Friends or foes: cooperation and conflict in current Turkish-Russian relations

The Russian-Turkish nature of current relations is a topic of discussion among policymakers and analysts considering its ambiguity and controversial developments. Russian-Turkish relations are increasingly important in determining the outcome of different regional conflicts, starting from Syria and Libya and extending to Ukraine. Their relations are characterised by some degree of cooperation on shared priorities while by friction on other issues. This situation is caused by different concurring factors, namely the geographical one, certain political affinities and geopolitical developments in the so-called “enlarged” Mediterranean area, which extends to the Middle East and until the Arabian Peninsula.

First, the geographical factor has been a key driver of conflict between the two countries during the last two centuries. As the Russian Empire expanded towards the warm water ports such as the Black Sea and the Mediterranean in the 18th and 19th centuries, Türkiye felt increasingly threatened by the Russian expansion. Access to the warm seas has been a key strategic objective for Russia as it needs navigable seas to secure commercial routes by circumventing the Northern seas, which are frozen during the colder months. This strategic objective is still relevant today in Russian foreign policy as it allows Russia to supply its military in Syria through its naval base in Tartus, partners in Africa and the Wagner group (i.e. its private military company). Nonetheless, ships to reach the Mediterranean must go through two Turkish chokepoints, the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, which were major sources of conflict in the previous centuries. The situation improved significantly with the Montreux Convention signed in 1936, which guarantees free navigation to all civilian vessels and sets out rules for military ones. Although the Montreux Convention improved bilateral relationships, the spectre of denying access to Russian vessels still looms from time to time. It comes with no surprise that recently, Türkiye argued the case of restoring Ukraine's borders to those before 2014 and thus including Crimea, as it seeks to limit Russian presence and capabilities in the Black Sea.

Nonetheless, the geographical factor has induced friction between the two countries over the centuries. Ongoing political affinities tend to balance such structural and now-regulated dimensions. Both countries, to different degrees, have embarked on revisionist foreign policies in light of sour relations with the West. While Türkiye is still a key member of NATO and Russia its main rival, both countries were denied access to a wider economic and security architecture in the early 2000s, which in turn led them to take their idiosyncratic initiatives. Türkiye is still a candidate member of the EU even though it is clear it will never become a full member, while Russian relations with the West deteriorated steadily over the decades and culminated with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In this context of sour relations with the West, both countries have attempted to expand their sphere of influence where the West has disengaged or is not capable of influencing local actors, most notably in the Middle East and Africa. Türkiye’s revisionist approach to the Middle East has been renamed “Neo-Ottomatism” as it aims at restoring the influence and prestige of the Ottoman Empire by embracing a more conservative approach in domestic politics and by deepening relations with regional countries while simultaneously promoting a pan-Turkic agenda. Similarly, Russia has sought to revive its Soviet ties with African and Middle Easter countries by providing military equipment to authoritarian governments who do not like Western conditionality on democratic institutions and market reforms and sees the Mediterranean as the weaker side of NATO’s maritime and military presence.

The last factor affecting Russian-Turkish relations is the political vacuum left by the EU and the US, along with regional dynamics. In the above-mentioned areas, the two countries seek to expand their interests simultaneously, thus forcing them to sit at the same negotiating table but on opposite sides. This is the case for Syria, where Türkiye is supporting filo-Turkish militias in the north and trying to control even jihadist groups such as Hayat Tahir al-Sham (HTS) to protect itself from instability near the border. At the same time, Russia provides military aid to the Syrian government in exchange for access to its naval base in Tartus. The same situation can be found in Libya, where Türkiye sponsors militias and supports the Tripoli government in exchange for economic and political interests. In contrast, Russia supports the Tripoli government through the Wagner group to secure a logistical base to supply its partners in the African continent.

Therefore, considering these three factors, Russian-Turkish relations can be depicted as tactical, such as the joint tactical patrol the two armies conduct in Syria. The two countries do share some interests and foreign policy goals. However, other key factors, such as geography and the opportunities arising from the US disengagement and the EU's inability to influence the MENA region, prevent the formation of a deeper bilateral partnership. Russian-Turkish bilateral relations can be seen as a sum-zero game, where gains come at the other party's expense, with each geopolitical development presenting an opportunity to gain or lose some leveraging power. In fact, political and military developments affect the relationship itself. As the Russian invasion of Ukraine did not attain its original objectives, and Russia started to face pressure from the Ukrainian counter-offensive coupled with Western sanctions, Türkiye immediately tried to extract more concessions from Russia in Syria at the Tehran summit. Türkiye failed to do so as both Russia and Iran opposed the idea of another Turkish military operation in Northern Syria. Finally, it is foreseeable that in the next decade, Russian-Turkish relations will become even more ambiguous as opportunities for more friction and cooperation will be more likely. The above can be visualised in the following emblematic picture. Türkiye is providing its cheap and effective Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine to fight the Russian invaders while at the same time it is deepening its energy links with the construction of a new pipeline coming from Russia that goes through Türkiye and Europe.