NATO Expansion in Northern Europe: What is Türkiye’s Deal with Sweden?
To date 28 out of the 30 member countries have ratified the accession protocols of Sweden and Finland. The countries that have not are Hungary and Türkiye. This article will focus mostly on Türkiye and Sweden. In the very first months of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Sweden and Finland expressed increased concerns and an interest in joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). When both Sweden and Finland finally delivered their accession protocols to NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on 18 May 2022, Türkiye expressed security concerns over these two countries joining the alliance. Türkiye’s concerns were based mostly on the fact that both Finland and Sweden had previously offered their indirect support to terrorist groups such as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Sweden’s weapon embargoes towards Türkiye have also been identified as non-compliant with NATO guidelines. However, behind these claims, alternate motives such as the U.S. blocking Türkiye’s F-16 purchase deal and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s campaign for the 2023 presidential elections can be identified.
Sweden and Türkiye did not have the warmest relationship before Sweden's application to NATO and that most certainly did not change when they did decide to apply. By way of illustration, the Swedish Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP) embargo on weapon exports to Türkiye was introduced on 15 October 2019, as a response to Türkiye’s actions in Syria. In the case of Finland, on 3 November 2022 during the press conference with Jens Stoltenberg and Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Türkiye’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, the former said “We don’t have that much of a problem with Finland’s stance” and added “Finland and Sweden have expressed a wish to join together”. This implies that either Finland potentially fulfilled their pledges made in the Trilateral Memorandum alongside Türkiye on 28 June 2022 to a level that satisfies Türkiye. Or, perhaps more simply, Sweden being one of the “gravitational centres” of Kurdish people, Türkiye has more grounds to base their accusations against them.
There are threeTurkish motives for stalling the accession of Sweden can be identified:
Türkiye’s fight against terrorist organisations, specifically the PKK.
The purchase of new F-16 fighter jets and modernisation packages for the current ones.
The 2023 presidential election and Erdoğan’s campaign.
1. Türkiye’s fight against terrorist organisations, specifically the PKK
This can be seen as one of the most important motives behind Türkiye’s intention to delay Sweden's entrance to NATO. Four articles (3,4,5 and 6), and five sub-sections (out of seven in total) of Article 8 in the Trilateral Memorandum, where Sweden and Finland agree to “concrete steps” for greater cooperation in countering terrorism.
Sweden has taken steps to fulfil these pledges: it has introduced new legislation which will potentially enable Sweden to extradite people associated with terrorist organisations particularly the PKK, as well as prevent the funding of terrorist organisations; it has recognised the PKK as a terrorist organisation; and it has lifted the weapon embargoes on Türkiye that had been implemented by the Swedish ISP.
In October 2022, a new three-party government headed by Ulf Kristersson came to power. One of the governing parties is the far-right Sweden Democrats (SD) which has radical views on immigration and providing asylum. The current Swedish government may therefore be more likely to extradite people requested by Türkiye, crack down on all organisations considered terrorist by Türkiye and demonstrate more support of Türkiye’s policies in internal and foreign affairs. After all, joining NATO is in the interests of the Swedish people and this is what Jimmie Åkesson, leader of the SD, advocates for, - working for the interests of the Swedish people.
2. The purchase of new F-16 fighter jets and modernisation packages for the current fighter jets:
The U.S. government sanctioned Turkey on 14 December 2020 under Section 231 of Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). This was done after Türkiye continued with their plans to obtain S-400 air defence systems. With this action, the US government has excluded Türkiye from the F-35 fighter jet programme. On 8 October 2021, Ankara made a request to purchase 40 new F-16 fighter jets and 80 modernisation packages for their current fighters. This deal seemed unlikely to gain approval from the U.S. at the time. However, looking at the situation today, the delay of Sweden’s accession to the alliance may have been used as leverage in negotiations with U.S. officials behind the scenes. In September 2022 Erdoğan, having met two U.S. senators in New York, said that he received “positive feedback” with regards to the backing of the F-16 purchase deal in Congress.
3. 2023 presidential election and Erdoğan’s campaign:
Erdoğan is currently in a tight position as he is approaching the presidential election of 2023. Over the last term in office, Erdoğan has damaged Türkiye’s economy, forcing the Turkish Lira exchange rates to drop significantly. On top of that, Erdoğan's populist views resulted in three heads of the Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye being fired. The economic situation and his sometimes autocratic-like actions, resulted in Erdoğan losing Istanbul and Ankara, two major cities to the opposition, according to polls. This type of situation forces Erdoğan to search for a distraction and any kind of win that he could present to the electorate.
To conclude, it is likely that Erdoğan, in the run-up to the 2023 presidential elections, is going to use Finland and Sweden especially, to increase his party’s popularity amongst Türkiye’s electorate. As can be seen from of Erdoğan’s introductory statement in the “Towering Power Turkey 1, 2 and 3” publications (the series of governmental reports on his party’s achievements) as well as from the ongoing actions in Syria, significant importance will potentially be placed on fighting against the terrorist organisations and defending the nation. It can be expected that Erdoğan will address the national security and military might of Türkiye, if he will be able to make the F-16 deal go through in the U.S. Congress. A point will potentially be made that Sweden and Finland have finally agreed to cooperate in the fight against terrorism and that the only safe haven of PKK, FETO, PYD and other terrorist organizations in Europe has now been destroyed, will be reiterated.
No more funding will be coming from those countries or, at least, it will be significantly reduced as both Sweden and Finland are cracking down on the funding of terrorist organisations coming from within their countries through the implementation of new legislation.
Erdoğan is likely to take the merit for the lifted gun embargoes by Sweden’s ISP, increased cooperation between the Türkiye’s and Sweden’s/Finland’s secret services, and the creation of intergovernmental working groups to tackle terrorism.
Taking all of this into account, it can be expected that Sweden and Finland will not be able to join NATO until the presidential elections in 2023 have taken place. To join before then will require Sweden to make even more significant steps that will satisfy Erdoğan’s political campaign. Whilst the chances that Sweden will do this appear more likely when the stance of the right-sided Swedish government is taken into consideration, they remain minimal.