The 2023 Integrated Review Refresh: What it Means for NGOs and Civil Society Organisations
External Expert Analysis
Tom Crofts is an independent political analyst and former British diplomat who focuses on conflict and geopolitics. He currently advises think tanks, NGOs, academic institutions and political advisory organisations on international issues. He specialises in foreign policy, international security, conflict, governance and peacebuilding, with a particular focus on democracy, good governance, human rights and security.
During his time in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Tom served in Afghanistan and Myanmar, and covered a wide range of other countries including Lebanon, Libya, Nepal, Russia, Somalia, Syria and Ukraine. He also served in the Foreign Office’s Policy Unit, where he was Deputy Head of Faculty for the International Policy Faculty of the (then) Diplomatic Academy.
On 13 March, the UK Government unveiled its Integrated Review Refresh 2023, which updates the previous Integrated Review 2021.
What is the Integrated Review?
The Integrated Review (IR) is the UK’s assessment of the global security environment, with a focus on security, defence, development and foreign policy. It sets out the primary threats to the UK’s global interests overseas and to the UK from abroad. It also articulates a vision of Britain’s place in the world and the UK’s strategic international objectives. In short, it is the UK’s national security and international strategy.
Why the refresh?
Two years on from the first IR (IR2021), the refresh (IR2023) describes a “more contested and volatile world,” in which geopolitical competition is intensifying. Specifically, “the transition into a multipolar, fragmented and contested world has happened more quickly and definitively than anticipated.” The use of ‘multipolar’ is significant here. It is a diplomatic way of saying the US is no longer the world’s only super power and that wealth is being redistributed as emerging markets, mainly from Asia, economically outperform developed markets.
A revised assessment of international security
IR2023 reconfirms four trends that it expects to shape the international environment to 2030:
shifts in the distribution of global power;
inter-state ‘systemic’ competition over the nature of the international order. This is the main driver of deteriorating security. It refers to authoritarian states challenging the stability and openness of the international order by undermining it (e.g. Russia) or remaking it in its own image (e.g. China);
rapid technological change; and,
worsening transnational challenges.
Two challenges stand out in the refresh. The acute one is Russia, whose invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 (a year after IR2021 was published) has triggered a political, security and economic crisis in Europe, the reverberations of which are being felt around the world. The upending of European security and the return of war in Europe has prompted a refocusing on the UK’s near neighbourhood and the commitment of significant new resources, including £2.3bn ($2.9bn) for Ukraine.
The chronic one is China’s “epoch defining and systematic challenge” to the international order, especially rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific (Taiwan Strait and South China Sea). IR2023 bluntly accuses China of trying to reshape the international order into one that is favourable to its authoritarian system.
For a government document, the language of IR2023 is uncharacteristically frank and direct. Although it falls short of calling China a threat, the paper states unambiguously that the risks posed by Russia and China are “threaten[ing] to create a world defined by danger, disorder and division – and an international order more favourable to authoritarianism.” By diplomatic standards, this is tough talk and a sign of the level of tension in the international system.
This analysis is a far cry from the UK’s analysis as recently as 15 years ago. The 2008 National Security Strategy described a world in which the Cold War had been replaced with complex and unpredictable relationships in which globalisation and greater openness created new challenges and vulnerabilities. Chief among the UK’s concerns at that time were “international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, conflicts and failed states, pandemics, and trans-national crime.” IR2023 relegates terrorism to a subset of what it terms ‘transnational challenges’ and marks a return to an age of political realism in the UK’s outlook on international relations.
Objectives and priorities
Anticipating that the international security environment will become even more difficult in the years ahead, especially in the form of state threats, IR2023 has four pillars:
Shape the international environment. Shape, balance, compete and cooperate to create the conditions for an open and stable international order (this covers diplomacy, development, climate and technology).
Deter, defend and compete across all domains. Protect UK and wider international security against state and non-state threats, and manage the risk of escalation (this covers defence and deterrence including cyber, nuclear and the NATO alliance).
Address vulnerabilities through resilience. Strengthen the strategic vulnerabilities that leave the UK exposed to coercion and global crises (this covers energy security, environmental damage, health resilience, economic security, the protection of democracy, and the UK’s borders).
Generate strategic advantage. Cultivate the UK’s strengths and update our approach to statecraft to maximise our influence and freedom of action (this covers science and technology, AI, soft power and economic competitiveness).
The four pillars reaffirm that the UK's overriding priority remains the Euro-Atlantic area but reinforces the importance of the Indo-Pacific to the UK’s future security and prosperity.
International polarisation
This characterisation of a more contested and competitive global environment is important for organisations working in the international space. It signifies a heightened level of geopolitical polarisation. IR2023 explicitly says the UK seeks to avoid “forcing zero-sum choices or encouraging bipolarity in the international system.” In other words, it seeks to avoid a return to a Cold War dynamic in which countries were pressured to take sides with either the Soviet Union or the West.
Nevertheless, the so-called middle powers are increasingly being viewed by the West as a middle ground in a tug of war over the future of the US-led international order and the post-war consensus.
The war in Ukraine has exposed divisions between the Global North and Global South over Russia’s invasion. Many in the Global South were publicly ambiguous about Russia’s behaviour. Thirty-five countries abstained in the 2 March EU-led UN General Assembly Resolution demanding Russia to withdraw military forces from Ukraine, including India, Pakistan, South Africa and Vietnam.
The risk for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in this more contested space is that they become ‘geopoliticised’. Research from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace suggests three ways in which geopolitical competition is beginning to reshape civic space. The first is that non-Western governments are starting to support civil society for geopolitical purposes, in some cases leading to greater political pressure on civic groups. The second is the deliberate promotion of cross-border civil society links by governments. The third is that civil society organisations are revising their strategies and agendas in the face of pressures, or simply trying to keep a low profile.
On Ukraine, the Carnegie Endowment paper notes that Ukrainian civil society has for some time, “…served as a defense and resistance actor”, especially focusing on resisting Russia and pursuing closer integration with Europe.
The return of war to Europe has also tested principles of peacebuilding among international NGOs working on conflict issues. Organisations are struggling to reconcile how to abide by Do No Harm principles, and promote conflict sensitive policies and practices, while taking a partisan position in the conflict.
Dealing with authoritarian regimes
IR2023 is notable for a shift in public rhetoric around engaging with “…those who do not necessarily share our values and perspective.” This is diplomatic code for authoritarian regimes, whose support the UK is likely to need in resisting the erosion of an open international order by the likes of Russia, China, Iran and North Korea.
Previous governments have often been squeamish about the need to engage with authoritarian governments or sought to frame UK foreign policy in a distinctive values framework such as Dominic Raab’s force for good agenda or Robin Cook’s ethical foreign policy.
The bluntness of IR2023 helps generate a more realistic foreign policy debate at a time when the UK regards its national interest as being squeezed by rivals and adversaries. Nevertheless, it comes with risks, particularly for civil society actors. A recent report by the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) notes that “engaging with authoritarian states without a clear plan for how to avoid doing harm risks entrenching authoritarian rule by legitimising or supporting parts and/or practices of repressive regimes.”
In particular, the report highlights the tendency of authoritarian leaders to appeal to language and promises that sound attractive to democratic governments while seeking to penetrate civil society domestically. It also overlooks the risk that civil actors are susceptible to state capture. As the report says, there is a “…risk that donors will find themselves engaging with a ‘counterfeit’ civil society or one that may even favour the status quo for self-interested reasons, and thus inadvertently strengthening the overall system.”
Finally, focusing donor engagement on civil society in authoritarian states can pose risks to civil society organisations themselves. Funding civil society organisations to resist authoritarian rule can make them a target for draconian legislation that further shrinks the civic space.
What it means for funding
The main headline from the IR refresh is the allocation of £5bn ($6.2bn) for defence until 2025. Of this, £3bn ($3.7bn) will be invested in nuclear defence capabilities to modernise the UK’s manufacturing and maintenance capacity. The remaining £2bn ($2.5bn) will go to replenishing the UK’s weapons stockpiles and improving the resilience of the UK’s munitions infrastructure.
IR2023 declares an aspiration to spend 2.5% of GDP on defence. This is expected to reach 2.2% in 2023 (not including nearly 0.09% [£2.3bn or $2.9bn] for Ukraine). Specifically, it commits to spending £20bn ($25bn) a year on R&D by 2024/25.
Where IR2023 remains silent is on Official Development Assistance (ODA) (defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] as "government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries"). UK ODA was cut from 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) to 0.5% in 2020 as a response to COVID. The reduction has always been described as a temporary measure, with the intention to return to 0.7%, “when the fiscal situation allows”.
The appointment in October 2022 of Andrew Mitchell as Minister of State for Development and Africa is largely seen as good news for those advocating for a return to 0.7%. Andrew Mitchell opposed the initial reduction and has said he will campaign to persuade doubters that international development is core to the UK’s national interests.
The current programme’s allocation for the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) for financial years 2022/2023 and 2023/2024 was set out in a statement to the House of Commons by Andrew Mitchell on 30 March 2023. This points to an increase in the total value of ODA from £7.6bn ($9.4bn) to £8.1bn ($10bn) between last year and this, much of which is accounted for by spend through multilateral institutions.
The picture is particularly bleak for organisations working on peacebuilding. Analysis from Mercy Corps and Saferworld reveals a significant decline in UK spending on civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution. It notes that between 2016 and 2021, spending dropped by $300m, causing the UK to fall from the largest investor in peacebuilding and conflict prevention to the fourth largest. There is no sign in IR2023 that this will be reversed.
Conclusion
IR2023 is distinctively up-front and honest for a UK national security document. As an analytical baseline and a set of strategic objectives and overarching principles, it sets out the UK’s outlook on global affairs and strategic direction with the force of genuine conviction.
The strategic message is clear. We have reverted to a new geostrategic competition in which the world is becoming more polarised. The risk for NGOs and civil society organisations is that they become caught up in geopolitical tensions and feel compelled to take one side or the other in the renewed global competition.
Navigating through the headwinds of a more contested global environment will require careful deliberation. NGOs and civil society organisations in the front line will need to think carefully about how they situate themselves on key political debates and how to manage their profiles in ways that enable them to remain objective and avoid becoming ‘geopoliticised’.
As always with strategy documents the test will be how the big picture is translated into action through policies, long-term programme decisions and legislation, and how this might change if there is a change of government in the next 18 months. Organisations that bid into UK government programme funds will find the funding space remains constrained, especially on peacebuilding.
For the time being, the Euro-Atlantic and Asia Pacific regions remain key geographic areas of focus for the UK. That much is likely to endure whatever happens in the more volatile world described by IR2023.