Armenia's Fragile Neutrality and the War in Ukraine
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a part of the world has decided to join up in condemnation and take action. This sentiment is clearly manifested among the EU, NATO, and their allies. On the other hand, some have decided to keep their distances or remain rather neutral. We usually hear about the stances of India, China or Middle Eastern countries, however, Armenia constitutes a somewhat ignored example of uneasy neutrality with particular characteristics.
During the Velvet Revolution of 2018, Armenia tried to free itself from the old elite that dominated the country since the breakup of the Soviet Union. The new government, under Nikol Pashinyan, born out of internal discontent, strived for more ties with the EU and the U.S. but without decisively shifting its strategic orientation away from Russia. Armenia´s state policy during the last three decades is explained both through its own and, sometimes, unavoidable economic, social or geographical limitations. Despite being landlocked between bigger, more powerful, and sometimes more hostile countries, such as Azerbaijan and Turkey, its political elite’s wrongdoings or lack of interest in the country's future development over the years have further exacerbated the weaknesses. The internal strife between Pashinyan and the so-called “remnants” who ought to be removed from their position may have also played a role in that weakening process. The leadership has been unable to maintain a degree of strategic balance between its security partnership with Russia and the aspiration of deepening ties with the West.
Armenia’s dependence on Russia stems from its membership to the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which are Armenia’s main economic and security partnerships with Russia respectively. Russia and Armenia also have a bilateral strategic partnership agreement (which has been expanding) that regulates the presence of Russian troops on Armenian soil in the form of the 102nd military base in Gyumri and presence in several other military installations such as the Erebuni military airport or border guard posts manned by the FSB. Armenia has since 2014 sided with Russia and voted against General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia's annexation of Crimea. Besides doing this because of their existing agreements with Russia and the pressure exercised by Moscow, Armenia saw it as a similar example of the principle of self-determination in their dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh with Azerbaijan.
The Nagorno-Karabakh War (44-Day War or Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, as Armenians and Azerbaijanis respectively prefer to call it) in 2020 caused some policy developments as it came as a shock for many Armenians. It proved that the country’ss already limited economic and military resources were not being used efficiently and effectively and that some officials who dared to make questionable declarations ended up jeopardizing Armenia’s image and negotiating position. As Armenia lost the war, Russia’s increased the weight of its presence with the deployment of over 2000 peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh (in addition to the thousand-strong military personnel in Gyumri). Nonetheless, this came at a high cost in prestige. Russia argued that it could not have helped Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh as the security guarantees of the CSTO only covered Armenia´s officially recognized borders.
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Armenia’s position has become more delicate. There have been some small demonstrations organized by marginal groups either in support of Russia or Ukraine. One in support of Russia was organized by an elderly communist group, while one in support of Ukraine was organized in front of the Russian embassy by the European Party of Armenia, a minor party with no parliamentary representation. Another protest in support of Ukraine was held next to the memorial of Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko. The Armenian government and officials have walked a thin line regarding the conflict, trying to adopt a low-profile neutrality. Due to its circumstances, Armenia opted for supporting its still main and only strategic and security guarantor during the votes in the Council of Europe. However, during the UN votes condemning Russia’s invasion, Armenia opted for abstaining on two occasions along with thirty-five more countries.
Russia’s war in Ukraine has so far led to a moderate reshaping of the regional situation of the South Caucasus. It played a huge part in inflaming the conflict again, as the revanchist Azerbaijani regime felt encouraged to go on a renewed offensive in September, this time against Armenia’sinternationally recognized territory, causing more than 200 deaths on both sides. This has also meant a small change of posture by the West regarding the conflict. Even if a weak cease-fire has been put in place, the Minsk Group in charge of the peace negotiations under the OSCE, consisting of representatives of Russia and EU countries, has now been rendered almost ineffective because of the events in Ukraine. That conflict is, thus, having its effects on the future geopolitical realignment of the Caucasus region. Armenia has been pushing for new and deeper relations with countries such as India and Iran. The further erosion of Russian influence was demonstrated by the visit to Yerevan by U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, remarks by Emmanuel Macron accusing Russia of aggravating the tense situation in the South Caucasus, and the decision by the EU, after a quadrilateral meeting on the sidelines of the European Political Community summit in Prague, to deploy a civilian mission to monitor the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. Yet, the EU still plays a double game in this conflict. As a result of its effort to steer away from Russian gas, the organization has reached supply agreements with Azerbaijan, giving Baku a key leverage.
Russia has also been displaying a double game in the Caucasian conflict. Russia has been the main provider of military equipment to Azerbaijan and has good commercial ties with both Azerbaijan and Turkeywhich has left some Armenians disappointed, with even some minor protests against Russia taking place. Armenia ruled out the recognition of Donetsk and Lugansk, which is a stark contrast to Artsakh officials (Armenian breakaway state that controls part of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast). The latter has openly sided with Russia and still expects more security guarantees from them.Armenia’s position on the conflict in Ukraine is also complicated from the diaspora perspective, as it is considerably large. There are several hundred thousand Armenians or people with Armenian roots in Ukraine and around two million in Russia (these numbers can vary, given the sometimes ambiguous census procedures in both countries and that some Armenians may be registered as ethnic Ukrainians or Russians by the authorities).
The singularity of the Armenia-Ukraine relationship arises because of the problems of the Ukraine-Russia relations. Ukrainian leadership can feel encouraged to view much of their own relationships through the prism of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” and “the friend of my enemy is my enemy”. Coupled with the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the occupation of a big portion of southeastern Ukraine by Russian forces, Ukraine can see itself closer to supporting Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and thus oppose Armenia because of its association with Russia. Stronger trade relations and military cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey has led to improvements in the relationship between Ukrainian and Azerbaijani authorities. As has been already mentioned, a silent majority in Armenia is upset by the fact that they were left alone by the world during the war of 2020. For them (as happens with many other conflicts such as in Yemen or Ethiopia) the current war in Ukraine shows a double standard regarding human suffering. What is more, Ukrainian officials have sometimes been excessively vocal about their support for Azerbaijan, stirring up sentiments among Armenians. An example of this is an already deleted tweet by the Verkhovna Rada official account celebrating Azerbaijani troop’s advances in Nagorno-Karabakh in March. Ukraine's Secretary of the Security Council also made declarations that opening new fronts against Russia in places such as Nagorno-Karabakh would be good for Ukraine. It is understandable that Ukraine wants to protect its own interests, but one cannot expect Armenians to not feel disappointed by these types of statements.
For the moment, Armenia faces several problems such as a security threat if Russia decides to pull troops out of Nagorno-Karabakh, potential rough handling if it does not clearly side with either Russia or the West, and high pressure from Turkey in order to normalize relations. Armenia’s official approach to the war in Ukraine, although not perfect, has managed to maintain a degree of neutrality. This is difficult given Armenia’s own fragile strategic situation where choosing between professed values and rights has to coexist with the harsh reality of geopolitical and security interests.