The short anatomy of yet another Budapest-Brussels clash


In March 2017, the Viktor Orban-led Hungarian government conducted a countrywide public consultation titled “Stop Brussels” aiming to survey the electorate’s opinion on the EU allegedly harming Hungary’s sovereignty regarding energy and immigration politics. Almost six years later another consultation was announced by the Prime Minister in September 2022, this time to gather the public’s general viewpoint on the “misguided sanctions [on Russia] of the EU”.

In Hungary, the Orban-specific “national consultation” form of public consultations is used. On these occasions, an informal questionnaire with a set of pre-defined answers is sent out to the electorate which can be returned via post or online. In fact, a “national consultation” is closer to being a popular vote without binding consequences than to being an actual public consultation. Still, scheduling yet another anti-Brussels consultation for the autumn of 2022 was a highly strategic move by the Orban government for numerous reasons.

First, it has the potential to distract public opinion from the 13.5-14.5% inflation and the rising energy prices. Hungary’s inflation rate was the sixth worst in the European Union behind the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria. It was also high above the average EU inflation rate (8.9%).

Second, if a large number of voters express their disagreement through the consultation, it could be a basis of argument for Orban against the EU’s sanctions on Russia, which he identifies as the main reason behind the peaking cost of energy across Europe. Hungary (just like Germany or the Baltic states) is heavily reliant on Moscow for natural gas resources and for that reason prefers good relations with the Russian state. Contrary to that, Hungary eventually voted in favour of the EU’s sanctions so far to emphasize that it still “shares the common EU position”. In addition, being a net beneficiary (receiving more money than that paid in) of the EU’s budget does not give much negotiating leverage to Budapest.

Still, the government is continuing to vocally advocate against sanctions and claim that those have “backfired”. With that, it might aim to shift the direction of voter frustration away from themselves and towards the EU. Being accused, however, is not something Brussels likes. EU officials had been fast to bring Hungary under scrutiny regarding the hesitation to support the sanction packages. This trend only continues after Orban’s government stated that “Hungary cannot support energy sanctions” when the freshly proposed eighth round of sanctions was announced this September.

Brussels seemingly wants an approach as unified as possible towards Russia which is overshadowed by certain countries’ national interests requiring fewer sanctions. The Hungarian Prime Minister once again finds himself in the challenging but certainly not unknown situation of having to balance his foreign policy on a tightrope between the EU and Russia, while also keeping Hungary’s national interests in mind. 

To put pressure on the Hungarian government, a recent European Parliament report has declared Hungary an “electoral autocracy”. It has also raised concerns about corruption, freedom of expression, media and academic freedom, and the independence of the judiciary. Parallel to the report, the European Commission has also proposed to suspend 65% of its contributions “for three operational programmes under cohesion policy”, which equals the loss of 7.5 billion euros, the 20% of all available EU financial support for Hungary. In return for the undisturbed flow of contributions – based on the conditionality regulation – the European Commission expects changes in Hungary regarding the rule of law.

At the core of the Budapest-Brussels relations have been these two major issues ever since the 2010s. Hungary’s distinct foreign policy towards Russia and different approach to the rule of law is not new at all. Neither is the tool of national consultations which have relatively frequently had an anti-Brussels rhetoric. However, in the new budget era (2021-2027), the Russian-Ukrainian War and the incoming economic recession have exacerbated these problems, which now the EU tries to resolve in a more explicit way, even if it includes the distancing of Hungary. The essence of the EU-Hungary relations has not, only its circumstances have changed.

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