Colonialism, Coups, and Commodities: Emerging Risks in the Sahel’s Former French Colonies

The Sahel region has significant energy and critical mineral deposits. While Mali and Burkina Faso possess gold, Niger is one of the world’s foremost suppliers of uranium and Guinea boasts large reserves of bauxite. Other critical minerals in the region include copper, phosphate, manganese, and lithium, with notable deposits of gold and iron ore. Given the demand for these commodities, with rising use of green technology and electric vehicles, the Sahel’s resource wealth should have acted as a catalyst for economic development. However, exploitation and corruption have prevented this from materialising and the region continues to suffer from “political instability, conflict, violence, and food insecurity. The Sahel’s abundance of commodities can thus be seen as a resource curse rather than a blessing.

Even within the context of Africa’s long history of instability, conflict, and violent regime changes, events in the Sahel over recent years stand out. The broader Sahel has seen a steady rise in the influence of violent domestic terrorist organisations – including groups with Al Qaeda, ISIS, and Wagner affiliations. In 2023, approximately 47 percent of all deaths related to terrorist activity globally came from this region, making the Sahel the global epicentre of terrorism.

In a vicious cycle of instability, escalating violence has both triggered and been exacerbated by a string of military takeovers in recent years within an area labelled the “coup belt”, stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. Of the countries to experience coups, Mali (August 2020 and May 2021), Guinea (September 2021), Burkina Faso (January 2022 and September 2022), Niger (July 2023), and Gabon (August 2023) were all former French colonies. Questions have been raised concerning the legacy of French occupation in the region. While the litany of risks in these countries is exhaustive, ranging from terrorism to humanitarian crises, those related to the shifting control of critical commodities merit greater examination.

The Post-Colonial Period: End of an Era, or More of the Same?

While the applications for Sahelian resources have evolved, the desire to control them has remained consistent. In adherence with colonial-era power dynamics, France’s African policy centred around resource exploitation. Despite decolonisation in the mid-20th century (see image below), France continued to protect its interests by shifting its strategy from direct colonial governance to indirect neocolonial influence. Spearheaded by French President Charles de Gaulle, the strategy was known as La Françafrique, “characterised by decades of political meddling”. The drafting of new military and economic agreements enforced France’s authority by securing bases and guaranteeing access to strategically important resources, including uranium and oil. By influencing and selecting the governments to succeed French rule, Paris secured the approval needed to continue mining and military operations in its former colonies. Strategies were even implemented to expand La Françafrique to nearby countries that were considered strategically useful. For instance, during the 1960s, De Gaulle, who was interested in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) copper, cobalt, and other minerals, supported secessionist forces fighting for their own state in the Katanga Province. Supported by the United States (US), their efforts instigated the downfall of DRC Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and the installation of Joseph Mobutu, who acted as a proxy for French and US interests.

Map of Former French Colonies in the Sahel Region

Source:Deutsche Welle

Over time, France became increasingly unpopular with Sahelian countries, which strived for genuine independence. Guinea was the first French territory to reject continued subjugation in favour of immediate independence during de Gaulle’s 1958 referendum. Growing anti-French sentiment in the decolonisation period (1940s to the 1960s) created momentum for challenges in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Notable grievances included military interventions, the persistence of the CFA franc as the local currency, restrictive visa policies, and resource extraction. The exploitation of Sahelian commodities was one of the most contentious and blatant illustrations of French neocolonialism.

The Nail in the Coffin

Despite French President François Hollande announcing the end of Françafrique in October 2012, French influence remained. This was encapsulated by a 2014 parliamentary report that outlined the need for France to “maintain a military apparatus” in the region to “defend its interests”. Three months after Hollande’s proclamation, French troops were deployed to Mali to fight rebel forces as part of Operation Serval. This later expanded into Operation Barkhane, which sought to eradicate jihadism across five Sahelian countries, aligning with the broader US-led War on Terror. This endeavour failed its primary objective of curbing the spread of terrorism, and lent credibility to jihadist allegations of Western imperialism, contributing to political instability. Investigations have also revealed severe war crime accusations against French forces that collaborated with local units, including the slaughtering of civilians from the Peul ethnic group in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

In light of the country’s waning popularity, France withdrew its troops from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in 2022 after the severing of defence contracts by the military juntas. The trio have also pulled out of the French-backed G5 anti-terrorism Sahel defence pact and expelled Western media entities, including Radio France International and France 24. The Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Senegal, and the Ivory Coast have each made similar requests for French troops to leave. Demonstrating a broader Western retreat from the region, in April 2024, the US agreed to withdraw 1,000 soldiers from Niger and hand over its last military base in the country following a request from the country’s regime.

Western Grip on Sahelian Critical Commodities Weakens

The West has maintained its interest in the Sahel’s commodities since the colonial period. However, with anti-Western grievances concerning corruption and instability rising, the region’s former colonial rulers are losing their grip. A cogent example is how Western access to uranium and gold has become increasingly threatened in recent years.

Uranium

France has historically relied on Sahelian uranium to support its energy infrastructure. Proportionally, France is the most heavily reliant country in the world on nuclear power, with approximately 70 percent of its electricity produced from this energy source. Although a shift in French energy policy was announced in 2014 to reduce reliance on nuclear power by 2025, in 2022, French President Emmanuel Macron announced plans for six new reactors, underscoring a long-term commitment to the power source. Furthermore, France has sourced a notable portion of their required uranium from Niger. In the last decade, 20 percent of imported uranium was sourced from Niger – making the nation its second largest importer, only behind Kazakhstan.

Although unpopular amongst the Nigerien population, French companies have maintained significant operations in the Nigerien uranium industry following the end of colonial rule. Despite French state company Orano (formerly Areva) mining uranium in Niger for over half a century through its subsidiaries, the country remains one of the poorest in the world,  only benefitting from 12 percent of the market value of the uranium produced. In addition to the exploitative nature of the relationship, Orano’s activities have also caused an “ecological and health disaster”, with radioactive pollution and mining waste contaminating local soil and water sources.

In recent years, French influence has come under increasing scrutiny. After overthrowing Niger's President Mohamed Bazoum in 2023, coup leaders demanded France withdraw its remaining troops and expel its ambassador. The junta also seized operational control of Orano’s local mining firm Somaïr. Relations between the Nigerien junta and Orano have been on a downward trend ever since. In June 2024, Orano was stripped of its mining permit for the Imouraren project – one of the largest uranium deposits on earth. Subsequently, in October 2024, Orano announced that it would immediately halt all uranium production in the nation, citing the “highly deteriorated” situation. 

Gold

The mining industry in Mali is dominated by gold production, with the commodity being a significant driver for the country’s economy in recent decades. As the nation’s most important export, gold accounted for more than 80 percent of the country’s total exports in 2023. The recent string of coups in Mali has made gold mining operations significantly more difficult for Western entities. For example, although not from a former colonial nation, Canadian firm Barrick Gold – one of the largest gold mining companies in the world – has found itself engaged in an intense legal battle with the Malian junta. Following the implementation of Mali’s new mining code in 2023, the situation escalated to a point in which Mali’s military government seized gold stocks from the Loulo-Gounkoto mine, stopped operations, and detained Barrick employees. In February 2025, Barrick signed a deal to end the multi-year dispute.

With the Barrick legal disaster, Western companies with projects in these nations will likely continue to leave the region as pervasive risks threaten operations and profitability. The Sahelian military governments have continuously tightened restrictions on mining operations for Western companies. In Mali, these restrictions have involved suspending all artisanal mining permits for foreign operators.

Out with the Old, in with the New

With the Sahel shifting away from the West, opportunities have arisen for rival powers to step in. Countries that did not experience a change in leadership, such as the Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Chad, have remained broadly friendly to France. However, states that experienced successful coups, including Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, have shifted towards other, non-Western nations. This implies that the greater the level of instability in the country, the higher the likelihood for foreign actors to take advantage.

Russia

As relations between the two deteriorated, Mali’s junta terminated relations with France, turning to Russian private military company Wagner to “shore up its domestic political position”. Exerting control over the mines is a priority for Wagner, which was reconstituted as Russia’s Africa Corps in 2023. While it would be an error to divert responsibility away from France for cultivating an environment that enabled this to occur, Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns have played a key role in tipping the scale by effectively galvanising anti-Western support.

Mali is not an isolated example. By offering military assistance to Sahelian governments interested in strengthening their positions in the face of growing security threats, Moscow has gained a foothold elsewhere and signed contracts for commodities and trade route development. One example was in 2017, when the Kremlin exploited Paris’ decision to withdraw its forces from CAR by sending weapons and deploying military trainers from Wagner. The move paid off with Wagner’s front companies, such as Midas Resources SARLU, Lobaye Invest, and Diamville SAU, being granted permits by the CAR government to mine and export gold and diamonds. These companies have amassed profits over $2 billion, financing Russia’s wider regional efforts as well as the military campaign in Ukraine.

China

As China has continued to expand its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Sahel has fallen into the sights of Beijing, which, much like its Russian ally, has moved to capitalise on declining Western influence. For instance, Chinese company Ganfeng Lithium has invested heavily in Goulamina, a lithium production plant in Mali, while others have begun to exploit gold mines. China has also completed a 2,000km oil pipeline linking Niger to its southwestern neighbour Benin. Although China has involved itself in regional security affairs through arms sales, for Beijing, political and economic dominance trump military and security concerns. However, with a struggling property market, demographic issues, geopolitical confrontations, and a trade war causing an economic slowdown, China’s operations in the Sahel will likely depend upon the country’s ability to manage such issues.

UAE

Since the 2010s, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has established defence and military relations with Sahelian states. This has included training and arms provision to counter jihadi terrorism in a range of countries. Simultaneously, the UAE is going toe to toe with Chinese investment in Africa. Between 2019 and 2023, the UAE invested approximately $110 billion USD in new projects in Africa across sectors including mining, oil, infrastructure and manufacturing. The UAE’s growing role in the Sahel primarily stems from an interest in “bolstering its influence in areas of competition with its Gulf rivals”. After Chad terminated its defence pact with France in November 2024, the country forged alliances with the UAE and Russia. However, the UAE has demonstrated greater interest in the Horn of Africa and countries along Africa’s eastern coast compared with former French Sahelian countries, which are predominantly located to the West. Abu Dhabi’s strategy of port diplomacy (see image below) provided a clear illustration of this emphasis.

Map of Ports and Logistics Platforms in Africa

Source: Defence 24

What’s Next?

The Sahel’s substantial resource wealth, which could have promoted economic prosperity, has instead been a critical factor in the instability, violence, and corruption that has plagued the region. Western influence in the area is poised to further diminish as the Sahelian juntas continue to push the West out in favour of Russia and China. While these shifts signal steps away from the lingering neocolonial structures that have existed in the post-colonial era, with exploitation set to continue at the hands of different parties, economic and social prosperity are by no means a likely outcome. For as long as authoritarian military regimes remain in power and suppress democracy, the Sahelian people will continue to suffer from an indefinite cycle of instability, corruption and violence.

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Mexico’s Election Impact on Energy Policy

Background

On 2nd June 2024, Claudia Sheinbaum made history by being elected as Mexico’s first female president. With a strong academic background, Sheinbaum is a physicist holding a doctorate in energy engineering and was part of the Nobel Peace Prize winning UN panel on climate change. Sheinbaum’s economic agenda aims to capitalise on the opportunities presented by American nearshoring efforts, contingent on a stable and expanding energy supply. 

Mexico is one of the largest oil suppliers in the world, having produced 1.6 million barrels daily in 2022. The country is also ranked 13th in the global crude oil output. Whilst Sheinbaum has promised to accelerate Mexico’s clean energy transition and aims to generate 50% of its energy from renewables by 2030, most spectators are divided. Some hope her scientific background will lead to a greater emphasis on clean energy, while others fear she might follow the policies of her predecessor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who invested heavily in bolstering fossil fuel-reliant state energy companies, PEMEX (Petróleos Mexicanos) and CFE (Comisión Federal de Electricidad). 

Regardless of her position on energy transition, Sheinbaum faces the challenge of restoring investor confidence, which was shaken during López Obrador’s administration. Without this achievement, the new leader cannot guarantee Mexico’s energy stability and it could jeopardise the country’s commitment under the US - Mexico - Canada Agreement (USMCA) and the Paris Agreement.

Mexico’s gas supply, traditionally dominated by PEMEX, faced disruptions due to declining production and pipeline congestions. An energy reform in 2013 allowed private firms to enter the gas market to boost market competition and supply reliability. However, under López Obrador, the private sector participation was viewed as a threat, and efforts were allocated to prioritise PEMEX’s production. Currently, the company is the most indebted oil corporation in the world, with its stocks having a -5.74% 3-year return, compared to +11.48% from other companies in the same period and sector. 

Considerations for Sheinbaum’s Energy Strategy

Sheinbaum has a decision to make regarding the energy future of Mexico. There is a confluence of energy-related factors that Sheinbaum will need to consider early in her administration, such as increasing domestic energy demands, pressure from environmental groups and international climate regimes, a deepened reliance on energy imports from abroad, and foreign companies’ dissatisfaction with the state’s current control of the energy sector.

Sheinbaum has long supported the state-centric energy policies of the previous administration, including legislative amendments that rolled back the 2013 constitutional reforms that helped liberalise the Mexican energy sector. Nevertheless, while Sheinbaum continues to defend the energy policies of the previous López Obrador administration, she is more pragmatic than her predecessor, which may provide a path for potential policy change to deal with the various energy issues facing her administration.

One area where Sheinbaum differs from López Obrador is the role of renewable energy sources in Mexico’s energy mix. Sheinbaum has a robust environmental pedigree and has published extensively on the clean energy transition. During her time as mayor of Mexico City, she implemented clean energy infrastructure and electrified transportation modalities. Furthermore, according to her campaign platform, she is committed to progressing Mexico’s clean energy transition and decarbonising the economy. However, climate progress under the Sheinbaum administration is likely to be tempered by fossil fuel supporters. Mexico still strongly depends on the oil and gas industry for its energy needs, accounting for over 80% of its energy mix in 2022. Understanding the necessity of oil and gas for the domestic economy, Sheinbaum has championed domestic oil production and supports the central role of PEMEX in the energy sector.

Source: IEA (2024)

As Mexican energy sovereignty will likely continue to be a focus for Sheinbaum’s administration, issues related to weak foreign direct investment in the Mexican energy industry are likely to persist. Under the current policy framework, private industry does not have an incentive to invest in exploration and production activities in Mexico. Lax private investment coupled with recent financial struggles at PEMEX may result in insufficient investment in Mexico’s energy infrastructure and increased reliance on energy imports. Therefore, to address the increased domestic energy demands, Sheinbaum may alter the government's prevailing energy strategy to ensure sustainable and robust energy supplies by providing private companies more control/access to the energy sector.

There are also broader trade implications regarding Sheinbaum’s potential approach to Mexico’s energy strategy, particularly how it impacts the country’s relationship with the US. The US Trade Representative communicated to its Mexican counterpart that the legislative amendments passed under the López Obrador administration violated investment provisions stipulated by the USMCA, leading the US to open dispute settlement consultations to address the issue. If a negotiated agreement is not reached, the US could invoke trade sanctions targeting Mexico in response. Failure to reaffirm Mexico’s commitment to the trade agreement could also lead to neglect of economic opportunities stemming from American nearshoring efforts.

The outcome of the 2024 U.S. presidential election will undoubtedly further impact Mexico’s energy sector, especially as it relates to trade and investment. Sheinbaum’s industrial policy plans and interest in promoting a green economy align with Biden’s focus on the clean energy transition and nearshoring efforts. Conversely, a Trump White House may provide a more hostile and coercive environment for Sheinbaum to operate within.

Outlook

Given the current instability affecting the early stage of Claudia Sheinbaum’s administration, companies and investors need to adapt their current strategy to seize the right set of circumstances for their business. 

Despite the undefined agenda for energy public policies and the ongoing debate between energy transition and oil investment, Sheinbaum will need to prioritise a stable domestic energy supply. Therefore, companies that want to be aligned with the government's agenda should invest in projects focused on new technologies that bolster domestic production or increase resilience.

Foreign companies may have concerns about the continuation of policies aligned with López Obrador’s approach, especially given the limited or even absent participation of private investment in Mexican oil companies in recent years. To mitigate this risk, companies can engage and promote public-private partnerships, which can foster joint ventures. However, joint ventures can present risk in the case of the nationalisation of foreign companies, but this is unlikely to occur under Sheinbaum’s presidency. Investors should focus on sectors that are likely to receive government support, such as technologies that enhance energy independence or generate a constant supply.

It is important to mention that there will be clearer indications if Sheinbaum will prioritise climate commitments or follow the steps of her predecessor in due course. Additionally, the outcome of the US elections is likely to significantly impact the country’s energy policy framework.