On May 12th, 2023, delegates from Portugal and Morocco convened in Rabat, Morocco, with an aim to strengthen bilateral ties between the two countries. During this meeting, Portugal reaffirmed their support for Morocco’s Autonomy Plan, a strategy that has been in circulation since 2007 as one of many attempts to end the conflict over the Western Sahara. The Western Sahara is a topic of intense disagreement and conflict between Morocco and the self-proclaimed Sahrawi Democratic Republic (SADR); Morocco and Mauritania annexed the Western Sahara in 1975, and since then, there has been over forty years of chaos, conflict, and suffering, mostly felt by the indigenous Sahrawi Arab population. These people largely still live in makeshift tents and rely on aid provided by the international community, with over 173,000 Sahrawis living in five refugee camps in neighbouring Algeria. Progress towards a peace agreement has been slow, and many have stated that the Western Sahara, and the Sahrawi people, have been forgotten by the world in Africa's “last colony.” Notably, the UN-led Baker Plan I and II  peace and self-determination initiatives both stalled due to an attempt to give the Sahrawi integrity under the control of Morocco, followed by an attempt at a referendum which was rejected by Morocco. The currently proposed Autonomy Plan would give the Sahrawi their own head of government under an “extended autonomy” situation under Morocco, with a planned referendum.

Western Sahara is a former Spanish colony dating from 1884 which subsequently became the Spanish Sahara in 1934. In 1975, Morocco began the “Green March” into the Western Sahara under the direction of King Hassan, having claimed sovereignty of the Western Sahara since 1957. Thus, when Spain withdrew in 1976, Morocco (and Mauritania) claimed sovereignty, both deploying troops into the area. Whilst this was condemned as a violation of the 1975 International Court of Justice declaration, stating that neither held sovereignty over this land, the Sahrawi People have since been locked in a continuous battle to regain what they see as their territorial integrity and right to independence. Whilst Mauritania withdrew their forces in 1979 and recognised the SADR, Morocco continued to push for a right to the Western Sahara, and even took over Mauritania’s section of the Western Sahara after 1979. As of 2023, Spain is still considered the ‘administering state.’

Decades of guerilla war followed from 1976, leading to a UN-brokered ceasefire in 1991, but this was broken in November 2020 after Morocco allegedly removed Sahrawi protestors from the UN-administered buffer zone. Moreover, when the ceasefire was initiated in 1991, a referendum was promised, but this has never occurred due to disputes over who is eligible to vote. As of May 17th, 2023, Wilson McMakin of The New Humanitarian reports of Moroccan drone strikes forcing Sahrawi from their homes. Importantly, McMakin also stresses how statistics released by both sides of this conflict are heavily politicised. At present, the indigenous people of the Western Sahara are largely forced behind ‘a heavily mined and patrolled 2,700-kilometre berm, one of the largest military infrastructure projects in the world’ as Houda Chograni writes for the Arab Centre Washington DC, with Morocco still in possession of the majority of the Western Sahara. 

Since 2021 with the reignition of violence, tensions have been escalating. Algeria has broken off all diplomatic ties with Morocco, cut off gas lines and accused Morocco of killing Algerians in the disputed area. Importantly, Algeria and Morocco are on opposing sides over the SADR. Algeria fully supports the SADR and the Polisario Front, the SADR’s elected political group, whilst Morocco infamously does not recognise the Sahrawi’s claim to the Western Sahara. As de Larramendi (2019: 510) writes, ‘...it is only with the logistical, military and financial support of Algeria that the Sahrawi national liberation movement Polisario Front has been able to survive.’ Moreover, these two large Maghrebi states have held contentious relations for decades. Tensions lie due to post-colonial border disputes and due to stark differences between the conservative Moroccan constitutional monarchical system of governance compared to Algeria’s revolutionary-supporting stance. Both states crucially compete for regional primacy and were involved in many skirmishes during the 1960s, 70s and 1980s, even closing the land border. Moreover, the Libyan civil war, subsequent societal instability and wider Arab Uprisings created a vacuum in the region, which, despite both states temporarily entering a period of detente around 2011, this has since reverted to ‘bilateral rivalry.’ 

However, in 2023, Algeria’s position in this conflict is under strain. Many countries which previously recognised the Western Sahara’s right to sovereignty have switched allegiance; most significantly, in December 2020, President Donald Trump decided to recognise Morocco’s claim over the Western Sahara in return for their normalisation of relations with Israel. As of May 17th, 2023, the United States under the Biden administration have upheld this position in favour of Morocco. Moreover, as seen with Portugal’s support of the latest Autonomy Plan, Spain has also shown support for Morocco’s strategy after a long campaign by Morocco which included ‘sending waves of migrants into Spanish territory.’ As such, the Polisario Front - this group has possessed the same leader since its foundation, Brahim Ghali, and has been recognised by the UN since 1979 - now faces an even more challenging situation, as through losing support from the US to Japan amongst others, their international position is considerably weakened. Many other countries like Peru and Kenya are also constantly switching allegiances, creating an atmosphere of uncertainty for the SADR. Therefore, the threat of a guerilla conflict fully re-igniting between the SADR and Morocco remains as the former continue to press for full independence whilst the latter finds itself with greater international support for its position. This would have immediate, and long-lasting, effects on Maghrebi stability and wider African stability. 

For Europe, the European Union (EU) has a strong desire to prevent this issue from boiling over again. The EU holds deep, comprehensive relations with Morocco which has historically allied itself close to Europe since independence, but the EU also has extensive energy links with Algeria; the latter is the third biggest supplier of gas to the EU, and since the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, Algeria has gained new importance to European energy markets. Due to conflicting interests, some have called for long-term thinking with regard to the issue of the Western Sahara, seeing the region in terms of its wider repercussions, and not purely bilateral interests. As Anthony Dworkin writes for the European Council on Foreign Relations: ‘For Europe to make concessions in the face of Morocco’s strong-arm tactics risks rewarding an approach that incorporates an element of blackmail through the weaponisation of migration.’ However, with Europe and the EU itself heavily focused on “stopping” (im)migration, reports of Sahrawi aiding Malian and Senegalese men on the dangerous journey to Europe will have not gone unnoticed.  

Moreover, as European colonial history is tied to both Morocco and Algeria, the EU has extra considerations in play regarding this conflict. Some member states, like Spain who still holds Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco, Ceuta and Melilla, are thus particularly connected with the protagonists, when compared to other actors in this dispute, like the AU. However, the AU also has a delicate balance at play regarding Western Sahara. With Morocco finally rejoining the AU in 2017 after leaving in 1984 over the admittance of the SADR, there is hope that a diplomatic solution through the UN can be encouraged. However, Algeria has tried to bring the AU actively into the debate, instead of supporting the UN-backed process which calls for multiple regional actors to come together, rejecting the AU’s Resolution 693 of 2018, which recognised the role of the UN. Notably, Morocco’s absence from the AU somewhat enabled Algeria to press for its stance on the Western Sahara, and Morocco was alarmed in 2014 at the creation of an AU Special Envoy to the Western Sahara. As such, both the EU and AU have a difficult line to tread in regard to Western Sahara. 

Additionally, with reports that Turkish and Chinese drones used by Morocco have killed members of the Polisario, most notably the Polisario chief Addah Al-Bendir in April 2021, and that Algeria is also buying military equipment from Turkey and others, it is clear that this conflict has far-reaching entanglements. Further concerns lie over the ripple effect this continued issue could have on other neighbouring and closeby states. For example, Mali has signed an agreement with other African states to expel the SADR from the African Union (AU).

With both Algeria and Morocco locked in an arms race, Algeria spent over $9.7 billion in 2020 on its defence budget with a significant proportion of weaponry coming from Russia but also Germany and Italy, whilst Morocco spent $4.8 billion, the two Maghrebi giants must be watched and interacted with as part of a larger, regional dynamic. With the Brussel’s Times reporting in January 2023 on a ‘dubious trip’ by four Brussels’ parliamentarians to the Western Sahara at the invitation of the Moroccan Parliament igniting debate over the disputed issue, and what tactics are at play by both sides, it is clear the fate of the SADR is still a highly complicated topic. Even though Algeria supports, since 2016, a non-interventionist foreign policy, rivalry with Morocco will certainly not wain, especially over the issue of the Western Sahara.