The Likelihood and Impact of a Russian Spring Offensive
The possibility of a Russian Spring Offensive has been feared and expected by Ukrainian President Zelesnky and top Ukrainian Generals Valery Zaluzhny (head of Armed Forces Ukraine) and Oleksandr Syrsky (head of Ukraine’s Ground Forces) since December 2022. The likelihood and impact of this potentiality, however, is highly dependent on whether Russian tactics have improved since the initial six months of the war (when they were on the offensive) and whether Ukraine can maintain its tactical superiority and adaptability against Russian missile strikes. This article is split into two sections; the first part takes stock of the current trajectory of the war and assesses the likelihood of a Russian Offensive. The actuality of an offensive is dependent on the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation’s (AFRF) fighting potential. As it stands, there are critical deficiencies facing the AFRF after being on the defensive since the summer. The second part assesses the potential impact of a Russian Offensive based on two variables: firstly, it looks at the lessons learnt in modern warfare from the initial six months of invasion and whether the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) can navigate the space to remain tactically competitive. Secondly, it looks at current AFU defensive capabilities and its ability to go on the offensive.
It is important to note that this article cannot account for all the potentialities and variables for a Russian Spring Offensive, nor can it predict the outcome of a war that is rapidly changing in tactics and strategy. The main purpose of this article hopes at least to draw upon known variables to inform its conclusion of the likelihood and impact of a Russian Offensive. Known variables can be drawn on the crucial first six months of the war where the AFU remained on the defensive yet successfully halted the Russian advance on Kyiv before launching successive counter-attacks after being supplied with NATO weaponry. Lessons on the tactics already employed by the AFU offer guidance for future large-scale engagements. Likewise, the main weaknesses and failures of the AFRF and whether improvements are made structurally and tactically will determine the successfulness of a renewed offensive.
The Current Trajectory
Russia’s last major victory can be traced back to June 2022 where they successfully encircled and captured Severodonetsk and neighbouring Lysychansk. At the time, it was thought Russia might pave a way to establishing its short-term and long-term military objectives. However the AFU’s huge reliance on NATO supplies and weaponry had proved almost critical in Ukraine’s recent successes. For example the provision of HIMARS rockets provided by America in June 2022 has decimated Russian ammunition dumps and command-and-control centres, rendering land operations tactically uncompetitive on the battlefield. This has resulted in a series of successful Ukrainian counter-attacks such as breaking the siege of Kharkiv and advancing some 8,000 square kilometres forward. Ukrainian troops were even able to recapture Kherson, a major city, which was lost early in the invasion. Since then the AFRF has been on the backfoot and on the defensive on most fronts. In the winter, ground activity and engagements have slowed considerably such as on the Zaporizhzhia and Kalanchak Front (including Kherson) where the battlelines have barely moved. In Kherson the AFU currently maintains control of the west bank of the Dnipro river while Russian troops have dug themselves deep in defensive trench lines and destroyed land bridges on the eastern bank.
Now, much of the heavy fighting remains in the East where on the Bakhmut front the AFRF are on the offensive. The Bakhmut front line stands some 43 miles north of Donetsk where some of the fiercest fighting can be found at the city and its neighbouring towns (such as Soledar). The actual city of Bakhmut holds little military strategic value, although a victory here could be a huge psychological victory for Putin who is looking at least for one victory to show after continuous defeats since the summer. The Bakhmut front is also quickly becoming a testing ground for evolving Russian tactics where the Wagner Group are leading the offensive, working closely alongside elite units of the AFRF in strike groups.
While the war is increasingly becoming contested and concentrated on this front, Mr Zelensky and his top Ukrainian generals' concerns for a Russian Offensive are a real possibility. The Kremlin in September 2022 said it was mobilising some 300,000 additional soldiers in Ukraine and is rearming its stockpiles of armaments consistent with the demands of a large-scale offensive. Furthermore, the new appointment of General Valery Gerasimov as Russia’s top military commander signals a change in leadership. Fresh leadership could bring renewed opportunities such as an imminent offensive. General Gerasimov replaced General Sergei Surovikin, a Syrian war veteran who was in the job for only a mere three months. A change in leadership signals an opportunity for Russian forces to improve their tactical capabilities in the coming months. From a military perspective a Russian Offensive from the North on the Ukrainian border with Belarus is a possibility, possible with another attempt to take Kyiv. These fears are further supported by the joint military exercises that Russian and Belarus began on 16 January. These military exercises will focus on air force drills involving the mechanised brigade subdivision. It is unclear how involved Belarus might be in a renewed Russian Offensive, but it is clear Belarus remains an existential threat to Ukrainian sovereignty. On the other hand, an attack could also come from the South, or directly from the East. Any attack from the East could potentially assist in the momentum of an attack on Bakhmut. Supply lines also run shortest from the East where troops and shells can be dispensed and resupplied quickly. It would also appear strategically prudent for Putin to further consolidate his position in Donetsk Oblast and the Donbas as a whole.
If the concerns of an offensive are very much real, key lessons can be drawn from the failures of the AFRF to help determine the success of a future offensive. A report from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)* offers insights into the leading deficiencies facing the AFRF. Some of the key areas which ought to be monitored include; firstly, how well Russian land, air, and navy branches can operate cohesively towards shared objectives rather than being subordinate to the needs of land operations. This has rendered air and navy branches operating so far at suboptimal levels, and tactically incapable of securing their own objectives. Secondly, whether Russian forces can improve the quality of its junior leadership, doing so would improve the tactical competitiveness of its units on the ground. There remains a tendency to rapidly promote troops in junior positions who are inadequately trained. Russian Forces often operate from a Soviet-era hierarchical top-down approach which makes junior leadership inelastic to the demands of modern warfare. Thirdly, whether a culture of reinforcing failure can be addressed. Due to this strict top-down approach, Russian forces struggle to facilitate adaptability or nurture initiative, making Russian units incredibly reliant on high-ranking commanders to set objectives for them rather than adapting to actual engagements on the ground. There also remains a significant lack of reversionary action (to cancel objectives) and a dishonest reporting culture to inform top commanders (with actual decision-making powers) of the true situation on the ground. A change in leadership and the fact the Wagner Group is working more closely now with AFRF elite units in smaller groups may signal a shift towards greater adaptability. Fourthly, whether Russian forces can improve their ability to rapidly fuse information. Russian forces were often too slow to commit to a strike, expending much of its munitions on targets which had already moved. If Russian forces can improve the precision and speed of their intelligence gathering it is no doubt that their tactical competitiveness on the ground would improve, as would its lethality. Lastly, a culture of institutional fratricide is endemic within the Russian forces. This is especially evident with ground units, which translates to a lack of appreciation for human life. The Bakhmut front is a testament to this with reports of ‘waves of infantry charges’. The actual life of a soldier in the Russian army operates in a structure that treats soldiers as expedient, leading to low morale and poor unit cohesion where desertions are likely to be high.
The insight to be drawn from the RUSI report are twofold; firstly, it sets the precedent for future projections on whether the AFRF can remain tactically competitive once they identify their structural and logistical shortcomings. Secondly, it holds key lessons for the AFU to learn from. It is a mistake to consider the common narrative that the Russian military is totally incompetent, corrupt and utilises ineffective weapons. As duly noted by the RUSI, such a culture of thinking is dangerous because the reality is that the Russian military is not averse to adapting or making sweeping changes. Their arsenal of weaponry, equipment and men so far have largely been effective despite tactical incompetence.
The Impact of a potential Russian Offensive
The evolving lessons from the first six months of the war provide insight into how modern warfare is changing and conducted. Units must remain tactically competitive and endure new forms of hardship to be successful in any engagements. Therefore future projections on how effective a Russian Offensive could be is dependent on several variables.
Firstly, the use of artillery for example cannot be underestimated especially in defensive warfare. Contrary to the common narrative seen on social media the use of anti-tank missiles (Javelin and NLAW missiles provided by the West) were not as tactically important in defending against large-scale invasions. Instead the strategic use of artillery is what allowed Ukraine to slow the large-scale invasion in February 2022 and halt the advance on Kyiv. The use of artillery was crucial, statistics show Ukraine maintained a 2:1 advantage of artillery fire over the Russians for around 1.5 months before running low on munitions by June. By then, Russia held a 10:1 advantage in output of firepower which allowed them to take Severodonetsk. The data points to the importance of being able to slow down an advance and harass enemy positions. Fundamentally, the idea behind artillery fire involves pinning down enemy forces to prevent them from moving or destroying them completely. The use of artillery historically has inflicted the majority of casualties in the First World War and in every theatre in the Second World War except the Pacific. This points to the vital lesson that a successful Russian offensive will depend significantly on which side has stockpiled enough supplies and shells. Since the summer, the rate of Russia’s shellfire has declined significantly, to the point that Russia has turned to North Korea for replenishment of its munitions. Nevertheless, the importance of remaining well-stocked and supplied with artillery fire will be crucial for maintaining dominance on the battlefield.
Secondly, remaining highly mobile and dispersed is key to survivability. Also, contrary to the narrative seen on social media, whilst the use of drones was significantly less effective when utilised for precision strikes, drones were vital for surveillance and reconnaissance missions. The RUSI noted that 90% of all drones used between February and July used by the AFU were destroyed. Yet this does not discount the importance of intelligence gathering and knitting of information. In modern warfare, the uncomfortable reality is that remaining hidden is much more difficult and that there can be no safe space for troops. For example, a well coordinated Ukrainian HIMARS strike on a Russian facility killed some 63 Russian soldiers early this year. The true lesson to be learnt is to remain dispersed and mobile before the enemy has spotted you and can commit to a strike. Ideally, it would be significant to remain dispersed enough to be uneconomical to strike. Therefore the mass gathering of large numbers of men and equipment is unadvisable unless one maintains air and land superiority needed for a large offensive. The fact is that Ukrainian tactics have remained highly adaptable, which has contributed to their tactical competitiveness on the battlefield despite being outclassed numerically in men and firepower. Immediately departing from some of the key deficiencies facing the AFRF in the first section, the AFU subscribes to NATO principles of decentralised command and the importance of morale to compensate for lack in firepower. A focus on surprise and deception is key when facing an enemy that holds numerical superiority. This leads the AFU to showcase both greater adaptability than their AFRF counterparts and initiative with better knitted junior leadership to execute its given objectives by operating in smaller groups. On several accounts, units were stitched together to form a makeshift battalion to harass supply convoys during the Russian advance to Kyiv, or mobile units were pulled and selected from existing brigades to form successful raids on enemy bases.
Ukraine’s current defensive capabilities rely heavily on NATO supplies and weaponry and Russia's onslaught against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure has made it vulnerable. Its intended target of course is the civilian populace, bombarded with air sirens, raids, inconsistent supply of electricity, warmth, food and water. The reality is that Ukraine needs better and more efficient anti-missile defences than what it currently has. The supply of Patriot missiles from America will be important in the coming months for Ukraine’s long-term survival. In addition, new agreements and fresh equipment is making its way to Ukrainian hands. The latest batch of support will include infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) including some 50 M2A2 Bradley from the US, 40 Marder vehicles from Germany, and an undisclosed amount of AMX-10RCs from France. The UK also paved the way to provide Ukraine with 14 Challenger 2 tanks, a much needed addition to the AFU’s arsenal of heavy vehicles. The hope of course is to provide Ukraine with further mechanised support in wake of a potential Russian Offensive. However, the use of heavy tanks will prove vital to expanding not just Ukraine’s defensive capacity but its offensive capabilities.
Ukraine has held a reliable track record of utilising NATO weaponry effectively. If the AFU were to make full use of NATO weapons and equipment the possibility of a Ukrainian counter-offensive should be considered. However, timing will be critical; it could be possible for Ukraine to launch a counter-attack in the East before Russia commits to an offensive, but expending, dispersing and committing too many units into the East would be imprudent given the threat Belarus poses from the North, leaving Kyiv vulnerable. On the other hand, if Ukraine were to ‘wait’ for an Russian Offensive it could lose the momentum it has held since the summer. Current Russian tactics indeed appear aimed at slowing Ukrainian gains to the point of standstill, it is already working as the winter has slowed the tempo of engagements. The current state of the war is also turning into what reporters have coined a ‘war of attrition’ where supplies, ammunition, and manpower matter significantly in the long run. Unfortunately, on all three counts Russia maintains a numerical advantage. The future of Ukraine therefore lies on its ability to tactically outsmart an enemy that has numerical firepower. The more territory that is liberated and recaptured by Ukraine, the greater its chances of success in the long-term. Time is not on their side. Retaking the northern coast of the Sea of Azov and cutting off the Kerch bridge that connects Russia’s direct supply line to the Crimean peninsula could be critical to Ukraine’s victory. It would effectively isolate Crimea from being directly supplied by Russia and place it within artillery range. It could also potentially open up greater access to Ukrainian exports which have still remained limited despite UN intervention.
Despite a trove of uncertainties and potentialities it can be said that Russia technically on paper maintains the benefit of larger manpower and technological capacity (based on output) in comparison to Ukraine. Yet, Ukraine has crucially relied upon sound military tactics which have ultimately led to its successes. But for how long? If Russia were to learn from its mistakes it would no doubt become a more dangerous force.