Elections in Tunisia: Political Unrest to Come?

Tunisia is preparing for parliamentary elections on 17 December 2022, an event that could be the final step in cementing the power of President Kais Saied. The elections are set to be the culmination of the Tunisian political crisis, which has dragged on since mid-2021. Although the results are unlikely to bring any surprises, the event is destined to bring large-scale instability.

Turnout is expected to be low as the main opposition parties have decided to boycott the elections, which are guided by the new electoral law that imposes restrictive measures on candidates. In addition, Tunisia has recently adopted a new constitution that significantly restricts the powers of parliament. With this, hopes for political change are rather unlikely, thus contributing to low turnout expectations.

With such a bleak outlook, the events leading up to and following the elections will be crucial. The Tunisian political crisis has been going on for over two years after President Kais Saied dissolved parliament. With tensions and stakes so high, the planned protests could very well turn violent, as they have in the past. How these events unfold will determine the political stability and state of democracy in Tunisia.

Where it all began

The political crisis in Tunisia started on 25 July 2021, when Kais Saied dismissed the government and Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi while also halting the activities of the parliament to appease those protesting against the government. Subsequently, President Kais Saied claimed all executive power. In the following months, he faced massive protests and calls from opposition parties to restore the balance of power. However, this was only the beginning of democratic backsliding in Tunisia.

The situation was further exacerbated on 6 February 2021, when the president dissolved the Supreme Judiciary Council, which guaranteed the independence of the judiciary. This was another attack on the country’s democratic institutions, signalling that Kais Saied’s power grab was not temporary.

To further limit any challenges to Saied’s rule, a new constitution was drafted, setting limits to the Assembly of the People's Representatives and concentrating executive power in the hands of the president. The draft of the new constitution was approved in a widely unpopular referendum, with the opposition boycotting it. Although the referendum approved the new constitution, the low turnout highlighted the lethargy and political apathy into which the country had sunk.

The last remaining hope was the parliamentary elections scheduled for late 2022. However, the electoral law was amended by a presidential decree introduced on 15 September 2022. This change came shortly before the deadline for announcing candidacies, which was set between 17 and 24 October 2022, thus significantly limiting the number of those who could stand for election. The new law changed the requirements for candidates, making it considerably more difficult to obtain the required support and endorsements, while leaving out the gender parity clause intended to ensure diverse representation.

The new law also limits the involvement of political parties in campaigns, which severely weakens their chances in the run-up to the elections. Unsurprisingly, the limitations imposed on political parties, designed to weaken any opposition to Saied, have led to announcements of  boycotts of the upcoming elections. All these measures mean that the election results will not bring many surprises or significant changes that could have an impact on the autocratisation of Tunisia. However, it is the events leading up to and following the parliamentary elections that will be largely significant. While protests are expected during this period, whether they can be sustained in the long-term and bring about change will depend on external factors.

Economic indicators and crucial foreign aid

Although political apathy and a flawed electoral system are unlikely to be the cause of political change, external pressures could have an impact on the current political situation. While opposition forces struggle to unite and organise due to past antagonisms, Kais Saied's position remains protected by the contingent support of the influential Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) labour union. 

The seemingly symbiotic but fragile relationship means that the president relies on the widely supported UGTT and its power to quell protests or dissent. This could change as Tunisia’s economic situation worsens, with inflation soaring high and foreign aid becoming a significant source of economic recovery and stability for the country. In negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Tunisia has managed to secure a staff-level agreement on a loan of approximately US$2 billion to stabilise the economy. However, the IMF is demanding strict measures regarding state-owned enterprises, which is a source of concern for the UGTT, and could jeopardise relations between the government and the union if the president complies with the restrictive measures. The loan package is a lifeline offered to the Tunisian economy affected by COVID-19, high inflation, and the war in Ukraine. Yet, delivering the necessary economic changes under the current IMF agreement could anger the UGTT to the point that it would support the protests. The already tense political situation could flare up and become violent.

Future outlook

Negotiations with the IMF and the UGTT will determine whether Kais Saied will succeed in both parties, while domestically, the opposition or trade unions will probably organise large-scale demonstrations that could easily turn violent. Democratic backsliding has been going on for over two years and Kais Saied has managed the transition to an authoritarian system with an iron fist and repressive measures. However, resisting external pressures in the form of IMF demands without upsetting the carefully balanced authoritarian regime will be an additional difficulty. For the opposition parties, the failure of Kais Saied and a conflict with the UGTT would give them a second wind to fuel efforts for systematic political change. Thus, the coming weeks will be crucial in determining Tunisia’s political future.

The Truce Ended, What's Next for Yemen?

Failure to extend the truce agreement

The warring parties of the protracted conflict in Yemen failed to extend a six-month-long truce that ended on 2 October 2022. The failure to renew and prolong the UN-brokered ceasefire is a massive blow to the fragile negotiations led by UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg. The original agreement, which came into force on 2 April 2022, has been renewed twice. However, this time, a stalemate in the negotiations and a rapid escalation of the conflict loom over the future of the truce.

The initial truce agreement in addition to the suspension of hostilities and cooperation relied on three major points: (1) allowing a limited number of commercial flights to Sana’a airport, (2) allowing entry of fuel ships into the Red Sea port of Hodeida, and (3) opening road access to the city of Taiz. The last, and currently the most contentious issue has seen the least amount of progress since the truce came into effect. While optimism for a lasting and sustainable peace agreement overshadowed the developments, the worsening crisis in Taiz steadily became a major impediment. Despite a reported significant decrease in casualties, the roads to Taiz remained closed, blocking humanitarian aid, emergency transits, and work travel, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis.

As it currently stands, the Houthi rebels have declared that the negotiations have stalled, claiming that they have made too many concessions without seeing any positive results. Conversely, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), which is the initiative of the anti-Houthi bloc to replace former President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and unite the opposition forces, opposes the deadlock, arguing that the Houthis are hindering the peace process and not demonstrating an honest commitment to resolving the conflict. The statements highlight the lack of trust between the negotiating sides revealing a gradually more incompatible perspective. As an immediate reaction to the failure UN Special Envoy Grundberg called for restraint on all sides to avoid a rapid escalation that could set back any progress made since 2 April 2022.

The Houthi long game

The strategy of the Houthi rebels looks like a bet on dragging out the negotiations, despite the territories under their control remaining overly reliant on humanitarian aid with limited supplies. This move could potentially expose the weaknesses of the PLC which is struggling to maintain a united front in its objectives. Repeated instances of infighting reveal that the anti-Houthi coalition is deeply divided. The idea of a representative PLC backed by both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi brought previous grievances and the unsettled issue of southern secession to the forefront. To the Houthi leadership, this signalled rifts in the opposition that could rapidly escalate, especially without a ceasefire agreement that forces the anti-Houthi coalition to act united.

A Security Council Forecast for October 2022 highlighted the readiness of Houthis to restore to active warfare yet again. Empowered by the gradually more observable internal struggles of the PLC, the rebels held multiple military parades and attempted to encircle Taiz further. The latest developments show worrying signs that hostilities could return and escalate rapidly, while hopes for extending the truce for the third time begin to fade.

The future

The upcoming weeks will be critical in determining the future of the conflict in Yemen. As the divide between the warring sides becomes more outlined, and unresolved grievances weaken the PLC, the progress achieved by the 6-month-long truce is under threat. The United Nations Security Council is expected to keep the developments in Yemen high on its agenda while following Grundberg’s course of action. Avoiding an escalation is the priority as the UN Special Envoy already cautioned the parties to refrain from engaging in hostilities until the negotiations about the future of the truce are resolved. However, Grundberg faces an additional hurdle as the Houthis are accused of hijacking the negotiations for their objectives while giving no concessions. Should Grundberg achieve extending the truce agreement for the third time, it will be crucial to achieve constructive engagement from all the parties and avoid false optimism with superficial gains.