Ukraine’s Long-Awaited Counter-Offensive will have to Overcome Tactical Challenges
Ukraine’s Counter-Offensive is Underway
For months, Ukraine’s highly anticipated counter-offensive left military experts and analysts guessing where they may strike. Most analysts believed the likeliest option would be a southern push from Zaporizhia to Melitopol, which would threaten the land bridge connecting Russia to Crimea. Other options envisioned assaulting northern Luhansk, attempting to retake Severodonetsk and threaten Russian supply lines in the East, or pushing further into Bakhmut, which had been the epicentre of Russia’s primary efforts for months. A less likely option was an amphibious operation into occupied Kherson across the Dnieper River. The now-destroyed Kakhovka Dam significantly changed the military geography of any assault in Southern Ukraine. While it was known that Ukraine had conducted small-scale raids over the river, perhaps to bog down Russian forces, a large-scale amphibious operation would never be the likely option.
On 4 June, Russia’s Defence Ministry reported that Ukrainian armed forces made a ‘large-scale offensive’ in South Donetsk across five axes; it was claimed that the attack was repelled. Ukrainian forces are also understood to have pushed further into the Western and Northern suburbs of Bakhmut, which has been the epicentre of the war in Ukraine for months. Now, as Ukraine enters the early stages of its counter-offensive, it is too early to tell how well it has gone. The bulk of its main forces have yet to be committed as assaults are made across multiple axes, the cost will be high. Ukraine’s current strategy will be to continue to push and probe Russian forces in the South and East as they are looking for vulnerabilities along a 1,200-kilometre frontline which cannot be defended equally. Both Ukrainian and Russian forces are engaged to varying degrees of intensity along this frontline, but there are gaps which Ukraine hopes to exploit. By not fully committing to one line of the axis, Ukraine hopes they can draw Russian reserves in, creating weak points in their defence before the main bulk of the force goes through.
If Ukraine decides to thrust further south and reinforce their attack, an important objective could be to threaten either Melitopol, as previously assumed, or Berdiansk and Mariupol, two key port cities on the Sea of Azov. Cutting off the land bridge which connects Russia to Crimea would threaten Russian positions in Crimea. However, Ukrainian counter-offensive operations along the Orikhiv-Tokmak axis in Zaporizhia have been arduous with significant losses in armour and men. Tokmak is a significant rail hub and gateway to Crimea, but even if Ukraine weren’t to advance far enough into the coast and liberate the main port cities, the possibility of threatening Crimea's supply lines would itself be a crucial step in the war. Another objective could be to reverse all Russian gains in Bakhmut, the locus of Russia’s failed Spring Offensive. Some progress has been made near Bakhmut and further north-east as Ukraine hopes to encircle the city and push further into the Donbas.
The Challenges Ahead
The real test of Ukraine’s offensive capabilities is yet to come. Ukraine hosts 12 offensive brigades, with an estimated 60,000 troops, which it spent months building up, training and equipping with Western tanks and engineering equipment. Amongst Ukraine’s brigades are German Leopard 2’s, British Challenger 2’s and American Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs). Much has been staked on this long-awaited counter-offensive. While Ukraine has spent time building up its offensive capacities, Russia, too, has been building up its defensive potential. This year, Russia has proven capable of adapting to emerging threats. A RUSI report analysed how the Russian Armed Forces had shifted its approach to improve its tactical competitiveness on the battlefield. Identifying these emerging threats will be key to understanding the critical challenges Ukraine will face and must overcome in the coming weeks.
Firstly, the role of artillery, for instance has been identified as crucial to Ukraine’s survival and defence as it significantly blunted Russia’s ability to seize Kyiv by slowing down and bogging units. Ukraine maintained artillery parity for the first month and a half before running low on munitions by June and losing the advantage until it received HIMARS rockets in the summer. While artillery has proven so effective for Ukraine, it will prove to be a field that must be overcome. By the summer of 2022, Russia had changed its tactics by consolidating artillery into tactical artillery groups with closer integration of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Its improvements were twofold. First, it gave Russian artillery greater situational awareness capable of firing from multiple positions before relocating, making counter-battery fire from the enemy less threatening. Secondly, it increased the responsiveness of Russian artillery to complete a kill chain where previously kill chains were disrupted because the time between identification and initiation would be delayed. Therefore current Russian artillery appears highly capable of blunting potential Ukrainian assaults. Furthermore, the use of Russian Armour, especially older tanks such as T62 and T55, cannot be underestimated despite their age. They have been repurposed to provide indirect artillery fire and fire support functions for Russian defensive positions. They will significantly threaten IFVs because of their thicker armour and greater firepower. To overcome such challenges, Ukraine must have more effective counter-battery capabilities to detect and strike enemy firing positions. Lessons in stockpiling artillery shells, especially during a war of attrition, will continue to be decisive in determining the outcome of the next stages of the conflict. The side which struggles to maintain artillery firepower will lose its offensive or defensive edge.
Secondly, Russian engineering has been identified as a potent threat to Ukrainian operations. With at least two Russian engineering companies attached to a brigade, where one company focused on mining and the other on force protection engineering. Russian engineers have proven highly capable of constructing obstacles and field fortifications, reinforced trenches, wire entanglements, hedgehogs, anti-tank (AT) ditches and complex minefields which follow no discernable pattern. Ukrainian intelligence has identified Russian defence positions as comprised of multi-layered defence lines with a mix of obstacles. The first line often consists of fighting positions for line infantry, whereas the second line holds proper trenches with obstacles laid ahead to bog down those assaulting the lines. These highly constructed defensive positions and fortifications will pose one of the biggest threats to Ukraine’s counter-offensive. Using grenade launchers to clear out Russian trenches along with proper mine reconnaissance, clearing will be vital to deciphering Russian defensive positions.
Thirdly, electronic warfare (EW) and the Russian air defence have proven capable of improving throughout the war and remain an ongoing threat to Ukraine’s counter-offensive. Regarding EW, Russia has been able to maintain real-time interception and decryption of Ukraine’s encrypted tactical communication systems, making it easier to intercept and anticipate upcoming combined-arms operations. Another known function is the ability of Russian EW to generate multiple UAVs on enemy systems and replicate ground control stations which would significantly disrupt accurate intelligence gathering. Furthermore, despite difficulties at the start of the war, Russia’s air defences, like its surface-to-air (SAM) missiles, have been adapted to deny airspace to Ukrainian aircraft. A combination of accurate long-range radar systems and anti-air capabilities have made air combat extremely lethal; however, the same remains for Ukraine’s equally effective SAMs. Lastly, Russia’s Air Force (VKS) remains a major threat to advancing Ukrainian forces. The VKS hosts incredible firepower capable of producing lethal payloads which impact Ukrainian operations. The VKS has already been reported to be utilised more in Zaporizhia than at any time since the initial stages of the war. Ukraine will have to rely on a combination of SAMs and MANPADS to create a kill zone at the lower and higher altitudes both sides operate in. This will result in greater fighting for air dominance in a medium altitude space just above the altitude MANPADS operate in and below the detection SAMs.
Overall, significant challenges remain ahead of Ukraine’s counter-offensive. At the same time, Russia’s failed Spring Offensive has painted its armed forces as largely inadequate, including the infighting between Wagner Forces and Russia’s Armed Forces. Russian tactics have changed, and its armed forces can adapt to and tackle emerging threats. Although they have remained entirely reactive to Ukraine’s tactical advantages, their firepower and systems technologies are still incredibly potent. Ukraine’s counter-offensive will test Russian unit coordination and cohesion, which are highly hierarchical. Low morale and poor unit cohesion still plague Russia’s armed forces. Nevertheless, this does not mean they are averse to adapting, but Ukraine’s tactical competitiveness has always been inherent in its innovation and initiative.