The Next War in the South Caucasus: is Europe Playing its Cards Right?
The fight over Nagorno-Karabakh was never considered as an epicentre that could spark a bigger confrontation among international players. Long-ignored by the international community, the sudden changes experienced in the region are now quickly developing as a result of the swift Azerbaijani victory in the 2020 war. It ended with a Russian-brokered cease-fire that could have seemed like a decisive settlement for one of the oldest so-called Soviet frozen conflicts. However, it resulted in a fragile agreement emanating from Armenia's weak diplomatic, economic, and military positions that keeps worsening as Aliyev's regime expands its ever-broader aims.
Azerbaijan has put into motion a coercive bargaining policy that involves both sides of the conflict and concerns the European Union's (EU) energy plans, Russia's diminishing influence, Pan-Turkism, or even the Israel-Iran regional tensions. The EU hopes to carve out a space in the South Caucasus, but its approach risks entangling the organisation. Baku has several aims. The first and most important is to hold on to the land, as it has already reconquered large amounts of Karabakh (the unrecognised Artsakh for Armenians) and the seven districts around it which are internationally recognised as Azerbaijani territory. The second one is to consolidate the seized territories in Armenia through the creation of what Azerbaijanis call buffers or “safety zones”. The third aim, exemplified by the constant border clashes, is to exploit Armenia's lasting vulnerability, and according to many Armenians, gradually obtain new concessions.
Aliyev's actions seem to be guided towards an effort to take personal revenge on Armenia. As scholars from both countries have argued, the narratives of both sides have reached a point of no return among their populations. This increases the difficulty for any international attempts to mediate and exert any kind of balanced mutual concession or obtain a beneficial and lasting agreement. The political discourse about the conflict always degenerates into who has the more ancient historic right and the primordialism approach to nationhood that emanates from Soviet Armenian and Azerbaijani intelligentsia that still have a big influence to this day.
The Azerbaijani system is dictatorial, where freedom of speech regarding the conflict is strongly suppressed and academic works can't deviate from official state information. Meanwhile, Armenia enjoys bigger liberty, especially thanks to its diversified diaspora on several continents. However, this decentralization entails tensions between the diaspora and the inhabitants of Armenia itself. The labelling of foreign agents and traitors when facing the realities and difficulties of war dilutes unity.
Negotiations between both sides appear to be fruitless and one-sided. Aliyev has publicly stated that what couldn't be solved by decades of negotiations was solved by Azerbaijan itself by force. Furthermore, he recently criticised outside intervention (in which the EU's recent civilian mission could be included) in the conflict, arguing that: “We are also warning certain countries that stand behind Armenia, […] to stop these dirty deeds. They wanted to tire us with meaningless negotiations. They wanted us to come to terms with the occupation”.
Markus Ritter, head of the EU's mission to Armenia, declared that they would consider their tasks a success if Azerbaijan did not launch an invasion in spring. These are rather daring words, taking into consideration that the EU's personnel aren't able to monitor Azerbaijani troop movements, access the contested region, or exert any kind of pressure on Baku.
In March, the European Parliament condemned the September Azerbaijani aggression against Armenia, accusing them of undermining the peace process. Baku knows that the words of EU officials fall short when the only pressure they have exerted so far is vocal, and the agreements regarding the exchange of natural resources keep increasing. The EU tries to solve a protracted and vicious conflict by making approaches to both sides while one of them holds the initiative and a clear advantage, and of which the organisation is energy dependent. This type of formula already proved to not work as expected, with Aliyev declaring that he favours direct negotiations with Armenia without mediators.
The EU had a chance to take advantage of the setbacks and loss of trust suffered by Russia and its peacekeepers in the region. The latter are unable to fulfill their mission and prevent Azerbaijani provocations, but the organisation hasn’t fully seized the opportunity yet. The month of May would have marked the fifth month of blockade of the Lachin corridor, a situation that got worse after Azerbaijan established new checkpoints. Now the blockade by the alleged activists appears to be lifted, being replaced by the Azerbaijani checkpoints manned by border guards and military. It becomes clear that what Baku doesn’t achieve by diplomatic means, it will try to achieve by coercion.
Baku's rhythm depends on how the Ukrainian conflict evolves during the 2023-2024 period, as well as on the second round of the Turkish presidential elections. Aliyev knows that he will need Turkish diplomatic support for future aggressive actions and his regime benefits from good personal and business relations with Erdogan. In recent weeks, Azerbaijani media has engaged in a campaign to glorify the Turkish president and his deeds in helping them, while criticising the opposition.
Azerbaijan plans to create a transport corridor (Zangezur) through the southern Armenian province of Syunik, connecting its main territory with the exclave of Nakhchivan and thus Turkey. This corridor was not part of the 2020 ceasefire agreement, and is very polemic among Armenians. However, it was agreed that new transport links should be opened, so Baku is putting its bets on that. Even if these plans do not seem to be succeeding in the way Aliyev expected (with a buffer zone along the proposed corridor inside Armenia), Azerbaijan is slowly forcing Yerevan authorities into agreeing to their demands by having increased its pressure around the Lachin corridor.
Right now, Pashinyan's hands are tied. The fate of the Armenians of Karabakh seems to be almost sealed, as the Prime Minister recently announced that he was abandoning the policy supporting the right to self-determination for Nagorno-Karakabk citizens. At any moment, the Armenian leader could declare that he did all what he could before finally conceding, a move that would spark even more infighting inside its ranks. In the last two years and a half, Aliyev and Pashinyan have met five times with the President of the European Council, Charles Michel. The last meeting took place in Brussels on May 14, where the demarcation talks regarding the mutual state border, launched one year ago, could be achieving results shortly. This would, effectively, commit Armenia to the 1991 Almaty Declaration and accept Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. Aliyev has declared that Armenians in Karabakh should take azeri citizenship or leave. Thus, there is a probability of again opening the door that leads to ethnic and cultural cleansing in the region.
On the 1st of June Aliyev and Pashinyan are expected to be present at the Summit of the European Political Community that will take place in Moldova. New agreements will possibly be announced and Pashinyan's position could become even more endangered if they also involve a corridor through southern Armenia. This would, despite its loss of prestige, still benefit the Kremlin, as it is becoming increasingly tired of Pashinyan and wants to bring Armenia closer to its sphere and end with the opening to the West initiated in 2018. That was, after all, the plan in 2020, although it has been altered by Russia's own miscalculations in Ukraine. Pashinyan has tried to maintain balance with Russia while exploring cooperation with new partners such as India or Iran, but he is still being vocal about Russian failures in aiding his country. This type of moves would help if he had a tangible security alternative to Russia, but he hasn't.
The EU and US are likely to clash with Russia if Pashinyan faces increased opposition and possible removal, but they do not seem to be able to offer the immediate security guarantees Armenia hopes for or help in moderating Azerbaijani demands. The West will demand him to resist both Azerbaijani and Russian pressure, but without that same pressure being exerted on Aliyev, neither Pashinyan nor any of his critics in the Armenian opposition seem to be able to withstand for long.
The EU is still too focused on mediating the conflict to secure a steady flow of energy, without seriously considering all the geopolitical implications of appeasing Aliyev and enabling the connection of the Turkic World. Therefore, the conflict in the Caucasus is likely to get worse, especially for the Armenian population and its heritage in the region of Karabakh. The mistakes of not standing up to Azerbaijan could have unintended long-lasting effects that will eventually need addressing.