Can Russia Make any Significant Progress during its Spring Offensive?
Various sources such as the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence (MOD) as well as various Western intelligence agencies have been indicating that Russia has planned a large offensive in the Donbas region set for this late winter or early spring.
Questions over what Russia can realistically gain in this offensive have been swirling around the media and information space. Recent defeats of the Russian army in Kharkiv and Kherson have likely fomented a desire in the Russian MOD for Russia to seize back the initiative and achieve some success on the battlefield. Furthermore, the announcement of tank donations by various Western governments in the last month has led hardline pro-war elements in Russia to put pressure on the Kremlin to respond with a decisive action before Western weapons make their way to the battlefield in large enough numbers to make an even greater difference.
As a result, we have seen a slow but intense grinding assault on Bakhmut by both Wagner forces and Russian regular troops in the last two months, which has seen some degree of success, albeit at a great human cost. While this effort goes on, large Russian troop formations of both professional and conscripted soldiers have been observed forming on the Svatove-Kremina line as well as in South Donetsk near the town of Vulhedar. A large Russian offensive has therefore been predicted around these two axes.
The capacity of Russian forces to actually make gains in these areas is heavily debated. The grinding offensive around Bakhmut has indicated to many observers that Russian forces have still not found solutions to their tactical shortcomings. A recent offensive action around Vulhedar in the south of Donetsk oblast saw Russian marines being devastated and losing several vehicles to mines and artillery, a result just as much down to Russian ineptitude as Ukrainian skill.
Whether masses of Russian troops with limited equipment will be able to overwhelm well-equipped Ukrainian defenders is yet to be seen, but the mass destruction of Russian men and heavy equipment will prove very difficult to sustain. If Russia does see some success over the spring, the cost of not achieving these successes will likely prove to be important in the future. Last summer, the high level of attrition suffered by the Russian army in their effort to take Severodonetsk and Lysychansk was a likely attributing factor to their subsequent failure to defend against a Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv. This summer could see similar results if the Russian military is unable to make gains without disintegrating its integrity. Heavy casualties may also prove to be unsustainable for Russia’s war economy and its society with only a partial mobilization in effect, something which may push Vladimir Putin to be more open to negotiation.