Disproportionate conscription of ethnic minorities into Russia’s war in Ukraine


Vladimir Putin’s announcement of partial mobilisation of the Russian population on the International Day of Peace caused quite a reaction in international circles. News reports about Russian citizens fleeing to neighbouring countries or attempting to forget their inevitable fate in their last moments as civilians, along with statements of leaders around the world offering refuge to those who manage to escape started pouring in. The shock and indignation are in many ways justified. However, what these reactions overlook is a deeper problem at the heart of Russia’s current lack of foot-soldiers to send to fight in their war against the people of Ukraine. In the days following the announcement, a few political commentators soon picked up on a trend - ethnic cherry-picking of new conscripts. Ehtnic minorities mostly from rural regions of the Russian Federation are being conscripted into the war in Ukraine at much higher rates than ethnic Russians, or inhabitants of larger, and more economically developed cities and regions. These practices, along with the secondary consequences they result in, have a much larger impact not only in these regions of Russia, but also in its neighbouring countries. This spotlight article seeks to address the political and economic fallout of the current mobilisation practices, and briefly assess the potential exacerbation of existing global political risks.

Shortly after the announcement of partial mobilisation, recruitment centres mostly across the rural regions, and regions inhabited by ethnic minorities got to work. Buses of fresh conscripts began arriving at collection points early the next morning. Regions like Buryatia, which have been losing soldiers rapidly in the war in Ukraine, have among the highest rates of conscription. This has a significant impact not only within the region, but on the development of rural parts of Russia as well. The lack of working-age men is impacting local industries, not to mention their families left at home. Furthermore, these practices only exacerbate existing economic struggles relative to more prosperous regions, as evidenced, among else, by the fact that most of those drafted agreed to go for the promise of good pay and a better life for their families. Others, however, chose instead to flee. Reports soon emerged of cars queuing up for hours at the southern border with Georgia and Mongolia, not to mention surging flight prices to destinations in other border countries like Finland and Turkey. In response to these developments, some countries openly welcome Russian citizens, while others react the opposite ways, closing their borders to incoming migrants. Meanwhile, the chief of the European Commission also encouraged countries of the European Union to “show openness” to fleeing Russians.

Whether European and other border countries welcome or turn away Russian migrants, the situation carries a few significant consequences. First and foremost, conscription into what many perceive as a ‘certain-death’ scenario leaves future soldiers and their families with severe emotional and psychological trauma. The lack of reliable news sources informing future conscripts of the real conditions of the war is especially prevalent in precisely these rural and ethnic minority regions. Secondly, the sheer numbers of fleeing Russians threaten to further exacerbate the migratory fallout of the war, leaving millions more in precarious circumstances. In the foreign context, it can also lead to renewed nationalist and xenophobic sentiments towards the Russian people, seen occasionally at the outset of the war. In the domestic context, the mass exodus from relatively more prosperous regions, where citizens can afford to flee, can further hurt underdeveloped rural regions, and exacerbate economic inequalities in the long run.

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