Iraq’s new political consensus: al-Sudani, al-Sadr, and al-Sistani
October 27th saw the apparent end to a year-long deadlock within the Republic of Iraq, with parliamentarians approving a new government, selecting Abdul Latif Rashid as President, who subsequently named former Minister for Human Rights Mohammad Shia al-Sudani as Prime Minister. Since parliamentary elections in late 2021, the Iraqi legislature had seemingly been unable to form a stable coalition government, owing largely to the newly elected parliamentarians under the control of radical Shi’i cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his eponymously named Sadrist movement, who rejected both the prevailing corruption that has pervaded post-Saddam Iraq, as well as the growing Iranian influence pervading Shi’i political movement. With Sadr failing to form a government, he eventually withdrew from the political process, officially retiring from public politics and calling on all Sadrist movement parliamentarians to resign from the Council of Representatives.
The election of both a new Prime Minister and President will hopefully bring an end to a year of turbulence for Iraqis, which has seen attacks on the offices of various political actors, violence in Baghdad’s specially designated “Green Zone”, and the growth of several external actors, namely Iran. Haste appeared to be of the essence for al-Sudani, who only used a third of his constitutionally-allotted one month to form a new cabinet from amongst a broad-church of political parties both within his Coordination Framework (a coalition of Arab Shia parties that hold significant affiliation to Iran) and externally amongst Kurdish and Sunni groups, even inviting the Sadrists’ participation (although these advances were ultimately spurned).
In so doing, Sudani has appealed to a broader constituency than al-Sadr could have ever wished for. Experts have decried al-Sadr’s tactics of applying public pressure through foot protests, occupying the Council of Representatives for upwards of half a month this July, as infantile and ostracising rather than welcoming. Additionally, despite holding one of the most significant legislative mandates in recent Iraqi history, domestic and international actors have welcomed al-Sudani’s government formation, as stability becomes the primary motivating factor driving subsequent power-sharing dynamics. al-Sudani, whilst far less known than al-Sadr both at home and abroad, has demonstrated that charismatic leadership is not the be-all-and-end-all in this new chapter for Iraq.
Whilst the peace is currently maintained, however, there is a lot on al-Sudani’s plate, assuming he is to run out his full, constitutionally-mandated four-year term. In the first instance, the fiscal landscape for Iraq is supremely bleak. Not a month after his election, a new corruption scandal involving the owners of several high-ranking companies that had been afforded public contracts unfolded, with almost 3.7 trillion IQD (2.5 billion USD) inconspicuously withdrawn from the state accounts of the Iraqi Tax Authority. For the wider Iraqi electorate, however, the main bones of contention are whether al-Sudani will attempt to reverse the decision of the previous government to deliberately devalue the Iraqi currency on foreign exchange markets, attempting to make Iraq less reliant on US dollars, the de facto underground currency in play within the state. Additionally, al-Sudani’s fiscal plan to develop a stable supply of food imports, create more state jobs, and initiate a long-delayed plan to compensate the families of those affected by both Da’esh and the campaign against them, are all heavily dependent on Iraq’s ability to obtain a secure line of international credit – a recent deal signed between the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development and the National Bank of Iraq to the tune of 36.7 million AED (10 million USD) is a vital lifeline for al-Sudani, in not only supporting his short term plans but long-term security and economic co-operation between the UAE and the Iraqi Republic.
In the second instance, the government must consider the advanced age of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, a major political player in post-Saddam Iraq, despite historically advocating for a separation between theology and politics. Turning 93 in the upcoming year, al-Sistani has played a pivotal role in determining Iraq’s political trajectory, issuing the infamous fatwa/call to arms for all able-bodied Iraqi men to fight the Da’esh onslaught, which was seen as a key turning point in the struggle against the Islamic State. Unlike his similarly politically inactive teacher Ayatollah Abul Qasim al-Khoei, al-Sistani has not yet named or even postured towards identifying his religious successor. The state of clerical politics in Iraq has been a key determinant in its political trajectory. It is the implicit respect al-Sadr has for al-Sistani that prevented the former from turning the holy Shi’i city of Najaf into a battlefield between Sadrist and US forces during the 2004 occupation, on the command of the former. It is this respect that again played a role in ceasing the violence in the “Green Zone '' earlier this year, on the orders of the Grand Ayatollah.
And it is the reverence that al-Sadr showed for his clerical authority Ayatollah Kadhim al-Haeri that determined the manner in which he conducted his anti-US campaigns in the early 2000s. As such, when al-Haeri announced his withdrawal from clerical life earlier this year, it appeared as though al-Sadr was in a political freefall.
As such, the potential for al-Sistani to pass away with no clear successor could pave the way for a re-emergence of instability, coupled with the potential filling of this space by the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has already gained a significant foothold given the role its specialised Islamic Revolutionary Guards (and its former top general, Qassem Soleimani) played in the struggle against Da’esh. The seminaries of Najaf in Iraq and Qum in Iran have historically been at odds. However, since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the latter has been on the rise – the ability to significantly determine who succeeds al-Sistani would anger several Iraqis and may potentially herald the reappearance of the anti-Iranian Sadrist movement in a far more potent manifestation.
In the third instance, al-Sudani must maintain the stability of not only the country but of his incredibly fragile Coordination Framework. Indeed, al-Sudani calling out corruption is a “double-edged sword”, for it may involve him engaging in incredibly stark confrontations, not least amongst some members of the Coordination Framework, some of whom, including former Prime Minister and political heavyweight Nouri al-Maliki, represent the class of politician that took over after 2003, and drove the country “into dysfunction and economic ruin”.
What can al-Sudani do to prevent another political breakdown? Al-Sudani has already laid out the vision for his premiership, including a vast and sweeping range of political and electoral reforms to improve democratic outcomes and reduce corruption, but experts say the only way this can effectively be tested is to win back the favour of the Iraqi electorate is through the calling of an early parliamentary election, allowing al-Sudani to marry his ever-increasing personal popularity with an electoral legitimacy not yet afforded to him.