Riyadh's quest for recognition: How Saudi Arabia's self-understanding explains its foreign policy
The 24th of February, 2023, marked a year since Russia initiated its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In parallel to the devastation that the war brought, the global economy suffered from the invasion’s effects, with oil soaring to $120 per barrel. Oil prices increased as Russia’s oil exports, which accounted for 14% of the global supply, came under Western sanctions. These sanctions, and subsequent Russian endeavours to maintain high prices by cutting production by more than 1 million barrels per day, engendered a decrease in global supplies while demand remained high. In the midst of this crisis, United States President Biden visited Saudi Arabia (KSA) in August 2022 to seek an increase in oil production from the kingdom, the world's largest oil producer and de facto leader of OPEC, the Organisation for Petroleum Exporting Countries. However, Riyadh has so far resisted Western demands for an increase in its output. This decision by the KSA has led politicians and pundits to advance a variety of hypotheses concerning Riyadh’s position. Some depicted the kingdom as an ally of Moscow, whereas other considered it an act of animosity towards the West in general, and the US in particular. But do these hypotheses accord with the facts on the ground? This article argues that the decision neither stems from a Saudi alliance with Russia nor does it stem from a particular desire to hurt the US. Instead, Riyadh’s position emerges from a new self-understanding that the Kingdom holds of itself and seeks recognition for, namely as both an energy superpower and a regional power.
Neither Moscow’s ally nor Washington’s enemy
The Kingdom’s decision not to increase its oil output has been viewed by several politicians and pundits as a clear support for Russia. For instance, John Kirby, the US National Security spokesman, stated that by maintaining supplies low, Riyadh helps Moscow finance its war effort in Ukraine and “blunt the effectiveness of sanctions”. Furthermore, the spokesman accused the Kingdom of coercing other OPEC member states into decreasing their oil production to help Moscow. However, this argument fails to account for instances in which Saudi Arabia and Russia clashed over energy policies.
Indeed, at the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic three years ago, the Kingdom and Russia engaged in a price war over oil. Whereas Riyadh and OPEC sought to decrease their production by an additional 1.5 million barrels per day to maintain a stable market as countries entered into lockdowns and oil-consuming industries such as air travel came to a sudden halt, Moscow sought to inflict heavy losses to the American shale industry which depends significantly on high oil prices for survival. As a result, on the 6th of March 2020, Russia refused to back OPEC’s plan and vowed to maintain its high production levels. The Russian refusal was followed by Riyadh flooding the market with oil and bringing prices to unprecedented lows, to which Moscow subsequently retaliated by increasing its own production. Eventually, the standoff ended with Russia losing the oil war and agreeing to Saudi Arabia’s, and OPEC’s, plan. Had Saudi Arabia been an ally of Russia, it would not have initiated a costly price war.
Another set of politicians and pundits argue that Riyadh’s decision stemmed from a desire for vengeance against President Biden and the Democrats. The argument stipulates that Saudi Arabia seeks to punish POTUS for his promise to make the Kingdom “a pariah” throughout his electoral campaign. Accordingly, the Kingdom would have decided to strategically decrease its oil production before the US mid-term elections to deal a blow to the Democrats’ “electoral prospects”.
Yet, this approach fails to account for two factors. First, the decision by Saudi Arabia to cut production came after two years of low prices due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Throughout the pandemic, oil prices remained low, resulting in significant economic and financial pressures on the Kingdom as 50% of its GDP depends on hydrocarbons. For instance, due to a drop in government revenues caused by low prices, Moody’s Investor Service downgraded Riyadh’s sovereign rating from “Stable to Negative”. Therefore, the Kingdom’s decision to cut production in 2022 is likelier to stem from a necessity to compensate for the losses endured during the pandemic than a decision to punish Democrats. Second, it is unlikely that Riyadh would seek to sacrifice its alliance with Washington to hurt Democrats during midterm elections. In fact, the “primary purpose of most alliances is to combine the members’ capabilities in a way that further their respective interests”, and considering the strategic interest that both Washington and Riyadh have in countering Iran in the region, it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia would endanger its alliance with the US as long as this external threat persists.
Therefore, neither the Saudi-Russian alliance hypothesis nor the Saudi-revenge hypothesis seem to accord with facts on the ground. Riyadh’s relationship with Moscow has been plagued with colliding interests over energy policies, and the Kingdom views Russia as problematic. As for the alliance with Washington, it is unlikely to be jeopardised as long as the Iranian threat persists. Instead, the decision to cut production is likely to stem from a new self-understanding that Saudi Arabia holds of itself and seeks recognition for within the international society of states.
The quest for recognition
In international relations, recognition refers to the attribution of meaning to the difference between a foreign “Other” and the “Self”. Because a state constitutes its own unique identity through an “other”, this act is therefore achieved through practice in the foreign policy realm. As such, in its international relations with other countries, the state produces “intersubjective precedents and shared symbolic materials” to impose a specific interpretation of itself, or its actions, that render other interpretations improbable. For example, if state A understands itself as a law-abiding nation that respects international law and promotes it, then its foreign policies will be formulated and enacted in accordance with the understanding that it holds of itself, and these foreign policies will themselves make other states recognise state A as a law-abiding nation. In other words, state A socially constructs, and perpetuates, its identity through its foreign policy and the subsequent recognition that these policies bring.
Recognition also begs benefits for the state. For instance, according to liberal institutionalist scholars, international cooperation is dependent on a state’s possession of a reputation within the international community. Indeed, before entering a cooperation agreement, states seek information about the other’s behaviour. The unique identity that each state constitutes, and tries to get recognition for, includes that necessary information. If a state is recognised by others as a reliable partner, it is more likely to see itself accepted to a cooperation agreement than a state that is not recognised for being reliable. As a result, a state’s unique identity, and the recognition it seeks for it, ensure predictability and order in its international relations.
In Saudi Arabia’s case, the state seeks recognition for a new understanding of itself that consists of two characteristics. The first is Riyadh’s perception of itself as an energy superpower. This perception is illustrated by two developments. The first is the price war with Russia in 2020. As a rival in the energy sector that also perceives itself as an energy superpower, the price war in 2020 amounted to a hegemonic oil conflict between Russia and Saudi Arabia. Eventually, the costly victory of Riyadh over Moscow cemented its position as a global leader in the oil industry. The second development is Riyadh’s leadership in OPEC. The Kingdom is the world’s largest crude exporter and is perceived as “the kingpin of the global oil market”. In fact, the size of the Kingdom’s oil export renders any action by OPEC member states that do not fall in line with Saudi policies futile. For instance, it is claimed that Riyadh did not shy away from coercing other members of OPEC to cut their output in 2022. As such, the size of its oil exports provides the Kingdom with both the ability to manage the market and recalibrate it when necessary on the one hand, and the power to coerce and dictate policies on the other hand.
The second characteristic is Riyadh’s perception of itself as the Middle East’s greatest power. On one hand, Türkiye, the other contestant for the position with Iran, faces important financial and domestic challenges. Moreover, Ankara seems to have lost the long-running standoff with Riyadh following President Erdogan’s visit to the Kingdom on the 22nd of June 2022. On the other hand, faced with crushing international sanctions, the Iranian regime lacks both the financial capabilities to invest in the region and the ability to appease social unrest domestically. As a result, Riyadh has cemented its position as the region’s greatest power.
Saudi Arabia now views itself as a “modern nation intent on deploying geo-economic and geopolitical power” both regionally and globally. In fact, this new understanding of the self has affected the kingdom’s foreign policy. For example, faced with Canadian criticism on human rights in August of 2018, the KSA reacted by cutting all diplomatic ties with Ottawa. Importantly, Riyadh was intent on challenging Canada’s, and eventually the West’s, international status and saw the opportunity to engage in a diplomatic conflict aimed at asserting “whose identity should be considered socially superior”. This position has yielded the kingdom support from both Middle Eastern states, such as Jordan and Egypt, and Russia, a great power. Such support indicates that Riyadh is starting to be recognised by other members of the international community for its unique identity, which in turn strengthens the kingdom’s understanding of itself.
Consequently, Saudi Arabia’s new self-understanding, and quest for recognition, provide an auspicious lens through which the decision to cut oil prices in 2022 can be understood. First, the kingdom could not acquiesce to the US demands to increase production because such demands came into collision with Riyadh’s own perception of itself as the world’s oil leader. Bowing to the US, a rival for the position, would have negatively affected the kingdom’s legitimacy and leadership position vis-à-vis OPEC member states and Russia. Second, acquiescing to Washington’s demands by going against its own domestic and economic interests would have also challenged the KSA’s understanding of itself as the Middle East’s greatest power, and would render a recognition by other states of Saudi Arabia's leadership position in the region less likely.
In sum, Riyadh’s decision to ignore Washington’s demand for oil cut stemmed neither from an alliance with Moscow nor a particular animosity towards the US. Rather, it stemmed from a new self-understanding for which the kingdom seeks international recognition.