Sergei Surovikin: Russia’s ‘General Armageddon’
In early October last year, after almost 8 months since the launch of the ‘Special Military Operation’ (SMO) in Ukraine, military veteran and army general Sergei Surovikin was appointed to the role of overall commander of Russian forces, a position which had been previously absent. Following his appointment, prior to his recent replacement with Valery Gerasimov, there have been a variety of notable shifts in Russia’s conduct of the SMO. From the increased use of high-intensity missile attacks against Ukraine to the more active focus on striking infrastructure, especially those that supply Ukraine with energy, Surovikin has had a significant impact on Russia’s operation. However, amongst these changes in tactics, Surovikin also oversaw several of Russia’s setbacks in the same time period. In November, for example, he had ordered Russian troops to withdraw across the Dnipro river, effectively removing its presence from Kherson city and allowing Ukrainian forces to retake it. While the military implications of this decision have had a limited effect in the immediate term, the political damage to Russia was severe. Yet in spite of this, Surovikin remains in charge and has continued to press on elsewhere, including in Bakhmut and Soledar. And Though he only served just over three months as overall commander, having been replaced now by Russia’s Chief of General Staff, Gerasimov, it is worthwhile understanding more about Russia’s ‘General Armageddon’ - as the more we know about Surovikin’s background and subsequent relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, the much better we will be able to interpret the actions taken by and positions appointed to Russia’s former SMO commander. As, in spite of his replacement, the changes which he had implemented to Russia’s overall strategy and its subsequent tactics have continued, expressing a rather fundamental influence of Surovikin.
Having begun his service in 1987, Surovikin has served in the armed forces of both the Soviet Union and the subsequent Russian Federation following the collapse of the USSR. He is a veteran of the Soviet-Afghan War and the Second Chechen War. He was also highly engaged in Russia’s military intervention in Syria’s civil war, in which Russia sided with the government forces of Bashar Al-Assad - and such was subsequently the same deployment during which Surovikin gained the notorious ‘General Armageddon’ title. His command, especially during his time heading Russia’s Aerospace Forces (including the airforce and missile units) in Syria, has been described as “clinical, brutal, and…ferociously calculated”, which has been very much reflected in his conduct as overall commander of the SMO. In his first few days as commander, an intense missile and aerial bombardment on Ukraine was launched, the largest single barrage since the start of the SMO, devastating much of its infrastructure and many of its military sites.These brutal and violent tactics were to characterise much of how Russia fought t under Surovikin’s command.
With Surovikin being a veteran of the Soviet Union, there are notable parallels that can be drawn between himself and President Putin,with the latter also a former KGB during the time of the USSR. While the relationship between the two has often been described as one of Surovikin serving as some kind of ‘attack dog’ for Putin’s interests, expressed through his deployments in Syria and appointment as commander of the SMO, the true dynamic between the two of them is difficult to deduce. Indeed, when Surovikin was sanctioned by the EU just a day before the SMO launch, they used the matter of his relationship with Putin as a reason for doing so, yet it is quite unclear what the specifics of their relations are.
Surovikin has been decorated for his service in Syria, awarded by Putin with the ‘Hero of Russia’ honour, and his appointment to overall commander of the SMO has expressed that Surovikin is somewhat competent in comparison to other potential candidates for the role, and this view was made especially clearer due to how Surovikin had only been awarded the rank of General just six months before the SMO launch. Surovikin, of course, has experience in several different army branches and thus, theoretically, able to “oversee and streamline” these branches - and consequently, this means that Putin was likely to be fairly reliant on the general.
It is clear that much of Putin’s power and government is reliant on the SMO succeeding or at least reaching a stalemate which inflicts as minimal damage as possible to his authority. With the sheer amount of resources and manpower being poured into the operation in Ukraine, it can be assumed that from Putin’s perspective whoever is commanding the Russian forces must be capable and competent as to avoid any significant setbacks. Utilising the information that is available, we see that Surovikin was viewed by Putin as essential to Russia’s ongoing activities of the SMO, and therefore gave Surovikin quite a degree of influence over how it is conducted.Yet, while he may have been for a time deemed to be a ‘core’ part of Russia’s SMO, recent developments within Russia’s military leadership structure has begged a few questions regarding Putin potentially shifting his stance on Surovikin. Having now been made deputy to Valery Gerasimov, Russia’s Chief of General Staff, in January, Surovikin has returned to acting as one of several commanders within the military operation. While such a move could be interpreted as an expression of Putin’s dissatisfaction with Surovikin’s progress as overall commander, this may not entirely be the case. In fact, unlike what we saw upon Surovikin’s appointment, where there was a major shift in tactics in the form of intensive missile attacks, we saw no change following his replacement via Gerasimov. This, therefore, can be interpreted that, from the Russian military perspective, Surovikin’s strategy remains valuable. Whether this strategy was solely his own, or whether Surovikin will receive recognition should the SMO’s objectives be achieved via this strategy, is unclear. However, irrelevant of these possibilities, and with the conflict constantly shifting, it is unlikely we will see any significant change in the relationship between Surovikin and Putin beyond this decision. As stated previously, Putin appears to view Surovikin as competent enough to serve as a commander within the SMO, and with his government effectively dependent on a successful outcome of the SMO, as to avoid domestic and international pressure, we will not see extensive interference or attempts to change the current situation.