The Armenia-Azerbaijan issue: what led to the recent escalations in Nagorno-Karabakh, and what is to be expected in the future?
Introduction
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been in a long-standing dispute over the contested territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, internationally recognised as Azerbaijan’s territory, however, inhabited by an ethnic Armenian majority (around 120,000 people). Up until 2020, the situation in the region was categorised as a frozen conflict with occasional violent clashes. In September 2020, however, a full-scale war broke out between the two states over the disputed territory, resulting in the death of over 7,000 troops and around 170 civilians. After six weeks of fighting, a ceasefire agreement brokered by Russia resulted in the withdrawal of Armenian forces from significant parts of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, as well as seven surrounding regions that Azerbaijan now controls. Now the tensions have further escalated between the two countries.
Lachin Corridor
The Lachin corridor is the only highway and communication route linking Armenia with the Nagorno-Karabakh region. As of September 2022, the two sides have had border clashes, and in December 2022, media outlets reported various blockades on the Lachin corridor, blocking the movement of people and goods. More specifically, on 12 December 2022, demonstrators who claimed to be environmental activists blocked the route near the town of Shusha in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which effectively restricted the flow of essential goods, including food and medical equipment, to the region. Azerbaijan, however, denied its involvement in orchestrating the blockade and insisted that humanitarian supplies from inside Azerbaijan should be accepted by those living in the Nagorno-Karabakh region.
More recently, the 2020 peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan that guaranteed, under the supervision of Russian peacekeepers, the unrestricted use of the Lachin corridor, was overlooked. On 23 April 2023, the Azerbaijani forces installed checkpoints along the route as a way of consolidating power and control over the goods supplied to the contested region. As a justification, Azerbaijan accused Armenia of using the Lachin corridor to supply weapons to Nagorno-Karabakh, and highlighted that the corridor is internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan. Following various reports from the ICRC and the Red Cross expressing their inability to deliver humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in the region, numerous international actors, including France, Russia, the US, and the UN, called Azerbaijan to reopen the corridors. It was only after the elections held in the self-proclaimed independent republic in Nagorno-Karabakh, which were condemned by Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Ukraine, and the EU, that on 10 September 2023, the Azerbaijani government and the Armenian separatists appeared to come to an agreement in relation to the opening on the Lachin corridor. Regardless, it cannot be denied that the humanitarian situation within Nagorno-Karabakh further escalated the long-standing tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan and served as a stepping stone for the violence over the past month.
Escalation of tensions
On 1 September 2023, the Armenian Defence Ministry announced that three Armenian servicemen were killed on the border with Azerbaijan. The Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, also accused Azerbaijan of building their troops up along the line of the contested Nagorno-Karabakh regional border. Moreover, the Azerbaijani Defence Ministry reported that their troops were also targeted, two of which were injured, by “attack UAVs'' reportedly launched from Sotk, a village in Armenia. This bloodshed and accusations came weeks after Pashinyan stated that another war with Azerbaijan was ‘very likely’ given the recent collapses in negotiations brokered by the US, the EU and Russia over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh. Adding fuel to the fire, the Armenian Defence Ministry announced a joint war game, Eagle Partner 2023, with the US forces, held 11 – 20 September, which aimed at increasing interoperability between various peacekeeping missions. This joint drill can be seen as Armenia’s changing alliances and forging closer ties with the West, aiming to secure new support over the conflict after Russia failed to act as a security guarantor. Armenia also withdrew its representative in the CSTO military alliance following the bloc's failure to act in support of Armenia during Azerbaijan’s offensive on the border in September 2022.
The ‘anti-terrorist operation’
A landmine explosion in the Nagorno-Karabakh region on 19 September 2023 killed four soldiers and two civilians and led to Azerbaijan announcing an ‘anti-terrorist operation’ targeted at the Armenian military, breaking the Russian-brokered ceasefire agreement of 2020. Unlike in 2020, the Armenian forces did not defend the region during most of the 24-hour operation out of fear of further Azerbaijani aggression. Although denied by Azerbaijan, footage demonstrated that the operation targeted the Armenian military and civilians within the urban centre of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. The operation, which lasted a day before another ceasefire was agreed upon, killed more than 200 people, wounded over 400, and displaced at least 7,000. The ceasefire agreement between the Armenian separatists in the Nagorno-Karabakh region and Azerbaijan, mediated by Russia, entailed the complete disarmament and disbandment of Karabakh’s military forces by the Azerbaijanis, with the help of the 2,000 Russian peacekeepers on the ground. This included the handover of over 20,000 rounds of ammunition, six military vehicles, 800 small arms, and anti-tank weapons. Furthermore, as part of the ceasefire agreement, talks of integrating the enclave into Azerbaijan, a blow for Armenia’s hold over the region, was discussed, including the dismantling of all existing institutions and political positions within the region.
The operation was soon followed by a devastating explosion at a fuel storage depot in the Nagorno-Karabakh region that resulted in the death of 68 people, 105 missing, and nearly 300 injured. These developments have led to the decision undertaken by Nagorno-Karabakh authorities, in a decree signed by the region’s separatist President, Samvel Shakhramanyan, on 28 September, for the regional separatist state to cease existence as of 1 January 2024.
Regarding the ongoing humanitarian issue, Armenian leaders have also expressed concern for the thousands of ethnic Armenians in the region that are without food and shelter following the ceasefire, with reports identifying only 70 tonnes of aid and food being delivered to the region. The Armenian government has also announced that more than 70,000 refugees from the Nagorno-Karabakh region have fled to Armenia following the ‘anti-terrorist operation’ as well as the fuel storage explosion; that is around 85 per cent of the 120,000 ethnic Armenians that populated the region. Reports have however, pointed to a sentiment of abandonment from all sides (including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, as well as Western states and institutions) felt by ethnic Armenians who still remain in the Nagorno-Karabakh region and find themselves without food and shelter. The President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, has since assured ethnic Armenians that they will enjoy the right to their own language and culture following the ceasefire. However, many Armenians have been expressing their concerns over the ongoing violence, and what they refer to as ethnic cleansing within the region. These concerns are grounded in the region’s history, specifically, the evidence identified in the 2022 US State Department report concerning Armenian graves being vandalised by Azerbaijani soldiers, and other grave human rights violations against ethnic Armenian minorities, including torture and killing. As such, the UN spokesperson highlighted that ‘it’s essential that the rights of the displaced populations be protected and that they receive the humanitarian support they are owed’.
Why did Azerbaijan pursue an “anti-terrorist operation” in Nagorno-Karabakh?
Having assessed the recent developments in the region, it is still important to discuss why Azerbaijan decided on its military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh/Artsakh. Despite efforts to mediate the issue over the disputed region by Russia and the European Union, from Azerbaijan’s perspective, there is practically no incentive to negotiate with Armenia as the latter’s position remains comparatively weak during peace negotiation talks.
Firstly, assuming that Armenia would allocate its resources to protect the ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh/Artsakh, it should be observed that Armenia has a much smaller population and much less active personnel than Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has more than three times the population of Armenia as of 2022 and about 82,000 active military personnel compared to 47,000 of Armenia. Even more striking is the difference in military spending in US dollars: in 2022, Azerbaijan has allocated 2.99 billion dollars to military expenditure, whilst Armenia has spent about 795 million dollars in the military in the same year. This trend of increased military expenditure of Azerbaijan started in around 2005 when their military spending dipped but has since even peaked in 2014 at 3.43 billion dollars, which alludes to the military advantage Azerbaijan has in comparison to Armenia.
Secondly, analysing political and military allies is essential to understand the reasons for the Azerbaijani “anti-terrorist operation” in Nagorno-Karabakh/Artsakh and the consequences that this operation would have if there were a spillover to Armenia.
Russian Federation
For a long time, Armenia's main security partner was clearly Russia, as the two countries were part of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), which functions as a military alliance. Moreover, Russia was Armenia's primary weapons supplier in 2011-2020, accounting for almost 94% of Armenia's imports. However, following Russia's precedent of not intervening on Armenia's behalf under Article 4 of the CSTO Security Charter in 2022, it is unlikely that Russia would act on Armenia's behalf if Azerbaijan's operation extended to Armenian territory. Not only is Russia channelling its military resources towards its war effort against Ukraine, but recent developments have made it harder for Russia to intervene on behalf of Armenia. For example, as mentioned, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has recently undermined CSTO's effectiveness in its security commitment, particularly to Armenia, even stating that Armenia cannot rely on Russia to guarantee peace in the Caucasus region.
The Armenian parliament recently ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which currently has an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin. This action was not well received by the Russian Federation, which has held Armenia responsible for the recent events in Nagorno-Karabakh/Artsakh following Armenia's alleged shift to the West instead of continuing to work with Russia and Azerbaijan for peace in the region. This position has been particularly reinforced due to the previously mentioned US joint military exercise in Armenia.
European Union
Regarding the European Union, there have been mediating efforts from the EU with Armenian and Azerbaijani representatives who were to meet at the beginning of October 2023 in Spain under the auspices of France and Germany, which failed following Azerbaijan’s refusal to attend due to Türkiye’s absence. EU-Armenia relations have flourished after the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) that was established in 2021, as well as with the launch of the EU Civilian Mission in Armenia (EUMA) earlier this year. However, the EU has yet to be able to support Armenia diplomatically as the bloc lacks influence over Azerbaijan following the establishment of the EU-Azerbaijan gas deal set to double gas imports to the EU until 2027, which are crucial to European energy security.
India
Armenia and India appear to have recently expanded their military and political ties following the weapons deal established between the two countries to provide Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers (MBRL), anti-tank missiles, rockets and ammunition worth $250 million to Armenia. As Russia and Armenia distance themselves politically, India seems to be the country that might be attempting to fill the void in Armenia’s arms imports, thus increasing Armenia’s defence capacity vis-à-vis Azerbaijan.
United States of America
Relations between the United States and Armenia have improved in the last years, particularly after the United States’ recognition of the Armenian genocide of 1915, which has thus antagonised Türkiye, the prominent supporter of Azerbaijan. The close relations between the US and Armenia have been illustrated by the previously mentioned “Eagle Partner” military exercise organised in Armenia at the beginning of September 2023, which involved 175 Armenian and 85 US soldiers. This seems to be rather in accordance with Armenia’s shift to the West according to Russia, but it does not mean that the US would support Armenia in the detriment of Azerbaijan, considering that the territory of Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh is recognised as Azerbaijani by the US administration.
Iran
Looking south, Armenia could rely on Iran to protect its borders, but whether that is tactically beneficial for Iran is unclear. No formal agreement between Iran and Armenia enshrines any Iranian duty to protect Armenia in case of foreign invasion. Despite Iran allegedly providing support to Armenia during the 2020 border clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenia, it is unlikely that Iran would now explicitly support Armenia to the detriment of Azerbaijan to avoid any sort of uprisings that might erupt in Northern Iran, where about 20 million Azeris live. However, Iran’s ambassador to Armenia did reiterate that Armenia’s territorial integrity ought to be preserved one week after Azerbaijan’s “anti-terrorist operation”. Furthermore, Iran continues not to be keen on Azerbaijan having control over the Zangezur Corridor. Iran is also willing to counter Israel’s influence in the region; this is important to consider as Azerbaijan and Israel have extended military equipment exchanges, with Israel exporting almost 27% of arms transfers to Azerbaijan. Iran is in a position where it is hard to assess whether it would rise to be Armenia’s main ally in the region or if it would only oversee the events so as not to suffer from a spillover of the conflict onto Iran’s borders.
Israel
At the beginning of the year, at least 92 flights from Israel to Azerbaijan were reported, including extensive cargo planes containing weaponry. Considering that Israel comprises 27% of arms transfers to Azerbaijan, it is relevant to view Israel as an important supporter of Azerbaijani military efforts.
Türkiye
Despite only exporting 2,9% of the total weapons supply to Azerbaijan in the period 2011-2020, Türkiye remains one of the major supporters of Aliyev’s efforts; Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has even visited the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan after the start of the “anti-terrorist operation” to show support for Azerbaijan’s actions. The visit to Nakhchivan is important becauseAzerbaijan has an incentive to control the Zangezur Corridor, which connects mainland Azerbaijan with the Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia. Erdogan supports this initiative as he claims that it will finally unite the Turkic nations as the Nakhchivan exclave borders Türkiye. It is relevant for the Turkish President due to the deal signed between Azerbaijan and Türkiye, which includes the creation of a pipeline running through the Zangezur Corridor, providing natural gas to Türkiye without redirecting the supply through Georgia, and without having to pay the subsequent transit fees of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.
Conclusion
Armenia has a military disadvantage compared to Azerbaijan, specifically when looking at the amount of active personnel and military expenditure, which is significantly greater in Azerbaijan than in Armenia. In terms of political and military supporters, Armenia can no longer rely on the Russian Federation, specifically with its obligation to protect Armenian territory in accordance with Article 4 of the CSTO Security Charter. The support of the European Union, the United States and Iran has been minimal, and India simply plays the role of military weapons exporter to Armenia. On the other hand, Azerbaijan continued to rely on the strong support of Türkiye and the weapons exports from Israel. Concerning the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh/Artsakh, the “anti-terrorist operation” has not resulted in a major diplomatic backlash towards Azerbaijan, as the region is recognised worldwide as part of Azerbaijani territory. This has left Armenia in a weak position to negotiate peace with Azerbaijan, thus granting Azerbaijani President Aliyev little incentive to come to an agreement with Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan. Ultimately, the “anti-terrorist operation” has led to the Armenian recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, including the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, which has subsequently led to the exodus of ethnic Armenians towards Armenia.
The challenges going forward
Similar to the protests held in 2020, Armenians now feel powerless and have gone to the streets of the capital, Yerevan, to accuse the Prime Minister of betrayal and surrender; however, they are unable to provide suggestions for ways to move forward in the situation. The international community's reaction to the recent developments in the conflict was insufficient to halt Azerbaijan's use of force in the region, and soon, with other arising disputes around the globe, the developments in Nagorno-Karabakh may disappear from news headlines.
However, the historic grievances, the humanitarian difficulties, and the ethnic-Armenian opposition to being under Azerbaijan's rule may pose serious challenges in the future for all parties involved in the conflict. In this vein, how the situation will evolve for the displaced population in Nagorno-Karabakh is unclear, as some flee the country, hide in basements, or seek help from Russian peacekeepers. Additionally, Azerbaijan's rapid recapture of Nagorno-Karabakh may even further affect the power dynamics within the region, impacting the differing interests of Western states, Russia, and Türkiye. With Russia no longer being Armenia's closest ally, it is unclear whom Armenia will now seek support from, and it seems that Western states and the EU are not prepared to get involved and protect Armenians. Similarly, what will be decided by Russia and Azerbaijan on the presence of Russian peacekeepers on the ground and how this decision will be affected by the war in Ukraine in the coming months is also unclear.
Furthermore, with the Zangezur Corridor being at the forefront of Azerbaijan's strategic objective, coupled with Armenia's desire to discontinue reliance on Russia's security forces for border protection, one may anticipate an escalation of tensions. Moreover, Aliyev's interest in connecting mainland Azerbaijan to the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan has garnered more stakeholder interest in the Zangezur Corridor, from Türkiye specifically. This situation may invoke further tensions in the future and may catalyse further conflict between the two countries. Ultimately, this 'resolution' of the conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh region does not indicate that Armenia and Azerbaijan won't face issues in the future; long-term peace is arguably still far away.