Istiklal Bombing and Türkiye’s Upcoming Election
On 13 November 2022, a bomb attack killed 6 and wounded over 80 people in Istanbul’s Istiklal street. With a presidential election on the horizon, the attack led many observers to draw parallels with the volatile and violent period between 7 June and 1 November 2015. The main theme of these observations was that a renewed political climate of fear and terror could provide the momentum President Erdogan needs to consolidate and mobilise the conservative-nationalist base once again, and edge out the opposition in what is anticipated to be a razor thin presidential race.
It is true that fear is a handy tool that is often used by politicians to consolidate and motivate masses. That was indeed a part of the picture in Türkiye leading up to elections back in November 2015, however, it was not the entire picture. There were multiple conditions that allowed President Erdogan to exploit the public’s perception of uncertainty caused by terror attacks, in order to navigate the volatile political landscape of 2015. It is yet unclear whether there are similar conditions in place today, but there are noteworthy variables to doubt the feasibility of similar political strategies.
Fundamentally, fear itself does not necessarily suffice to shape the voting behaviour in a dramatic fashion. The real success of President Erdogan in the 2015 elections was his ability to offer the public a new story. A narrative which successfully depicted the divisions among the opposition and inefficiencies of the parliamentary system as the root causes of the undergoing political instability. With this narrative, President Erdogan managed to craft an alliance with Mr. Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the MHP (Nationalist Action Party) on the basis of the national security, endorsed by the State’s security apparatus, thus positioning himself as the sole actor capable of governing, particularly in the eyes of conservative and nationalist segments of the society.
Then the question remains whether President Erdogan can utilise the fear, caused by the Istiklal bombing, to write a new story that can convince the Turkish public leading up to elections in 2023. When we look at the political landscape today, unlike 2015, we see a relatively more unified opposition front that is emboldened by the local election of 2019, where the candidates of the Millet Alliance (which comprises of the main opposition party CHP and nationalist IYI) won municipalities of major cities, most remarkably Istanbul and capital Ankara. Furthermore, the opposition camp has enlarged since 2019, with the formation of the “Table of 6”, an opposition framework that brings together parties like former prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s Future Party, former Minister of Economy Ali Babacan’s DEVA Party, Islamist Felicity Party, conservative liberal Democrat Party and Millet Alliance with the goal of reverting back to the parliamentary system and restoring the rule of law. It must be conceded that “Table of 6” has many shortcomings that require a dedicated analysis in a separate piece. However, the fact that they manage to present a unified front despite the ruling coalition’s persistent efforts to drive wedge between opposition’s various components as well as their own differences, would negate President Erdogan’s claim of being the sole actor capable of governing the country.
The current geopolitical conjuncture is another aspect that makes it more difficult for President Erdogan to write a story that resembles 2015. President Erdogan by forging a “national security coalition” with MHP did not only win the elections, but also shifted Türkiye’s foreign policy paradigm. Türkiye’s foreign policy became more assertive, particularly in Syria, Iraq and Eastern Mediterranean. This can be partly attributed to the pre-existing frustrations of Ankara on several issues, the most notable one is the growing ties between “the West '' and PKK’s Syrian offshoot YPG. However, this paradigm shift was also the product of this new story, narrative, in which Türkiye was under attack by internal and external threats and any concerns, whether it is economy or rule of law, were only secondary to the need for security, which was represented by the ruling coalition of Erdogan’s AKP and MHP. From 2015 onwards, President Erdogan enjoyed the domestic political sphere that is opened up by foreign policy actions. Developments such as further deteriorating relations with Egypt and Greece due to clashing geopolitical interests in Eastern Mediterranean and Libya, or highlighting the role of UAE and to some extent US in the failed coup attempt of 2016, reinforced the legitimacy of the ruling AKP-MHP coalition. On the other hand, this political dynamic forced the opposition parties to choose between operating within a limited political sphere that does not pose a significant challenge to the ruling coalition, or risk being perceived as domestic extensions of security threats. Clearest illustration of that phenomena is possibly the run-up to the 2019 local elections where President Erdogan equated voting for Mr. Ekrem İmamoğlu (current Mayor of Istanbul) with voting for Egyptian President Sisi.
However, today the geopolitical conjuncture is considerably different. Paradoxically, due to the shift of the foreign policy orientation, which reinforced the authority of President Erdogan at home, Türkiye found itself isolated in the international arena. This isolation, in conjunction with a set of other poor policy choices, has significantly increased the fragility of the Turkish economy, thus decreasing the political support of the ruling coalition at home. Noticing this trend, President Erdogan went to a foreign policy change on many fronts in the last couple of months, mending ties with countries such as Saudi Arabia, UAE and most recently Egypt meanwhile, trying to use his role as a mediator or at least a communicating party in the Russian invasion of Ukraine to solidify its position within NATO and more broadly in “the West”. Therefore, compared to 2015, it would be much more challenging for President Erdogan to convince the public of a story that trivialises all political demands except security while having at least cordial relationships with regional and international actors that were once deemed as threats to national security.