Antarctic Claims: Racing for the seas and not the lands - Argentina and Chile
As part of London Politica’s Geopolitics on the Periphery Programme, our newest addition, the Antarctic Claims project is set to examine the geopolitical implications surrounding the division of the world’s least populated continent. This project consists of four articles organized in a series, each approaching the issue from the perspective of one or two countries that have any direct claims in the land. This is the second out of the four articles, discussing Chile’s and Argentina’s involvement in Antarctica.
Due to its proximity to the continent, Latin America as a whole has taken an important role in the exploration of Antarctica. Standing out, however, are Argentina and Chile, who have historically led the charge in the institutionalization and exploration of the south pole. These two nations have stood together as a counterbalance to British interests in the region. Nonetheless, Chile’s and Argentina’s geographical position vis à vis Antarctica have also been sources of geopolitical and diplomatic tensions: notably, regarding the ownership of the continental shelves around the Zona Austral. In addition, China has also entered the stage leveraging investments to secure the Argentian south as a staging area for its Antarctic ambitions.
Competing claims
Argentina’s claim in the Antarctic continent spans 965 314 km² of land and 496 283 km² of sea, a total of 1 461 597 km². This territory, known as the Argentinian Antarctic Sector (AAS) is defined by the 60th South parallel and the South Pole, and the 25º and 74º West longitude meridians and is considered to be a part of the Tierra de Fuego province within the Argentinian federal system. Buenos Aires currently operates thirteen bases in the continent, six of which are manned all year round. While the Argentinian Ministry of Exterior Relations is charged with managing two of these installations, the other eleven fall under the Ministry of Defense.
On the contrary, according to a 1955 decree, Chile holds an overlapping claim defined by the 53º and 90º West longitude meridians with no northern or southern limit. This Chilean Antarctic Territory (CAT) spans a total of 1 250 257,6 km² and is considered a part of the Magallanes region within the Chilean federal system. Santiago currently operates 10 Antarctic bases through the Chilean Antarctic Institute, a branch of their Ministry of Exterior Relations.
The main rivalry in this territory of the Antarctic continent takes place between Argentina and the United Kingdom. There is a significant overlap between the territory claimed by Buenos Aires and that held by London, defined from the 60th parallel to the South Pole and between the longitudes of 20°W and 80°. Because of Argentina’s and the United Kingdom’s history of conflict, this overlap represents a source of tension for both countries.
While Chile’s and Argentina’s territorial claims in Antarctica do overlap, tension between the countries is defused through the Antarctic Treaty System of 1959 (ATS) and a series of bilateral legal instruments. As parties of the ATS, Chile and Argentina are unable make new claims in the continent or expand their existing Antarctic territories. Furthermore, both countries maritime claims in the waters near Antarctica where delimitated by the 1985 Peace and Friendship Treaty which ought to avoid an armed conflict between them. Chile and Argentina thus currently enjoy a stable relationship vis à vis their Antarctic claims on land.
Argentinian Antarctic Sector
Chilean Antarctic Territory
Competition over continental shelves
The territorial delimitations of both countries’ sea claims are, however, a different kind. Chile and Argentina are currently engaged in a territorial dispute concerning the boundaries of their maritime jurisdictions in the Zona Austral sea, per the aforementioned 1985 Treaty. The controversy began in 2009 when Argentina, seeking to expand its claim to the maritime territories between the southernmost tip of the continent and Antarctica, sought approval from the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), a part of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) international regime. This expansion was greenlit in 2017 which prompted a negative reaction from Santiago. After the exchange of several diplomatic notes, Chile’s Ministry of Exterior Relations issued a decree that modified the country’s continental shelf claim in the zona Austral and causing a significant overlap with Argentina’s. The result: a territorial dispute that spans 5 300 km².
According to the UN a coastal State’s continental shelf consists of “the submerged prolongation of the land territory of the coastal State - the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance”.
Chile and Argentina both are interested in this territorial delimitation because it determines lawful access and commercial rights under the applicable international legal framework. Under the 2017 CLPS decision, Argentina would expand its continental shelf by 35% and grant Buenos Aires the exclusive right to the natural resources found therein. Namely, seafloor-dwelling fish resources and all sources of oil and gas.
Argentina’s Continental Shelf Claims (CLCS Approved and Disputed Areas)
Some areas that have been claimed by Argentina in its CLCS Submission could not be considered by the commission due to ongoing disputes or the ATS.
Image courtesy of; P. Willetts, Delimitation of the Argentine Continental Shelf, (London: South Atlantic Council, Occasional Paper No. 14, updated version, September 2016), available from http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/SAC/OP/OP14UPDT.HTM
A new player from East Asia?
Latin American interests in the Antarctic are also a part of a larger geopolitical game. China has notably become a disruptive force having recently entered the region. Although Beijing currently does not hold any territorial claims in the continent, it does operate 4 research installations. China’s ambitions for Antarctica, however, are much grander and involve Latin America.
While three out of four of the Chinese bases are not located inside any of the previously discussed claims, China does operate one base within Argentinian territory known as Great Wall Station. Still, this can hardly be considered a source of tension between Beijing and Buenos Aires. Particularly, because of the recent memorandum both countries have signed regarding Argentina’s adhesion to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Argentina and China also have a history of joint projects that strengthen Beijing’s geopolitical position in Antarctica. For instance, there is the construction of the Chinese-operated Espacio Lejano Station, a radio station located in Patagonia. Some have expressed concern over this installation’s military applications, especially in relation to Beijing’s space programme.
China is also currently building a cargo port connected to the BRI in the city of Ushuaia in southern Argentina. Furthermore, Beijing is reportedly seeking to build a relay station for its ocean monitoring satellite network in Zhongshan research base located in eastern Antarctica. It seems then that these Chinese investments in Argentina are part of a larger scheme to secure stronger and easier access to Antarctica.
Implications for the future
As we look towards the future, we should expect continued competition over this stretch of maritime territory. Chile’s president, Gabriel Boric Font, has stated during his first official visit to Argentina that his administration intends to compartmentalize this controversy and preserve goodwill between Santiago and Buenos Aires in order to find a diplomatic solution. However, given the importance of both the resources that can be found in the disputed continental shelves and the symbolic value of these territories, the road to a peaceful resolution will likely be long and complicated.
By the same token, the origin of this controversy could represent a prelude to a new dynamic of geopolitical competition in the Antarctic. In effect, Argentina’s summoning of the CLCS could lead to a politicization of the continental shelves located around the Antarctic continent. This is significant because, unlike land-based claims which are frozen under the Antarctic Treaty System, maritime claims can be modified and disputed under UNCLOS. Argentina is the first state to pursue this strategy in Antarctica.
Regarding China, the harmonization of Chinese and Argentine relations regarding Antarctica are undoubtedly going to contribute to an atmosphere of tension between them and western powers, notably the United Kingdom. While the ATS will continue to hold as a defuser of conflict in the region, its hypothetical breakdown would give gateway nations - such as Chile and Argentina - an even greater importance in polar geopolitics.
On the road ahead, Argentina and Chile would do well to manoeuvre around China’s Antarctic ambitions. However, if Beijing is left unchecked to expand into the south pole through Latin America, it could push towards a reformulation of the ATS that would include the possibility of resource exploitation and a potential opening up of territorial claims. With this, a new era of fiercer great power competition in Antarctic geopolitics would begin.