Islamist militancy in West Africa: the latest counter-insurgency failure?
On 11th May, the ‘Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh/ISIS’ held its first meeting located in an African country. Co-hosted by Morocco and the US, officials from 85 countries met in Marrakesh, in what can seemingly be interpreted as a signal that Africa is now considered the new global focal point of Islamist militant activity. Following significant turbulence in West Africa and the Sahel region, Burkina Faso and Benin have both now joined the Coalition. A specific Africa Focus Group was also established in December to “enable the Coalition to undertake civilian capacity-building programs to help address the Daesh threat across Africa”. With the total number of African members in the Coalition now at 18, and the release of a joint communiqué in May recognising the need to meet the evolving threat of Daesh/ISIS in Africa, it seems the threat posed by Islamist militancy in Africa is being taken increasingly seriously.
For some time, the Sahel region and West Africa in particular, has witnessed intense violence. In recent weeks over 100 civilians were killed by suspected al-Qaeda affiliated militants in central Mali, and over 50 people were killed in an attack on a village in northern Burkina Faso. Neighbouring Niger has also experienced its share of violence waged by suspected jihadist groups in recent months. These attacks represent a morbid trend of indiscriminate violence by Islamist groups that has gripped West Africa and the Sahel for nearly a decade. Since 2013, the United Nations estimates that over 2.1 million people have been displaced from the Central Sahel region, with the majority of refugees fleeing Mali where the violence began in January 2012.
As a result of such violence, in 2014 the French military launched ‘Opération Barkhane’ to counter the insurgents in the G5 Sahel nations: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. This operated alongside the ‘United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission In Mali’ (MINUSMA). Established in 2013, MINUSMA’s objectives were to ensure the “security, stabilization and protection of civilians; supporting national political dialogue and reconciliation; and assisting the reestablishment of State authority, the rebuilding of the security sector, and the promotion and protection of human rights in that country”. As of April 2022, over 17,000 UN personnel have been deployed - including 3,384 civilians and over 13,000 military personnel. Despite this, violence waged by Islamist groups in the Sahel has steadily increased – with such a pace that every year since 2017, more people have been killed in terrorist attacks in Sub-Saharan Africa than in either South Asia or the Middle East and North Africa. Unfortunately, the violence in West Africa looks set to increase in intensity as the political atmosphere in the region continues to worsen.
With Mali witnessing two coups in as many years and the ousting of Burkina Faso’s President by the army in January, conditions have been ripe for Islamist militants to consolidate their progress in the region. Both countries’ populations are suffering dire living conditions, whilst their governments commit widespread atrocities against their people under the guise of tackling the Islamist militia groups that run riot. Previously, the ousted Malian government made use of the 5,000 French personnel deployed. However, due to a breakdown in relations with Mali’s new ruling junta, in February President Macron announced France’s complete military withdrawal. In a similar vein, Mali is also exiting the G5 Sahel’s joint counter-insurgency force, citing a lack of progress. The subsequent hire of Russian mercenaries, the Wagner Group, only serves to stoke the Islamist fire further, with over 450 civilians murdered in suspected Wagner-orchestrated atrocities between January and April of this year.
However, increased Malian isolation is not entirely of its own doing. Despite the desperate situation the country finds itself in, West Africa’s regional political bloc (ECOWAS) placed sanctions on the country for delaying promised elections in February. Such measures have crippled the impoverished country with the closure of neighbouring members’ land and air borders, and the suspension of state assets in ECOWAS and commercial banks. Despite the Malian junta pledging to return to democratic rule by March 2024, West African states have recently agreed to continue with these damaging measures.
Neighbouring Burkina Faso has also found itself in similar circumstances. So much so that it now appears to have become the new epicentre of Islamist activity in the Sahel, with just 60% of territory reportedly under state control. According to the ‘Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project’ (ACLED), annual reported fatalities in Burkina Faso surpassed annual reported fatalities in Mali for the second time in three years. In 2021, Burkina Faso had twice the number of organised political violence events compared to the previous year. It comes as no surprise then that a recent UN report has stated that, in a country of 20 million people, 4.7 million Burkinabe require urgent humanitarian assistance. With the Ukrainian conflict diverting most of the international community’s attention, NGOs have reported that some donors are preparing to reduce their funding for projects in countries like Burkina Faso by up to 70% to support their new operations in Ukraine. In further harrowing similarities to Malian events, Burkinabe forces have allegedly carried out atrocities of their own, with the army reported to have killed as many people as al-Qaeda and ISIS-affiliated groups combined. The use of ‘self-defence’ forces and ethnic militias by the Burkinabe military has added to the violence. With unsupervised ethnic militias not being held to account, communities have no choice but to pick sides for their own protection. These ethnic and religious divisions have proven ripe for exploitation by armed Islamist groups in pursuit of their recruitment agendas. Such indiscriminate violence and chaos in already desperate areas only serve to benefit the growth of Jihadism in the region further.
Conditions such as those found in Mali and Burkina Faso provide the perfect storm for Islamist groups to proliferate. Governments in this region are characterised by corruption, impunity, and a failure to provide basic security for vast swathes of the population. Combined with under-equipped and poorly trained armed forces, desertion as happened in Nigeria, and ignored atrocities, increase divisions between governments and neglected communities. Jihadist groups and their recruitment narratives thrive in such power vacuums. The offer of relative order and improved living standards for suffering communities is too attractive to decline in the face of a negligent government.
The United States now estimate a total of 18 Islamist militant organisations operating on the African continent, with allegiances split between ISIS and al-Qaeda. With ‘Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin’ (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate, now the fastest-growing terrorist group in the world, violent Islamist groups look set to continue their growth as chaos in the region goes on. The ACLED reports that the majority of violence in Burkina Faso in the past year has been waged by JNIM, increasing their political violence in 2021 by over 200% compared to their engagement in 2020. The JNIM have been particularly effective at exploiting the intercommunal tensions between young, Muslim livestock herders and their grievances against the government. ISIS too appear to be making somewhat of a comeback having reportedly carved a sanctuary for themselves on the Mali-Niger border. With the Malian military focusing on securing power and local populations fleeing the violence, ISIS are beginning to build territorial havens for themselves again.
Having originated in Mali and shifted to Burkina Faso, this wave of Islamist militancy threatens to overflow to further neighbouring countries. A report by the ‘Africa Centre for Strategic Studies’, states that cattle farmers in northern Benin express similar grievances to those in Burkina Faso, which Islamist groups could feasibly exploit. Militants have already reportedly been spotted in the northern region who appear to have travelled South across the Burkinabe border. With controversial government laws limiting the migration of cattle across borders, inter- and intracommunal tensions have become increasingly polarised over scarce resources and land rights. Such ill-judged government measures only serve to increase recruitment among the aggrieved herders and farmers which further fuel deadly massacres carried out by Islamist groups and ethnic militias.
The failure of French forces in the Sahel region represents another clear example of the limited impact that military intervention has in defeating Islamist insurgent groups. Such foreign intervention has often proved to be unpopular among local populations and is frequently characterised by Islamist groups as Western colonial tactics to protect unpopular governments, such as those in Mali. External actors must instead shift their focus from military intervention, to addressing the structural failures of these suffering countries. Poor governance, corruption, brutality, and lack of opportunity are just some of the factors that encourage impoverished young men to join these Islamist militant groups.
Fortunately, it currently looks as if Islamist groups’ further expansion throughout coastal countries in West Africa is not yet a certain prospect. In its May communiqué, the ‘Global Coalition against ISIS/Deash’ did recognise the need to address underlying localised political and economic drivers of the conflict if any lasting solution to halt the spread of Islamist groups in West Africa is to be found. Indeed, it seems that the failure of French forces in Mali has also triggered a “lessons learned” moment of realisation too. Whilst not explicitly addressing the failure of French intervention, the Coalition did outline the potential that private military companies operating in Africa have in “generating destabilisation and further vulnerability … that ultimately favours Daesh/ISIS and other terrorist and violent extremist organisations”. Therefore, it is reassuring the Coalition’s ‘Africa Focus Group’ has pledged to “bolster the civilian-led counterterrorism capabilities” of African states and the acknowledgement of the importance of “national authorities, as well as sub-regional and regional efforts”. This civilian-led approach to addressing the root causes of radicalisation and extremist expansion offers a promising solution to intra- and intercommunal conflict, resource scarcity and subsequent Islamist recruitment.
However, further large-scale military responses risk exacerbating the delicate situation and reinforcing the Islamist message among struggling communities. With the Burkinabe government recently ordering civilians to evacuate vast rural zones, one of which consists of over 11,000 square kilometres, ahead of major counter-insurgency operations, it seems requests for civilian-focused efforts have fallen on deaf ears. Naturally, these operations that target Jihadist-saturated areas also coincide with heavily contested cattle herder territory. The prohibition of human presence in these areas not only prevents already desperate civilians from making a living, but also risks further civilian casualties as Burkinabe forces and Islamist militias contest territory.
In similar alarming events, it seems that the United Nations’ efforts in Mali may become even further restricted due to recent developments. This week, the UN Security Council voted to extend its MINUSMA mission in Mali until June 2023 - clearly a sign that there is much more work to be done. However, since its inception in 2013, MINUSMA has faced repeated criticism for its failure to protect civilians and its overall performance in the country. These criticisms look set to gain further momentum with the unfortunate ramifications of French military withdrawal. Despite renewed enthusiasm, MINUSMA’s humanitarian operations will come under increased risk as the mission’s logistical, security and intelligence capabilities are depleted. With the Malian government increasingly aligning itself with Russia and rejecting Western intervention, it comes as little surprise then that authorities intend to deny UN peacekeepers access to investigate human rights violations allegedly waged by Russian mercenaries and government forces. Despite the rhetoric of the ‘Global Coalition against ISIS/Daesh’ committing to increased civilian-focused efforts, only so much can be achieved without the cooperation of Malian authorities.
As the ‘Africa Centre for Strategic Studies’ outlines, any effective conflict resolution and counter-terror strategies must first directly address the economic and social tensions, such as those of the cattle herders, that Islamist recruitment narratives seek to exploit. The civilian-focused approach that the Coalition espouses must foster a fluid channel of dialogue, between respected community figures and senior government officials, if there is any hope of protecting communities’ livelihoods that are under threat from short-sighted legislation. However, tackling the corruption and brutality that characterises such fragile governments in this region poses a much more complex issue. Addressing systematic failures of governance requires external pressure from actors such as the United States and the United Nations – neither of which are particularly admired for their recent record on nation-building and their respective approaches to tackling militant Islamism, with the Afghan failure still fresh in the minds of many. If there is any hope for the people of West Africa and the Sahel region in the struggle against this brutal insurgency, there needs to be a unified and multilateral civilian-focused effort to address the root causes of Islamist recruitment.