What Role will Russia and Iran Play in Syria's Earthquake Reconstruction Process?
The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation have played a central role in the ongoing Syrian Civil War, offering extensive support to the Assad regime, and additionally, in Iran’s case, to pro-Assad Shi’ite militias, in its fight against opposition forces. As a result of their military and economic endeavours over the course of the Syrian Civil War, the governments in Moscow and Tehran have been in a prime position to reap the benefits of the Syrian reconstruction process. Given the devastating impact of the Türkiye-Syria earthquakes, which have exacerbated the humanitarian crisis and infrastructural damage, questions arise regarding what role Iran and Russia will play in the reconstruction of Syria as a whole.
To begin, it is important to consider why Iran and Russia intervened on behalf of Bashar al-Assad’s government. Firstly, for Iran, Assad’s, or a general Shi’ite, victory was crucial for two primary reasons; Syria’s geographical role as a key outpost for the Iranian geopolitical machine and fears of a Gulf-backed Sunni regime in the area. Iran’s geographical positioning in the region poses a significant hurdle to its geopolitical ambitions. As a result, Iran has used Syria, and the Assad regime, as its regional headquarters, using the territory to facilitate its military, intelligence, and economic operations. Additionally, a Gulf-backed Sunni victory in Syria poses major threats for Tehran, namely the expansion of Saudi influence in addition to the proliferation of American and Israeli agencies in the Middle East.
Similarly, for Moscow, Assad’s defeat in Syria posed significant geopolitical threats, namely the legitimisation of Western-backed regime change and fears regarding the rapid growth of transnational terrorism. Russian officials saw the Syrian Civil War as the latest iteration of Western attempts at undermining states which acted contrary to American interests; Russia deemed Western-backed regime change a major threat to its own national security and the stability of the international political system. Moreover, Moscow viewed the Syrian Civil War through the lens of a secular state battling against extremist forces. Russian officials saw a direct link between extremist gains in Syria and the expansion of religious extremism domestically and near its borders.
Over the course of the civil war, Russia and Iran played a significant role in propping up the Assad regime and assisting in its war efforts. Firstly, Tehran provided significant amounts of economic and military aid to Damascus. In its economic efforts, as of 2020, Iran had opened four credit lines to Syria, estimated to be worth $1 billion at the start of 2013, $3.6 billion in mid-2013, $1 billion in 2015, and $1 billion in 2020. Additionally, between 2013 - 2018, Iran provided the Assad regime with over $10.3 billion worth of oil shipments. While some analysts have claimed that Tehran has spent upwards of $6 billion annually on its efforts in the Syrian Civil War, the real figure remains shrouded in mystery. Furthermore, on top of its economic aid, Iran has provided the Assad regime with significant amounts of military backing, ranging from the deployment of Iranian special units to funding and arming Shi’ite militias. Tehran has deployed the IRGC ground forces and the IRGC Quds force for training and advisory purposes; they have also played a significant role on the ground, providing military and intelligence support to the Assad regime. In addition to the deployment of the IRGC’s special forces, Iran has funded, armed, and trained a variety of Shi’ite militias, such as the Kataib Al-Imam Ali, the Fatemiyon Brigade, and the Zaynabiyun Brigade.
On the other hand, although Russia’s role in Syria has not been as extensive as Iran’s, Moscow’s military support has been a critical factor in Bashar al-Assad’s changing fortunes on the field of conflict. Although the Kremlin had expressed its support and backed the Assad regime since the onset of the war, Russia’s military intervention in Syria did not begin until September 2015, after an official request by the Syrian Government. Russia’s intervention in Syria consisted of airstrikes launched from its Khmeimim air base near Latakia and naval operations from its base in Tartus. Moscow’s intervention targeted extremist elements of the Syrian opposition, opting to strike against militant actors such as the al-Nusra front, ISIL, and the Army of Conquest. Russia’s military operations in Syria significantly bolstered the Assad regime's position in the civil war, assisting the Syrian army in the capture of Palmyra in 2016, facilitating the regime's reconquest of Aleppo, and helping break the siege of Deir ez-Zor.
As a result of their support in the Syrian Civil War, Moscow and Tehran have been in prime positions regarding profiting from the post-war reconstruction of Syria. For example, in January 2017, Iran and Syria signed five cooperation treaties, granting Iranian-firms construction contracts, roles in telecommunications, oil and gas contracts, and land for agricultural development. Furthermore, Iran and Syria have signed a memorandum of understanding regarding the construction of 200,000 housing units in Damascus. Similarly, in January 2018, Moscow signed a bilateral agreement with Damascus which gave it exclusive rights to extract oil and gas. Additionally, Russian companies have secured contracts for projects in Homs, construction of rail lines, and the construction of industrial plants.
Even though the full extent of the infrastructural and humanitarian damage of the Kahramanmaras earthquake is yet to be mapped, the toll has been heavy. In Syria, it is reported, the earthquake caused widespread destruction in infrastructure and civilian buildings in Aleppo, Hama, Idlib, and Latakia governorates. Although the earthquake has devastated the population in Northwest Syria, it may be a victory blow for Assad in his fight against the remaining opposition forces of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham; in turn, indirectly benefiting Iranian and Russian reconstruction ambitions.
Although the full extent of Russian and Iranian aid is yet to be mapped, Irek Faizullin, Russia’s Minister of Construction, Housing, and Utilities, affirmed Moscow’s willingness to aid with infrastructural reconstruction following the earthquake. Despite the fact that Iranian officials are yet to comment, it can be expected that Tehran harbours similar ambitions. Although both countries are strategically positioned, and willing, to contribute to the reconstruction process, domestic realities in Iran and Russia may hamper their economic aspirations in Syria. Firstly, Moscow, in the midst of its special operation in Ukraine, is facing significant economic challenges as a result of American-led sanctions. The Western sanctions targeting Moscow might also limit Russia’s ability to finance and conduct the reconstruction process, a reality further exacerbated by Russia’s commitment to its objectives in Ukraine. Iran faces a similar domestic situation, where economic woes, as a result of American sanctions and incessant spending in Syria, have challenged the theocratic republics legitimacy. Tehran, dealing with an increasingly hostile domestic political environment, may find it challenging to contribute the required resources and financing to the reconstruction process.
Although it is still too early to predict what route the Syrian reconstruction process may follow, the obstacles hampering Russia and Iran’s potential aspirations may open the door for regional rivals such as the UAE to assist Bashar al-Assad’s government while establishing its foothold as an influential player in the country at the expense of Russia and more importantly, Iran.