What the 20th CCP Congress told us about Taiwan and “One Country, Two Systems”
Taiwan has been a pressing issue for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for more than seventy years. Mao Zedong sought but finally renounced military liberation; Deng Xiaoping developed a policy of peaceful reunification and military coercion; Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao focused on peaceful reunification although they never renounced the use of force. Xi Jinping, while insisting on a rhetoric of striving for peaceful unification, has made clear that the Taiwan question is the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) non-negotiable core national interest and has relied more on brinkmanship to press Taiwan to accept his hardened terms of unification. Taiwan is a critical hotspot in US-China relations and fault lines have been deepening for several years.
In the Report at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive in Unity to Build a Modern Socialist Country in All Respects, Xi Jinping mentions extensively Taiwan and Beijing’s, up to now only, proposal for a peaceful reunification: the “one country, two systems” (OCTS) principle. Overall, the report restates, maintaining a relatively moderate tone, many long-standing policies, such as the focus on “peaceful reunification”, adherence to the One China principle and the 1992 Consensus, and opposition to Taiwanese formal independence. Xi’s speech appears consistent with the White Paper released last August and his speech in 2019 for the 40th Anniversary of Deng’s Message to Compatriots in Taiwan. It does not emerge with any new sense of urgency nor any deadline for reunification.
Check out previous articles on Taiwan and the OCTS principle:
Conception and Application of the One Country Two Systems Principle: Link
An Analysis of One Country Two Systems: Link
Taiwan is not Hong Kong: The ultimate barriers for the enactment of the one country, two systems principle: Link
“The work of the past five years”
In the first part of the report, Xi lists what he perceived as the successes the CCP achieved in the last five years:
“We have put forward an overall policy framework for resolving the Taiwan question in the new era and facilitated cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation. We have resolutely opposed separatist activities aimed at "Taiwan independence" and foreign interference. We have thus maintained the initiative and the ability to steer in cross-Strait relations”.
He then moves on to reaffirm that “resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China's complete reunification is, for the Party, a historic mission and an unshakable commitment” and that “the wheels of history are rolling on toward China's reunification and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”.
Hong Kong is another important part of Xi’s speech. Xi has praised the implementation of the “one country, two systems'' framework:
“we have fully and faithfully implemented the policy of One Country, Two Systems. We have upheld the policy of One Country, Two Systems, under which the people of Hong Kong administer Hong Kong and the people of Macao administer Macao, both with a high degree of autonomy […] The policy of One Country, Two Systems is a great innovation of socialism with Chinese characteristics. It has proven to be the best institutional arrangement for ensuring sustained prosperity and stability in Hong Kong and Macao after their return to the motherland”.
No big surprises here. The PRC defends the repressions of the protests in the former British colony in 2019, celebrates the supposed “high autonomy” that it grants, the 2020 national security law and the 2021 electoral reforms that introduced a new vetting system that requires every candidate to prove their “patriotism”:
“we will see that Hong Kong and Macao are administered by patriots and that the laws and enforcement mechanisms for safeguarding national security are implemented there. We will ensure both the central government's overall jurisdiction and a high degree of autonomy in the special administrative regions”.
Glorifying the success of OCTS helps the PRC in promoting the idea that such proposal not only could work in Taiwan but that it would enhance Taiwanese prosperity: “the policies of peaceful reunification and One Country, Two Systems are the best way to realize reunification across the Taiwan Strait; this best serves the interests of Chinese people on both sides of the Strait and the entire Chinese nation”. All this, neglecting the will of Taiwanese people, who have repeatedly refused the “one country, two systems” formula due to a deep distrust towards the PRC, especially after the crackdown in Hong Kong in 2014 and 2019.
The steps forward
Xi also puts forward the next steps in the PRC’s Taiwan policy:
“We will adhere to the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus. On this basis, we will conduct extensive and in-depth consultations on cross-Strait relations and national reunification with people from all political parties, sectors, and social strata in Taiwan, and we will work with them to promote peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and advance the process of China's peaceful reunification. We will stand closely with our Taiwan compatriots, give firm support to patriots in Taiwan who desire reunification, and join hands to keep pace with the trends of history. We will safeguard the overall interests of the Chinese nation and take resolute steps to oppose "Taiwan independence" and promote reunification”.
Here the reference, already made multiple times, is to Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen, leader of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and her government that have always refused to accept the 1992 Consensus and therefore the One China principle. Even the reference to consultations with personalities and organizations in Taiwan is not new and wants to promote the image of Beijing as seeking dialogue with the counterpart. Nevertheless, Beijing refuses to acknowledge the DPP as an interlocutor, prefers to consider it an illegitimate separatist faction controlled by the United States and refuses to engage with it.
As during the historical meeting with Taiwanese President Ma Ying-Jeou in Singapore in 2015, in the Report at the 19th CCP Congress in 2017 and in his speech for the 40th Anniversary of Deng Xiaoping’s Message to our Compatriots in Taiwan in 2019, Xi appeals to common culture:
“Blood runs thicker than water, and fellow Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are one family bound by blood. We have always shown respect and care for our Taiwan compatriots and worked to deliver benefits to them”.
The CCP therefore seeks to emphasize cultural similarities, ethnic equivalence, and common economic interests, while acknowledging that Taiwan has distinctive and different characteristics due to the years of separation from the mainland. Xi is here picking up Deng’s narrative according to which the two communities divided by the Strait are a family, the Chinese nation, that share common ancestry, history, and culture, and emphasized such a fraternal relationship. A vision that is firmly refused by many segments of Taiwanese society, and politically by the pan-Green coalition led by the DPP, which reveres Taiwanese unique culture and history.
Perhaps, what is more notable in Xi’s report is the focus on interferences by external forces (外部势力干涉):
“Taiwan is China's Taiwan. Resolving the Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese, a matter that must be resolved by the Chinese. We will continue to strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort, but we will never promise to renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all measures necessary. This is directed solely at interference by outside forces and the few separatists seeking “Taiwan independence”; it is by no means targeted at our Taiwan compatriots”.
Opposing foreign interference is now a central part of the PRC's policy but it is not new. Indeed, Jiang Zemin’s speech in 1995 on reunification warned against “the scheme of foreign forces”. The reference to external interference is primarily aimed at the US, but Beijing is increasingly worried about other countries' interference as well, maybe Japan or the European Union. The same rationale is also reserved for Hong Kong: “We will crack down hard on anti-China elements who attempt to create chaos in Hong Kong and Macao. We will take resolute action to prevent and stop interference in the affairs of Hong Kong and Macao by external forces”.