PRC’s naval base in Argentina: Implications for regional and Antarctic security
In August last year, the US navy released a piece warning of PRC’s increasing influence in Latin America, with keystone activity in Argentina. PRC activity in the region has indeed increased substantially, with the most recent developments potentially seeing a new naval base established in Ushuaia, Tierra del Fuego province in Argentina. With the negotiation between the local officials, and Shuiping Tu of CCP-affiliated HydroChina Corp, attention is steadily turning towards Argentina and other such PRC activity.
PRC economic activity, especially investment into energy development and infrastructure projects as a part of the Belt and Road Initiative has been a part of establishing greater influence in the region. Argentina especially enjoys strong economic ties with the PRC, the latter being one of its largest trading partners and a ‘comprehensive strategic partner’ additionally. It has also joined a number of other development initiatives and banks of the PRC, including accepting an invitation to the BRICS summit, and accepting large amounts of PRC-developed COVID-19 vaccines. In the context of the present naval base project, HydroChina engaged in extensive lobbying of local politicians since late summer, as well as seeking approval through public opinion in the province. Despite being promoted as a 1.4 billion investment in the hydrocarbon sector, the project did not prove an easy sell, as it is proposed to be entirely PRC operated.
At the same time, there is an extra-regional dimension to this latest activity, namely close connections to PRC’s expansion and increasing influence on the Antarctic territory. Situated only 1100 km (680 mi) from the coast of Antarctica, the new naval base gives the PRC a unique access to this part of the icy continent. More importantly, the section of Antarctic territory in question harbours three competing claims, Argentina, Chile, and the UK, ‘frozen’ under the current Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). With its expanding presence, the PRC is likely to seek greater influence in the ATS in the future, especially towards its set ‘expiry’ date in 2048, when it may seek to make territorial claims of its own, as it has expressed previously.
The PRC became a signatory of the ATS in the 1980s, at which point interest in the region was subsiding, and the system itself suffered a few crises in the following decades. Nevertheless, much like at the start of the continent’s colonisation, the PRC’s and other interests persist on the basis of possible advantages in the future. Although outlawed by the present ATS, the PRC is especially interested in mineral resource mining, as well as expansion of its current limits on krill fishing. This is supported not only by exploration of deeper Antarctic territory, but also frequent voyages by the Xuelong and Xuelong 2 ice breakers for the purposes of gaining experience navigating the Antarctic waters. Furthermore, other CCP-affiliated construction companies continue the process of building and equipping larger krill fishing vessels. It is important to note, however, that the PRC has repeatedly maintained its support for the ATS and the weight of its legal rules, and has largely followed them. At the same time, Western countries with stakes in the region increasingly worry about the transformation of PRC’s scientific Antarctic bases into dual-use civilian-military complexes, evidenced by the installation of aircraft runways and satellite communication technology, although the routine checks of PRC bases are seldom actually undertaken.
Map of PRC Antarctic bases juxtaposed against Antarctic territorial claims
A PRC naval base in Argentina presumably has two major implications for its Antarctic strategy and future presence in the region. First, the base, situated as it would be at the junction of the two oceans, is a good strategic point for monitoring communication and transportation on both sides of the South American continent, as well as serving as a crucial communication and transportation point for PRC’s five other Antarctic bases. The advantage is thus mostly in terms of geographic positioning, which, in case of realisation, would be almost exclusively controlled by the PRC. Second, its location also implies that PRC’s increasing influence in Argentina would presumably carry over and extend to Argentina’s claimed Antarctic territory in the future, likely in the form of future infrastructure and development projects and resource extraction. This fact would give the PRC potential access to such activities even without its own territorial claim at present. Crucially, such access also extends to the PLA, thus with further strategic and security implications.
In terms of wider Latin American security politics, PRC expansion into and greater influence in the Antarctic region is also likely to bring issues of Antarctic territorial disputes back on the agenda regionally. With the Argentine and Chilean claims overlapping, increased importance of the region and the rapidly approaching renegotiation date of the ATS are likely to create tension in otherwise seemingly cordial bilateral relations, at least where the Antarctic and security politics are concerned. Additionally, these issues concern the UK's territorial claims, which overlap with those of Argentina to an even greater extent. They are furthermore part of a much larger regional issue, the UK’s long-standing dispute with Argentina over the status of the Falkland Islands. Originally not included in the ATS frozen claims, the Falklands and their proximity to the Antarctic have the potential to inflame the sovereignty issue further, resulting in greater security implications for Latin America. In the present situation, the UK has been operating on the basis of old policy prescriptions when it comes to military modernisation of Argentina, which imposes an embargo on such equipment from the UK. This crucially extends to equipment with any UK-made parts, which has caused delays in delivery from other countries such as India and even the US in the past. Opening old wounds while revisiting these issues is thus likely to have the secondary effect of a further pivot towards the PRC by Argentina, should UK’s policy remain unchanged. These issues have increasingly caught the attention of other western countries, notably the US. Besides a disagreement over the aforementioned embargo policy, UK’s western allies have expressed concern that greater PRC presence in the Antarctic region close to UK’s territorial interests is likely to distract the latter away from other pressing issues and commitments, especially within NATO. Rising PRC presence in Latin America and the Antarctic alike can thus have unexpected security implications beyond both regions.