Chinese Policy in the Arctic: Alaska, United States
Nowadays, any discussion of Sino-American relations is bound to end up in the territory of great power geopolitical competition. And though it is seldom mentioned directly, nowhere does this hold true more consequentially, as far as the Arctic region is concerned, than in the US state of Alaska. This region, once a hotbed of geopolitical competition with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, seems to be gaining in importance once more, even as new competitors to United States global hegemony emerge. With the northernmost third of its landmass located in the Arctic Circle, Alaska’s Arctic territory includes the maritime areas of the Arctic Ocean, the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas, and the Aleutian Islands. This puts the state at a very strategic point in the global economy, particularly in terms of trade routes and the exploitation of natural resources. It is thus no surprise that it has been called “the most strategic place on earth” as early as 1935. As was the case with most of the other Arctic nations, this strategic importance and the economic benefits that may be derived from falling ice levels around the region have been its chief attraction for, among others, China. Cooperation on trade, investment, tourism, and scientific research are thus well underway. Furthermore, Chinese presence in Alaska is not negligible, and thus is increasingly getting on the radar of US military services, whose rediscovered interest in the Arctic owes no small part to China’s own ambitions.
Economic interests - Trade and energy
For China, the chief attraction of Alaska’s Arctic territories appears economic in nature, and particularly in the seafood, fishing, energy, and mineral industries. China imports upwards of $1 billion of seafood from Alaska, which in turn accounts for approximately 54% of the state’s export in this sector. These numbers are substantial, but far from surprising when considering that the Bering Sea is home to some of the most important commercial fisheries in the world. Managed by the Federal fisheries of Alaska (a joint State and Federal government organisation), it also supports one of the largest groundfish fisheries - pollock, cod, flatfish, and rockfish - as well as further crucial sources of salmon, herring, octopus, squid, and halibut, all of which are in continuously high demand in East Asian countries, chiefly among them, China.
At the same time, although seafood is the biggest source of exports to China, lead, gold mineral ores and petroleum byproducts - minerals and energy - are not far behind. As it slowly phases out fossil fuels as its main source of energy, China finds itself increasingly dependent on imports of new energy sources from abroad. For instance, out of its total exports of crude oil, 80% went to China in 2020. In addition, in Alaska a considerable portion of untapped natural gas reserves, especially in the form of LNG, are thus one such potent source, as well as providing beneficial economic cooperation for the state itself. In 2014, a joint investment with Sinopec, the Bank of China, and China Investment Corporation began to finance the development of an LNG pipeline from the North Slope to the Pacific Ocean. China is the second largest importer of LNG in the world; nevertheless, the agreement has been termed disadvantageous for Alaska. Besides Chinese investors carrying 75% of the costs, the state’s economy overall has been on the decline since 2012, and Alaska thus has comparatively more to lose in case of the project’s failure.
Image 1: The proposed LNG pipeline funded by Chinese investment
On the other hand, energy independence is considered an important source of US global power, with more voices arguing that such development should be reserved to fulfil domestic energy needs. Such was the case with the Willow oil and gas project managed by the National Petroleum Reserve, under which the US would be able to obtain an estimated 600 million barrels of oil. Although initially approved by the Trump administration, the project was overturned in an Alaskan state court ruling in 2021, before being re-approved by the Biden administration on a smaller scale. Nevertheless, the project has come up against a growing number of climate activists, within the state and nationally, concerned with the allegedly insufficient evaluation of environmental risk that its process would entail. Whatever the result of this national debate, however, China looks to gain from Alaska’s energy export, and does not seem to lose much if it does not take place.
Social and cultural exchange
While comprising a smaller portion of bilateral relations between China and Alaska, a growing area of cooperation can also be observed in tourism and cultural exchange. The former, consisting mainly of Northern Light sightings, but also increasingly Arctic Ocean cruises, included approximately 10,000 visitors from China in 2018. Such activity was, furthermore, encouraged by the previous governor of Alaska, Bill Walker, under whose leadership cooperation between the US state and China grew faster than under previous, or subsequent administrations. During this time, Alaska also developed a “sister state/sister province” relationship with Heilongjiang Province in central China, with ongoing talks about the introduction of a direct air route between Anchorage and its sister-capital Harbin. Nevertheless, bilateral and international cooperation of this sort often comes up against numerous legal obstacles, not the least of which are the matter of constitutional jurisdiction, strategy, and national security.
Issues of jurisdiction - Security and Arctic affairs
Chinese bilateral relations with the state of Alaska are complicated by the fact that according to the US Constitution, no state may conduct international affairs on its own. Therefore, any and all relations with China necessarily proceed from the Federal government. This has the unintended result of not only complicating relations for Alaska on the state level, but effectively dragging it into the centre of any and all geopolitical competition between the United States and China in the Arctic region. In other words, Sino-Alaskan relations are regarded chiefly through the prism of national security and broader Arctic geostrategy.
Nor is it a completely unfounded perspective. Since the advent of China’s greater interest in the region, there have been a number of incidents around the Arctic territories of Alaska that have raised eyebrows by their security implications for the United States. For instance, Chinese military vessels have been spotted off the coast of Alaska no less than three separate times (September 2015, August 2021, and September 2022), the latest occurrence involving a joint patrol with Russian vessels. While, in each of these instances, the US Coast Guard proclaimed the vessels to be operating “in accordance with international rules and norms”, the move gives credence to fears that China might seek to project its power and influence across the Arctic region, even as Chinese media proclaim this alarm over the supposed ‘Chinese threat’ a “speculation”. In the realm of Arctic governance, some of this uneasiness is no doubt due to the ‘expiration date’ of the ATS, as well as the 2037 end to the CAOFA (banning fishing in the high seas portion of the central Arctic Ocean), both of which give China the opportunity to push for renegotiation with more advantageous terms. As a result, all major US military services have worked to create Arctic-specific national security documents recently, especially as the ‘foot-traffic’ and therefore the responsibilities facing the US Coast Guard increase. The Federal government has also worked to limit Chinese influence in Alaska specifically, and the Arctic region generally, prohibiting the development of telecommunications technology (especially from companies like Huawei and ZTE Corporation), and even proposing to purchase Greenland under the auspices of national and regional security. China has, it seems, prompted a returned focus of the United States on its northernmost territory and on the Arctic region as a whole.
Conclusion
Although greatly overshadowed by general geopolitical and economic competition between the United States and China, Alaska, as the Arctic portion of US territory, boasts quite a significant portion of Sino-American relations. With its strategic location and wealth of natural and energy resources, it is easy to envisage as the centre of the continual drama that is Arctic geopolitics. At the same time, Alaska is caught in a balancing act between its state interests and considerations of broader US national security and economic interest. As a result of decisions made in Washington D.C., Alaska has not once suffered the consequences of decreased trade with its largest investor and trading partner. At the same time, Chinese lobbying presence in the state legislature and continued need for further investment in infrastructure and natural resource development make it a relatively vulnerable point for the United States overall. With the necessary technology for Arctic security allegedly lagging behind that of Russia, and even China, the United States might not be so wrong to turn its attention up north once more. While it would be too early to proclaim a new ‘cold war’, with the current state of Sino-American, as well as Sino-Russian relations, Alaska, and its important connection to the Arctic region, can no longer be ignored.