Ghanaian electricity: the triumph of competitive politics over good governance
On 26th May, Ghana’s government tried to propose a restructuring of the US$1.58 billion of debt owed to various private power producers. The producers have rejected this proposal and threatened to cut off the power supply, which could cause a third power crisis within the last decade. These power crises are part of a larger consistent failure to provide basic electricity to the citizens of Ghana; It exemplifies the failure of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) and the Good Governance Agenda of the 1980s. This article will explore how commercialisation can fail in a culture of competitive politics.
Electricity has been a front-running issue in Ghanaian politics since its founding President Kwame Nkrumah’s belief that building the Akosombo Dam, the third biggest dam in the world in terms of water capacity, would bring developmental leaps. The succeeding presidents including President Jerry Rawlings, the first democratically elected President, used the extension of the electric grid to draw votes, making electricity a critical measure of political success and developing a norm that electricity provision is a core responsibility of the government. This has led leaders to intervene frequently in the privatised energy sector to increase electric grid sizes (making it one of the biggest in West Africa). The political structure also allows the president to have a say in the decisions of the supposedly ‘independent’ Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC) since he has the power to appoint board members. Ghana adopted the IMF’s SAP in 1995 when its inflation rates were over 100%. Under the Standard Reform Model, Ghana allowed private management of their electrical facilities.
Fast forward to August 2012, the anchor of a pirate ship ruptured on the West African Pipeline, inflicting a GDP loss of US$320-924 million. This external element is only the tip of the iceberg. The underlying issue for such a large GDP loss (an estimated 4%) was that the remaining power generation capacity required crude oil, which was more expensive than pipeline gas. This led to high debts within the producing companies; the Volta River Authority (VRA) and the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG). Furthermore, Government subsidies and financial support were insufficient for these companies to continue ordering fuel, despite multiple requests. For example, The VRA requested amelioration for six cargoes of light crude but was only provided with finance for three. As such, the government played a significant role in the elongation of the crisis. A central problem can be traced back to the inefficiency of Ghana’s large electricity grid. Incumbents often expanded the grid in hopes of demonstrating their continued dedication to providing electricity, but large parts of these grids are unmonitored and suffer from severe reliability issues. This can be traced back to show how competitive politics has compounded the severity of the crisis.. With the 2012 General Elections scheduled for December of the same year,, there was a further electorally motivated intervention to prevent tariff rises, increasing profit and allowing the companies to order more fuel. This resulted in the inability of the VRA to pay the fuel suppliers, thus further elongating the crisis.
Without sufficient investigation into the underlying issues of the price of fuel and the lack of capital to invest in them, the government signed 43 new contracts for primarily thermal power plants taking the total electricity capacity (assuming sufficient fuel is provided) from 1GW to 5GW.. The then President John Mahama did little due diligence and circumvented officials in the Energy Commission who had predicted energy demand of 3,000 to 4,000MW by 2020. The simplest way to mitigate this oversupply would be for Ghana to become an electricity exporter in the region; however, this did not materialise due to high tariffs, poor infrastructure, and neighbouring countries wanting to be self-reliant after previous experiences of shortage. This overabundance has driven government debt to US$1.4 billion, which is approximately 4% of GDP. Furthermore, these contracts were used to create thermal power plants instead of implementing the planned hydropower plants including Micro-Hydro Western Rivers Scheme and the Juale Dam. Focusing on increasing electricity capacity instead of the fundamental cash flow and reliability issues can be best explained as an electorally driven solution which demonstrates the incumbent’s continued dedication to providing electricity by investing in tangible infrastructure instead of actually solving the electricity crisis in the long run.
These two crises show the failure of the Standard Reform Model in a highly competitive political situation. The market mechanism, commercialisation and separation had no effect in a country where governments continue to intervene to meet short-term political objectives. Since tariff increases meant a loss of power, it was impossible for leaders to divert resources to achieve long-term stability and instead focus on unsustainable practices like low tariffs.
Today, Ghana is set to default on loans by the IMF and has been in talks with the G20 to restructure its external debts. While the IMF is imposing more stringent conditions on loans, its leaders have also been cosying up to the Chinese to help solve their debt crisis, leading to increasing tensions with the United States. If this gridlock continues, the Ghanaian people would either be buried in further debt or have to face another electricity shortage crisis.
Cover image: “Ghana Akosombo Dam” by Mark Morgan Trinidad A