Inside the Syrian Arab Red Crescent
The Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) was founded in 1942 and recognised by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1946. It is a humanitarian organisation with its headquarter in Damascus and regional branches in all 14 provinces of Syria. The SARC has the particularity of having an official legal status, renewed in 1966 after the Ba’ath party came to power, which grants it formal independence.
The SARC is now the main local humanitarian partner for the United Nations, its main funder, the ICRC and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). Regarding the UN, beyond funds, several of its agencies cooperate with the SARC to provide food (WFO), items (UNHCR), and to promote health (UNICEF). In 2019, it was estimated by the American-based Syria Justice and Accountability Center (SJAC) that around 60% of international aid in Syria was channelled through the SARC. This cooperation can be explained by the pivotal role of the organisation, which is both a local actor legally recognised by the regime, as well as by the international humanitarian system.
This importance has been confirmed after last week’s earthquake. As mentioned by Abid Zaidi’s London Politica analysis, the SARC is a central organisation in the humanitarian effort on the ground in Syria. It is also possible to see the influence of the organisation in the recent easing of sanctions against Syria by the United States. The decision came days after the SARC president denounced the negative effect of sanctions on the humanitarian effort, a call for the lifting of sanctions that was widely publicised and shared by other actors.
However, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent has been facing criticism for the sway the Damascus government has over the organisation. Theoretically, the SARC’s rules and internal procedures are strong and coherent, and ensure the smooth functioning of the organisation along with its external activities. It organises the internal structure to ensure its independence and efficiency. But although these procedures provide for 4-year mandates, no election has been held since 2011. Changes within the organisation that have occurred since then have mostly been appointments made by the Damascus government. The government tries to extend its influence through a mixture of infiltration and oppression.
For example, the Syrian Network for Human Rights reports that Dr Abdul-Rahman al-Attar, who held the position of president of SARC since 1981, resigned in 2016. The Damascus government then made several amendments to the 1966 legislative decree, in December 2016. Those amendments, issued by Prime Minister Imad Khamis, gave power to the government over the appointment of the president of the SARC. Based on this amendment, the Syrian businessman Khaled Ahmad Tawfiq Hboubati was directly appointed by the Prime Minister as the head of the organisation.
It has also been reported by the Istanbul-based Jusoor studies institute that heads of SARC’s regional branches have to be approved by the Damascus security forces. Beyond those controls, in some regions, members of the organisation whose political views openly align with the government are favoured by the security forces for management positions. Finally, since 2011, retired officers from the Syrian army or the security forces have assumed senior management positions.
Raed Al Tawil is one of the most notable examples of oppressive security practices against the SARC’s volunteers and staff, where he has been a long-time volunteer. He became an elected board member in 2011 and was responsible for a medical point. He was also openly in divergence with the Damascus government's political views. Raed Al Tawil was arrested by the security forces inside the SARC’s headquarter in Damascus and, after a few months of forced disappearance and torture, exiled to Lebanon after mediations by several international organisations.
Given the de facto power of the regime, the situation of the SARC could therefore be seen as a necessary bargain. In exchange for the appointment of personalities with political views aligned with the Damascus government, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent is allowed to work, even in regions with ongoing military operations, which is where humanitarian help is needed the most. The SARC is also permitted to be the interface with international help. In exchange for control by the government, the organisation can do efficient humanitarian work.
The oppressive security practices, and more generally, the government’s control within the SARC, varies according to the region. There are nuances between regional branches in terms of Damascus’ intensity of the influence and tightness of the grip.
In the region of Idlib, the SARC is facing pressure from the government, but also from local armed factions, such as the Islamists of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. The Idlib branch is the only facility that is completely out of the government’s reach, as humanitarian help is also forwarded from Türkiye. The organisation’s regional branch headquarter was deliberately bombed in 2017 by the Damascus government. By applying such pressure on the SARC in Idlib, the government may hope to reduce the organisation's ability to provide humanitarian assistance in this rebel region, therefore weakening the rebel’s position, and use humanitarian help forwarded from government-held areas as leverage. With the earthquake that struck, among other regions, Idlib, the SARC and its regional branch will probably come under even more political pressure from all sides. Indeed, the difficulty in channelling humanitarian help through the Syrian-Turkish border because of the destruction of infrastructure, which has been covered by London Politica, reinforces the Damascus government’s leverage over humanitarian organisations through the forwarding of aid from the regions controlled by the regime.
Finally, it is important to note that the government’s influence over the SARC does not keep the volunteers and staff from putting their lives in danger. Despite the Red Crescent symbol, humanitarian workers in Syria have been victims, sometimes deliberately, of attacks.
The Syrian Arab Red Crescent and its members seem to be caught between the dire necessity for humanitarian help on the ground and the obligation to find a compromise with the Damascus government to be allowed to carry out this mission.