Türkiye and Greece: A Summer of Hot Tensions
On Sunday 28 August, Türkiye’s state-run Anadolu media reported that Greek missiles had locked onto Turkish F-16 jets completing a mission around the island of Rhodes on Tuesday. The event, which involved Russian-made S-300 surface-to-air missiles located on Greece’s Crete island, has been labelled by Turkish state media as harassment by their Mediterranean neighbour. Under NATO rules of engagement, radar lock-ons are considered an act of hostility, which the Turkish government and press have used to bolster their rhetoric on the increasingly sour relations between the two states. A discourse that has rapidly emerged from this latest act of hostility is that NATO countries continue to criticise Türkiye’s purchases of Russian S-400 missiles, but stay silent on Greece’s use of the older system on Türkiye. Almost immediately, Greek state-run media rejected the Turkish claims.
Greece’s alleged radar lock-on of Turkish jets is just another drop in the bucket for months of tension between the two neighbours. Last week, the Anadolu Agency reported that Türkiye filed a complaint with NATO after Greek F-16s allegedly harassed Turkish F-16s, placing them under another radar lock. Greece’s response was practically the opposite, with the ministry of defence claiming that five Turkish jets appeared in Greek-controlled airspace to accompany US B-52 bombers without prior notification. The summer months have seen accusations on both sides, although Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erodgan has taken the offensive on Athens numerous times. On the 99th anniversary of the Lausanne Treaty, Erdogan accused Greece of undermining the rights of Thrace-region Muslims and hinted at the use of force if Greece militarised its Aegean islands. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu ended the joint mechanism with Greece – a bilateral diplomacy channel historically used between the two states – because of perceived hostile remarks made by Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis. Back in 2021, Erdogan declared a February 2021 meeting between Greece and Egypt, France, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Cyprus as an anti-Türkiye alliance. In June 2022, Greece submitted a letter of request to purchase F-35s, a day after United States President Biden gave his full support to the sale of F-16s to Türkiye. The Greek letter of request has the potential to flare rhetoric by Türkiye against both Greece and the United States as Türkiye was excluded from the F-35 programme three years ago.
The war in Ukraine has had an impact on Greek-Türkiye relations. President Erdogan’s leadership in holding peace talks between Ukraine and Russia, including the August grain deal, has positioned Türkiye favourably within NATO and the UN. Furthermore, Türkiye’s refusal of imposing sanctions on Russia, and Erdogan’s generally positive relationship with Vladimir Putin, are positioning Türkiye in the spotlight of international diplomacy – all while tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean remain high. At the same time, Sweden and Finland are in talks with Türkiye over their now highly contested NATO bid, with approval from Türkiye needed to go forward with membership plans.
In a summer of diplomatic highs for Türkiye, including championing the Ukraine grain deal and coordinating economic support from both the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Russia, the strained relationship with Greece has the potential to take many routes.
Firstly, Türkiye’s diplomatic centrality over the past few months could mean that aggression towards, and in response to, Greece and their actions could be ignored as NATO and the UN aim for a unified approach towards Russia. Erdogan’s continued friendliness with Putin is a risk factor as Türkiye attempts to negotiate for sustained resolutions in Ukraine. Meanwhile, Erdogan’s incursions into Northern Syria over the past few years have angered both Russia and Western human rights groups, a policy that makes him largely unpopular on the world stage. Yet, Türkiye’s ability to remain diplomatically agile, mediating between the UN and Russia in the Ukraine war, means that Erdogan has an ability to uphold a foreign policy that is aggressive while keeping criticism at bay. The outlook for Greece, then, is less than ideal as Erdogan has more diplomatic power to continue to criticise Greece’s actions, particularly in the Aegean.
Secondly, Greece could be ramping up its actions on the Aegean islands to take control of the current global spotlight on Türkiye, in the hope of pivoting attention towards what it sees as sustained Turkish aggression on Greece’s sovereignty. Erdogan’s current significance in international diplomacy means that many global conflicts are reliant on Türkiye. As such, Greece could resort to this option as it cannot, for the time being, leverage successful diplomatic avenues of critique against its neighbour.
However, these two situations are unlikely to remain static for long, just as the seemingly never-ending tension between Greece and Türkiye. Both Erdogan and Mitsotakis are facing elections within the upcoming year, and this verbal jesting will only increase as both struggle to retain their electorate. With the latest report of radar locking onto Turkish F-16 jets, the actions of both states might not be about international politics as much as each respective country looks to utilise rhetoric, their militaries, and appeals to international diplomacy to secure a domestic political agenda.