Putin’s hardliner dilemma and his need to seize the initiative
Thumbnail image is of a destroyed Russian BMP-3 near Mariupol, image courtesy of Ukrainian government, Wikimedia Commons
As Vladimir Putin finds himself in an increasingly difficult situation militarily, economically and politically due to his war in Ukraine, recent developments have highlighted the Kremlin’s need to regain the initiative in its conduct of the war as the Russian President has increasingly appeared on the back foot.
Vladimir Putin has shown throughout his tenure in office as President of the Russian Federation that he thrives in controlling the information space and ensuring his adversaries are confused and disorganized. Maintaining initiative has been one of Putin’s prime strategies in his quest for turning Russia back into a global power. This tried and true strategy revolves around making sure your decisions dictate the tempo of any given crisis, and that your adversaries are kept in a reactive role and are unable to be offensively minded. Russian doctrine in the geopolitical sphere has frequently adopted this offensive policy, and Vladimir Putin as an experienced intelligence officer, has excelled at it.
Putin’s reputation as “invincible” both in and out of Russia has frequently stemmed from his effective control of the information space in this way. While many commentators, and Russian propaganda itself, often depict Putin as a skilled planner and decisive action taker, I would argue that Putin’s strength lies more in his ability to take rapidly evolving crises and keep his adversaries guessing as to where the situation is heading.
Euromaidan protest in Kyiv, 18 February 2014, image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons
The most poignant example is the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. The Euro Maidan revolution of 2014 in Ukraine was neither a planned nor predictable event in the eyes of the Kremlin. Victor Yakunovich’s removal from office during the revolution was a rapidly evolving and catastrophic development for a Russian government that desperately wanted to keep Ukraine in the fold and a Russian reaction to the revolution was anticipated by every foreign observer. In this situation, Putin employed every possible misdirection in order to create a foggy and muddled battlespace, he riled up pro-russian Ukrainians with propaganda surrounding the genocide of Russian speakers and de-legitimized pro Western Ukrainian politicians. Born out of this confusion was his eventual invasion and annexation of Crimea. Among one of the most successful military operations in the modern world, Putin was able to deploy the Russian army under the guise of deniability throughout the peninsula, hold sham referenda without resistance and present the West with a “fait accompli” all within 3 weeks. His maintenance of the initiative in this case prevented both the new Ukrainian government and the West from mounting any sort of adequate military, economic or political barrier that could dissuade or deter Putin.
Since then, we’ve observed Putin using this strategy consistently in his competition with the West. Wide spread information warfare, election meddling, assassination attempts and military interventions in places like Syria have all seved symbolic, military or political goals, but they have also helped keep Western governments on edge when dealing with Putin, who has often come off as quick and on the front foot when picking his battles. In the lead up to the Russian invasion of Ukraine this year, the long build up of Russian troops on the border of Ukraine for several months, and the Russian President’s deflections by not giving any straight answers about it showcases this as well. The “will he won’t he” that swirled around the information space is what Putin often craves, and indeed it is difficult to tell if he himself knew what he was going to do until the final few days before the invasion.
Putin’s war in Ukraine has not gone well however. Russian loses are mounting, and Russia has been served some significant setbacks even before September’s Ukrainian counter offensive in Kharkiv. Putin’s “deal” with the Russian population and many elites has been centered around the idea that he would maintain some semblance of their normal lives in exchange for either their support or apathy on the war in Ukraine. Some setbacks like the Russian military’s failure to seize Kyiv or the slow costly progress it has made in the Donbas had Putin take a slight hit in credibility, but nothing like this month’s Ukrainian counter offensive in Kharkiv. The Ukrainian counter offensive in the Kharkhiv region saw a surprise offensive smash through Russian defenses, routing thousands of Russian troops and seizing hundreds of pieces of heavy equipment and thousands of kilometers in territory. This offensive by Ukraine has clearly created a crisis within the Russian military as it panics in order to rally russian troops to defend other sectors. But it has also created a major crisis both in Russian public opinion (which is starting to feel the war’s failures), and in Putin’s ability to control the narrative both at home and abroad.
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Map is the latest Defence Intelligence update on the situation in Ukraine as of 3 October 2022, image courtesy of UK MoD
This last month’s military successes have allowed Ukraine to seize the initiative away from the Kremlin in multiple ways. Firstly, the battlefield tempo is now dictated by Ukraine. Ukrainian troops are have now put Russian forces on the defensive in Kherson, where they’ve used US provided HIMARS to all but cut off Russian troops from their supply lines across the Dniepr, and have increasingly started to recapture territory in the Donbas, with the surrounding of Russian troops in Lyman imminent if the Russian MOD doesn’t decide to pull out of the city in the next few days. Secondly, it has been clear in the last few weeks that Putin is not able to maintain control of his remaining alliances and partnerships. Governments in the Russian sphere like Kazakhstan seem increasingly discontent with the actions of the Kremlin, even stating that they would take in Russians fleeing the draft. In a covertly symbolic gesture, the Kyrgyz prime minister Sadyr Japarov even kept Putin waiting for a meeting on the 16th of September, which as many long time Putin observers will note, has been one of his favorite strategies to humiliate and discomfort other world leaders. Important partners for Russia like China and India have also voiced skepticism and distanced themselves from Russian policy this month as they clearly see Russian failures on the battlefield.
Domestically, Putin finds himself in trouble, not so much from the Russian people (yet) but likely within his inner circle. While any talk of a coup in the Kremlin is unsubstantiated so far, it is likely that Russian elites and their allies are increasingly weighing their options as the war continues to fail. On the one hand, Putin faces more moderate voices that seek to cut their losses, negotiate a settlement or abandon the war altogether, one can imagine this group comprising more of economic elites, oligarchs, and those that are losing major assets from sanctions. On the other, he faces hardliners and militarists that are increasingly voicing displeasure at Putin over his hesitation to prosecute a more comprehensive and total war. The latter community is likely more of a danger to Putin, he needs this community in order to prosecute the war, but cannot afford to suffer more setbacks for fear that they may think of removing him from office. This goes both ways, as many in the security establishment may believe that Putin plans to throw them under the bus or dismiss them and so may feel the need to act preemptively.
The shift in narrative control has likely convinced Putin that he needs to do anything in his power to reclaim the initiative before he is unable to get out of his predicament, things that for Putin usually involve escalation. Some significant developments in the last two weeks have shown that this may be the case.
Putin’s call for partial mobilization was the first of these, on top of satisfying a perceived military necessity as more manpower is needed to fill the gaps in Russian defenses, the call for mobilization has successfully filled the information space with guesses over how Putin will use these reinforcements, when they will arrive, the quality of their training and equipment etc… This has duly served to shift foreign media attention back onto Russia and away from Ukrainian operations. The same goes for Putin’s thinly veiled threats to use nuclear weapons in the defense of Russian territory, all while announcing sham referendums that would annex occupied regions of Ukraine into Russia. Threats of nuclear war have by design reignited public worries around the world of the apocalyptic consequences if these weapons are used, the fact that many international observers are now biting their nails over what Putin may do next in this regard is likely to be the idea behind the rhetoric. The annexation of Ukrainian regions also serves this purpose by splitting the focus of Russians and Ukrainians away from Ukrainian battlefield victories and onto the implications of such a move.
The latest development has been the almost certain sabotage of Nordstream 1 and 2 this past week, with 4 explosions reportedly making the key pipelines to Europe unusable for the foreseeable future. Investigations into these explosions have not yet come to a conclusion over who the culprit is. It is very possible, if not probable, however that these explosions were an act of sabotage by Russia itself. Questions have so far been raised as to why Russia would seemingly sabotage its own pipeline and major source of revenue. But by sabotaging the Nordstream pipelines and not just shutting it off at the source, Russia can distance itself from liability in wreaking havoc on Europe this winter by claiming the pipeline is unusable anyway. It has also allowed Putin to shift attention away from Russia by spreading the conflict and raising the prospect of Western (American specifically) involvement in covert and hostile action, especially to Russian citizens, as he continuously seeks to frame the conflict as one between Russia and the West. Lastly, Putin, in destroying the pipeline, may be seeking to “burn the ships” of more moderate voices in Russia and the Kremlin by denying them their last out in reestablishing economic normalcy with Europe. If anyone within the Kremlin or Russia was still hoping to topple Putin, stop the war, and resume trade in gas with Europe, Putin has now robbed them of that as well.