Assessing Morocco’s Atlantic Initiative: Implications for the Maghreb and Sahel
King Mohammed VI's launch of the Atlantic Initiative on November 6, 2023, aims to provide Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger access to the Atlantic Ocean via Moroccan infrastructure. While hailed for its potential economic benefits in the Sahel, the project faces hurdles of cost, security, and strained diplomatic relations, particularly with Algeria, challenging Morocco's ability to reshape regional trade routes.
Executive Summary:
Since 1999, Moroccan King Mohammed VI has pushed for political and economic integration to increase Morocco’s reach in Africa. The Atlantic Initiative, proposed in December 2024, epitomizes this strategy. The Atlantic Initiative could strengthen Morocco’s diplomatic stance in the Sahel and therefore also exacerbate tensions with Algeria.
This plan, granting the Sahel states access to the Atlantic Ocean through Morocco’s infrastructure (notably the Dakhla Port), is officially based on “co-development”. However, it comes at a propitious time. While ECOWAS’, France’s and Algeria’s influence in the Sahel is declining, Morocco has sought cooperation with its neighbors, who are eager to diversify their partnerships.
The IA bears economic potential: it could modernize regional infrastructure and attract investment, possibly from Gulf states, to the Sahel.
However, the project’s costs, the lack of disposable infrastructure, insecurity, and tensions between Rabat and Algiers will limit the Atlantic Initiative’s significance.
Introduction:
On 6 November 2023, King of Morocco Mohammed VI launched the Atlantic Initiative (“Initiative Atlantique”, hereafter IA), a plan granting Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger (all three have formed the Sahel State Alliance, hereafter AES, following their departure from ECOWAS in early 2024) and Chad access to the Atlantic Ocean through the provision of Morocco’s infrastructure. Key to the IA is the Dakhla Port, located in the disputed territory of Western Sahara. The proposal was met with great enthusiasm, notably in the Sahel, but also in Europe, with France and Germany both hinting at investments.
What are the IA’s implications, both politically and economically, for Morocco and its neighborhood? Does the IA have potential to reshape regional trade routes and diplomatic alliances? The IA could bear economic potential, as it would modernize regional infrastructure and boost trade. However, systemic factors such as insecurity and strained political relations, notably with Algeria, will challenge Morocco's ability to fulfill its goals.
The Atlantic Initiative and Morocco’s active African diplomacy under Mohammed VI
Since coming to power in 1999, and even more so since Morocco’s return to the African Union in 2017, Mohammed VI has cultivated solid bilateral ties with other continental heavyweights while pushing for greater regional integration. Morocco applied for ECOWAS membership in 2018 and has consistently reiterated its support for African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), while offering Europe natural gas through the Nigeria-Morocco pipeline. The private sector served as a useful foreign policy tool: companies in sectors such as mining, communications, and agriculture are present all over Africa, providing the kingdom with attractive opportunities. Rabat’s strategy is both economic and political: “benevolent” economic cooperation is pursued to generate diplomatic gains. This has proven successful: between 2016 and 2021, 10 countries out of the 26 that actively supported Western Sahara’s Polisario Front transitioned to a more neutral stance, followed by European nations such as Spain.
The IA emerged in this context. Moroccan officials insisted that it is grounded in the principles of “solidarity, cooperation, and co-development”. Nevertheless, it seems that Mohammed VI is taking advantage of a favorable political context. In fact, he is attempting to “fill the void” after the French retreat from the region and capitalizing on Algiers’ acrimonious relations with the Sahel states. Rabat has opportunistically abstained from condemning the military coups in West Africa and has sought cooperation with Chad and the AES, whose members are eager to diversify their partnerships. Moreover, as the Dakhla port is located in Western Sahara, using it means - albeit implicitly - recognizing the province’s “Moroccanity”.
2. Strengths and weaknesses of the Atlantic Initiative
Strengths
If completed, the IA could boost regional economic development. It entails bolstering regional infrastructure, cutting down transportation costs - a systemic issue in the Sahel -, and attracting foreign investment to the region. The GCC has expressed interest in the project, which would create new avenues for West African economies, for instance in the export of natural resources and clean energy. More generally, the IA would offer alternative export routes to AES states. Indeed, the latter are currently mostly using the Cotonou port in Benin. However, after their expulsion from ECOWAS, they are on the lookout for alternative transit routes to escape potential economic sanctions by their West-African neighbors.
Weaknesses
However, the IA is facing strong headwinds. As the Sahel lacks large-scale disposable infrastructure, the IA’s costs will be considerable, and it remains to be seen whether Morocco can attract enough funds to build it. Furthermore, trade between Morocco and the Sahel remains limited: it barely totaled $1,2 billion in 2022 (as a comparison, trade between Morocco and France amounted to $13,4 billion in the same year). Such trade encompassed mostly limited added-value goods such as agricultural products and phosphate. Additionally, Jihadist groups, separatist militias, and criminal gangs are still operating in vast swathes of the region, further compromising long-term security and development required to ensure the IA’s viability. Morocco is also confronted with fierce competition from other nations, such as South Africa or Algeria. Indeed, Algeria recently reached out to Tunisia and Libya to deepen regional cooperation, leaving out Morocco.
Mauritania as a gateway to the Sahel
Another key point remains unelucidated: for the IA to succeed, all roads lead to Nouakchott. Mauritania is the cornerstone of Mohammed VI’s project, as Morocco has no land border with any AES state. Nonetheless, the country has repeatedly reiterated its willingness to maintain intensive cooperation with Algeria, and no Mauritanian official attended the IA’s launch in November 2023. Nevertheless, Mauritania seems to be ready to cooperate passively with Morocco on the IA, as Nouakchott’s recent decision to repeal tolls on Moroccan agricultural goods exemplifies.
3. Outlook for the future
To conclude, the IA is unlikely to turn out to live up to its potential. But it could bolster Morocco’s posture. Indeed, it would push more African countries to recognize the kingdom’s sovereignty over Western Sahara in order to use the Dakhla port, while weakening Algeria’s traditionally strong diplomatic stance in the Sahel. It also signals Rabat’s ambitions to become a major economic hub between Africa and Europe - a long term prospect that bears some potential as Morocco’s economy will continue growing and diversifying steadily in the medium term. However, the IA will likely further fuel tensions between Algeria and Morocco, undermining any rapprochement between them and straining regional politics. That being said, all Sahel states (Mauritania included) will want to maintain good relations with both Morocco and Algeria to integrate global markets, meaning that the IA could materialize, even under Algerian pressure - albeit on a lower scale.