The Death of Transatlanticism? Trump, Ukraine, and the Widening Atlantic
Executive Summary
U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance’s 2025 Munich Security Conference speech marked the opening of the floodgates for years of pent-up disdain for Europe in the MAGA movement.
Drastic changes in U.S. policy, along with comments from U.S. officials and the Oval Office press conference spat between U.S. President Donald Trump, J.D. Vance, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, have significantly weakened the U.S. and Ukrainian bargaining positions with Russia.
Various European measures are being implemented to increase defensive readiness in the European Union (EU) and partner nations like the United Kingdom (UK) and Norway. However, they face the significant obstacle of domestic pushback against cuts to social spending and tax increases.
The prospect of the United States withdrawing entirely from Europe is very unlikely. However, it is more likely – but not certain – that the seemingly transactional Trump administration will force an unfavourable peace deal on Ukraine.
The transatlantic relationship between the United States and its European allies is irreparably damaged — but not yet destroyed.
Introduction
The Atlantic is widening — and fast. Literally, yes, but metaphorically, even more so. The last two months have seen the most significant nadir in transatlantic relations between the United States and its European allies since the darkest days of the Great Depression. The origins of this low point lie in the development of the post-Cold War consensus: the 1990s.
During the 1990s, European institutions decisively moved toward greater defence and security integration — most notably through the Maastricht (1992) and Amsterdam (1997) Treaties, which established the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Yet from the outset, U.S. policymakers expressed unease over Europe’s growing autonomy, fearing it might erode NATO’s unified command structure.
In the early 1990s, the Bush administration expressed clear reservations. For instance, in February 1991, Under Secretary of State Reginald Bartholomew warned European governments that deeper defence cohesion might marginalise U.S. influence. He even hinted that creating a Franco-German military corps could undermine NATO — thereby threatening the unified command structure that had long guaranteed transatlantic security. Later, under the Clinton administration, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright articulated a “3Ds” policy in 1998, insisting that European defence initiatives must avoid de-linking from NATO, duplicating its efforts, or discriminating against non‑EU NATO members. These cautions were designed to ensure that any European moves toward integration would occur within the NATO framework and preserve U.S. strategic primacy.
At the same time, many European countries dramatically reduced their defence spending to take advantage of the so-called “peace dividend.” Although the United States never explicitly encouraged these cuts, it tacitly accepted them. Lower European defence spending meant that U.S. forces remained the dominant deterrent in Europe, allowing Washington to retain significant influence within NATO while reallocating diplomatic resources to other priorities. In essence, Europe’s reliance on American military power served U.S. strategic interests by ensuring that Europe remained dependent on Washington for security and keeping U.S. leadership unchallenged in the transatlantic alliance.
The start of the War on Terror after 9/11 did not change this calculus, nor did the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. It was only after the Russian invasion of Crimea and the Donbas in 2014 and the beginning of the Pivot to Asia that U.S. President Barack Obama and then President Donald Trump pressured European allies to spend more on their defence. By then, Washington became frustrated with what it saw as European “freeriding.” While Trump’s threatening approach kick-started some degree of action, the biggest jump came after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. U.S. officials emphasised the need for European countries to meet or exceed targets – such as the 2% of GDP benchmark set for all NATO countries on defence spending, which not all NATO members meet – to ensure a more balanced burden-sharing and reduce America’s costs and over-commitment. Despite significant progress in European defence spending since the start of Trump’s first term and the fact that EU countries have collectively contributed at least as much – if not more – than the United States to Ukraine’s aid, resentment toward Europe for its perceived freeriding and weakness has festered for years among the highest ranks of the MAGA movement in the United States.
The Rift Opens
At the February 2025 Munich Security Conference, U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance delivered a shocking keynote speech attacking Europe’s migration policies, hate-speech laws, and ‘political firewalls.’ While not entirely untruthful, this scathing address did more than just offend its audience; it revealed the Trump administration’s broader aim of emboldening right-wing populist movements across the continent.
After the MSC, U.S. actions regarding Ukraine further soured European relations. Trump administration officials have:
Expressed that EU member states will likely not be included in peace talks with Russia
Pledged future economic cooperation with Russia
Engaged in a public shaming of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy
Called Zelenskyy a dictator while refusing to say the same about Russian President Vladimir Putin
Voted alongside Russia against two United Nations resolutions condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
Ordered a cessation of cyber operations against Russia
Began exploring a process to deport Ukrainian refugees from the United States
Temporarily stopped both the sharing of military intelligence with Ukraine and U.S. arms shipments to Ukraine
Detained and deported legal European visitors to the United States
Failed so far to secure Russian participation in a ceasefire in Ukraine despite concessions to Russia
These actions have led European leaders to fear a lack of U.S. commitment to European security, as U.S. neutrality in the face of Russian revanchism, or even tacit support for it, could mean that the United States would not assist Europe in contesting a long-term, imperialist Russian bid for hegemony in Europe. This fear has led European nations to discuss ways the continent can rearm to protect itself without requiring aid from the United States. Portugal’s new uncertainty in buying U.S. F-35 fighter jets is likely the first of many moments where European countries question the sagacity of purchasing U.S. weapons systems. Notably, the Trump administration wants to have it both ways: decrease its commitment to Europe and continue to be the primary arms supplier to Europe.
Across the Atlantic, President Trump seems focused on two things: speed and money. Trump famously promised to end the Ukraine War on his first day in office, and while this was an obvious exaggeration, it did speak to a desire to strike a deal posthaste. This mindset can partially explain Trump’s decisions: by squeezing Ukraine, which is largely dependent on the United States in its fight against Russia, and simultaneously enticing Russia to negotiate by punishing Ukraine, Trump is trying to bring both countries to the table at the speed he would like. Trump’s push for wealth extraction is evident in the initial proposal for the critical minerals deal with Ukraine, which demanded U.S. control over vast mineral, fossil fuel, and infrastructure assets in Ukraine and essentially amounted to shakedown diplomacy. The latest memorandum of understanding between the United States and Ukraine reflects a commitment to securing this deal. The rationale behind this focus could be to present an economic win to the U.S. public, particularly Trump’s base, to justify not abandoning Ukraine entirely and making previous U.S. investment in the country seem worthwhile. Yet a minerals deal and a win for the MAGA base is needed soon, or else U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s recent comments threatening that the United States may leave negotiations to end the war may bear fruit.
The Price of Transactionalism
Provided the United States does not pull back from negotiations, will the Trump administration’s transactional approach work out well for Ukraine and Europe?
The prospects for Ukraine are stark. Historically, Moscow has failed to honour promises unbacked by hard power, as evidenced by the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the failed Minsk agreements. The Trump administration currently offers little more than a tenuous tripwire by prioritising a ‘minerals-for-security' deal. If Ukraine’s resource deposits prove less valuable or Russia carefully sidesteps areas hosting American workers, Kyiv gains no real protection. In short, transactional guarantees relying on tripwires risk leaving Ukraine open to the consistent aggression it has historically faced from a lack of credible military backing.
Trump’s single-minded focus on wealth extraction and a quick, perhaps unjust, peace is also a foreboding signal to EU member states. Many of these countries are now taking strides towards strategic independence that would have been unimaginable only a year ago. Incoming German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who spent much of his career working for American firms, stressed the need for Europe to “achieve independence” from the United States. He has successfully negotiated a deal to reform the country’s constitutionally mandated debt brake to allow for more defence spending. Merz even refused to rule out acquiring nuclear weapons to bolster deterrence, breaking a longstanding German taboo. Another leader with nuclear deterrence on the mind is French President Emmanuel Macron, who suggested the possibility of using France’s nuclear weapons to create a European nuclear shield independent from the United States. Macron also implored European countries to spend 3% or more of their country’s GDP on defence and ordered the French intelligence services to begin sharing intel with Ukraine to help fill the temporary gap left by the United States. Alongside France and other countries, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer has expressed a willingness to deploy troops from the United Kingdom as part of a peacekeeping force to Ukraine upon the war’s conclusion. Starmer also took part in a pan-European summit following the Oval Office conflict, where European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen unveiled a plan to provide up to €150 billion in loans to governments, aimed at increasing military spending as part of a broader €800 billion ‘ReArm Europe’ initiative over the next year. European countries continue to issue significant joint security funding packages to Ukraine as well. Also potentially in the works is a ‘Military Schengen’ agreement and a hike in the defence spending of most, if not all, NATO countries, as NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has urged.
If all of these efforts are successful and European leaders can overcome the monumental challenge of convincing their citizens that taxes will likely have to be raised and social spending decreased to pay for more security, Trump’s transactionalism could end up having positive effects on Europe by finally forcing it into a position of strategic independence and self-reliance. If Europe fails to rise to the challenge, however, a transactional foreign policy from the United States could cause the continent to slip into fragmentation, in-fighting, and even strategic irrelevance, as pro-Russian spoilers like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and potentially other right-wing populist leaders who gain power across the continent could split Europe into squabbling factions of Russia hawks, to include states like Poland and the Baltic countries, and Russia appeasers.
There is also danger for Europe in being caught up in a likely doomed scheme by the Trump administration and future ideological successors to induce a Sino-Russian split in the style of the Sino-Soviet split that former U.S. President Richard Nixon and his National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger negotiated with Chinese Communist Party Secretary General Mao Zedong in the 1970s. In an interview with American podcaster Tucker Carlson, Trump expressed his desire to “un-unite” Russia and China, claiming that previous U.S. policies had facilitated this union. Such a scheme is likely to fail for two reasons: any U.S. attempt to win over Russia would necessitate a peace deal in Ukraine with no security guarantee, all but ensuring future conflict, and Russia and China have a mutually beneficial partnership that overcomes whatever potency Chinese irredentist claims on the Russian Far East have. If the Trump administration attempts this gambit and fails, Europe will need to worry about future Russian aggression in Ukraine, Moldova, or even the Baltic states, potentially with little or no U.S. assistance; and if the gamble somehow succeeds, Europe would be incentivised to establish a closer relationship with China to weaken Russia, thereby worsening relations with the United States even further. It is unlikely that the Trump administration will fully commit to attempting a Sino-Russian split, particularly because it is paradoxically more possible to induce a split through pushing the two states closer together in the short-term. Europe should nevertheless not neglect this possibility, as the second Trump administration’s actions show a clear willingness to completely overturn existing norms and engage in ultrarealist transactionalism in the pursuit of ideological goals.
Whether the Trump administration attempts Sino-Russian split gambit or not, Europe has three options: adopt a subservient approach to align with a U.S. administration that views the continent as an inferior partner; drift temporarily away from the United States but undertake little action in the hope of future europhilic U.S. administrations patching up the holes in the U.S. security umbrella, an approach which risks a European fracture into blocs in the Russian, Chinese, and U.S. orbits; or become a powerful strategic actor with relevant military capabilities that deters Russian aggression and offers a third way to low-income countries caught in the great power competition between the United States and China.
What Lies Ahead?
One key question, however, remains unanswered: Will the Trump administration adopt a fully transactionalist approach? Although policy shifts and rhetoric from Trump and his officials since his second inauguration point in this direction, the first Trump administration’s relationship with Russia, which was frostier than many people remember, suggests at least that Trump is not afraid to put pressure on when he considers it to be in the U.S. national interest. It is also not out of the question that all of Trump and his administration’s fiery bluster towards Ukraine and Europe is merely a tactic to lure Russia into negotiations under false amity, only to escalate pressure later and force concessions, lest Russia appear unwilling to negotiate and face crushing sanctions as Trump threatened. Observers and pundits may therefore be “overreacting to rhetoric and symbolism” while focusing too little on underlying results.
Yet one must wonder whether the Trump administration’s actions have cost Ukraine and the United States precious negotiating leverage that could be critical in forcing Russian concessions. For example, Trump’s lack of action beyond a few angry words to Putin’s failure to abide by the terms of a U.S.-proposed ceasefire to which Ukraine agreed suggests to Russia that it can push hard to win more territory and strengthen its hand further without much pushback. U.S. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth publicly urging Ukraine to give up on NATO membership and reclaim its full territory also shows Putin that the Trump administration is happy to concede on these points. The Kremlin has notably not expressed any willingness to compromise on its objectives, and given Trump’s appeasement, why would it? Thus, once all parties are at the negotiating table, it may very well be the case that Russia has significant leverage to get the United States, which has signalled its amenability to Russian demands loud and clear, to agree to an unjust peace in Ukraine that holds at risk future Ukrainian national security.
It is for this reason that Europe must rearm. In this endeavour, Poland should serve as a model country to the rest of the continent. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced plans to implement military training for adult men to strengthen the country’s reserve force. While the rest of the EU and its partner nations need not necessarily follow this approach – though some already have similar programs – Poland’s commitment to defence is a mindset all European countries should now embrace. Poland spent 4.1% of its GDP on defence in 2024 and plans to spend 4.7% this year, spending far more than other EU countries in relative terms. This makes Poland the only NATO country close to meeting the 5% spending goal Trump set for alliance members, which could also make Warsaw the Trump whisperer of Europe.
Though Poland is close to meeting the 5% threshold, is this necessary and feasible for other NATO member states? It is worth noting that almost all 11 countries that spend 5% of their annual GDP on defence are at war or were recently at war. Defence spending is therefore strongly connected to the immediate threat to a state’s security. This is why Poland, along with Lithuania and Estonia, will likely hit the 5% mark, as these countries directly bordering Russia could face an existential conflict if Russia decided to attack them. It is also worth noting that Trump’s 5% figure would require the United States itself to spend far more on its own defence; Trump’s trillion dollar defence budget does not bring the United States close to 5%, and it is unclear how, if passed, this budget will work alongside the substantial cuts and reallocations ordered in the Pentagon. A more realistic figure for a NATO defence spending requirement is NATO Secretary General Rutte’s suggestion of 3.7%. However, even this is difficult to achieve given how significant NATO countries’ budget adjustments would need to be to meet such a figure. It is also worth noting that if European defence capacity increases substantially, the United States will have less leverage over Europe, thus driving the continent down a more independent path. A loss of leverage could impact Trump’s ability to renegotiate trade deals with Europe, which he seems keen on given his tariff threats.
Although it may not be reasonable for European countries to spend 5% of their GDPs on defence, more is certainly needed. If other European countries at least put themselves on a trajectory like Poland’s, it would negate Trump’s rationale for potentially not defending them in the event of an attack. Such rearmament could also change the current state of affairs regarding Europe’s ability to guarantee Ukraine’s security independently. European leaders acknowledge privately that no security guarantee for Ukraine using the tripwire method would be feasible without U.S. involvement, as more troops than Europe can muster would be needed to avoid endangering homeland defence and provide a credible deterrent. For its security and Ukraine’s sake, Europe must grow serious on defence.
Conclusion
One thing in all the chaos of the past few months is sure: the transatlantic relationship has been irreparably damaged. Europe can no longer consider the United States’s commitment to its defence ironclad. Although some Trump officials like Secretary Hegseth believe the transatlantic alliance will be “sustained for generations to come,” others like White House advisor Elon Musk have openly called for the United States to leave NATO. While a U.S. departure from the alliance remains highly unlikely, it is clear that the Trump administration regards European security as relatively insignificant compared to its other goals. This does not mean the United States would not come to Europe’s defence in the unlikely event of war, but transatlantic trust has been shaken. Depending on the extent to which Trump pushes a transactionalist foreign policy, particularly concerning Ukraine, the relationship could continue to sour or change course for the better. After all, Trump is a mercurial leader who is willing to shift policy abruptly. Regardless of how the transatlantic relationship develops, it is clear that Europe must become serious about its own defence or risk strategic incoherence and irrelevance. If Europe fails in this endeavour, and if Trump proves willing to sell U.S. leadership abroad for short-term gains, dark days lie ahead. But hope is not lost. Though authoritarian actors bent on upending the liberal world order are on the rise, a better future is possible. To achieve this, however, today’s leaders must rise to the generational challenge and strive boldly on the path ahead.
About the author
Connor Cowman: Programme Analyst - Europe Programme
Connor joined London Politica as a Programme Analyst for its European Programme in 2024. He also works at the Alexander Hamilton Society (AHS), a non-partisan, non-profit organisation headquartered in Washington, DC, focused on educating young leaders on the Hamiltonian principles of foreign policy and preparing them for careers. At AHS, Connor oversees the speaker events hosted by AHS students on college campuses across the United States, creates the weekly AHS newsletter, and researches current issues in world affairs. Connor graduated magna cum laude from the University of Texas, Austin, with a B.A. in history and government, minoring in global management.