Russia’s potential withdrawal from the International Space Station: An attempt of pressurization or a sign of decline?
A little less than ten years ago, following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Roscosmos (Russia’s Federal Space Agency) announced its plans to move its astronaut training to Sevastopol, the largest city in the peninsula. Being born out of the sanctions on Moscow, this plan was immediately viewed not only as an open threat to international space cooperation but also as a use of the International Space Station (ISS) to achieve geopolitical goals on earth. Given that at that time the only way to reach the International Space Station was through Russia’s Soyuz rocket, the US and its ISS partners could choose from either agreeing to the re-location of the astronaut training to Crimea and with that quasi-recognizing its belonging to Russia or losing their access to the ISS.
Fast forward eight years, upon further sanctions in 2022 as a result of the invasion of Ukraine, Russia confirmed that it would cease operations on the International Space Station by the end of 2024 and instead would focus on building its own national orbital station. Whereas the 2014 incident was a clear attempt of pressuring the United States and the rest of its allies into acknowledging Crimea’s annexation, this announcement is by far not an unequivocal threat to weaken the West in space.
Russia is still in charge of some of the ISS’s control systems, which the US’s NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) or the EU’s ESA (European Space Agency) would need to take over. Finding suitable solutions for Russia’s concerning exit from the ISS is likely to take serious time and cost. However, the pressure on the US and the EU is not nearly as high as it was in 2014. None of them are reliant, for instance, on Roscosmos in sending a crew to the ISS anymore, since from 2020 onwards, Tesla-billionaire Elon Musk’s SpaceX program has also been able to transport astronauts to the ISS. As for replacing the Russian technology onboard the ISS, both SpaceX and aerospace company Northrop Grumman were quick to offer help.
Furthermore, threatening to abandon cooperation regarding a space station that NASA plans to fully vacate in less than 10 years anyway, is not nearly as concerning as the 2014 announcement. Seemingly, Russia is trying to maintain its declining space hegemony through propagandistic threats that most certainly have serious short-term consequences. However, these immediate repercussions could be overcome in the long term. When for example – also in 2022 – Roscosmos refused to launch British satellites using its Soyuz rocket because of London’s war sanctions on Moscow, the owner of the satellites, OneWeb, turned to SpaceX. The fact that Russian technology including Roscosmos’ highly valued Soyuz rocket family is now replaceable, does not advance Russia’s position in space anymore.
The decline of Russia’s space sector is signaled by other factors too. The Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies lists corruption, decreasing budgets, frequent structural and leadership changes, and the lack of a competent workforce as the main reasons for Roscosmos’ shrinking space capacity and activity. When threatening to exit from space initiatives based on international cooperation, Moscow is not only trying to adequately “hit back” for the sanctions but also compensating for its decline as a significant space power.
In fact, this is not the first time Russia has answered sanctions with threats in space. A year before, in 2021 Roscosmos also announced a potential withdrawal from the ISS to counter the sanctions of the United States. They even shut down one of their own non-functioning spy satellites. With that Russia not only did demonstrate its capability to launch earth-space, anti-satellite missiles but also endangered the ISS and its crew with the debris.
Despite being militarily weighty in space, Russia, however, is “losing its long-time and prominent position in international cooperation”. Its share in the market of launch systems is constantly decreasing and “the country is ill-equipped to meet new standards in this […] competition”. To attempt to match the rival SpaceX program, Moscow’s plans for the near future include manufacturing a next-generation transportation spacecraft. According to its 10-year space strategy adopted in 2016, a constellation of broadcasting and communication satellites will also be one of the priorities. Moreover, specifically to maintain its military significance in space, the plans also include establishing offensive capabilities against space infrastructures (as demonstrated in 2021) and exploring nuclear technologies in space.
The 2021 and 2022 threats of withdrawing from the International Space Stations complemented by the 2021 launch of the earth-space missile resulted in the security concern of Russia’s decreasing motivation to protect orbital space from debris. However, whether Moscow thinks of its withdrawal seriously or whether it is only a pressure-applying strategy, or a sign of decline remains debated. Nonetheless, the recent withdrawal announcements can most certainly be taken less seriously, especially since regardless of the invasion of Ukraine, NASA and Roscosmos still agreed to allow cosmonauts on joint ISS missions.
Overall, the example of Russia’s potential withdrawal from the International Space Station reaffirms two major long-term consequences. First, that conflicts on earth have a considerable impact on space cooperation – but this has always been the case. From the Cuban missile crisis of the Cold War to the Ukraine-Russia war of the present all major Russia-West clashes came with implications for both individual and joint space projects. Second, and this is a new consequence, that joint space projects have started to be used to advance individual political gains. In other words, a looming threat is that current and future space exploration and politics might not be as cooperative as before.