Wagner Intel Brief - 26/06 at 23:30 BST

Authors: Matheus Mora Machado

Source: BBC. Yevgeny Prigozhin is pictured shaking hands with a resident of Rostov-on-Don, then occupied by Wagner PMC, as he leaves the city.

Putin’s First Words Since the Mutiny:

  • In a short speech broadcast on state-owned television channel Russia-24, Putin remarked publicly about the armed rebellion for the first time since its conclusion on Saturday. Putin re-affirmed his statement during the rebellion that those who attempted to march on Moscow are ‘traitors’ that will be ‘brought to justice’. Contrary to Prigozhin’s message, Putin claimed that the organisers of the mutiny ‘wanted [Russian] society to be fragmented.’

  • Further, Putin stated that ‘most’ Wagner mercenaries are ‘patriots’ who were ‘used’ by the ‘organisers’ of the rebellion. Putin assured Wagner mercenaries of three choices: to work for the Russian army, ‘go home’, or flee to Belarus. Putin thanked the ‘commanders of the Wagner company’ who made the decision to halt the march to Moscow. 

Prigozhin’s First Words Since the Mutiny:

  • Prigozhin spoke publicly on Monday evening, via an eleven-minute audio-only message on Telegram, for the first time since the mutiny, stating that the ‘purpose of the campaign was to prevent the destruction of Wagner PMC and to bring to justice those who, through their unprofessional actions, made a huge number of mistakes during the special military operation’. It was ‘never our goal’, said Prigozhin, ‘to overthrow the current regime and legally-elected government.’

  • Prigozhin pointed to Sergei Shoigu and the Ministry of Defence’s decision, on June 11th, to compel PMC soldiers to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defence as an existential threat to Wagner and the founding reason for the mutiny. Prigozhin stated: ‘[Wagner] was meant to stop existing on 1 July, 2023. “Employees all refused to sign the contract with the Ministry of Defense, only 1-2 per cent decided to join the Russian army.’

  • Prigozhin clarified that the ‘original plan’ to transfer all of Wagner’s vehicles to the Ministry of Defense on the 30th of June at Rostov-on-Don. However, Prigozhin claimed that ‘[d]espite any aggression, Wagner suffered a missile attack, followed by a helicopter attack’, at the hands of the Ministry of Defense on the afternoon of the 23rd of June. These attacks ‘triggered an immediate decision to move out early and respond militarily’ to the Ministry of Defence’s aggression, in order to ensure the survival of Wagner. 

  • The decision of Wagner forces to turn around and end the mutiny was driven by two factors, according to Prigozhin: ‘first, [Wagner] didn’t want to shed Russian blood. Secondly, they wanted to demonstrate their protest, not overtake authority in Russia.’ 

  • Although the purpose of the mutiny was not to overthrow Putin’s government, the mutiny did reveal ‘serious security flaws across the country.’ Prigozhin also stated that Wagner ‘blocked all military units and airfields. In twenty-four hours, we covered the distance that corresponds to the distance from where Russian troops started on February 24th, 2022 to Kyiv and from the same point to Uzhgorod.’

  • True to his rhetoric, Prigozhin’s audio message continued to call into question the competency of the Ministry of Defence and the Russian armed forces in general: ‘if the operation of February 24, 2022 was carried out by a unit of a similar level of training and moral composure such as Wagner then perhaps the “special operation” would have lasted one day.’

Developments on the Prigozhin-Putin Deal: Legal Charges and Investigations

  • Russian State media outlet Ria Novosti, quoting a source in the Prosecutor General’s office, has reported that Prigozhin still faces charges related to his armed rebellion, in contradiction of the deal struck between Prigozhin and Putin, which had assured that all criminal charges against Prigozhin would be dropped, as claimed by Dmitry Peskov

  • Prigozhin continues to face a separate investigation, launched on the 23rd of June, by the FSB on the pretext of instigating and launching an ‘organized armed rebellion’ under Article 279 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. Although the FSB reported via Telegram it was opening the investigation on Friday evening, no official sources have affirmed the investigation since. Instead, reports of the investigation’s continuity have stemmed from Kommersant, a Russian business news outlet. 

The Status of Wagner and its Presence in Africa:

  • Russian lawmaker Pavel Krasheninnikov has been cited by Interfax, a Russian State news agency, declaring that Russian PMCs will no longer be allowed to recruit criminals; criminals will be allowed to sign contracts exclusively with the Ministry of Defense. Krasheninnikov’s statement followed Dmitry Peskov’s assurance that ‘some’ Wagner troops may be able to ‘ink contracts with the Ministry of Defence’, as reported by Russian state-owned agency TASS. Despite the mutiny, Wagner headquarters appear to be operating normally: amongst regular day-to-day operations, the PMC is said to continue recruiting soldiers.

  • Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reiterated Russia’s commitment to provide military support for African states, including Mali and the Central African Republic. The work of Russian instructors in the Central African Republic will continue, Lavrov said, but it is unclear whether such instructors will be from the Russian military or Wagner, leaving open the possibility that Wagner may continue to operate in Africa. 

Wagner and Prigozhin in Belarus:

  • Following his exit from Rostov-on-Don on Saturday evening after the conclusion of his deal with Lukashenko and Putin, Prigozhin’s whereabouts remain unknown. It was reported that Prigozhin was leaving Rostov to head for Belarus, though Prigozhin’s arrival, nor his destination, has been confirmed. The audio message Prigozhin posted on Telegram on Monday afternoon gave no clues as to his location. 

  • Highly speculative reports have surfaced on Telegram claiming that preparations are underway for the accommodation of Wagner troops in the Osipovichi region of Belarus, where a major operations base will allegedly be established to house Wagner mercenaries. 

Shoigu Makes First Appearance Since Mutiny:

  • Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu made his first public appearance on Monday morning following the attempted mutiny. Shoigu was seen on a trip to Ukraine to inspect Russian troops. The video, which was broadcast on Russian state television, was undated, and the specific location of its recording is unknown. 

  • Al Jazeera journalist Yulia Shapolova speculated that Shoigu’s public appearance may quell ‘theories of his possible resignation’. At most, the video suggests that the Prigozhin-Putin deal did not stipulate the resignation of Shoigu, as had been reported by some sources. 

International Response to the Mutiny: Updates

UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly’s Comments on the Mutiny:

  • Foreign Secretary James Cleverly delivered on Monday afternoon a statement to the House of Commons concerning the events in Russia over the weekend. 

  • Cleverly noted that ‘one of Putin’s protegés had publicly destroyed his case for the war in Ukraine’, stressing that the ‘rebellion is an unprecedented challenge to President Putin’s authority and it is clear that cracks are emerging in the Russian support for the war.’ 

  • Cleverly also made clear that the UK has been in ‘close touch’ with its allies concerning the events in Russia. Cleverly spoke to his American counterpart, Antony Blinken, and other G7 colleagues, whilst British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak discussed the rebellion with President Biden, President Macron, and Chancellor Schulz.

  • In response to a question concerning what preparations the UK and NATO have made to deter and respond to an attack on Kyiv via Belarus, Cleverly reiterated the UK’s position that ‘severe repercussions’ will follow for Belarus if it becomes directly involved in the Ukraine conflict. Notably, Cleverly highlighted that the sanctions package levelled on Russia is transposable to Belarus

European Union Raises Financing Ceiling for Aid to Ukraine:

  • The European Union announced on Monday evening that it has reached an agreement to raise the financial ceiling of the European Peace Facility (EPF), through which aid is being provided to Ukraine by the EU, by an additional €3.5 billion, according to a press release of the Council of the EU

  • The press release noted that the increase was necessary because 92 per cent of the EPF’s  financial ceiling had been committed in 2023; the release did not tie the timing of the increase to events in Russia nor the ongoing Ukrainian counter-offensive. 

United States Set to Announce Additional Aid Package to Ukraine:

Belarus’s Neighbours Tighten Border Security Amidst Prigozhin’s Relocation:

  • Several of Belarus’s neighbouring States have tightened border security in light of Prigozhin’s purported relocation to Belarus. Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are reported by Euronews to have agreed to ‘coordinate and enhance’ border security. 

  • Polish Foreign Minister Mariusz Blaszczak stated that Poland has strengthened its border with Belarus and is ‘responding by anticipating attacks’. 

  • Latvian Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs stated that the Latvia-Belarus border has been ‘strengthened’ and that ‘visa or border entry from Russians leaving Russia due to current events won’t be considered.’ Indeed, Latvia will not issue visas to Russians, including humanitarian visas, nor will it amend pre-existing border crossing restrictions, reports Ukrinform

  • Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda called for enhanced border security should Prigozhin or any part of Wagner end up in Belarus, and stated that tightening eastern borders concerns not only Lithuania but ‘undoubtedly… the whole of NATO.’

  • German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius has announced that Germany is preparing to send 4,000 Bundeswehr soldiers to Lithuania to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank. Politico reported that the decision has support from both Germany’s ruling coalition and its main opposition. 


States Come Forth in Support of the Kremlin:

  • The Chinese Foreign Ministry has stated its support for Russia’s leadership amidst the mutiny. A Foreign Ministry Spokesperson in a press conference on Monday affirmed Beijing and Moscow’s close ties, stating, ‘As Russia’s friendly neighbor and comprehensive strategic partner of coordination for the new era, China supports Russia in maintaining national stability and achieving development and prosperity, and we believe in Russia’s ability to do so.’ 

  • Putin held a call with Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, the Emir of Qatar, an American ally, where Al Thani ‘expressed his support for the actions of the Russian authorities related to the events of June 24’, according to the Kremlin’s website

  • Putin also held a call with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi on Monday, in which the Iranian President ‘expressed full support for the Russian leadership in connection with the June 24 events’. 


Analysis:

Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s long-time press secretary, declared on Monday evening that Putin’s then-forthcoming speech to the Russian public concerning the weekend’s events, ‘without exaggeration, will determine the fate of Russia.’ Putin subsequently delivered a short speech–barely longer than five minutes–that all but determined that fate. 

In his address, Putin sought to control the narrative surrounding the weekend’s events and to carve out Wagner’s power base in order to discourage further attempts to displace his power. On the one hand, much of Putin’s speech doubled-down on the position he adopted during the rebellion: those who took part are ‘traitors’ seeking to ‘fragment’ Russian society, and will be ‘brought to justice’. Regardless of the mutineers' efforts, the rebellion, said Putin, was ‘doomed to fail’. The rebellion appears for Putin, and he hopes for all of Russia, as a futile criminal power-grab aimed at destabilising Russian society. On the other hand, Putin shifted his tone, distinguishing between the rebellion’s ‘organisers’ and the Wagner ‘patriots’ whom the organisers ‘used’ to perpetrate the rebellion. Rather than being carried out by Wagner forces en masse, and with the support of some Russian citizens after-the-fact, the rebellion was led by elite Wagnerites. 

Putin was careful not to vilify ordinary Wagner troops who did not actively take part in the rebellion. Putin does not want to re-ignite any elements still set on rebellion, nor does he wish to entrench a desire for regime change that could prove fatal to his rule in the coming months. As such, Putin sought to cultivate national unity, emphasising the ‘civil solidarity’ that arose from the weekend’s events, and highlighting that the rebellion was quashed not by Lukashenko’s timely intervention, but by the ‘patriotic mood of the citizens, the consolidation of the entire Russian society’. Putin’s credit to the Russian people for the resolution of the rebellion is, it appears, false: Wagner troops were gleefully greeted by residents of Rostov-on-Don on Saturday. For this reason, Putin’s allusion to Russian unity is particularly striking, as he may very well believe that support for his rule is quickly fading. 

More striking still is Putin’s reference to the ‘consolidation of the entire Russian society’, which implies that Putin himself has consolidated his grip on power. The rebellion may have exposed weak allies, traitors within Putin’s government, and incompetent staff–all of which Putin will purge at will, once given the time. But the rebellion’s most important outcome was the presentation to the Russian people and its elites of an alternative leader, an alternative Russia. Alternatives have risen in the past–Alexei Navalny chief amongst them–but none have ever been presented so forcefully, in a manner that has exposed the weaknesses in the foundation of Putin’s regime. This seems to be the view of several of Putin’s domestic critics, including Igor Girkin, who commented that Putin’s speech was ‘pitiful’, alongside Putin’s international adversaries. 

Most notably, the Russian as a whole people may start–indeed may already have started–to doubt the legitimacy of Putin's invasion of Ukraine, intended to be the crown jewel of his rule. Prigozhin explicitly questioned the rationale for the ‘special military operation’ in the lead-up to the rebellion, though his most recent public statement shied away from decrying the basis of the war, and instead focused on the mistakes made by the Russian military in its course. This effectively represents a shift of responsibility for Russia’s failures in the war from Putin further onto Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov. That more cautious angle implies that Putin was somewhat successful in subduing Prigozhin’s perceived ambition for regime change, but the momentous symbolism of the weekend’s events will remain etched into the Russian consciousness for some time. 

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