What the War in Ukraine Means for Russia and NATO in the Arctic
For the past two decades the Arctic has been touted by many analysts as a new front of geopolitical competition and opportunity. As the largest Arctic nation, Russia has long observed and invested in its vast Arctic region to bolster its power and take advantage of its geographic position. The Arctic region has in the past been overlooked mainly due to its harsh climate and sparse population (only 4 million people live within the Arctic circle, half of which are Russian, though it had been heavily militarized during the Cold War as it proved to be the shortest route for Signals intelligence and other power projection methods between NATO and the USSR.
Today, a warming climate has completely changed how state and non-state actors see this region. As the ice sheet recedes, it has revealed vital SLOCs (Strategic Lanes of Communication) through the Arctic Sea north of Russia, which Russia and many other countries, such as China, see as shorter and geopolitically advantageous sea lanes connecting the Pacific and Atlantic, bypassing the much longer and mostly Western controlled passages of the Dardanelles, Suez, Gibraltar and the Cape of Good Hope. Additionally, receding ice sheets have revealed a wealth of untapped resources that could be a game-changing revenue source. These resources range from Natural gas and oil to a wealth of precious metals used in a wide range of modern industries and technology. Some estimates have put the total value of rare earth metals alone in Russian-controlled and claimed Arctic territory as hovering around 3 trillion USD.
RUSSIAN INVESTMENT IN THE ARCTIC
While many of the “Arctic states” (Russia, USA, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, Finland, Denmark and Canada) as well as the Arctic Council observers (which also includes countries like the UK, France, and China) have included the Arctic as part of their security and economic strategy for the future, such as the USA’s National Strategy for the Arctic Region or the UK’s Strategy for the High North. Russia has been well ahead of any other country in investing in the region for power projection economically and militarily. Since the start of Vladimir Putin’s regime, the Russian state has recognized the potential of the Arctic in being a key region where Russia can draw advantages over the other Arctic states.
Economy:
In the past 10 to 15 years, Russia has invested heavily in the economic exploitation of the area, recognizing the potential of its resources for national revenue. Many Russian oil giants, such as Rosneft, have set up oil rigs and extraction sites throughout the region, trying to tap into its wealth. Russia has also invested heavily in the exploitation of new sea lanes north of Russia, which provides Russia with means of transporting goods from the Atlantic to the Pacific through lanes located almost exclusively within Russian territorial waters. This investment has come in the form of building and updating ports in the Arctic sea and investing in 11 Nuclear powered Ice Breakers, capable and valuable ships in the region that are only operated by Russia so far.
Military:
The other, and more significant Russian investment in the Arctic has been the militarization of the region. In the last two decades, Russia has pursued a policy of military power projection in the Arctic, which has sought to use its natural geographic advantage to secure its territorial claims and threaten NATO’s northern flank. Russia has reopened over a dozen Soviet-era military bases in the Arctic circle and invested heavily in making its sub-surface fleet and air defense very capable and top-of-the-line. Many NATO commentators have pointed to the Russian submarine fleet in the Arctic in particular to be significant, with Russia possessing both its Soviet era Shchuka B (Akula class in NATO designation) submarines and planning more modern Borei class submarines to supplement the fleet. It has equipped most of its surface fleet with its most modern cruise and ballistic missiles, such as Kalibr and even Kinzhal. It has also sought to bolster its air capabilities by maintaining a significant armory of fighters and strategic bombers from Karelia to the Far East, as well as building enormous radar stations that Russia claims are capable of providing significant radar awareness in the entire region. The militarization of the Arctic has alarmed many Arctic states, as Russia has been particularly aggressive in laying maritime and territorial claims throughout the region, as well as regularly conducting espionage and interception of ships and aviation from Alaska to Norway.
THE WAR IN UKRAINE, NATO EXPANSION AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE ARCTIC IN THE FUTURE
Consequences of the war:
Since February of 2022 and the start of the full-scale invasion in Ukraine, there have been significant shifts in Russia’s ability to project power. Most Western analysis on the war in Ukraine has concluded that the last year and a half has shown a decline in Russian influence and power around the world. Russia’s initial invasion and its inability to secure a victory early on in the conflict has led to heavy costs militarily, economically and politically. Western and international sanctions have limited Russia’s ability to access various markets and specialized equipment needed for its military and economy. The costs and conduct of the war have also alienated many of Russia’s traditional partners and allies, as they seek to distance themselves politically from the Kremlin, further straining Russia’s political influence in many sectors. Lastly, Russia’s military losses and setbacks have severely damaged Russia’s reputation as a military power, and created significant challenges in the Russian military’s ability to project power and conduct operations in places such as Syria, Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Arctic.
For Russian power projection in the Arctic, the War in Ukraine has been a major complicating factor. The most visible of these challenges is the military presence of Russia in the Arctic. While Russia had invested over decades to re-militarize the Arctic and bolsters its presence there, the Russian military’s situation in Ukraine has forced it to increasingly pull resources from the far North to reinforce operations in Ukraine. Russian marines and brigades dedicated to the Northern military district, such as the 200th Motor Rifle Brigade, have been spotted fighting in Ukraine. Many of these formations have suffered heavy casualties that will take years to reconstitute. The same has been observed for air wings and air defence platforms, amongst other equipment, which have been reassigned for operations in the West of the country. The losses or possible losses of such equipment will create issues in the Russian military’s ability to maintain a sizable presence in the Arctic and react to any possible security threat in this vast area in the near to medium term. The Russian MOD will have to reprioritize where and when to use its more limited resources, even after the war stalemates or concludes, making the Arctic a region that will have to be reevaluated militarily.
The effects of the war are also visible economically and politically, however. The Arctic Council has suspended any official meetings with Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion, freezing the ability for political dialogue specific to the region. Economically, the strains on the Russian economy due to sanctions have led to cutbacks on investment in the region, with some major developments of extraction industries being put on hold as a reprioritizing of economic assets has taken place in the country.
A newly prioritized region?
Despite the challenges Russia faces at home and abroad due to its dedication to a costly war in Ukraine, Russian strategic investments and focus on the Arctic will likely stay the same and may in fact increase in the long term.
There are a few key factors that may influence this:
Russia is still reliant on exporting its natural resources. This is unlikely to change in the future, and as Russia seeks to export to new markets, surveying new sources of natural gas, oil, and minerals in the Arctic may provide new channels of revenue for an economy in desperate need of cash to stay afloat and supply its military. Therefore, while Russian economic investments in the Arctic have slowed down in the immediate due to the reprioritization of funds, this may not reflect a shift in policy, and the Russian government may look to double down on the region.
Russia enjoys a natural advantage in the Arctic due to its geographic position and size, making it a natural power projecting point for a more hostile relationship with NATO. The Arctic is, therefore, not likely to be abandoned in the future when it comes to military or political power projection. Despite the stripping down of Russian infantry, mechanized and air defence battalions throughout the Arctic, Russian forces maintain virtually all of its naval presence in the area, including its formidable submarine fleet. Furthermore, the addition of Finland and later Sweden to NATO makes the far North a even more expedient region for competition between Russia and NATO militarily. The Russians will be sure to note this and will be forced to dedicate significant forces in places such as Karelia in the future.
Whatever the outcome of the war in Ukraine, Russia is likely to be severely hampered in its ability to operate and project power in Continental Europe for years to come. European states such as Poland are arming rapidly to counter Russia, and NATO has made reinforcing its Eastern flank a top priority. The consequences of this will likely lead Russia to look even more towards the Arctic as it seeks more advantageous places to pressure the West. This follows with the “pendulum” theory of Russian foreign policy strategy that had been espoused since the mid-19th century, which posits that the Russian state seeks to push in one geographical direction until it faces a significant setback or obstacle, in which case it shifts its focus to a different direction, and repeats. A consequence of any severe blow to Russian power projection in Eastern Europe may be a renewed interest in seeing the Arctic as a contestable region.Russia has the advantage of larger geographical presence, larger population, larger military and economic investment, and more to gain.
Why it matters for everyone else?
For other Arctic states, Russia’s focus on Arctic power in the past decades has been an important challenge. Not only because of the disproportionate influence and power it holds over the region, but within the context of an increasingly hostile relationship with Russia and China, it forces NATO to increasingly take the region seriously as a weak spot in its geopolitical strategy.
For China, Russian presence in the Arctic helps and challenges its desire to exploit the region economically. On the one hand, Russia remains an important strategic partner for China, and the existence of new key waterways accessing the Atlantic in the hands of Russia is likely to be seen as a positive for China. Russian focus on militarily building up the region can also be seen as advantageous to China, as it takes Russian focus away from a region in which it has a more contentious relationship with its northern neighbor, such as Central Asia. On the other hand, China’s aspirations for economic exploitation of the Arctic often compete with that of Russia. For example, China is a major exporter of rare metals and minerals, and a possible increase in Russia’s access to these metals may cause unwelcome competition.