No 2021 great reset in sight for Arctic relations

Russia is to take chairmanship of the Arctic Council this year (Arctic Council, 2021), a move that will likely be hoped to strengthen its already strong Arctic credentials (Trine Jonassen, 2021), and at a key time of growing regional tension (Levon Sevunts, 2020), remind others of its legitimacy as an Arctic actor through engagement with the region’s international institutions. 

It is likely not enough though to ‘reset’ deteriorating relations with the ‘west’ in the region (Abhishek Saxena, 2020). The US announced on Tuesday that it will restart it’s ‘Arctic patrols’ using surface assets to push for ‘freedom of navigation’ modeled on US actions in the South-China Sea, concentrating on areas where Russia’s Arctic claims are deemed dubious (Paul Mcleary, 2021). Russia for its part is likely to pursue a ‘no rest, no surrender’ policy towards Biden’s presidency (Pjotr Sauer, 2021), and is steadily increasing its Arctic military presence with new bases and defence systems (Smriti Chaudhary, 2020), upgrading its Northern Fleet (Mike Rajkumar, 2020), and even constructing combat icebreakers (Joseph Trevithick, 2019).

While logistically it will be a while before the US can attempt to contest Russia’s Arctic ambitions as its single icebreaker, even with friendly hires, lacks the sheer-scale coverage of Russia’s 50 (David Larter, 2020), the fact though the US has published in policy as well as statement (United States Navy, 2021) its intent to contest controversial claims, makes Arctic claims a source of tension, where previously these had been discounted as a largely benign factor in regional tensions (Kathrin Stephen, 2018). It thus adds greater uncertainty to an already tense region that is seeing increasing levels of militarization from all parties, a context not mitigated by Russian engagement in existing international forums, not least because these forums self-censor the discussion of any security-related matters.