 years since the collapse of the USSR, Central Asia has seen over 20 conflicts between at least two of the five countries that comprise the region – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – or two or more communities from these different states. Although the conflicts varied from country to country, water has played, at least in part, a major triggering role. With factors such as climate change, overexploitation, and diverging interests between upstream and downstream states, the demand for the region’s limited water supply has increased rapidly. Coupled with the lack of any unified and coherent inter-state cooperation to address water insecurity, relations in Central Asia have become strained, which will contribute to more local, and even regional, conflicts. Water shortages have already started to hamper economic growth and, without a greater effort to manage and use water more efficiently in Central Asia, the five republics will find themselves struggling to survive.
Although Central Asia’s mountains act as the region's water towers, feeding the two main rivers, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya in abundance, water availability issues arise from accessibility rather than scarcity. The disintegration of the Soviet resource-sharing system has led to disputes over water management between upstream Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, home to the sources of the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya, and downstream Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. A divergence of interests and policies follows the increasing demand and the rise of nationalistic calls for the securitisation of water supplies for states’ own needs. In this context, ‘water-rich but energy-poor’ upstream states use hydropower dams to power the state, while ‘water-poor but energy-rich’ downstream states require water for their agricultural economies. This situation causes disputes to arise, such as Uzbekistan’s disapproval of Tajikistan’s Rogun Hydropower Plant Project which Uzbekistan claims limits the irrigation of its cotton crops. Access to water is also used to leverage and defend political interests. Upstream countries have been known to cut off the flow of water to downstream ones during times of contention and often in response to the latter withholding gas and electricity to their neighbours when payments are late. This cycle of reprisal only serves to increase tensions and hinder regional cooperation, which is increasingly required.
Whilst dams can be tools to enforce stability through managing river flow to avoid droughts and floods and ensure energy access, the absence of robust institutional governmental arrangements and scientific communities to inform them means no mutually beneficial solution can be reached. Moreover, current bilateral and multilateral agreements tend to be imprecise and poorly enforced, although efforts are being made, such as those by Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who has concluded border demarcation agreements with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and lifted objections to the Orto-Tokoi reservoir and Farhad hydroelectric power station.
Yet, competing interests are not the only threat to water security in the region. The overexploitation of natural resources and the role of climate change in diminishing already limited resources presents a risk of reduced water accessibility. This will hit farming communities and agricultural economies the hardest, whose livelihoods depend on the irrigation networks that support their agricultural way of life. According to studies, the mean annual temperatures in Central Asia are expected to rise. Additionally, the mean monthly river discharge is expected to decrease in the summer months of this century. The threat of water scarcity will only increase. The impacts of this situation have already been felt as severe droughts have hit the region over the years. In 2021, over 2,000 domesticated animals died due to water shortages in Kazakhstan, whilst in Kyrgyzstan, the lack of water for irrigation led to mass protests from farmers. Similarly, Uzbekistan has suffered crop losses leading to higher vegetable prices, as well as the implementation of water rationing in the Samarkand region. Moreover, the 2021 drought in Turkmenistan’s Ahal region was the worst weather event in 13 years and resulted in low yields and reduced fodder for livestock. These states, which rely heavily on agricultural produce for exports, face insecurity that could threaten their way of life, and potentially global supplies.
The over-exploitation of water resources, particularly in southern regions of Central Asia, is also responsible for decreasing access to water. Excessive water usage in cotton production is causing the fertile Ferghana Valley, which spans Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, to dry up. According to PeaceLab, the increasing decline in water availability has catalysed local tensions “over ethnic fragmentation, disputed borders, and numerous exclaves within the three countries.” Violent clashes have resulted in hundreds being killed in the valley over the years. However, the impacts stretch beyond the region. The World Bank’s report on climate change and internal migration predicted that Central Asia could be home to up to 2.4 million climate migrants by 2050.
Despite serious regional tensions and rivalries, however, efforts are being made to build agreements to manage water accessibility both in the Central Asian region and beyond. Kazakhstan has transboundary agreements with China to the east and with Russia to the north. Moreover, promising water management agreements in the Aral Sea basin include Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, but are arguably ineffective and inefficient and are seen by some as inequitable with inadequate financing. The agreements also exclude Afghanistan due to it not being part of the Soviet legacy, although it shares borders with the signatories along the Amu Darya River. A 2017 report by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation stated that “despite a general commitment to cooperation, water policies in the region are mostly driven by uncoordinated national strategies. A combination of low water efficiency, negative externalities caused by unilateral action and competing national priorities have caused disagreements and contributed to political and diplomatic disputes.” Passivity in regards to improving water management is predicted to cost the region up to $4.5 billion per year.
Central Asian governments need to act quickly to avoid water insecurity and the social and economic disasters it will bring. Domestic recommendations include supporting water-saving technologies, providing greater support to producers on how to conserve water, promoting practices to conserve soil moisture, and working in collaboration with local organisations and communities. However, the most important focus should be on building strong transboundary agreements between neighbours and cooperating on water management agreements. This requires strong and coherent border demarcation and responsible governments committed to fighting environmental destruction and avoiding stalled negotiations. Effective water management legislation must be complied with by all regional states. They must also reach agreements on the exchange of hydrocarbon energy (from downstream states) for water (from upstream ones). Only when all parties reach a beneficial and peaceful compromise, can the threat of water insecurity, and the challenges it poses, be overcome.