Kazakhstan’s Realignment: Away From Russia, Closer to China, & Yielding to the West
Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, ties between Kazakhstan-Russia have weakened. This comes despite the intentions of the former Kazakhstani president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, to create a Kazakh economy widely dependent on trade with Russia, more so than any other trade partner. While Moscow and Astana have seen positive relations of the past based on strategic cooperation surrounding an intertwining of economies, especially with oil and space, the war in Ukraine has allowed for a pivot to take place in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy. Following the replacement of Nazarbayev by the current administration in 2019, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has delivered a stronger stance against Moscow particularly since January of this year and has channelled his efforts (albeit quietly) towards Beijing. Through the introduction of anti-Russian sanctions, Tokayev and his administration condemned Russia’s actions while at the same time welcoming President Xi Jinping this past September. Although the CIS region has at times been described as ‘Russia’s backyard’, their actions are unsurprisingly shaping a Kazakh foreign policy that stands against Russia, forcing one of its closest trade partners towards other opportunities.
In part, Kazakhstan’s current foreign policy decisions are influenced by their understanding of the risks attached to lending their support to Russia’s war in Ukraine – that is, the risk of becoming a pariah state (e.g., Iran) and being hit by Western sanctions. As of 2022, the current President Tokayev has distanced Kazakhstan even further from Russia which is expected following ‘Bloody January’ wherein Russian forces helped the Kazakhstani government suppress public protests over rising fuel prices. As a result of the violent methods Russia typically resorts to when suppressing public outcry, Kazakhstan saw the death of 238 people this past January. Additionally, fears of Kazakhstan being the next territorial claim for Russia have been expressed. Of course, even if Russia is interested in Kazakhstan’s re-integration, a large percentage of Russians have fled to Kazakhstan, both for business as well as dodging the draft. Ultimately it remains highly unlikely that we will see a thinly spread Russian military take Kazakhstan, particularly given that it would lead to a weaker front in Ukraine. Kazakhstan’s foreign policy therefore stands against Russia’s efforts in Ukraine, exemplified through Tokayev’s decision to observe and follow the Western sanctions, ensuring no aid to circumvention will be provided, in addition to refusing to expel the Ukrainian ambassador from Kazakhstan.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s foreign policy over the next two decades held a focus on strengthening its grip on the CIS region, including that of Kazakhstan. In 2009, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a statement on regional integration:
Russia will seek to develop the potential for regional and subregional integration and coordination among member-states of the CIS, first of all within the framework of the Commonwealth, and also the CSTO and [Eurasia Economic Union], which exert a stabilising influence on the overall situation in the regions bordering on the CIS. (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 2009)
Based on the positive relations at the time, Kazakhstan’s wavering position on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 is understood based on mixed public opinion as well as Nazarbayev and Putin’s positive friendship. Nazarbayev’s support for Russia was most clear when in 2015 during the unveiling of a monument commemorating a ‘Hero of the Soviet Union’, Nazarbayev repeated positively a phrase from that time of ‘political instructor Klochkov: ‘Russia is great, there is nowhere to retreat, Moscow is behind us’. During the 2014 invasion, the former president Nazarbayev initially supported the idea of reintegration yet over time withdrew support. Nazarbayev explained in 2021 that they would have recognised Crimea yet chose not to as they would have had to recognize ‘Ossetia, Abkhazia, [and] Kosovo’. Additionally, Kazakhstan’s unclear alignment with Russia in 2014 was a result of the country’s ethnic divisions. With Northern Kazakhstan having a greater ethnic Russian population as well as the country broadcasting Russian news media - public support for the invasion was therefore widely mixed.
At present, Kazakhstan’s efforts to stand against Russia are much stronger than those of the past. Tokayev and his administration have demonstrated resilience in condemning Russia’s actions as well as welcoming those that are fleeing the mandatory draft in Russia. Kazakhstan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Mukhtar Tleuberdi stated prior to the outbreak on 22nd February that they would not recognize Donetsk and Luhansk, and that ‘the situation is now deteriorating, tension is growing, and therefore Kazakhstan is ready and calls on the entire international community to use diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict’. Ties between Moscow and Astana did not have a great start at the beginning of this year either. Their mutual involvement in Kazakhstan’s now infamous event referred to as ‘Bloody January’ resulted in the death of 238 protesters. The request for involving the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – a Russian-led military alliance – led to the assistance of ‘peacekeepers’, with Tokayev having ‘authorized security forces to shoot those involved in the riots’. The President pleaded to CSTO in January, stating, ‘it is an undermining of the integrity of the state and most importantly it is an attack on our citizens who are asking me... to help them urgently… Almaty was attacked, destroyed, vandalized, [and] the residents of Almaty became victims of attacks by terrorists, bandits… therefore it is our duty... to take all possible actions to protect our state’. However, it has been suggested that the violent public protests stemming from the rise in fuel prices were somehow ‘orchestrated’ in an effort to undermine Tokayev due to his increasing independence, a point which at the very least speaks to the inner-turmoil within Kazakhstan’s current government administration.
Since Tokayev has taken up the position of power, he has made efforts to distance the current government from that of Nazarbayev’s. Two primary actions taken include the replacement of Nazarbayev as Chairman of Kazakhstan’s National Security Committee (KNB) with Tokayev himself and the removal of the Head of KNB, Karim Masimov, who was hand-picked by Nazarbayev. In January, Masimov was dismissed and then subsequently found guilty of treason during his time as Head of the KNB, however, the details remain unclear. Kazakhstan’s current domestic situation continues to evolve and will need continued observation over the next six months, especially the relationship Tokayev maintains with Putin. While there is a potential measure of debt owed to Russia, that leverage over Kazakhstan has been more or less subdued given the fact that Kazakhstan appears adamant in abiding by the Western sanctions announced by the EU and the US at present, frequently stating an unwillingness to help Russia circumvent said sanctions.
In terms of ongoing trade between Russia and Kazakhstan, the threat of closing the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), a major source of transport for Kazakh oil, has forced the country to seek alternative routes. One major contract, which was signed in September of this year, was the agreement of transporting Kazakh oil via Azerbaijan’s biggest pipeline. While the CPC is the best option, Russian aggression will lead Kazakhstan to strengthen diplomatic and economic alliances with others, one of those being China. As noted above,. Details shared of the meeting that took place during President Xi Jinping’s visit in September include President Xi noting how China and Kazakhstan have ‘reached the high level of permanent comprehensive strategic partnership. He noted that, during the visit, he will hold talks with President Tokayev to jointly chart a new blueprint for all-round China-Kazakhstan cooperation’. Of course, even as stronger ties develop between Kazakhstan and China, Tokayev cannot risk falling out entirely with Putin. One key issue is the sanctioned Russian company Lukoil having a reported four ongoing energy projects within Kazakhstan: ‘Karachaganak (13.5%), Tengiz (5%), Zhenis (50%), and Al Farabi (49.9%)’. As a result, the intertwined economy will continue to remain a complex factor as time goes on.
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy decision-makers are therefore finding itself leaning away from Russia and actively pursuing multi-vector diplomacy as the country re-strategizes with China whilst simultaneously appeasing those in the West. In contrast to Kazakhstan’s past position towards Ukraine in 2014, it is clearly taking a much stronger and strategic pathway that will lead to stronger bilateral and multilateral relations. It is also worth noting Kazakhstan’s potential influence in the CIS region. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it failed to provide support via CSTO to Armenia during its most recent violent conflict with Azerbaijan. While Kazakhstan is by no means as powerful militarily as Russia, within the CIS region it is only second to Uzbekistan. As Russia continues its own efforts in Ukraine, Kazakhstan will have the opportunity to take steps in becoming a more influential diplomatic figure in the CIS region. In sum, the war in Ukraine, while devastating in the violence it has unleashed, is leading countries such as Kazakhstan to shape their foreign policy decision-making and become less dependent on others. If successful in its multi-vector diplomacy, we will see a more global Kazakhstan stepping away from Russia, building strategic ties with China, as well as becoming another authoritarian government strategically appeasing the West.