Changing Face of the Visegrád Group. Elections and 2024 Outlook
Executive Summary:
The Visegrád Group (V4) was established to coordinate accession to the EU. Its unity has been shattered by differing stances on the conflict in Ukraine.
Concerns over democratic backsliding in Viktor Orban’s Hungary have fragmented the group. Hungary is isolated as Slovakia, Poland and Czechia distance themselves.
Elections in Slovakia (30 September) and Poland (15 October) look set to change dynamics within the group.
Following Robert Fico’s victory in Slovakia and the prospect of a PiS victory in Poland in October, the V4 could evolve to undermine support for Ukraine at the European level. This would be particularly so if they can find common cause with Orbán’s Hungary. This could be likely should a dispute over Ukrainian grain imports continue.
1 Introduction:
The V4 is a loosely institutionalised political and cultural grouping of four countries in Central Europe: Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Created to facilitate accession to Euro-Atlantic institutions, it has functioned as an effective platform for projecting the interests of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries onto the European stage. However, its erstwhile unity has been fragmented by differing approaches to the conflict in Ukraine and concern over the state of democracy in Hungary and Poland. Following the results of Slovakia’s election (30 September) and predicted outcomes of the Polish election on the 30th October, both elections look set to install governments which will toe more explicit anti-EU and pro-Russian lines.This is a critical juncture which will weaken resolve for Ukraine in the CEE region. The V4 grouping could evolve to project those views on a regional, European basis.
2.1 The Visegrád Group - Recent Context, Changing Purpose:
The V4 was created in the context of the non-violent collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989. The Visegrád Declaration was signed in 1991 by representatives of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, Poland and Hungary. As a non-institutionalised political alliance, it explicitly sought accession to the “[...] European political and economic system”, including institutions such as the European Community (EC) and NATO. Cooperation is conducted at multiple levels, ranging from mayoral meetings, think-tank and cultural institution collaboration, up to high-level diplomatic meetings. Following the accession of all V4 members to the EU in 2004, the group has since re-focused its strategy on reinforcing cooperation between members in a number of areas. It now functions as a unified regional voice for Central European interests within the EU arena. This political unity was particularly evident in the aftermath of the 2015 European Migrant crisis, when the V4 group resolutely opposed EU plans for a quota system to relocate refugees across member states. Such opposition was rooted in a shared ‘Visegrád’ identity, which some member states interpreted as proof of an ‘east-west’ divide in Europe. As a crucial sub-group in the geographical heart of the EU, it has voiced regional concerns across areas of EU legislation.
The V4’s effectiveness as a cooperative platform is dependent on an internal coherence by which members contact members of the alliance to coordinate their stance on policy, prior to consulting countries outside the group. However, this coherence is compromised where member states are misaligned on a policy issue. Two contemporary issues have exposed deep fissures within the group, hampering its ability to act as a strategic actor within the EU.
2.2 The First Cleavage - Democratic Backsliding:
The Visegrád Group has been fragmented by a growing divergence between Hungary and Poland on the one hand, and Czechia and Slovakia, in terms of the state of democracy and rule of law. Czechia and Slovakia have voiced their concern over perceived democratic backsliding in Budapest and Warsaw. Both Poland and Hungary share entrenched illiberal governments, governed by Andrzej Duda’s Law and Justice Party (PiS) and Orbán’s Fidesz Party respectively. The loudest members of the V4, both countries have challenged the EU on areas ranging from the rule of law and subsidiarity to LGBTQ+ rights. This shared ideological position has fomented a relationship based on isolation vis-à-vis the EU. Each veto’s punishment’s dispensed by the EU for fundamental breaches of values under Article 7 of the EU’s founding treaty. This is the continuation of a fraternal Poland-Hungary relationship which is expressed in commonality on key issues.
However, the position of Warsaw and Budapest as increasingly illiberal disruptors within the EU increases the cost of association for Czechia and Slovakia. In particular, the latter members are concerned with the reputational damage done to the V4 grouping in Brussels by Hungary and Poland’s intransigence. The governments of Czechia and Slovakia have sought to distance themselves from the illiberalism of Poland and Hungary by pursuing a pro-EU agenda. The election of former foreign minister Petr Fiala as PM of Czechia in December 2021 marked the country’s explicit turn towards the EU. Moreover, as the V4’s only Eurozone member, Slovakia was more inclined to pursue pro-EU policies. It also expressed concern over backsliding in Hungary, particularly from Slovakia’s outspoken Atlanticist Minister of Foreign Affairs (2022-2023), Rastislav Káčer This has led to the formation of a ‘V2 + V2’ format, denoting a deep fissure over whether the CEE region should fundamentally work within the structures of the EU, or outside of it.
2.3 The Second Cleavage - War in Ukraine:
The second, potentially more potent, fissure afflicting the Visegrád Group concerns Orbán’s stance over the war in Ukraine. Given the geographic intimacy of the conflict, with three out of four V4 countries sharing a border with Ukraine, members recognised it was in their immediate interest to quickly provide Ukraine with unprecedented levels of support. Poland has asserted itself as the chief Ukraine hawk within the EU, enhancing its strategic standing within both the EU and NATO. Both Czechia and Slovakia have also taken determinative steps to support Ukraine, providing military aid, including crucial MiG-29 fighters from Slovak Air Force inventories, as well as ‘soft’ support for aid packages and refugees.
However, Orbán’s refusal to adopt a pro-Ukraine line whilst reinforcing ties with Putin’s Russia has shattered any ostensible cooperation the V4 once enjoyed. Budapest has refused to send weapons to Kyiv and maintains a tepid relationship with the Ukrainian leadership. In particular, Orbán’s perceived ‘neutrality’ on the Ukraine issue has severed the historically strong, productive bilateral relationship between Hungary and Poland. Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki of Poland’s ruling PiS publicly stated that “[..] Poland and Hungary have parted ways” in July 2022. No high-level official meetings have occurred since then. This has fundamentally impacted the ability of the V4 to function. Crucially, it means that Warsaw and Budapest can no longer rely on the other to veto proceedings brought by the Commission under Article 7, increasing the cost of disobedience to Brussels.
Opposition to Hungary’s intransigence in Prague, Bratislava and Warsaw has led to the cancellation of high-level meetings of the group, including a meeting of defence ministers planned in March 2022. Hungary’s position on the war in Ukraine has thus halted the ability of the V4 to act as a cooperative group, or do anything at all. Officials from Czechia and Slovakia, without decrying the total demise of the group, have signalled that they do not believe it can function in the current geopolitical climate. The Czech minister for EU affairs Mikuláš Bek (2021-2023) stated in 2022 that the V4 is not dead, but it is “[...] taking a rest or a pause”. In a similar vein, Slovak foreign minister Ivan Korčok signalled his desire to “[...] significantly mute the foreign policy dimension” of the group.
3.1 Elections in Slovakia and Poland - Implications for the Visegrád Four:
Heading into the final quarter of 2023, the outlook for the Visegrád Group looks pretty bleak. With Hungary isolated both within the EU and the V4 itself, a ‘V3 + 1’ dynamic is emerging. Other multilateral formats, including the ‘Slavkov trilateral’ of Czechia, Slovakia and Austria and the ‘Bucharest Nine’ (B9) continue to look like more consequential European players. However, elections in Slovakia (30 September) and Poland (15 October) could lead to government changes with the potential to reconcile differences within the V4, particularly with Orbán’s Hungary. Whilst this could repair the ability of the V4 to function as a geopolitical player, it does not bode well for levels of resolve for Ukraine in Europe, particularly in CEE countries.
3.2 Poland’s PiS - A Waning Ukraine Hawk:
In a populist bid to secure votes in Poland’s agricultural eastern region, the PiS government has vowed to stop supplying weapons to Kyiv amid a dispute over Ukraine’s grain exports. Should PiS win a third term in power, which polls indicate is a likely scenario, then resolve for Ukraine in a key CEE country would be greatly diminished. This assessment hinges on the assumption that Poland’s PiS will continue to be willing to make Ukraine-related concessions to bolster its domestic support. This will be particularly so if the far-right Confederation Party, which pushed PiS to ban Ukrainian grain, secures enough votes to act as a powerbroker in the aftermath of the election. The outcome of the Polish election matters for the dynamics of the Visegrád Group because if the PiS government is re-elected for another term, it increases the possibility of a rapprochement with Hungary. As proposed here, the looming threat of rule-of-law proceedings could encourage Polish PM Mateusz Morawiecki to pragmatically overlook Hungary’s pro-Russian stance to secure a fellow traveller in its disputes with the EU.
This would solidify the V2 + V2 dynamic previously evident within the group. it would also reduce Hungary’s recent isolation within the group, particularly if Poland’s staunchly pro-Ukraine stance is tempered by electoral concerns. The continuance of a dispute over Ukrainian grain imports could also mend the rift between Warsaw and Budapest, which were united in their imposition of Ukrainian grain bans. It revives the dynamism of the Visegrád Group, though the group that it resuscitates could be harmful for pro-Ukraine sentiment in Eastern Europe, particularly if the platform is used to project concerns over support for Ukraine onto the European stage. This is concerning for supporters of Ukraine when contextualised against the latest opinion poll conducted by GLOBSEC across CEE countries, which pointed to a slight softening of opinion on the war in Ukraine, particularly in Slovakia and Bulgaria. However, the strongly pro-Ukraine stances of Czechia and Slovakia prior to these elections should be noted. This could temper any move away from a pro-Ukraine stance by the V4.
3.3 Slovakia Election Results - Victory for the EU’s ‘Awkward Squad’?
The Polish government’s waning support for Ukraine is particularly concerning in the context of the results of the Slovakian elections. Held on the 30th September, this snap election comes early following the no-confidence motion and collapse of the coalition government (2021-2022), headed by Prime Minister Eduard Heger, in December 2022. Heger’s caretaker government stepped down in May of this year, being replaced by a technocratic administration led by Ľudovít Ódor, the central bank deputy governor. The opposition Smer-SD leftwing populist party, led by former prime minister Robert Fico, consistently polled on top during 2023, notwithstanding a last minute surge in support for the liberal Progressive Slovakia party, led by Michal Šimečka. On the day, Fico’s Smer received a commanding 23 percent of the vote, whilst the Progressive Slovakia party came a distant second at 17.96 percent of the vote. This was also an election ecosystem awash with Russian disinformation, particularly concerning pro-Kremlin talking points on the conflict in Ukraine and attacks on LGBTQ+ rights. Having campaigned on an anti-Ukrainian platform, Fico’s victory has set alarm bells ringing in Brussels and Washington at the prospect of another pro-Russia, Orbán-esque member of the EU’s ‘Awkward Squad’. He doubled down on this rhetoric following his victory, proposing that Slovakians “[...] have bigger problems than Ukraine”. Orbán quickly affirmed the affinity between his brand of politics and that of Fico, posting a congratulatory ‘Guess who’s back!’ tweet the day after the election.
Robert Fico is not a new figure within Slovakian politics, nor is his left-wing populist Smer party unknown. Fico had previously served as prime minister during three previous terms, from 2006-2010 and 2012-2018. In recent years, his politics have increasingly been characterised by conspiracy theory bent. Fico was forced to resign in 2018 following the murder of Ján Kuciak, an investigative journalist looking into links between members of the Slovakian government and Italian organised crime. As large protests rallied in Bratislava decrying the Slovakian government, Fico suggested that George Soros was behind attempts to destabilise the state. Fico has since been accused of turning Slovakia into a ‘mafia state’, resounding with voter frustration with an administration that was perceived to be operating outside the norms of democratic law and order.
European capitals and EU institutions are concerned that Fico’s victory creates a natural ally for Orbán in his attempts to torpedo EU sanctions packages for Ukraine and arms deliveries via veto. However, a couple of points may allay fears in European capitals. Firstly, the necessity of forming a coalition to govern may force Fico and Smer to temper some of their more explicitly pro-Russian, EU-sceptic positions. The third-place Hlas party, led by former PM and ally of Fico Peter Pellegrini will likely emerge as a kingmaker in coalition negotiations. The strength of support for the liberal Progressive Slovakia (PS) party at 18% should also not be discounted. Secondly, Fico has previously demonstrated a degree of pragmatism in his foreign policy. During his previous terms, he sought to place Slovakia within the ‘core’ mainstream of the EU and NATO. Though the geopolitical environment has since changed in Europe, the possibility that Fico could pursue a similar strategy should not be overlooked. It is worth also considering the strength of a young civil society in Slovakia, aptly demonstrated by the aforementioned mass protests of 2018. This could inhibit Fico from taking Slovakia in a direction which fundamentally compromises its Western EU and NATO credentials.
4.1 Why this Matters for the Visegrád Group and Europe:
Although the political stance of Fico’s administration remains unclear, it seems likely that Fico will want to pull Slovakia into Orbán’s pro-Russian orbit. This creates a natural ally for Orbán within the Visegrád Group, reducing Budapest’s isolation within the group. It returns the group to a ‘V2 + V2’ format, or potentially a ‘V3 + V1’ depending on the direction of the Poland-Hungary bilateral relationship after the October election, and whether a new PiS government will find common ground with Budapest. Indeed, despite divisions over Hungary’s pro-Russian stance, Poland and Hungary were united in their imposition of a ban on Ukrainian grain. This would leave Czechia particularly isolated within the group as it pursues its strongly pro-EU, staunchly pro-Ukrainian course.
From a European-wide perspective, Fico’s victory coupled with a win for Poland’s PiS in October poses several obstacles. It creates a natural ally for Orbán in his efforts to undermine the EU’s unity and ability to support Ukraine in repulsing Russia, also reducing his erstwhile isolation within the bloc. This will have manifold implications for the functioning of EU foreign policy in the medium-term. These two election outcomes may actually increase the utility of the Visegrád Group as a forum of coordinating common interests between Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. This was particularly evident when the V4 countries called on the EU commission to tighten controls on Ukrainian grain imports to protect their domestic agricultural markets. In fact, it was this same dispute over grain imports which prompted Poland to suspend supplies of munitions to Ukraine. However, should these three countries find common ground on Ukraine, then the V4 group, as a consequential sub-group within the bloc, could seriously undermine the EU’s ability to support Ukraine. In the context of Republican opposition to further funding for Ukraine in Washington, this is a concerning development for all those who wish to see Ukraine repel Russia.
4.2 Scenarios:
PiS wins another term in Poland’s October election and Fico forms a coalition government with the third-place Hlas party. Both countries find common cause with Orbán’s Hungary and the V4 group evolves as a troublemaker within the EU, frustrating efforts to support Ukraine by vetoing aid packages and sanctions. This will be particularly likely if a dispute over Ukrainian grain imports continues. Czechia’s isolation within the alliance deepens.
The Polish opposition, led by Donald Task and the Civic Platform Party (PO), wins the election. Poland pursues a pro-EU, pro-Ukraine line similarly to Czechia. This restores a ‘V2 + V2’ format within the Visegrád Group. The alliance remains largely paralysed by divisions.
As suggested by Matt Boyse of GIS Reports, the V4 group loses its relevance as a geopolitical player due to divisions between members, with other relationships being prioritised. Other multilateral formats, including the ‘Bucharest Nine’ and ‘Three Seas Initiative’ gain prominence as vehicles for promoting regional interests within Europe.