Western Sahara Conflict: Geopolitics of Natural Resources, Foreign Actors and Humanitarian Impact
This report, a collaboration between the Middle East Watch and Conflict & Security Watch Programmes, undertakes an intensive examination of the conflict in Western Sahara. Covering the conflict’s historical, economic and humanitarian dimensions, the report explains the decades-long Moroccan sovereign claims over Western Sahara and highlights the critical humanitarian and economic risks emerging from the conflict.
Read the report HERE
Iran Update: Protests Continue, Islamic Republic Falters
Now entering the 18th day of protests in Iran, the momentum and mass mobilizations behind calls for Mahsa (Zhina) Amini’s justice have spread worldwide. Protests continue in all 31 provinces of Iran, and the Iran Human Rights group estimates the death toll to be 133 as of Sunday, 2 October.
Crackdowns are increasingly targeting ethnic minorities and student groups. Late Sunday night, Iranian police stormed and laid siege to Sharif University, where students have been organising protests and boycotting classes. Videos from the University show students chanting against Ayatollah Khamenei early Sunday morning. Reports emerged that evening of police surrounding the entrances to the University – shutting students in and firing live ammunition and tear gas. On 1 October, a planned boycott of classes began across 100 universities in Iran, cementing the centrality of universities in the protests. By law, Iranian uniformed police cannot enter university campuses, although reports of plainclothes officers entering and shooting at protesting students have been increasing. Just on Friday, 30 September, the deadliest confrontation between protesters and police occurred in the southeast area of Zahedan, where 19 were killed as minority Sunni Baluchi worshippers exited Friday prayers at the Makki Grand Mosque.
Iranian police forces are additionally targeting prominent celebrities and public figures in hopes to highlight the wide-reaching ability of the Islamic Republic. Last week, Elahe Mohammadi and Niloufar Hamedi, two prominent journalists responsible for covering and reporting on Amini’s death, were arrested. Singer Shervin Hajipour, who went viral across the world for his songs composed of protesters’ tweets, was also arrested. Meanwhile, Iranian officials call the acts of solidarity from journalists, celebrities, and athletes ‘fanning the flames’ of the protests. In arresting high-profile figures, the Islamic Republic has done the opposite of diminishing protesters’ drive – it has only emboldened them.
Similarly, international mobilisation has increased significantly, with the Iranian diaspora in major cities organising solidarity protests. 1 October was deemed an international day of protest, which saw collective action in Washington DC, Brussels, Cologne, Amsterdam, New York, Los Angeles, Montreal, Barcelona, and others. International figures such as Bella Hadid, Angelina Jolie, Nazanin Boniadi, and more are also drawing attention to the protests and calling for support. In the political and diplomatic realm, the UN has condemned the protests. German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock has been pushing the EU for further sanctions on Tehran, with France appearing to support the move. The United States has introduced a new round of sanctions in hopes of “severely restricting” Iranian oil and petrochemical exports, while keeping previous sanctions in place. Notably, the Biden Administration has linked these new sanctions, which target one of Iran’s primary exports, to Iran’s alleged failure to meet a renewed nuclear deal, not to the recent protests. While showing support for the protests, the Administration has noted that it is willing to sign a nuclear deal based on mutual compliance.
Meanwhile, the response from the Islamic Republic has been incohesive, signifying Iran’s flailing attempts at controlling the protests. Ayatollah Khameini has been notably abstaining from commenting on the protests, while other top leaders have urged security forces to harshly deal with those engaging in the protests. In absence of a top-down political directive, Amnesty International uncovered an official document from the General Headquarters of Armed Forces on 21 September that urges security forces to “severely confront troublemakers and anti-revolutionaries”. In addition, the Islamic Republic is engaging in the flare-up of regional conflicts in an attempt to cast a shadow on the protests. On 28 September, Iran launched 73 ballistic missiles into Iraq’s Kurdish region targeting opposition groups and killing at least nine civilians.
Iran’s targeting of Iraqi Kurdish opposition is crucial to the significant undertone of the protests: Kurdish identity and the Islamic Republic’s historic treatment of Kurdish communities. Mahsa (Zhina) Amini was a Kurdish woman from Iran’s Kurdish-dominated northwest, and the Islamic Republic’s response has not shied away from blaming Iranian Kurdish dissidents for causing and amplifying the protests. The protest chant, “Women, life, freedom” has emerged as the leading rallying call globally to represent the protests, a phrase that comes from the Kurdish “Jin Jiyan Azadî” which has been traced to Kurdish women’s organising throughout the region. Activists are increasingly noting the importance of Iran’s historic suppression of Kurdish regions and communities, and the protests – in addition to calling for women’s rights and “Death to the Dictator” – also feature a significant call for Kurdish justice and rights.
The sustained protests have captured the globe in ways far different from protests in recent Iranian history. The current women, student, and minority-led movement highlights the solidarity across groups, and international calls for justice have ranged from celebrities to heads of state. As the protests enter their third week, some significant domestic and international factors should be given particular attention:
The call for increased EU sanctions by the German Foreign Minister and the addition of new sanctions by the Biden Administration are concerning. Sanctions over the past decade have effectively crushed Iran’s economy, leading to internal discontent, as evidenced by the 2019 protests, which were ignited by rising fuel prices. Activists are drawing attention to how the sanctions are most damaging to women, working-class people, and ethnic minorities – the very communities that are at the roots of the current protests. Further economic sanctions, even if framed in response to Iran’s alleged noncompliance with a renewed nuclear deal, will embolden the Islamic Republic to continue its crackdown. Iranian officials’ targeting of public figures and journalists domestically and abroad highlight how any international action against the Islamic Republic will likely be framed in ways that target protesters.
The current mobilisation of the Iranian diaspora is unparalleled in recent history. It will be crucial to pay utmost attention to the calls being made from Iranians and others abroad, as they will not only remind the Islamic Republic that solidarity exists beyond borders, but will also play a significant role in how states within the EU, as well as the United States, respond.
The Islamic Republic’s disjointed response signifies Tehran’s flailing strategic arms in attempting to crack down on the protests. Iranian President Raisi’s participation in the UN General Assembly at the beginning of the protests made a brutal crackdown – similar to what happened in 2019 – impossible. Raisi’s return to Iran from New York might have been too late into the protests’ international spread for Tehran to institute crackdowns similar to 2019. Instead, Iran’s current strategy has consisted of vague and contradictory signals. The silence from Ayatollah Khamenei and Raisi’s continual use of enemy conspiracy language reduces the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic in executing a cohesive response. The directive from the armed forces headquarters that seemingly allows and encourages violence against protesters alludes that instead of a diplomatic or political response, the policy on demonstrations comes from the security forces themselves. This fractured approach might be serving as a way to shield the Ayatollah – and therefore the Islamic Republic – from critique as Khameini ages and his successor is being sought out. However, reports are noting internal factions over the search, with one hardline official being quoted saying “this race has caused disarray inside the leadership. The deepening rift is the last thing we need when the country is in turmoil.”
The future of the Islamic Republic seemingly coincides with these unprecedented protests, and the combination of a flailing domestic strategy, international diaspora attention, and misguided calls for sanctions constitute a serious destabilising factor not only for Iran, but for the region as a whole.
The Death of Mahsa Amini – Understanding the Iran Protests
Violent protests, marked by calls for dismantling state-controlled modesty laws, continue in Iran following the arrest and subsequent death of Mahsa Amini last week. 22-year-old Mahsa Amini was travelling with her family from the northwestern Kurdistan province to Tehran when she was detained on 13 September for what police alleged to be ‘immodest clothing.’ Amini died three days later, on 16 September, due to what state authorities claim was a heart attack in their ‘guidance centres’ - the infamous re-education centres where detainees are taught compliance with Iranian law on female clothing. Her family rejects this claim, saying she had no heart problems that could have led to cardiac arrest. A source from the hospital where Amini died claims that she was transferred to the hospital only two hours after her arrest, where hospital staff found her lungs filled with blood and multiple blows to the head. In a Sunday interview with BBC Persian, Amini’s father Amjad Amini said he was barred from viewing her body by hospital authorities, and that Mahsa’s younger brother Kiarash had been told she was beaten by the police, in what Amjad Amini called a government cover-up.
Almost immediately after the funeral and burial of Mahsa Amini, numerous protests began in Iran decrying the infamous morality police and the Islamic Republic’s compulsory dress laws. The morality police, officially called the Gasht-e Ershad, are tasked with enforcing the dress code as laid out in Iranian law. It is the Gasht-e Ershad that arbitrarily detained Masha Amini, allegedly over just a few strands of loose hair out of her hijab. While claiming to enforce a strict dress code for all, the force has been notorious for its targeting of women who do not adhere to modest dressing norms and a near-full coverage of hair – what the Islamic Republic has called targeting ‘bad hijab’. The process of detainment by the Gasht-e Ershad is frequently a traumatic experience, where women are treated like criminals and effectively whisked off the streets.
The protests have since escalated, becoming deadly and far-reaching across Iran and the world. As of Thursday, at least 9 have been killed in protests across Iran, although Iranian state broadcasts put the number at 26. Protests are being held in 90 towns and cities across Iran, in which many are ripping off and burning their hijabs, calling for women’s freedom and down with the compulsory dress laws, and for the ‘death of the dictator’, referring to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. A viral trend of women cutting their hair in support of the protests has swept across the globe, becoming popular on Instagram and TikTok. As protestors clashed with riot police firing bullets, tear gas, and water cannons, the Islamic Republic shut off internet access in its entirety on Wednesday, with blackouts continuing into Thursday as popular media sites Instagram and WhatsApp, key tools for spreading information out of Iran, continued to be down. Iranian officials have confirmed the blackouts as a method to control the protests. In addition, several pro-government protests began on Friday, 23 September in several cities, with some chanting for the execution of the ‘rioters’. In a widely critiqued statement, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi called for an investigation into Amini’s death, while pointing to the double standards from the West in reference to the missing and murdered Indigenous women in Canada. It is important to note that Raisi made the statement on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, the leader’s first appearance at the General Assembly since taking office last year.
Condemnation against the Islamic Republic and the Gasht-e Ershad have emerged across the globe, from state leaders to human rights groups. In his speech at the UN General Assembly, United States President Joe Biden showed support for the protests in Iran. At the same time, the Treasury Department pressed sanctions on the Gasht-e Ershad, while easing sanctions on internet sanctions in Iran, in hopes to allow information to move more freely in light of nationwide blackouts. Acting UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Nada Al-Nashif has called for an independent investigation, while the pro-Kurdish HDP party in Türkiye has applauded the resistance by protestors. Amnesty International has called for the world to take action in support of the protests.
While extremely significant, these mass mobilisations within Iran are not new. After fuel prices were raised in November of 2019, massive nationwide protests were quelled with unprecedented use of force by the Islamic Republic – Amnesty International estimates 321 men, women, and children were killed by state forces in the protests. Protests saw around 20 killed by rising prices in January 2018, which were quickly followed by the ‘Girls of Revolution Street’ protests in solidarity with Vida Movahed who removed her hijab in an act of civil disobedience in December 2017. In 2019, Sahar Khodayri dressed up as a man to sneak into a stadium and watch a men’s soccer match. Upon her arrest and learning that she could face up to 6 months in prison, she lit herself on fire in protest and died. In November of 2021, water shortage protests prompted the arrest of 67 in similar violent crackdowns. The saturation of state-led suppression in the past five years is a reason to concern for the future of the current mobilisation.
However, the protests today have new features to them – notably a recognition of Mahsa Amini’s Kurdish identity. Her Kurdish name is Jina, and many activists are urging the use of her Kurdish name in protest of the Islamic Republic’s refusal to acknowledge Kurdish names that reference Kurdish history or places. Kurdish media have referred to Amini solely by her Kurdish name, and former President of Iraqi Kurdistan Masoud Barzani has offered his condolences to Amini’s family. Amini’s killing and subsequent protests are highlighting the struggles Kurdish people face within Iran. Hengaw Organisation for Human Rights, an NGO based in Iran’s Kurdistan province, has reported that dozens of activists in the province have been called and threatened with arrest by Iranian authorities in an attempt to dispel continued protests. Figures in Turkiye’s pro-Kurdish HDP party, including former head Selahattin Demirtaş and former mayor Selçuk Mızraklı, both in prison, have shaved their heads in solidarity. The emerging regional solidarity based on Kurdish identity is perceived as a threat by the Islamic Republic, which explains its focus on suppressing activist organising in the Kurdistan province.
Simultaneously with the violent protests and global outrage, Iran held military parades across the country on Thursday in commemoration of the anniversary of the Iran-Iraq War, what the Islamic Republic calls Sacred Defence Week. During the parade in Tehran, the Iranian Armed Forces revealed a new surface-to-surface missile, dubbed Rezvan, that has a range of 1,400 km. The medium-range ballistic missile can travel up to 8 times the speed of sound, according to Major General Hossein Salami, Chief Commander of the Islamic Revolution Guard. The introduction of a regional missile seems like an attempt to divert the public and media’s attention from the protests and enhance nationalistic feelings.
What is the future of the protests over Mahsa Amini’s death? It looks unpromising.
Domestically, the protests are unlikely to create much change. Ayatollah Khamenei is 83 years old and will not be moved to modify or alter any element of Iran’s interpretation of Islamic law in response to the protests. As he enters the last stages of his life, Khamenei is looking to strengthen the core of the Islamic Republic and preserve his legacy for his predecessors. Even though studies are finding that increasing numbers of Iranians are opposed to compulsory modesty laws, the legal norm will likely stay the same. Furthermore, violent repression of the protests can be expected to intensify as Iranian President Raisi returns from the UN General Assembly in New York. While under the scrutiny of international leaders as President Raisi makes his first appearance at the General Assembly, an extreme crackdown similar to the 2019 one which saw over 300 killed would spell a diplomatic disaster for the Islamic Republic. The next few days are crucial as Raisi begins his journey back to Iran, and more widespread internet blockages would not be surprising. While the emergence of solidarity protests globally and on social media platforms is unique to these protests, ultimately the events of the past week are likely to continue the long list of bloody repressions perpetrated by the Islamic Republic in recent history.
Regionally, the protests put Iran in a challenging position. Amini’s Kurdish background has already mobilised Kurdish party leaders and activists across the region, particularly from Iraq and Türkiye. Should Iran continue its active repression and targeting of activists – particularly in the Kurdistan province – further regional mobilisation based on Kurdish ethnic solidarities can be expected. While Kurdish parties within Türkiye and Iraq are unlikely to influence national politics that would impact Iran’s diplomatic relations with the states, the potential for grassroots resistance to the Islamic Republic is high. For the Kurdish community within Iran, the death of Amini could likely catalyse further protests in the Kurdistan province targeting Iran’s history of conflict with the Kurds. However, the significant Iranian military apparatuses in the northwest province have a history of quelling Kurdish political movements and military rebellions, so any potential protests are more than likely to be shut down with ease.
The introduction of the Rezvan drone at the 42nd anniversary of the Iran-Iraq War on Thursday is a coincidence that gives few distractions to the significance of the protests. Rezvan’s 1,400 km capacity is a primary threat to Israel – as the Israeli press has already noted the ability for the missile to be launched from Iraq or Syria. The introduction of the missile can also be interpreted as a show of military strength in light of an escalation in violence between Azerbaijan and Armenia, in which Iran wants to prioritise the stability of its border with both nations. Overall, however, the missile is unlikely to contribute significantly to any distraction tactics that might be underlying the seeming coincidence.
Internationally, the protests will cause an increased condemnation of the Islamic Republic from global leaders. While many have voiced their opinions already at the UN General Assembly, more criticism is sure to arise as protests continue – especially if violent repression intensifies as Raisi returns to Iran. The protests are also likely to add further tumult to an already unstable negotiating table for an updated Iran nuclear deal. President Raisi dedicated part of his General Assembly speech to supporting a revised deal, though critiqued the American counterparts for their willingness to seriously contribute to a deal. As international dissent grows against Raisi’s handling of the protests, any chance of a new deal will become near dormant as diplomatic jabs continue from across the negotiating table. However, it is crucial to watch for renewed calls for sanctions against the Islamic Republic. US President Biden’s updating of technology sanctions and the imposition of sanctions on the Gasht-e Ershad highlights the ease by which the US is willing to further its sanctions regime. The effectiveness of sanctions in promoting political change within Iran has come to the forefront with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as many leaders and human rights organisations now realise that the sanctions regime against Iran continues to harm the most marginalised. At the international level, a call for sanctioning the Islamic Republic further should be seriously cautioned. While a relatively easy diplomatic and economic way of pressuring Iran, adding sanctions will not benefit those protesting.
As people across the globe mobilise in support of Iranian protesters and as President Raisi returns to Iran, the future of the protests remains in flux, dictated by a combination of factors all working against the current movement.
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Border Clashes: Another Opportunistic Advance?
Nearly 100 have been killed in border clashes between the two Central Asian states of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the past week, a significant escalation in a decades-long tension. The conflict arose primarily in the Batken and Osh regions, which Tajikistan has invaded, according to Kyrgyz state media. However, around half of the 970km-long border area has been contested by both states since their independence from the Soviet Union.
The border clashes began on 14 September, and death tolls on both sides have been rising since. The latest official number from Kyrgyz authorities from Sunday, 18 September indicate that 46 have died, meanwhile Tajik authorities have been less transparent, although Facebook posts from the Foreign Ministry indicate 35 have died. Tajik authorities claim civilians have been wounded, but have not published numbers. In addition to official deaths, hundreds have been wounded and both sides have accused each other of using tanks, mortars, rocket artillery, and drones against civilian areas and settlements. In response, Kyrgyzstan evacuated 136,000 people from conflict areas, in what state media calls an invasion, alleging that those without military insignia participated on the Tajik side in the attacks.
A ceasefire was achieved on Friday, 16 September although both sides continued fighting and accusing one another of breaching the agreement. The night of September 17 passed without significant fighting, and Kyrgyz state media reported that some evacuees started returning home on Sunday.
Both Russian President Vladimir Putin and UN Secretary-General António Guterres have called for an end to the violence and upkeep of the ceasefire, with Putin phoning both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s leaders to urge them to find a diplomatic resolution. Russia has historically played a mediating role in the tension, even after both states’ independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. A similar international outcry occurred just last year when another set of clashes erupted – the deadliest in the pair’s history – with 160 Kyrgyz casualties and fears of a full-fledged conflict.
While the most recent border clashes are of significant concern, the history of conflict between the two Central Asian states indicates a somewhat routine and expected outbreak of conflict. However, for both the 2021 and last week’s clashes, no official explanation has been provided by either side, although Kyrgyz state media continues to say that the most recent attacks constituted a planned military action that violates international law. Given the lack of published data from the Tajik authorities on casualties and explanations for the conflict, it remains challenging to interpret the position of Tajikistan apart from continually blaming Kyrgyzstan for escalation.
Yet, the timing of the border clashes alludes to a larger trend in using Russia’s preoccupation in Ukraine to advance the position of regional alliances and individual states’ territorial aspirations. The recent and continuing violence between Azerbaijan and Armenia is a prime example of this. Although not as direct as Azerbaijan and Armenia’s conflict, Moscow’s historic mediating power between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan could very well be a core pillar that allowed this round of clashes to be so deadly. Furthermore, the striking similarities with the 2021 outburst could suggest that Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are becoming used to more routine violence; if this is the case, the region could see more semi-permanent evacuations and a reshaping of the contested border landscape. Both states are members of the Russian-led CSTO, which has condemned both sides for continued violence, meaning that either state cannot overstep its regional influence without serious intervention from the transnational body.
Looking at the short term, the ceasefire achieved on Friday night shows signs of becoming gradually more stable as Kyrgyz communities move back into homes from evacuation and reports from both sides of violence are decreasing significantly. While Russia played a larger role in the 2021 conflict, it is unlikely that current conditions will require sustained diplomatic intervention from Moscow. However, the trend of regional players taking advantage of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to launch small-scale conflicts over territory is troubling and highlights the weakness of the region in relying primarily on Moscow as a diplomatic hegemon. While long-term sustained conflict between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is unlikely, the regional and global position of Russia in the ongoing Ukraine war will send shockwaves across former Soviet Union territories. The continued weakening of Russia through sanctions and international condemnation could likely translate into a more unstable region that becomes more focused on local territory battles in favour of regional stability – a stability once upheld by Moscow.
Escalating Conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan: An Explainer
What happened
On the night of 12 to13 September, a conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan flared up. Within hours, both sides blamed each other for the initial provocations. According to the Armenian Ministry of Defence, at around 00:05 local time, Azerbaijan launched intensive shelling against military positions in the direction of the towns of Goris, Sotk, and Jermuk, with the support of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. That same night, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defence declared that Armenian armed forces had committed a large-scale provocation on the Azerbaijani-Armenian border before 00:05, towards Dashkasan, Kalbajar and Lachin.
On 11 September, the Armenian Ministry of Defence denounced the spread of disinformation by the Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan and denied fire exchanges on the night of 10 to 11 September. After the initial news of ignited violence, Azerbaijan issued an official statement denouncing the presence of Armenian disinformation campaigns and denying the targeting of the civilian population, objects, and infrastructure.
Mutual accusations and reports of ongoing fighting continued throughout 13 September. In the afternoon, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan told parliament that at least 49 servicemen had lost their lives. In a late evening press release, the Armenian Ministry of Defence included Verin Shorzha, Artanish and Nerkin Hand in the list of areas under attack, rejecting the accusation that the Russian-brokered ceasefire agreements had been violated. According to the US National Security Council coordinator for strategic communication, the ceasefire was "almost immediately broken." The same evening, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defence declared the death of 50 servicemen. During the day, the Spokesman for UN Secretary-General António Guterres, released a statement calling for immediate de-escalation, while Armenia officially appealed to the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). The Ministry of Foreign Affair made it public that a special session of the CSTO Permanent Council was requested and during the session the Armenian representative described Azerbaijani actions as a gross violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Armenia.
On Wednesday 14, fights continued throughout the day. Armenia's Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan reported to the parliament that Azerbaijani forces had taken control of 10 square kilometres and that the death toll had risen to 105 soldiers. In the evening, the Armenian Ministry of Defence reported tensions had been defused.
Another ceasefire has allegedly been reached on the evening of 15 September, although the situation remains precarious and it is difficult to say whether it will last.
Background
The two countries have been in a frozen conflict for decades since the fully-fledged conflict that opposed the two throughout the 1980s and 1990s over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. In 1991, the region of about 150,000 people declared independence, initially as the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and later as the Republic of Artsakh. The territory is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, a predominantly Muslim country, but with an ethnically Christian Armenian population and under the control of Armenian armed forces. The latter is supported by Russia, which has deployed around 2,000 peacekeeping forces in the area and is part of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the Eurasian intergovernmental military alliance, which entails a mutual defence act. Azerbaijan is backed by NATO member Türkiye.
Fighting has regularly broken out in the area of Nagorno-Karabakh. In 2020, a new war started on September 27, with the launch of the operation ‘Iron Fist’ by Baku. The goal of the mission was to acquire control of Nagorno- Karabakh to fulfil the Azerbaijani desire for territorial integrity. During the conflict, thousands of soldiers lost their lives on both sides. After 44 days of conflict and hours after Azerbaijan claimed it captured the town of Shusha, a 9-point ceasefire was reached and signed on 9 November. Azerbaijan managed to reclaim control of areas outside the Nagorno-Karabakh region, including the Lachin area, that had been under Armenian control for decades. The ceasefire represents indeed a new partitioning of the contested area, favourable to the Azerbaijani vision. The last point of the ceasefire concerns the corridor that connects Azerbaijan to the exclave of Nakhchivan and states that economic and transport connections with the exclave should be unblocked. The attention toward the corridor did not wane. In late 2021, the Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev, supported by the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, described it as a bridge to “unite the entire Turkic world.” In March 2022, Yerevan denounced a new aggression after Baku forces entered the village of Farrukh, in an area returned to Azerbaijan after the 2020 conflict and in which Russian peacekeepers were deployed. At the beginning of August 2022, Azerbaijan accused Yerevan of having violated the 2020 ceasefire provisions and announced the launch of a retaliatory action that resulted in the seizure of chunks of land in the area of Sarybaba.
What’s different
The latest escalation has involved targets deeper inside Armenian territories. Yerevan has accused Azerbaijan of attempting to enter Armenian territory, violating the borders of a sovereign country. Russia is involved in a demanding conflict in Ukraine that is reaching the end of the seventh month; news of an effective counteroffensive by the Ukrainian forces are spreading, while Moscow is appearing more and more isolated and therefore more reliant on Azerbaijani land routes for trade with Asia and Iran. The military effort in Ukraine makes it difficult to imagine that Russia is ready for an intervention in the South Caucasus, and regional geopolitical partnerships are more complex than in the 2020 conflict.
What to expect
The surging conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has implications not only for the future of each state’s borders, but also for a range of regional stakeholders with strong alliances with both nations. In addition, the conflict has serious detrimental potential to energy exports from the Caspian Sea region, as highlighted by Azerbaijan during the 2020 conflict. Russia, Türkiye, Iran, the United States, and Israel have stakes in the conflict, and how each responds will dictate the scale that this conflict has the potential to take.
Türkiye: Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has, and will continue to, stand by the side of Azerbaijan. Erodgan has repeatedly claimed that his relationship with Azerbaijan is one of “one nation, two states”, and his response to the current episode of violence is no different. Erdoğan, on 14 September, said that Armenia will face consequences for its breach of the 2020 agreement reached after the war. While not defining those consequences, Türkiye’s history of military support for Azerbaijan provides an idea of what Turkish support might look like in the coming weeks. While being an exporter of military equipment to Azerbaijan, Türkiye has been conducting joint military training with Azeri forces since 1992. Türkiye’s military capacity-building ventures in Azerbaijan for three decades, along with its prominence in NATO and support for Azerbaijan joining the Organisation, indicates the former will take an unwavering stance in favour of Azerbaijan’s actions in the continued conflict. In addition, Türkiye’s recent history of incursions into northern Syria concretises support for Azerbaijan’s seeming attempt at retaking land.
Russia: Russia arguably has the largest stake in the conflict and has the power to control the future of the violence. With over 2,000 peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh, regional Russian influence remains high. Russia has historically kept strong diplomatic ties with the conflict – a Russian-backed truce was signed during the first iteration of the war in the 1990s, and the 2020 peace deal was signed by Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. While Russia might have affiliations towards Armenia as a former Soviet member, analyses after the resolution of the 2020 conflict highlight Russia’s complex way of approaching its relations with Armenia. Scholars have argued that Russia did not directly quell Azerbaijan’s 2020 military violence as it proved the military weakness of Armenia’s military and government, allowing Russia to have a heavier hand in commanding the future politics of Armenia. However, that was two years ago, and Russia is in a wildly different geopolitical situation now. In response to Armenia’s invocation of Article 4 of the CSTO, member states, coordinated by Russia, met on 13 September and are sending a joint mission to Yerevan to assess further action. Apart from Article 4, Russia – as the figurehead of the CSTO – has no solid responsibilities towards Armenia at this time. The Russia-backed ceasefire failed within hours, and an interpretation of Russia’s relative inaction could be a repetition of their 2020 diplomatic policies. However, the more likely reason for inaction is the international awareness of Russia’s military failures and extensive land loss in Ukraine. Ukraine has reclaimed 8,000 square kilometres of land since the start of September, in what some are calling a turning point in the 6-month long war. In the face of the situation, Russia cannot be focusing on Armenia and Azerbaijan at the present moment, and its few mentions of the conflict in the past days might be attributed to diplomatic spectacle to affirm a projected image of Russian stability and integrity in the face of dramatic loss.
Iran: The Islamic Republic will likely play a safe onlooker in the ongoing conflict. With recent scrutiny over the extended revived nuclear deal negotiations, Iranian leaders are unlikely to set forth a strong opinion or policy against Armenia or Azerbaijan. However, territorial integrity remains key for Iran: the Islamic Republic shares a 44km border with Armenia, and the Foreign Ministry called for the preservation of current borders between all states. While Tehran supported Baku’s victory in 2020, the current position of Iran is to avoid another conflict in the region and support a peaceful resolution.
Israel: While not a frequently cited ally of either Armenia or Azerbaijan, Israel remains an ardent supporter of Azerbaijan’s military. Israel’s support for the latter primarily revolves around military exports: consistent supplies of Stinger missiles and Harop drones to Azerbaijan, including a 2021 $2 billion negotiation by Azerbaijan for Israeli arms, are strategically important for Israel. Azerbaijan’s long border with Iran is likely the primary pillar of Israel’s continued support. In the long-term, Israel could be warming ties with Azerbaijan as both a diplomatic and military partner to leverage regional alliances, and become geographically closer, to its foremost geopolitical foe: Iran. Apart from weapons alliances, Israel might be encouraged to take this new episode of violence as an opportunity to assert diplomatic mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as some scholars from within Israel are already recommending. While Israel’s immediate role is less clear, the opportunities are vast for the nation to exert its power in the South Caucasus for its own benefit.
The United States: In a phone call between Secretary of State Blinken and Azeri President Aliyev on 13 September, Blinken called for Azerbaijan to stop shelling Armenia. Blinken is further concerned about Russia’s ability to worsen the conflict as a method to distract from its recent losses in eastern Ukraine, although supports a Russian diplomatic solution to the conflict. In regards to the 2020 conflict, the United States took no real action in the conflict, other than Democrats calling for an end to military aid to Azerbaijan. Focused at the time on the 2020 presidential elections, the United States is facing a similar situation now with upcoming midterm elections and continued pressure to support Ukraine. It is foreseeable for the United States to make statements in broad support of Armenia, but little action can be expected from officials.
Azerbaijan has seized upon a geopolitical opportunity to lay military claim to lands previously unseen in previous iterations of the conflict. The stakeholders in the conflict against Azerbaijan’s present and historical actions are notably preoccupied: both Russia and the United States have significant obligations that take priority over the current conflict. All the while, Azerbaijan’s allies – Türkiye and Israel – have the capacity to take on a large role in shaping the conflict to their own benefit by propping up Azerbaijan’s actions. Azerbaijan is empowered by its regional standing, creating the conditions for this latest escalation to be successful, in line with its victory in 2020.
Within this context, the conflict is unlikely to escalate to a fully-fledged war involving international powers. Rather, the regional environment allows Azerbaijan to continue its offensive, relatively unchallenged by regional or international actors. While some have highlighted the potential energy export implications of the conflict, the current European energy crisis actually benefits Azerbaijan’s offensive. In July, Baku and the European Union signed a Memorandum of Understanding, a deal that would see increased energy exports to European states over the next five years, and Azerbaijan’s current energy pipelines in Georgia, Türkiye, and the Mediterranean mean that Europe has an infrastructure to rely on in advance of the expected winter crisis. In the short term, then, Europe’s energy deficit spells out more benefits for Azerbaijan and its offensive into Armenia: the EU is unlikely to pursue heavy sanctions or condemnation against Baku as the South Caucasus state remains a potential ally in a looming dark winter for Europe.
The end result of the conflict remains clouded, however. There is a possibility Azerbaijan claims sovereignty over more land that is internationally recognized, as was the case in the 2020 resolution. Yet, critiques of the 2020 agreement as organizationally bare and not definitive towards the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh territory could be levelled against Azerbaijan’s claims once a ceasefire is achieved. It seems, at present, that Azerbaijan has a green light to continue its military operations; however, challenges arise once a ceasefire can be negotiated and committed to. Then, Azerbaijan has to rally the diplomatic powers of its key allies against Armenian claims to land, the CSTO, and potentially a UN-backed resolution. Due to Russia’s current preoccupation with Ukraine, any deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan is unlikely to arise quickly between regional actors: more international players will likely be drawn into the negotiations after military violence ends. When that time comes, Azerbaijan might not have the diplomatic strength, even if backed by Türkiye, to uphold its military gains. While the present is grim for the Armenian side of the conflict, the real fate
Türkiye and Greece: A Summer of Hot Tensions
On Sunday 28 August, Türkiye’s state-run Anadolu media reported that Greek missiles had locked onto Turkish F-16 jets completing a mission around the island of Rhodes on Tuesday. The event, which involved Russian-made S-300 surface-to-air missiles located on Greece’s Crete island, has been labelled by Turkish state media as harassment by their Mediterranean neighbour. Under NATO rules of engagement, radar lock-ons are considered an act of hostility, which the Turkish government and press have used to bolster their rhetoric on the increasingly sour relations between the two states. A discourse that has rapidly emerged from this latest act of hostility is that NATO countries continue to criticise Türkiye’s purchases of Russian S-400 missiles, but stay silent on Greece’s use of the older system on Türkiye. Almost immediately, Greek state-run media rejected the Turkish claims.
Greece’s alleged radar lock-on of Turkish jets is just another drop in the bucket for months of tension between the two neighbours. Last week, the Anadolu Agency reported that Türkiye filed a complaint with NATO after Greek F-16s allegedly harassed Turkish F-16s, placing them under another radar lock. Greece’s response was practically the opposite, with the ministry of defence claiming that five Turkish jets appeared in Greek-controlled airspace to accompany US B-52 bombers without prior notification. The summer months have seen accusations on both sides, although Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erodgan has taken the offensive on Athens numerous times. On the 99th anniversary of the Lausanne Treaty, Erdogan accused Greece of undermining the rights of Thrace-region Muslims and hinted at the use of force if Greece militarised its Aegean islands. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu ended the joint mechanism with Greece – a bilateral diplomacy channel historically used between the two states – because of perceived hostile remarks made by Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis. Back in 2021, Erdogan declared a February 2021 meeting between Greece and Egypt, France, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Cyprus as an anti-Türkiye alliance. In June 2022, Greece submitted a letter of request to purchase F-35s, a day after United States President Biden gave his full support to the sale of F-16s to Türkiye. The Greek letter of request has the potential to flare rhetoric by Türkiye against both Greece and the United States as Türkiye was excluded from the F-35 programme three years ago.
The war in Ukraine has had an impact on Greek-Türkiye relations. President Erdogan’s leadership in holding peace talks between Ukraine and Russia, including the August grain deal, has positioned Türkiye favourably within NATO and the UN. Furthermore, Türkiye’s refusal of imposing sanctions on Russia, and Erdogan’s generally positive relationship with Vladimir Putin, are positioning Türkiye in the spotlight of international diplomacy – all while tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean remain high. At the same time, Sweden and Finland are in talks with Türkiye over their now highly contested NATO bid, with approval from Türkiye needed to go forward with membership plans.
In a summer of diplomatic highs for Türkiye, including championing the Ukraine grain deal and coordinating economic support from both the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Russia, the strained relationship with Greece has the potential to take many routes.
Firstly, Türkiye’s diplomatic centrality over the past few months could mean that aggression towards, and in response to, Greece and their actions could be ignored as NATO and the UN aim for a unified approach towards Russia. Erdogan’s continued friendliness with Putin is a risk factor as Türkiye attempts to negotiate for sustained resolutions in Ukraine. Meanwhile, Erdogan’s incursions into Northern Syria over the past few years have angered both Russia and Western human rights groups, a policy that makes him largely unpopular on the world stage. Yet, Türkiye’s ability to remain diplomatically agile, mediating between the UN and Russia in the Ukraine war, means that Erdogan has an ability to uphold a foreign policy that is aggressive while keeping criticism at bay. The outlook for Greece, then, is less than ideal as Erdogan has more diplomatic power to continue to criticise Greece’s actions, particularly in the Aegean.
Secondly, Greece could be ramping up its actions on the Aegean islands to take control of the current global spotlight on Türkiye, in the hope of pivoting attention towards what it sees as sustained Turkish aggression on Greece’s sovereignty. Erdogan’s current significance in international diplomacy means that many global conflicts are reliant on Türkiye. As such, Greece could resort to this option as it cannot, for the time being, leverage successful diplomatic avenues of critique against its neighbour.
However, these two situations are unlikely to remain static for long, just as the seemingly never-ending tension between Greece and Türkiye. Both Erdogan and Mitsotakis are facing elections within the upcoming year, and this verbal jesting will only increase as both struggle to retain their electorate. With the latest report of radar locking onto Turkish F-16 jets, the actions of both states might not be about international politics as much as each respective country looks to utilise rhetoric, their militaries, and appeals to international diplomacy to secure a domestic political agenda.