Valery Gerasimov: A Doctrinal Failure?
Valery Gerasimov is the current head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and he has been exercising this role since the end of 2012. In January 2023, he was designated the overall commander of the Russian troops in Ukraine. Unlike other Russian decision-makers, interest for Gerasimov spiked long before Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. He has been long credited with designing the so-called “Gerasimov Doctrine”, put to the test during Russia's sponsored actions in Ukraine in 2014. This produced a considerable amount of speculation around the nature of hybrid warfare. Gerasimov did not come with anything new, he just reinterpreted a reality that had been discussed for a long time both in Soviet/Russian and foreign militaries. Gerasimov was sanctioned in the spring of 2014 by the European Union and several other countries around the world for being responsible for the deployment of troops near Ukraine's border and acting against its territorial integrity and sovereignty. In February 2022, the United States added Gerasimov to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN) along with Vladimir Putin and Russia's Defence Minister, Sergei Shoigu.
Born in Kazan, Gerasimov went through several military institutions such as Kazan Suvorov Military School, Kazan Higher Tank Command School, the Malinovsky Military Academy and the Military Academy of the General Staff. He quickly rose through the ranks and served in the Far East, Baltic and North Caucasus. He became commander of the Leningrad and then Moscow Military Districts. In 2010, he was appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff and promoted to Chief of the General Staff in November 2012. On 11 January 2023, he was promoted to Commander of the Joint Group of Forces in the Special Military Operation zone putting him in charge of Russia’s military operation in Ukraine.
Gerasimov was designated as Chief of the General Staff as part of the ongoing efforts to modernize the Russian Armed Forces. These reforms started during the Medvedev term under Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov. Russia's intervention in Georgia in 2008 was swift, but it revealed many shortcomings. Serdyukov was tasked with making the Russian military a modern force, but many problems arose as he did not have a military background. As a result, relations between the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces and the Military-Industrial Complex deteriorated. Serdyukov was sacked in 2012 after the return of Putin to the Presidency. His replacement, Sergei Shoigu was welcomed as a more suitable candidate, being a close associate of Putin himself. Shoigu abolished some of the intended changes of the 2008 reform and continued with others. The new Defence Minister was the one to introduce Gerasimov to Putin, since then Gerasimov became part of the hard-line close circle of Putin along with Shoigu, Bortnikov and Patrushev.
As mentioned, interest in Gerasimov rose after he outlined the Russian perspective on the broader post-Cold War security environment in 2013. Reviewing the lessons learned from major crises and conflicts since 1991 (Gulf War, War on Terror, Georgian War, Arab Spring), Gerasimov argued that the value of non-military means to achieve political and strategic ends had increased to such an extent that, to a certain degree, they exceeded the effectiveness of weapons. For Russian military theorists, the Arab Spring constituted the greatest example of hybrid warfare at the time. According to Gerasimov, politics and economy are not the only tools used to develop and exercise this hybrid warfare. Information activities, humanitarian operations and other non-military measures, all can be employed to fuel the potential for popular protest. This process is supported through clandestine military and special operations activities.
As stated, Gerasimov did not come up with anything new, he just stressed the need for Russia to adapt to a rapidly changing world. According to the chief of staff, the US military transformation in terms of enhancing plausible deniability actions allowed for fighting across a broad spectrum without resorting to armed clashes. In addition, US capabilities to conduct non-military asymmetric actions integrated into Prompt Global Strike capabilities were a challenge for Russia. New technologies represented a revolution in the information space, and already in the 1990s Russian military theorists recognised that the internet offered opportunities to act against the adversary by influencing public opinion and degrading its military capabilities.
According to Gerasimov, it is possible to divide the new conflicts of the 21st century into six stages: covert origins, tensions, initial conflict actions, crisis, resolution, peacemaking, and post-conflict regulation. Gerasimov noted the need for Russia, following the approaches of NATO and the European Union, to establish an approach where military efforts are integrated with those of government agencies under civil-military cooperation. The ideas put forward by the Chief of Staff are inspired by Soviet theorists such as Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Vladimir Triandafilov, Georgii Isserson or Nikolai Ogarkov. All of them played a key role in the revolution of military concepts; and some like Ogarkov already warned in Cold War times about the new stage of conflicts in which military and non-military means would be linked to achieve superiority in the dominance of cyberspace and information. These “revolutions” in military affairs were never fully implemented in Russia (either because of bureaucracy hard-liners or the economic crisis, among others). That is why the current Russian military strategy focuses on catching up on the use of regular and irregular forces combined with psychological, economic, political and informational means. Russian strategist believe they are lagging behind the West regarding the development and employment of these type of tools.
In this regard, Russia was successful during the 2014 events in Ukraine. Crimea was seized without bloodshed, the information space was dominated and, despite some setbacks, the old style soviet-era Ukrainian Armed Forces were defeated by the separatist forces in the east after Russia intervened in summer of that same year giving intelligence, equipment and military support. Gerasimov supervised Russian military actions in Syria, where they managed to stabilize Bashar al-Assad's grip over the country. Putin could often be seen close to Gerasimov during military exercises such as Zapad or Vostok and the Chief of Staff declared in 2017 that Putin actively involved himself in the planning of military operations and designation of objectives in Syria together with Gerasimov and Shoigu. A big part of the success of the operations in Ukraine and Syria was due to the reforms accomplished during Serdyukov's time in office, but Russia did not engage in grand-scale operations nor led a symmetrical war in Syria like it is doing since 2022 in Ukraine. Russian successes in these scenarios, undoubtedly, influenced decision making both in top political and military leadership when making assessments about future actions.
After Russia's botched invasion, the aura around the Chief of the General Staff started to dissipate and Gerasimov ‘disappeared’ from the public eye for several weeks. There have been many rumors about the relation between Putin and Gerasimov, but for now the Russian President seems to still trust the Chief of Staff. In December 2022, Gerasimov reappeared again to reproduce the Russian state narrative about the reasons for the war, but most eyes appear to be more focused on “new” faces like Sergei Surovikin and his strategies. Unless Russia suffers a really serious setback (like losing Crimea), Gerasimov will remain in his post, at least as long as Shoigu remains as Defence Minister. Furthermore, less generals would be interested in taking such a great responsibility. His recent designation as overall commander of the Russian forces in Ukraine, replacing Surovikin, could be signaling of new intentions for the Ukrainian theater, although it is unclear what advances could exactly Gerasimov obtain having at his disposal the same resources as his predecessor. State sources argued that this change was part of the process for “raising the level of leadership of the special operation” and “expanding the scale of the tasks being solved”. This suggest Russia could be preparing a new wave of mobilization for spring offensive operations. On the other hand, and as it has already been stated, Gerasimov and Shoigu could be wary of Surovikin's rise to prominence and although he was not entirely demoted, now he will occupy a less relevant role as one of Gerasimov's deputies in Ukraine. It remains to be seen how efficient will Gerasimov be in this new role. The Chieff of Staff will have to coordinate Russian war efforts and, among other tasks, keep up to date with all military developments pertaining the rest of the country and other relevant theaters where Russia has military presence (Syria, Caucasus, Central Asia or Transnistria).
Gerasimov is already 67 years old and he will need to be a replaced in the following years. There are several Russian Commanders who are in their 50s or early 60s and have acquired experience in Syria. Some of them occupied important positions but were dismissed from their responsibilities after not performing as expected during the invasion of Ukraine:
Alexander Zhuravlyov, former commander of the Western Military District and responsible for Russia's failed northern thrust during the invasion. He was dismissed in summer of 2022.
Alexander Dvornikov, first to be appointed as the overall leader of the invasion forces. He did not perform as expected and witnessed serious setbacks in the northeast, being replaced by Surovikin.
Alexander Lapin, former commander of the Western Military District until October 2022. In March, footage of Alexander Lapin awarding his own son, Denis Lapin, appeared on social media. Allegedly, the awards ceremony took place despite a failed offensive and poor leadership. He was heavily criticised by Chechnya's leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, for retreating and being “mediocre”. Despite all this, Lapin senior was recently designated as Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces.
Andrey Kartapolov, former commander of the Main Military-Political Directorate (GVPU VS RF) and the Western Military District, could have been a replacement for Gerasimov. He retired from the army in late 2021 to become a member of the Duma. Another option is Gennady Zhidko, who commanded several military districts and replaced Andrey Kartapolov. He is rumored to haven been designated as overall commander of the Russian forces in Ukraine after Dvornikov. This was never confirmed, but Zhidko was dismissed from the Main Military-Political Directorate in summer of 2022. For now, Surovikin seems to be the best positioned to take Gerasimov's mantle, even if he acts as his deputy, but the Ukrainian war has showed that abrupt changes in the short-term should not be ruled out.
Even if Gerasimov can be efficient at reproducing military theories, the expected results have not materialized on the ground. The man who claimed to “command the second most powerful army in the world” either seriously misjudged its own capabilities or was unaware, which is hard to believe, of the structural and persistent problems within the Russian military. Although, it must be mentioned that wrong assumptions about Russia's Armed Forces were also present in foreign analyses. Nonetheless, judging the potential of armed forces in abstract terms has proven to lead to wrong assessments, what matters is the specific context.
Issues related to the control and organization of troops or logistics are important, but deeper problems (heritage of Imperial and Soviet Russia) lie at the root of Russia's traditional military toxic culture and are closely related to some characteristics of Russian society itself. Poor treatment of soldiers and higher tolerance of losses is common and detrimental. There is still a very high degree of submission to central-command with low flexibility, where promotion of effective individual consciousness inside the chain of command is still lacking in favor of collectivism. Ironically, individualism is present mainly through egocentrism. High-ranking officers, eager for promotions, try to prove their value, “in service to the Motherland”, no matter the cost. Widespread corruption, bribery, abuse of power and commercialization of relations, which became a problem during the 90s, have not been solved.
Gerasimov is not solely responsible for the state of the Russian army. The whole chain of high-ranking command, including Sergei Shoigu, bear equal responsibility for incorrectly addressing these problems or even perpetuating them during the last decade. Recreating the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts, returning brigades to divisions or massive consolidation of units are some of the changes recently announced, but is there cohesive vision for the future? Returning to the pre-2010 era will not be the solution if issues like soldiers' treatment, corruption and the overall faulty approach to the armed forces are not solved. Russia's military will need serious reforms once more.