Ukraine’s successes on the battlefield have caused concern over a nuclear exchange between countries with the two largest arsenals, Russia and the United States, to resurface. Some analysts fear Vladimir Putin will use nuclear weapons to overcome Russia’s failures in Ukraine, causing a cascading series of crises leading to WWIII. These concerns are understandable. The use of nuclear weapons in conflict by any actor on the global stage would disrupt a precedent lasting over 75 years since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. It would cause further damage to an already fragile international environment. But how likely is the war in Ukraine going to spiral into a global nuclear calamity, and how should these concerns shape US foreign policy in Eastern Europe and elsewhere? 

The US should proceed with prudent and clear-headed decision-making. But overreacting to currently unlikely dangers not only sets back US interests in Ukraine, but also plays into the hands of revanchist dictators eager to roll back US influence. The world will become more, not less, dangerous. Instead, the way to proceed is to double down on deterrence. The US should continue to articulate that it will defend and support its partners and allies in the face of aggression, and will allow neither nuclear blackmail nor the use of nuclear weapons as a means to achieve political aims to go unpunished.

Ukraine’s success in defending its homeland has been a shock to most observers, including those who would wish to see Russia falter. Many failed to imagine a situation where Ukraine would not only hold its own in a war with Russia but humiliate one of the world’s ostensibly most powerful militaries. This coincides with Putin—who for many years was viewed as a master of conniving statecraft in the West—being exposed as both unhinged and a poor (or disinterested) analyst of Russia’s strategic vulnerabilities. Therefore, could Russia’s continual humiliation at the hands of Ukraine’s courageous and innovative armed forces necessarily result in nuclear escalation? 

The evidence thus far suggests otherwise. Russia was humiliated when it initially failed to take Kyiv, it was humiliated at the sinking of the Moskva, and it is humiliating for Russia to watch the Ukrainians retake cities like Kherson—the capital of the Russia-annexed Kherson region that was supposedly under Russia’s nuclear umbrella. Bakhmut, as of the publication of this article, is still standing, while the parts of the Kerch bridge need rebuilding. None of these humiliations for Russia have resulted in the use of nuclear weapons.

This is not to say that Russia will not use nuclear weapons in the wake of possible future Ukrainian victories, or in any other instance. Indeed, Putin recently alluded to the possibility of adopting a preventative first-strike nuclear policy which would mark a departure from Russia’s current policy of using nuclear weapons as a last resort. 

Nobody knows what Putin will choose to do, but there is already evidence suggesting his iron grip over Russia is weakening. Indeed, Putin’s regime may not survive the international backlash that would ensue from the use of a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine, and the same logic can be applied to the nightmare scenario of Putin taking the suicidal step of using a nuclear weapon against the US or another NATO ally. Should he choose to, a number of options remain open for the US and its allies, ranging from increasing military aid to using conventional weapons against Russia (likely confined to Ukrainian territory) while expanding NATO’s footprint in Eastern Europe—which is already taking place to a degree.

While it is beneficial to analyze and prepare for these risks, the US should not deter itself. At present, Ukraine’s sacrifices are helping to untie itself from a murderous regime, while also benefiting the US and its allies. A militarily and economically weakened Russia at the hands of Ukraine’s armed forces and Western sanctions demonstrates the value of partnering with the US, underscoring that the US-led international order is backed overwhelmingly by consent—not domination. 

With no US military service members paying the ultimate sacrifice in this war, it is clear that funding Ukraine’s armed forces to the tune of over $20 billion is some of the most efficient and worthwhile Pentagon spending in decades. Indeed, to take one example, an upshot of Putin’s wavering invasion of Ukraine is the increased urgency that countries feel to free themselves from dependence on Russian energy, which weakens Russia’s ability to leverage its geopolitical advantage in energy exportation down the line. Also, despite internal hangups brought on by Turkey, the possibility of Sweden and Finland joining NATO would further strengthen the alliance that has brought unprecedented peace to Europe and turn the continent into more of a porcupine. The US has certainly suffered economically due to the war, but that cost pales in comparison to major gains in securing American interests in Europe. 

The time may hopefully come for genuinely productive negotiations. But to push a winning Ukraine to negotiate, as some have suggested, and potentially relinquish invaded territory with Russia having “shown no serious proposals” is counterproductive and dangerous. In addition to undercutting the gains mentioned above for Ukraine, the US, and other Western allies, the prospect of Russian nuclear blackmail redeeming a failed military campaign legitimizes that practice. 

What is more, although it may not ignite another global arms race, Russian nuclear blackmail that sees territory carved out in eastern Ukraine will probably impact China’s calculations vis-à-vis Taiwan, and not for the better. The US should provide Taiwan with the arms necessary to defend itself should China choose to invade. But this vital support will lose much of its value should Xi Jinping see the West recoil now in its support for Ukraine in the face of Russian nuclear blackmail.

The Ukraine-Taiwan comparison is not exact, and one should avoid assuming parallels in various contingencies. After all, despite Russia’s embarrassing performance, a land-based invasion of Ukraine is an objectively simpler task than the enormous hurdle of an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. But to deter an invasion of Taiwan—and the disastrous economic consequences that would follow (to say nothing of the tragic human cost)—the US should be keenly aware of how the messages it sends to Russia will reverberate across the Pacific and elsewhere. China’s massive expansion of its nuclear arsenal underscores the value Xi places on such weaponry to achieve its foreign policy aims, and the US should take notice.

To be sure, a drawn-out war in Ukraine is hardly in the US’ interests. Indeed, America and its allies are unprepared politically or militarily to fight large powers simultaneously in Europe and Asia. A war in eastern Europe that, at best, remains contained to Ukraine or, at worst, spirals beyond its borders could be a step toward a nuclear scenario. But this is not a reason to force Ukraine to the negotiating table, especially with a Russia failing to demonstrate it will abide by a deal and not menace Ukraine in the near future. After all, it was Russia who violated the 2014 Minsk Agreements ahead of the February 2022 invasion. Ukrainians are therefore understandably skeptical that premature negotiations would provide long-term security to their country—let alone the rest of Europe.

The US should continue to support Ukraine financially, militarily, and politically, and the Biden administration’s effort has been commendable. Hosting President Zelensky to address a joint meeting of Congress in December was a powerful show of solidarity, and the recent announcement of another $3 billion in military aid will build on the progress Ukraine has already made (despite Ukraine asking for additional materiel) and support possible winter offensives. Europe is also stepping up, with France and Germany pledging a range of armored fighting vehicles to support Ukraine (including Germany finally agreeing to send Leopard tanks), and Germany and the United States pledging a Patriot anti-aircraft missile battery. Support from Great Britain and Poland has been steadfast throughout. 

As in any war, uncertainty remains ever-present. A Republican majority less friendly to Ukraine recently took control of the US House of Representatives, and it is unclear how Russia would respond to a Ukrainian offensive in Crimea. Meanwhile Russia, through its relentless mobilization, continues to have an advantage in numbers, as Ukrainian manpower wanes in comparison. But, as Ukraine’s battlefield victories and continuing international support show, there is much to be optimistic about. As Zelensky said in his address to Congress, “Ukraine is alive and kicking.” The US, by resisting nuclear blackmail and supporting its partners and allies, will continue to help Ukraine be so.