Forecasting futures: London Politica Analysts on the impact of Ukraine in 2022

Hannibal VadNoah TrowbridgeTristan LeelandAng Shao HengNathalie BredbergMatheus Mora MachadoSamuel Jardine

Feb 10

Thumbnail image courtesy of Anton Holoborodko (Wikimedia Commons)

London Politica does not take a specific policy position for this project. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the individual authors.

Invasion: Possible, but very expensive.

By Hannibal Vad

As it stands, Putin has left himself in a tough spot. The diplomatic concessions that Russia requires from the West, is by most estimates unobtainable, with many speculating that failed diplomacy would be used as a pretext for war. If we examine some of Putin’s statements, it would seem that this would be true. There have been no talks of Ukraine receiving or basing the weapon systems that could hit Moscow, nor does there seem to be an interest to do so. At the present, Russia is yet to diverge from their main demands, meaning an invasion does seem likely.

At a glance, it would be possible. Russia does have a qualitative and quantitative military advantage over Ukraine, and can most likely win in a conventional war given enough time. That being said, an easy victory is not given, and the cost of an invasion could be high for several reasons (of course dependent on scale of operation Russia would conduct).

First, Ukraine has expanded its military drastically since 2014. It would not be the same military that Russia faced 8 years ago. Most of the soldiers currently serving have gained experience from fighting at the line of contact. Ukraine’s armored forces have also been updated and could impose cost on an invasion, but would most likely fare poorly against Russian armored formations. Second, Russia would most likely have to occupy land, which would be both bloody and costly. Ukraine is home to a plethora of militias and a “homeguard”, which would lead to a partisan-style war both during and after a defeat of the regular armed forces. Combating them, and potentially subduing the civilian population, would be expensive, both in a financial sense, but also in lives lost. Third, depending on the Ukrainian defense, Russia may be forced into urban combat to secure key railway stations to serve as logistic points. Urban warfare is tough for any fighting force, and it would diminish certain tactical advantages that Russia has. All in all, a costly endeavor, but not an impossible one.

On the basis of the points raised before, it might be tough to follow Putin’s logic and understand what Russia would gain from this conflict. The sanctions being imposed would cripple the Russian economy, and anxiousness in Romania, Poland and the Baltics would likely lead to increased NATO troop-presence in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, backing down now, without meaningful concessions from the West, may create the impression, both internally and externally, that Russia is weak, something any dictator would like to avoid. Putin needs a win, a diplomatic one is not in the cards, a military one is.

EU Foreign Policy: no drastic changes in sight

By Noah Trowbridge

Born in the context of the Cold War, the EU has always been concerned with security issues on its oriental borders, especially since the integration of Baltic, Central and Eastern European states between 2004 and 2007. While this eastern focus was bolstered by Russia’s cyberattacks on Estonia in 2007, its occupation of South Ossetia since 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the migratory crisis and the staunch increase in terrorist attacks on European soil since 2015 have pushed Mediterannean member states to advocate for a foreign policy shift towards North Africa and the Sahel. This initiative came to fruition in 2020 with the launch of the EU Takuba task force in support of Opération Barkhane in Mali – with notable contributions from Estonia, Denmark and Sweden.

The diplomatic escalation surrounding the ongoing conflict on the Russo-Ukrainian border since late 2021 raises serious doubts regarding the future focus of EU foreign policy. Whilst low-intensity armed conflict has prevailed in the Donbass since 2014, the concentration of over 100,000 Russian troops on the border has reignited existential fears of Eastern European member states. The Russo-American bilateral talks – bypassing the EU – have further emphasised this need for strategic rebalancing eastward. In parallel, European presence in the Sahel has received significant blows in the past month, with the interruption of the democratic transition process in Mali, the forced withdrawal of Denmark’s 90-man strong contingent from the Takuba task force and the expulsion of the French ambassador from Bamako in January 2022.

All indicators in Europe’s eastern and southern neighbourhoods seem to point towards a strategic rebalancing eastward. However, the author argues that the Ukrainian crisis will not cause another major policy shift. Focusing on the Eastern front, EU member states are still incapable of agreeing on a united stance against Russia. German Chancellor Scholz – just like his predecessor – relies on Nord Stream 2 to uphold Germany’s green energy commitments, whilst Hungarian Prime Minister Orban flirts with Moscow to guarantee the supply of cheap gas amidst a tense electoral period in Hungary. Furthermore, Eastern member states still rely predominantly on – and are outspokenly satisfied with – the American security umbrella provided through NATO, thus discrediting a European strategic shift to the East.

Concerning Europe’s southern front, whilst European presence has been met with resistance from the Malian military junta, the Takuba task force is likely here to stay. President Macron has initiated the scaling down of Opération Barkhane to a smaller multinational force operating alongside Sahelian standing armies, just like Takuba does. With illegal border crossings into the EU increasing by 72% in 2021, concerns linked to irregular migration add to ongoing fears of terrorism within the bloc’s Mediterranean member states. As such, as reminded in January by Macron – at the helm of the Council of the European Union for the coming months – the Sahel will remain a priority for EU foreign policy, as demonstrated by the holding of an EU-African Union summit in Brussels in February. Therefore, whilst tensions in Ukraine are at their highest since 2014, the EU will not drastically change its foreign policy in the months to come.

Ukraine’s ‘small alliances’ – a model for the region?

By Tristan Leeland

January 2022 saw the announcement of a new “trilateral” between the UK, Poland and Ukraine. This new arrangement stands as arguably the most significant achievement of Ukraine’s strategy of ‘small alliances’, such as the Lublin Triangle (with Lithuania and Poland) and the Quadriga (with Turkey), which it views as key to deterring Russian aggression and fostering Western integration. Whilst little of the specifics of this new arrangement have been announced (indeed, no name or formal structures have been put in place yet), it is possible to attempt to forecast what this development will mean for Ukraine and the region in the years ahead.

Undoubtedly, a major part of this new arrangement is security-oriented, with Polish PM Morawiecki stating that this grouping aims to strengthen regional security and cooperation. Poland and the UK already cooperate closely with Ukraine in security affairs; the former shares a joint military unit with Ukraine and Lithuania (LITPOLUKRBRIG) as part of the Lublin Triangle, and has provided materiel support in the past, along with exploring joint military procurement and development. The latter is intimately involved with Ukraine’s efforts to rebuild its naval strength, providing a £1.7bn loan for shipyard/naval base construction and cooperation in Ukraine’s future frigate programme, alongside a long-standing troop training programme and occasional weapons transfers, most recently of light anti-tank weapons. It is likely that this new “trilateral” will function as a platform to formalise these existing programmes and coordinate future initiatives of a similar nature. Indeed, Britain has key defence technology relationships with Poland and Ukraine, notably illustrated by Poland recently selecting the UK’s CAMM missile as the centrepiece of its multi-billion dollar NAREW air-defence programme – given the deepening military relationship between the three nations, trilateral joint weapons procurement/development stands a distinct possibility, especially as both Ukraine and Poland have recently announced major military expansion and modernisation programmes and both operate large numbers of legacy Soviet military systems. Joint training and acquisition programmes would aid both, and be invaluable in transitioning Ukraine to NATO standards ahead of membership. The security aspect of the “trilateral” is likely to be limited to this extent; the arrangement is designed primarily to support Ukraine in the short term as it attempts to join the EU and NATO, rather than replace them. Moreover, both the UK and Poland have ruled out troop deployments to Ukraine before or after any Russian military operations. Despite some rather optimistic pronouncements to the contrary, this arrangement is not a ‘mini-NATO’, and will in all likelihood not include security guarantees. Indeed, Poland and the UK would be very unlikely to seek to undermine NATO, the cornerstone of both nations’ security arrangements. The “trilateral” may also go beyond purely “kinetic” cooperation, with Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba highlighting future cooperation in trade, investment and energy, with an emphasis on renewables. Indeed, the UK has already earmarked £88m for projects to reduce reliance on Russian energy supplies. Such initiatives could include gas transfers from Polish LNG terminals, or over the longer-term could leverage the UK’s renewable technology base to help Ukraine develop sovereign energy generation capabilities, denying a key lever of influence to Russia.

Whilst this new trilateral is undoubtedly embryonic, it is a pronounced example of a long-standing (but apparently intensifying) trend within European diplomacy and security, namely the cleavage of Europe into broadly “hawkish” and “dovish” positions on Russia. The trend is becoming increasingly formalised by bilateral and multilateral arrangements between these “hawkish” states, such as the Visegrád Group, Bucharest 9 and Three Seas Initiative. However, with the notable exception of the Lublin Triangle, such arrangements have tended to exclude Ukraine. This new trilateral is significant as it incorporates the UK, a global military player, tying it ever closer to the defence of Eastern Europe and includes Ukraine, a non-NATO state, and is much more focused on defence and security than dialogue and influence-seeking (as characterise the above relationships). This is especially significant given wider EU disunity on what measures to take against Russia or to support Ukraine in the current crisis. Ukraine has deliberately sought out closer relationships with individual or small groups of partners that it views as more reliable in confronting Russia, such as Poland and Turkey, as it perceives that other regional actors (notably Berlin which has demonstrated real ambivalence in support of Ukraine) are insufficiently resolute towards Russia due to political and economic interests. These ‘small alliances’ appear to be bearing fruit and giving Ukraine what it needs; not just rhetorical support for its territorial integrity, but actual, tangible (if limited and currently undefined) material assistance. Moreover, the incorporation of major regional powers demonstrates their interest in Ukraine’s security and may embolden Ukraine in its quest for other such alliances. Such alliances are certain to be key to Ukraine’s attempts to defy Russia in the near future, and it is possible that other states may create similar arrangements following this example – indeed, it is likely that many members of NATO’s eastern flank, or other non-NATO powers in the region, have learned lessons from the broader Western indecision exhibited by the current crisis. In future, more agile and flexible arrangements which may be better suited to modern geostrategic requirements may proliferate, catalysed by the lack of unanimity displayed by the current crisis, especially as more hawkish states may lose patience with more dialogue-oriented ones.

Closer collaboration between Russia and China: A boon for Eastern Europe

By Ang Shao Heng

Amidst the glamour of the Winter Olympic Games held in Beijing, all eyes were on Xi Jinping’s first face-to-face meeting with Putin since the outbreak of the pandemic. The summit, significantly held in the backdrop of the ongoing Ukraine crisis, highlighted the convergence of geostrategic interests for both Russia and China. Apart from signing oil and gas deals worth over US$117 billion to strengthen economic cooperation, Beijing and Moscow issued a joint statement opposing the further expansion of NATO and criticised Washington’s negative impact on peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

Whilst the summit might signal warmer ties between China and Russia, it should in no way be interpreted as an offer of support for Russia to invade Ukraine by China. Even though China has acknowledged that Russia’s security concerns were legitimate, China’s official stance has been and will remain to be one that is extremely cautious. Discussions over coordination between Moscow and Beijing should be regarded as psychological operations to unsettle the US and its allies, and an attempt by Beijing to keep Washington occupied so as to relieve pressure due to the recent developments in Taiwan. Beijing hopes to utilise the posturing by Moscow to lambast the present international order and gain support for its interpretation of sovereignty: the right to exert a sphere of influence in neighbouring regions for national security. Protracted negotiations that do little to change the status quo between Russia and the West will be the most ideal outcome for China.

China is also practical enough to understand that Russia would not risk invasion without the minimal assurance of economic support from Beijing to mitigate the economic consequences of sanctions imposed upon an invasion. The European Union is China’s second largest trading partner and it is highly unlikely China will risk antagonising the EU and shoulder additional financial commitments as its economic growth slows in a year where Xi Jinping is seeking an unprecedented third term. Escalating the conflict and alienating Europe will also invite further pressures on Taiwan which is fundamentally calamitous for China.

Unlike during the Cold War, Russia now depends far more on China. The relationship between Beijing and Moscow should also be viewed as a pragmatic cooperation rather than an ideological alliance. Russia is cognisant of the support it requires from China while China is clear of the true costs of an invasion. Therefore, China would continue to coordinate with Russia to prolong negotiations, only stopping short at directly enabling a Russian invasion on Ukraine. Without commitments from Beijing, Putin would be extremely brazen to launch an invasion.

Are Russian aggressions in Europe pushing Sweden towards a NATO membership?

By Nathalie Bredberg

Throughout the World Wars and the Cold War, Sweden has protected its interests through the policy of neutrality. While the de facto position of Sweden has often been pragmatic to serve Swedish interests, neutrality and pacifism have been integral to Swedish foreign policy, identity, and the balance of power in the region. Since the 1970s, neutrality has been accompanied by continuous disarmament, cuts in military spending and declining military conscription. With its entrance into the EU in 1995, Sweden was no longer neutral. Yet, this position was reinvented as a policy of military non-alignment to fit the membership and disarmament continued. Likewise, it has a close partnership with NATO and aligns with its core liberal values. In a recent meeting, NATO’s general secretary Jens Stoltenberg said “Sweden and Finland are our closest partners.” Unlike aspiring members that go through endless Membership Action Plans, if Sweden wants to join NATO, it could (in theory) be approved in less than a week.

Sweden has a conflicting strategy, combining the desire to stay non-aligned with the need to participate in the Western community with normative allies. With the post-2014 Russian aggression, the fact that Sweden could only defend itself for a week became a worrying reality. As a result, Sweden’s concern for its security interests has increasingly surpassed the desire to confirm its pacifist identity. The Swedish population has the most unfavourable view of Russia among European and North American countries and there is a parliamentary majority in favour of NATO membership. This has pushed for the largest expansion in its military spending in over 70 years and increased military conscription. Further, the heightened Russian assertiveness since the annexation of Crimea has sparked a reconsideration of Sweden’s military non-alignment in the political discourse. Yet, only 35 percent of Swedes are in favour of membership, inadequate support for a NATO referendum.

A potential membership would not only have direct effects on Sweden but would leave its close neighbour Finland vulnerable against Russia. Most observers agree that a potential Swedish membership has to be implemented in coordination with Finland. If both countries were to enter the alliance, the power balance in Europe would undergo a historical transition.

This is a serious security concern for the Kremlin. In December, the Russian foreign ministry stated that a Finnish and Swedish NATO membership “would have serious military and political consequences that would require an adequate response from the Russian side”. Swedish and Finnish memberships would likely trigger further Russian aggression in Europe.

To counter potential Russian threats, Finland has adopted a ‘NATO-option’ policy to prepare to join the alliance in a time of crisis. Simply put, it is an announcement of holding the door open towards a NATO membership. The Swedish Social Democratic government is critical of an equivalent policy in Sweden, despite the parliamentary majority in favour of such a policy. The Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ann Linde, claims that NATO is not the most effective way to protect Swedish security. While it is not expected that Sweden will join anytime soon, Sweden seems to be leaning towards a ‘NATO-option’. Due to its unbinding nature, it is unlikely that it would have any major long-term effects on Swedish-Russian relations.

Nonetheless, neither Sweden or Finland can hold the door open to NATO forever. If Russian aggression would occur in the Nordic region, there would be a turning point pushing the countries towards either membership or non-alignment. Such a moment would determine the European security environment and alter the balance of power for years to come.

Due to the Swedish hesitation and tradition, however, aggression in Ukraine are not an adequate threat towards Swedish security to force it to join NATO. If the Kremlin takes unconventional actions in the Nordics or Arctic, the Swedish assessment may be different. Nonetheless, since preventing NATO membership is in the Russian interest, it would be irrational for Russia to take aggressive measures in the Nordics under current security circumstances.

It seems like the Swedish and Finnish military non-alignment will remain – at least for now.

Between a Rock and a Hard Place: A Forecast of Germany’s ‘Traffic Light’ Coalition’s Response to the Ukraine Conflict

By Matheus Mora Machado

The looming threat of a Russian invasion of Ukraine presents Germany’s ‘traffic light’ coalition with its first significant geopolitical test. And that test is by no means a straightforward one: Olaf Scholz and his compatriots must traverse an intricate multi-level game, played both in Europe and across the Atlantic, in order to emerge from the crisis unscathed. Indeed, Germany’s strategic, political, and economic ties with Russia place the country in a unique position in the ongoing crisis. On the one hand, Germany must face the reality of its reliance on Russian energy, and the diminishing bargaining power and internal tensions it bears as a result. On the other hand, Germany must work with its NATO and European allies to deter Russian aggression towards Ukraine, and, aspirationally, to leverage the crisis to establish the European Union as a genuine geopolitical force on the global stage.

Nord Stream 2: A Double-Edged Sword

Nord Stream 2 is Russia’s primary bargaining chip in its strategic relations with Germany. Germany’s reliance on natural gas is vast: it is the country’s second-most significant primary energy source, accounting for 25% of energy consumption in 2019. This state of affairs was in large part established by the debut of the original Nord Stream pipeline in 2011, which entrenched German-Russian collaboration on energy policy. Indeed, in December 2021, Russian pipeline gas accounted for 32% of Germany’s natural gas imports.

Nord Stream 2, however, also poses strategic implications for eastern European countries, and can therefore be viewed as a consolidation of strategic influence by Vladimir Putin in the region. By rerouting the transport of natural gas through the Baltic Sea, the pipeline will diminish the importance of the Brotherhood pipeline network and the Soyuz pipeline, which cumulatively transported over 89 billion cubic metres of natural gas through Ukraine in 2019 to be sold in western and eastern Europe. Without the need to pay Ukraine substantial transit fees and maintain cordial relations with the country to ensure natural gas transport, the Kremlin will be able to ensure that Ukraine is vulnerable to arm-twisting, whilst fostering further western European reliance on its natural gas exports.

As such, it is no surprise that the construction of Nord Stream 2 was met with widespread opposition – both within the German government and amongst its allies. Vice-Chancellor Robert Habeck of the Greens has expressed willingness to block the operation of the pipeline amidst rising tensions with Russia – a viewpoint shared by the Free Democratic Party (FDP), which comprises the other third of the incumbent coalition. However, Olaf Scholz, alongside many relevant factions of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), regards Nord Stream 2 as a private, non-political project. There is also a divergence in the treatment of and rhetoric surrounding Nord Stream 2 between Germany and its most significant strategic ally, the United States. Whereas the United States placed several sanctions on Nord Stream 2 and Biden has recently promised the ‘end’ of the pipeline should Russia invade Ukraine, Scholz has refrained from taking such a hardline stance.

Germany’s ‘traffic light’ coalition is, then, stuck between a rock and a hard place: its allies, and indeed some of its constituent parties, oppose the pipeline, yet the country’s reliance on Russian natural gas remains entrenched. Therefore, Nord Stream 2 will constrain the ability of Germany’s ‘traffic light’ coalition to be overtly hawkish where material policy is concerned with respect to Russia. This was evident even when Merkel was in office, as she blocked the sale of American arms to Ukraine through a NATO procurement scheme. And there has been continuity on that front: despite calls from Ukraine for arms supplies, the German government has instead confined aid to sending 5,000 helmets to the country.

Nonetheless, Nord Stream 2 may be a bargaining chip for Germany. Foreign minister Angelina Baerbock – an outspoken critic of the pipeline – announced in December 2021 that, alongside legal concerns, the pipeline’s debut would not take place were there to be ‘escalation’ over Ukraine. Although that has done little to deter the Kremlin from pursuing its aims in the country, should the German government align with President Biden’s stance on the matter, the threat of negating Russian influence in eastern Europe will seem substantially more immediate. However, given Scholz and the SDP’s affinity for Nord Stream 2, such an alignment is unlikely to occur. In the short-term, therefore, Nord Stream 2 is more of a strategic liability than asset for the German government where the situation in Ukraine is concerned.

A ‘United States of Europe’: Germany’s Vision for European Security and the Ukraine Crisis

Yet the dispute over Ukraine has grander strategic implications for Germany’s ‘traffic light’ coalition. The crown jewel of its foreign policy, as provided by its coalition agreement, is the deepening of European integration in order to achieve a federal European Union. A necessary corollary of that goal is a collective European security and defence architecture – a vision shared by France, who, on January 1st, 2022, assumed the Presidency of the Council of the European Union.

Amidst the crisis in Ukraine, both France and Germany have been proponents of the Normandy Format, first conceived of in 2014, whereby France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine engaged in multilateral talks to attempt to end the dispute. Nonetheless, the Format did not accomplish that goal – its effectiveness in the present conflict will therefore likely be minimal, though the appearance of a ‘united front’ against Russia may be somewhat of a deterrent to any planned invasion.

Despite seizing the opportunity to provide European strategic leadership throughout the Ukraine crisis, it is unlikely that Germany will pursue its grand vision of a geopolitical Union in the short-term. Firstly, each member of the ‘traffic light’ coalition is under domestic pressure to deliver on its campaign promises – very little of which revolved around the Union or foreign policy. The SDP, for instance, campaigned largely on the premise of providing social equality, meaning Scholz’s focus must turn inwards to enact minimum wage reforms, an overhaul of the social welfare system, and socially-focused housing policies, amongst other legislative initiatives. Secondly, differences in what the government’s stance on Russia should be have persisted. For instance, in response to newly-emergent details surrounding the murder of a Chechen dissident by a Russian agent in Berlin, Baerbock dismissed two Russian diplomats whilst Scholz remained silent.

Constrained by its reliance on Russian gas and beset by internal differences on its Russia policy, Germany’s ‘traffic light’ coalition will therefore remain somewhat tame where the situation in Ukraine is concerned, lest an invasion occur.

The impact of a looming Ukraine conflict on “Global Britain” and the UK’s Integrated Defence Review

By Samuel Jardine

An Invasion When?

A Russian invasion of Ukraine is something that is highly likely to occur within the next few weeks. Russia’s build-up is extensive, it has shifted its deployment to forward operating positions, detailed logistical elements are now in place, including blood supplies - a clear sign of active conflict preparation. The wait now is for Ukraine’s terrain to freeze over to facilitate the primarily wheeled Russian logistics support for motorised infantry, armoured brigades, and artillery. While there is still the slight possibility that a de-escalation could occur, a quick, comparatively limited open conflict is certainly the most likely outcome. This would likely involve significant Russian long-range barrages from massed missile and artillery systems, followed up by rapid strikes from armoured columns at Ukrainian military targets, and to seize key points. The aim would be for Russia to present a fait accompli to NATO and Ukraine and dare them to deploy forces and attempt a costly push-back, with the threat of nuclear escalation looming. These strikes could entail Russian rapid-strike forces aimed at pressuring Kyiv, but more likely will see land grabs in Eastern Ukraine aimed at destabilising Ukraine’s political situation due to uncertainties surrounding Russia’s logistical capacity to sustain a massed attack over a longer period.

The starting gun for all this would be the Russian manufacturing of fig-leaf plausibility for an invasion - this likely stemming from a hoped-for pro-Russian coup (its failure or success would not particularly matter), or the invitation of Russian aid by pro-Moscow elements within areas of Ukraine, likely with reference to fabricated atrocities committed by Ukrainian militia forces and the drumming up of “neo-Nazi” or “Far-Right” elements within these forces. For this reason, the intelligence agencies of the UK and US have been keen to share information they have gathered surrounding any Moscow coup intentions publicly as a way to mitigate this fig-leaf, potentially delaying (or as unlikely as it might be, preventing) an invasion, and at least hoping to ensure that Russia’s use of this in the information war is contested and less-effective.

Whatever the actual outcome - conflict or not - this is a costly exercise for President Putin both economically and strategically. Backing down would likely destabilise Putin’s leadership and severely damage his perception domestically and abroad. In the case of backing down, Putin has ensured both that Ukraine will continue to strengthen its defensive capability and shift closer towards NATO and the EU, but also that NATO’s wider activity and presence in the Baltics, Eastern Europe, the Arctic, and Scandinavia will continue to increase due to Russia’s threat perception. If Russia does invade, however, it’ll be subject to further serious economic sanctions. It also runs the risk of losing men and equipment it can ill afford politically or in terms of strategic outlook, as well as the rest of Eastern Europe and Scandinavia shifting even closer to NATO than if it hadn't gone in regardless. The parts of Ukraine that Russia might seize if successful will, like Crimea, be an economic black hole and potentially sources of unrest, their economic viability taking decades to come to fruition.

While this is a significant miscalculation for Putin, it does however also present challenges for NATO-aligned states and their outlooks too. For instance, UK strategy will be fundamentally altered emerging from this crisis, conflict or not.

Conflict or not, the damage to “Global Britain’s” scale and ambition as defined by the Integrated Review is done:

The UK has received international recognition and plaudits for its comparatively strong support for Ukraine, delivering weapon systems, advisers and trainers to Ukraine and committing to deploying forces across Eastern Europe. It’s been an image boon for a post-Brexit “Global Britain” in the short term. However, regardless of a Russian invasion of Ukraine happening or not, the serious threat, and real danger, of a conflict in Eastern Europe that has spill-over potential fundamentally alters the UK’s strategic position and makes current policy assumptions regarding “Global Britain” outdated in two significant ways;

1) It offers a contesting reality for the UK’s future armed forces plan:

Currently, as laid out in the Defence Command paper and the Integrated Review, the UK’s armed forces are in a process of “modernization” towards how the UK envisages its conflict and security needs in 2030. At the heart of this vision is the belief that “capability in the future will be less defined by numbers of people and platforms than by information-centric technologies, automation and a culture of innovation and experimentation.”

The deterrence provided by “mass”, that being a battle-ready globally deployable force which can engage effectively, or indeed survive, in high-intensity peer or near-peer conflict, is being diminished, in favour of emphasising new “on the cusp” capability investments such as cyber, drones, and space and a change in “culture” which is hard to specifically define or measure.

This is highlighted not merely by shrinking army numbers (despite the actually pragmatic increased scope of Britain’s global interests presented in the Integrated Review demanding a broader global presence), but also in the down-scaling or phasing out of high-intensity conflict capability epitomised by the de-emphasis on Main Battle Tanks (MBT). Britain is only ordering 148 Challenger 3s to replace its already small number of 227 Challenger 2s. By comparison, a UK equivalent partner, France, operates 406 MBTs. Meanwhile Russia, who the UK has publicly labelled as the “most acute direct threat to the UK”, is estimated to have 3000 MBT’s, alongside around 9000 other armoured platforms.

While there are arguments in favour of this down-scaling; primarily that if Britain is to project a rapid-reaction force to go alongside its increased globally deployed presence; spearheaded by the establishment in 2021 of a light-infantry special-operations focused Rangers Regiment, then the increased logistical difficulties and cost of deploying MBT’s is not efficient. The money would be better directed towards modernising and expanding Skynet 5, or increased offensive cyber capability.

However, budget constraints are also at play, placing tensions on just what capabilities Britain’s military will be able to utilise effectively. The traditional “do more with less” mantra is highlighted by the fact that despite Britain undertaking new maritime deployments globally as part of “Global Britain”, particularly in the Indo-Pacific; the Royal Navy’s surface fleet will by 2030 have only expanded to 20 warships. This is inadequate for both fulfilling its new role and providing credible war-fighting capability. The Royal Navy had 19 warships in 2013 and that was without the aim to develop a “more persistent presence” in the Indo-Pacific compared to any other European country.

With a widening vision, but without necessarily the budget to match, the UK has gone for a globally dispersed “leaner and more agile” armed forces supported and coordinated by more efficient intelligence, communication and information networks that is geared towards competing and engaging in the “grey zone” of multi-polar competition among larger powers and the “diversifying dependence” among smaller states that is increasingly defining 21st century international relations.

Such a force configuration has its benefits; the presence of British forces collaborating with current and potential partners is a significant diplomatic tool, and investing in technology like AI or harnessing offensive cyber capability increases the “grey zone” toolkit for states to respond to threats without escalating to war necessarily, either due to being sub-threshold, or issues with attribution. However, such dispersed forces offer no credible deterrent to peer, or near-peer states engaged in escalation or militarization, likewise increased cyber capability cannot be deployed and displayed the same way an armoured battle-group can. So, while the UK armed forces can support “Global Britain’s” aims of offering support and grey zone engagement, they are no longer as able to deter an escalatory-inclined Russia.

While relying on coalition partners might be the answer to plug this gap, the diplomatic back-and-forth that Putin’s threatened invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the weaknesses of this, with key partners near the conflict like Germany stepping back until pressured to commit. The danger here is that any Russian invasion would likely aim to achieve its objectives rapidly, seizing strategic locations at minimum, destroying Ukraine’s military command and control, and presenting a defensive line around its new gains to NATO as a fait accompli. The kind of coalition-based deterrence that the UK is relying on is not effective here; coordination takes time, and Britain’s own Integrated Review notes that it should be in a position to shoulder NATO burdens as the US expects more of its partners in Europe. This is not to say that Britain should be prepared to take the lion’s share of that, but simply that it needs to have a credible NATO offering for such a collaboration. For instance, a smaller-scale capability offering of the recently closed British Forces Germany.

Currently it risks not having an effective contribution, as starkly highlighted by the lack of options for the UK in Ukraine. The comparatively small-scale deployments of relatively lightly-armed British troops across Eastern Europe, and the shipment of short-range weapon systems to Ukraine while helping show support, in themselves are not a credible deterrent to Russian forces who rely extensively on long range massed fires. The Ukraine crisis, even without warfare, highlights that Britain needs to reconsider the direction of its armed forces modernization.

2) Some of the strategic aims and considerations underpinning “Global Britain” and the Integrated Defence Review have been fundamentally altered:

Strategically the UK will now have to grapple with two key points. Firstly, that Europe is clearly the UK’s primary security frontier, alongside an attendant opening Arctic that is of increasing importance, particularly in its near-future ability to convey power projection from the Pacific world to the Atlantic. It was identified indeed by Britain’s current Chief of the Defence Staff that China’s growing blue water navy will be able to reach the Atlantic in the near-future due to thawing Arctic shipping routes. This means that alongside Russia’s increasing Arctic militarization, the UK and Europe will need to be aware that supporting and courting partners for “Global Britain” as part of its Indo-Pacific tilt, through contesting Beijing’s South China Sea claims could be met by an equivalent response from China near British waters, particularly if Beijing feels the need to appease its domestic audience through a show of strength. This increases the longer-term security considerations of the Euro-Atlantic area further for the UK. No longer is the Indo-Pacific a region for Britain to simply increase its presence in; competition and security considerations there will have a direct spill-over for the UK’s own backyard.

With that in mind the UK’s Indo-Pacific tilt, the core strategic and economic pillar of the “Global Britain” agenda, becomes complicated. Britain has placed significant hope in the Indo-Pacific acting as a significant alternate market to the EU. It is applying to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and extols the potential economic gains to be found in the Pacific. However, for Britain to dedicate the necessary security, political, and financial resources needed to make the most of the Indo-Pacific tilt and expand into Asian markets, it requires as a prerequisite a stable Euro-Atlantic region. Russia’s Ukraine build-up alongside its related moves in the Arctic, Atlantic, and Mediterranean highlight this is not going to be the case. This is succinctly highlighted by all 6 UK destroyers being stuck in port due to repairs, refits and preparations for a large-scale allied exercise, at a time of extreme crisis. There is a lack of ships to shadow Russian vessels, and protect Britain’s waters, let alone its wider global commitments. The Royal Navy is already thinly stretched.

Even if the UK re-orientates its military plan to better allow it to engage in peer or near-power escalatory deterrence as I noted above, which given budgetary constraints would see its Global Britain needed-capabilities diminished, the Indo-Pacific tilt requires grey zone engagement and the dispersed military presence to add diplomatic value to Britain as a stable and supportive partner. This will mean that the Indo-Pacific tilt might need to be reconciled as not being quite as lucrative economically potentially as hoped, as the Euro-Atlantic area will once again need to take precedence in terms of budgetary, security, and political bandwidth.

Secondly and related, even if Ukraine does not lead to conflict, it certainly has pushed Russia closer to China due to the NATO-aligned states response. Moscow is not a natural partner for Beijing, they both have significantly clashing spheres of influence. Their partnership so far has been fairly limited and characterised by a mutual wariness. For instance, Beijing’s Polar Silk Road has provided much needed capital for Russia’s Arctic ambitions since the 2014 Ukraine crisis saw significant sanctions applied. However, Moscow has remained wary of China’s own polar ambitions and has sought to minimise Beijing’s influence. This is because Russia sees the Arctic as its “strategic reserve” economically speaking, and key to its future to quote President Putin. However, there is the very real risk that even without active conflict in Ukraine, NATO states will push Russia and China together with the former being by necessity a junior partner to Beijing due to its weakened position, rather than currently where Russia seeks equilibrium with Beijing. Already off the back of the Ukraine situation an announcement has been made by Russian and Chinese officials that equates to a non-aggression pact and a deepening of cooperative ties across potentially all areas of interest.

While Ukraine’s sovereignty rightly needs to be protected, NATO-aligned states must recognize that the cost of this could be the formation of the Russia-China axis that it fears would have such a significant impact on the international order in a self-fulfilling prophecy. For the UK’s Integrated Review, the deepening of Russian and Chinese ties would essentially out-date its policy and demand a complete rethink and re-prioritization of its security, economic and diplomatic strategy.

London Politica