The Iran nuclear deal: running out of time and options
Talks on reviving the Iran nuclear deal, or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was signed between Iran and six major powers in 2015, are at an impasse since at least March 2022. The United States is preoccupied with the war in Ukraine and has once again taken to looking westward despite its best efforts to focus energy, money, and power on the ‘east’. As the world looks elsewhere, Iran has slowly but steadily increased its ability and technical capability to develop nuclear weapons. In such a scenario, what will happen to the Iran nuclear deal? Can it be revived? Even if revived, to what extent can it curtail Iran from going nuclear? Can it?
The JCPOA was one of the “hallmarks” of the Obama administration. The deal was meant to curb Iran’s nuclear capabilities in exchange for relief from US sanctions that had been wreaking havoc on the Iranian economy for years. The deal was praised by those who believed that it would achieve its aims and condemned by those who saw it as insufficient to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions and capabilities. The latter included Israel, and Obama’s successor to the White House, Mr Donald Trump, who went on to unilaterally pull out the US from the JCPOA in May 2018. There were justifications for withdrawal, including claims that the deal’s “sunset provisions” would only delay, not prevent, Iran from acquiring a nuclear bomb and that it did not cover Iran’s ballistic missile program.
The current US administration of President Joe Biden pledged to revive the Iran nuclear deal, as part of Biden’s efforts to take his country to pre-2016, before the perceived “damages” done by Trump to the US’ international standing. Though there have been no direct talks between Iran and the US to revive the deal, negotiations through the other signatories of the deal have taken place in Vienna. But this time, Iran has more conditions which the US cannot afford to agree to.
Tehran wants the US to revoke its designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The IRGC is a branch of the Iranian armed forces that was founded after the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and answers directly to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. The IRGC’s Quds Force is responsible for Iran’s external operations, meaning that it supports, trains, and funds organisations abroad including the Lebanese Hizbullah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Yemen’s Houthis. The US has so far refused to revoke the IRGC’s terrorist designation, and international media reported recently that Biden had personally confirmed to Prime Minister Naftali Bennett that there would be no change in the US stance on the matter. The US justifies its stand by claiming, quite reasonably, that the issue is not related to the nuclear deal. In any case, the Biden administration cannot afford to give this concession to Iran when they are nearing the US mid-term election in November, which is not projected to have overly bright prospects for the Democrats.
What are the possibilities for the deal, then? Some analysts opine that even if the deal is revived successfully, Iran has already enriched uranium to levels forbidden under the nuclear deal and is capable of developing nuclear bombs in a matter of weeks, not months. Assassinations of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani in January 2020 and nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in November of the same year pushed Iran to declare “revenge” and escalate its levels of enrichment in response, thereby bringing it closer to becoming a nuclear state. In such a scenario, going back to the previous terms would be pointless. And the next US president can very well tear up the deal revived by Biden, a possibility that hasn’t escaped the Iranians.
Therefore, Iran has turned elsewhere for aid and political support. China-Iran ties have grown, and both signed a 25-year bilateral agreement including economic, military, and security cooperation in March 2021. This is an implicit message to the US that Iran has options. Having traditionally perceived the West as hostile towards itself, Iran looks at the east as a counterbalancing force. Another aspect is the reaction of Israel and Saudi Arabia to current events. Israel, of course, will not be deterred in its military approach and wariness towards Iran no matter the future of the nuclear deal. Rather, Israel is more concerned about Iran’s financial enrichment through the easing of US sanctions in case of a revived deal. Saudi Arabia, like other Gulf Arab countries, is apprehensive that the US has not included its concerns with Iran in the negotiations. This, combined with the increasing perception that American interest and power in the region are in decline, forced Riyadh to take matters into its own hands. Talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran to normalise relations have been ongoing behind closed doors.
An unchecked expansion of Iran’s nuclear program along with its deteriorating economy will spell disaster for the Middle East. A rise in tensions with major players will be inevitable. The world is caught between a rock and a hard place in dealing with Iran’s nuclear deal. If revived, progress in the achievement of the deal’s aims is questionable. If left to the current stalemate, there would be no check on Iran’s nuclear ambitions and capability, which will inevitably escalate tensions in the region.