Jordanian and Egyptian Responses to Iran-Israel Escalation

Iran’s direct attack on Israel on the night of April 13 represents a watershed moment within the context of the on-going conflict between the two countries. Despite widespread hostility towards Iran in the region, the publics in two neighbours of Israel, Jordan and Egypt, have been broadly supportive of the attacks and have criticised their governments for not taking harsher actions against Israel. The growing divergence between state and public views over the conflict is forcing the governments of both countries to walk an increasingly-challenging tightrope.

For the first time ever, on April 13, Iran launched a direct attack on Israel consisting of a barrage of drones and missiles. According to Iran, the attack was in retaliation to Israel’s air raid in Syria earlier in April. This attack had targeted the Iranian consulate in Damascus, killing several Iranian officials.

The Iranian attack, which was telegraphed ahead, ended with the majority of the projectiles shot down, with the remaining causing limited damage. While the physical damage was negligible, the attack was nevertheless a watershed moment in the region.

The incident puts local powers in a difficult position. Public hostility towards Israel has grown steadily since the Gaza conflict began after the Hamas attack on October 7, forcing governments to walk a tightrope towards placating the public without upending their strategic interests.

We have analysed two neighbours of Israel, Jordan and Egypt, assessing the public and state reactions in both. Our findings show that the publics in both countries have been broadly supportive of the Iranian attack as part of the broader trend of hostility to the region. This has forced the governments in both countries to take a neutral or pro-Palestinian stance even as they are showing signs of clamping down on the pro-Palestinian movements in order to preserve the status quo and prevent them from escalating into broader anti-government movements.

Jordan

Since the normalisation of their diplomatic relations in 1994, Jordan and Israel have gradually broadened their cooperation. The two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2013 on water-sharing, paving the way for a pipeline from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea, and for Israeli water exports to Jordan. Israel is also Jordan’s largest gas supplier, and an ally of the US, which has established a military base in Jordan.

However, tensions between the two neighbours have flared up occasionally. One-fifth of the Jordanian population, including Queen Rania, is of Palestinian descent, meaning that Amman remains a staunch advocate of the two-state solution. Since the beginning of the Israeli offensive on Gaza in October 2023, the Jordanian government and King Abdullah II have repeatedly called out Israel for its targeting of civilians, while setting up multilateral initiatives to impose a ceasefire in the enclave.

Reactions of the Jordanian Public

An overwhelming majority (94%) of Jordanians remain opposed to cooperation with Israel, according to a 2022 poll. Israel is viewed as a threat by 48% of Jordanians. Anti-Israel sentiment further deepened after the launch of the Israeli offensive on Gaza. Several pro-Palestinian protests calling for the severing of all ties to Israel took place, and Hamas’ popularity increased in Jordan. Prominent Hamas figures seized the opportunity and called on Jordanian tribes to fight for Palestine. In this context, authorities have framed pro-Palestine protests as a foreign intervention attempting to destabilise the country - a statement that can be interpreted as a veiled reference to Iran, Hamas' strongest backer. Furthermore, as the domestic economic situation remains grim, Jordanian authorities fear that pro-Palestine activism might fuel anti-monarchist unrest. Consequently, pro-Palestinian activism, both online and in the streets, has faced repression: human rights organisations have documented police violence and arbitrary imprisonment of demonstrators and cyber activists.

During the Iranian strikes on 13 April 2024, Jordan was notably the only Arab state to actively target Iranian missiles and drones. Despite the lack of support for Iran, the Jordanian public reacted very negatively to the interception of missiles, viewing it as a defence of Israel. Memes and Tweets criticising Amman’s intervention surfaced online, and a popular post depicted Abdullah II wearing an Israeli uniform, exemplifying the deep discontent over the monarchy’s “double-standards” when it comes to Israel: although the king has denounced the “genocide” in Gaza, he has refrained from sanctioning Israel for its actions more directly, and has not taken any steps to move away from the US, Amman’s main security guarantor.

Reactions of the Jordanian Government

To ease public pressure, the Jordanian government downplayed the significance of the Iranian strikes and assured that their interception was purely defensive and destined to safeguard Jordanian sovereignty over its airspace. Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi claimed that the downing was “a principled position, and these are measures that we have taken in the past, have taken yesterday, and will take in the future, whether the source of the threat is Israel, Iran, or whoever”. He reiterated Amman’s commitment to preventing an extension of the war in Gaza to a regional conflict. It appears that the authorities’ tight grip on cyberspace and their vigorous crackdown on pro-Palestine gatherings have constrained open criticism of the monarchy and support for Iran.

To conclude, it is unlikely that Amman will revoke its agreements with Israel, which are vital to the country’s food and energy security, and turn its back on the US, which accounts for the kingdom’s security. However, Abdullah II will continue to ramp up pressure on Israel to protect Palestinian lives and revive a political solution to the conflict, while seeking de-escalation and avoiding Palestinian refugee flows to Jordan.

Egypt

Bilateral ties between Egypt and Israel, one of the longest-running in the region, have deepened after President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi came to power in 2014. The two countries have since engaged in military cooperation in the Sinai Peninsula to combat extremist groups and strengthened their economic ties. Both governments have also shared suspicion of Hamas and have regurlarly flooded tunnels connecting Gaza and Sinai. However, Hamas’ attack on October 7 and the subsequent reactionary measures taken by Israel have reinstated tensions between the two countries. Egypt fears that Israel’s planned large-scale ground offensive in Rafah would lead to a spill-over of the 1.4 million displaced Palestinians and has pushed back at Israel’s demand to open the border. It has also stepped up its military presence in the Sinai region as Israel’s Rafah operation will be imminent in the following days. Nonetheless, despite critical public comments by the Egyptian government, there have been continuous reports about backchannel deals. These have been mostly about the securitised Rafah border as Cairo balances its concerns in the region with its rising debt, causing fundamental tensions between the public and the state.

Reactions of the Egyptian Government

Following the Iranian confirmation of the attacks on April 13, a crisis unit has been deployed to monitor the situation and the air defence has been put on high alert. In contrast to Jordan, it has not been reported that Egypt intercepted any of the Iranian missiles or drones. Generally, the government has remained a relatively neutral stance following the attacks in terms of actions, as Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry reached out to both of his Israeli as well as Iranian counterparts, calling for “the exercise of utmost self-restraint”. Interestingly, Shoukry has indicated that the tension between Iran and Israel are a result of the “Israeli war on the Gaza strip, and the military actions being practised in that region”. While Egypt is expressing strong concerns about the current events, Shoukry’s statement as well as a recent UN meeting on Gaza imply that the Iran-Israel situation does not alter Egypt’s publicly stated critical stance on Israel’s ambitions in Southern Gaza. In light of Israel’s recent retaliatory attack on Isfahan and Tabriz, the government has voiced similar warnings of regional escalation.

Yet, Egypt’s generally sympathetic rhetoric towards the Palestinians is somewhat at odds with the state’s increasing grip on pro-Palestinian protests since October last year. According to Amnesty International, Egyptian authorities have at least arrested 196 people between October and November 2023 - peaceful protesters included – partially on charges of “affiliation to a terror group”. Even though the crackdowns were perceived as pre-election repressive measures, arrests of government-critics and pro-Palestine protesters have continued to rise, with 14 people having been recently detained after a Gaza solidarity protest in Cairo on April 7.

Reactions of the Egyptian Public

Perceptions on Egyptian social media remain mixed. While pro-government affiliated accounts denounced the Iranian strikes, pro-Palestinian voices were rather supportive of the offensive. Yet, while el-Sisi’s covert deals with Israel and an increasingly positive image of Hamas amongst Egyptians would anticipate stronger public reactions from anti-government groups, responses were broadly muted. Apart from repressing street protests, President el-Sisi’s re-election in December 2023 has led to opposition players being detained and independent media being punished, which has possibly deterred government critics from expressing a vocal response to the current situation. Nonetheless, Iran’s offensive will not change that there seems to be a clear divergence on the matter of Israel between the public and the government, as the majority of Egyptians continue to have an already existing negative view of Israel. According to the Washington Institute (2024), 97% believe that Arab states should take a tough stance on Israel.

Despite Cairo’s vocal criticisms of Israel, rumours of backchannel negotiations between the two countries have caused growing public frustration in Egypt. First, there have reportedly been talks about cooperation between Egypt and Israel to hand over the Philadelphia Axis (a buffer zone between Egypt and Gaza) to Israel. A realisation of these plans would mean deployment of Israeli forces into the buffer zone and a further potential slowdown of aid into Gaza. Second, a leaked document of Israeli intelligence services displayed talks between President el-Sisi and Israeli officials, proposing that Egypt should receive Palestinian refugees into Sinai in exchange for the cancellation of its debt to the World Bank. Egypt’s external debt is at $160 bn (Q4, 2023), forcing it to take on multiple loans from the EU ($8 bn), the World Bank ($6 bn), the IMF (+ $5 bn), and a heavily contested $35 bn deal of selling land assets to the UAE. Overall, considering Israel’s continued military measures in Gaza and the ambiguous actions taken by the Egyptian government in light of its economic crisis, it is unlikely that the current Iran-Israel situation will significantly change public opinions on Israel or Egypt, particularly if conditions in Gaza continue to worsen.