2024 Elections Report: Risks & Opportunities for Commodities Sector
In the ever-evolving landscape of global commodities, the year 2024 stands as a pivotal juncture marked by transformative elections across diverse regions. As nations prepare to cast their ballots, the outcomes hold the power to shape policies and strategies that will significantly influence energy, trade relations, and resource management worldwide.
This report encapsulates the intricate intersections between political shifts and their repercussions on the commodities sector. London Politica’s Global Commodities Watch has made a selection of the most significant countries, and analysed the potential impact of elections based on election programmes, past policies, and scenario planning.
North African Energy Market Analysis: Algeria
This report serves as an overview of the risks – mainly political, economic, social – in the Algerian energy market. It will look at natural gas, as well as crude oil and green energy. The report is also part of a broader series of analyses on North African energy markets.
REPowerEU, Piano Mattei, and the Political Economy of the Mediterranean
From the Phoenicians to the First French Republic, two shores of the Mediterranean have been the cradle for many important ancient civilizations, including the Carthaginians and Ancient Egyptians. Although in modern times the post-war political alignments and government institutions look very different, the evidence of a rich common history can be seen all over Southern Europe and North Africa in the forms of enclaves, architecture, and shared cultural and linguistic norms. Following Giorgia Meloni’s state visits to Algeria and Libya, this spotlight considers how Italy’s Piano Mattei (Mattei plan) can be an opportunity for the rest of the European Union (EU) to successfully implement the REPowerEU energy plan and potentially rekindle trans-Mediterranean trade and cooperation, beyond natural gas and energy markets.
Immigration, Energy Markets, and Fratelli d’Italia: What is Piano Mattei?
In simple terms, Piano Mattei represents Italy’s de facto foreign policy in the Mediterranean under Giorgia Meloni’s tenure as President of the Chamber of Deputies (the official title of the head of the Italian government). The origins of Mattei can be found in Fratelli d’Italia’s (FdI) manifesto for the 2022 Italian general election, which stresses FdI’s belief that Italy must once again become a leader in energy markets. Piano Mattei takes its name from Enrico Mattei – founder of Italy’s state-owned hydrocarbons agency: Ente nazionale idrocarburi (Eni). During his time in the Chamber of Deputies, and later as Chairman of Eni, Mattei realised that if Italy wanted to include natural gas in its energy mix then Italy needed to cooperate with key exporters. Indeed, Mattei oversaw the signing of various bilateral agreements with many newly-independent states in the MENA region to import natural gas to Italy. Mattei’s work with Eni was also crucial to the construction of the Transmed pipeline, which channels Algerian natural gas to Sicily via Tunisia. The plans for the Transmed pipeline also included the Maghreb-Europe pipeline, which exported Algerian gas to the Iberian Peninsula until last October, when Algiers elected to not renew its export contracts with Morocco over increasing tensions over the Western Sahara conflict. This effectively ceased the flow of natural gas from Algeria to Iberia.
Giorgia Meloni formally introduced Piano Mattei last December, during the eighth iteration of the Dialoghi Mediterranei di Roma – a forum on Mediterranean politics hosted by Italy’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation alongside the Instituto per gli studi di politica internazionale (ISPI), a prominent Italian thinktank. In Meloni’s own words, Piano Mattei is a “virtuous collaboration leading to the growth of the European Union and African nations” guided by the principles of “interdependence, resilience, and cooperation”. Naturally, the namesake “Mattei” suggests that Meloni’s stance is primarily to secure energy supplies for Italy and totally eliminate the dependence on Russian natural gas. On the one hand, however, Meloni’s foreign policy in the Mediterranean also aims to build upon the European Commission’s trade ambitions with the ‘Southern Neighbourhood’: “The long-term objective of the trade partnership between the EU and its Southern Neighbourhood is to promote economic integration in the Euro-Mediterranean area, removing barriers to trade and investment” and the EU’s wider energy policy goals. On the other hand, Associazione Amici dei Bambini – an Italian children’s rights NGO – raises the concern that Meloni’s ambiguous and rhetorical references to immigration in her keynote speech at the Dialoghi Mediterranei di Roma, suggest that perhaps Meloni’s ambitions are centred on delivering campaign promises regarding trans-Mediterranean migration flows. Indeed, Meloni’s lexical and rhetorical ambiguity is often the cause for concern for some analysts (including the author of this spotlight). Whether Meloni intends to use Mattei to further her immigration policies is difficult to ascertain at this stage, and is beyond the scope of this spotlight.
Regardless of how one may interpret the scope or intentions of Mattei, one thing is certain – it can be an opportunity for all of the Mediterranean countries. For Italy (and to a large extent, Meloni) it would be a first step in re-establishing itself as a regional economic powerhouse and help move away from decades’ long economic stagnation. For Algeria and other North African countries, the prospect of increased cooperation and interdependence with the EU is an incentive for investment, potentially beyond natural gas and energy markets. In the two weeks after Meloni’s visit to Algiers on January 24 2023, Eni’s (Euronext Milan) share price increased 4.58 per-cent from €14.18 to €14.83. Year-to-date growth is around the 8 per-cent mark, at time of writing.
Limits for the European Commission and Meloni’s Government
Although a more collaborative and economically interdependent Mediterranean could have the potential to benefit states on either side, Giorgia Meloni and the European Commission need to learn from the past if they are to derive short-term economic benefit as well as long-term regional cohesion. What is meant here by “learning from the past” is that ‘switching’ who is supplying the EU with gas from Russia to Algeria, for example, does not account for the weakness in Europe’s energy strategy before the Russo-Ukrainian War. That is, relying on a weakly-integrated trade partner for a crucial commodity.
The REPowerEU plan outlines the EU’s energy policy following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Although the medium to long-term impetus is to increase the role of renewables within the bloc’s energy mix, the short-term imperative includes securing hydrocarbons from non-Russian suppliers. These two foreign policy goals are not necessarily ad diem, and in the context of the Mediterranean, actually involve compromising successful economic interdependence between the EU and its ‘Southern Neighbourhood’.
To contextualise; on January 19 2023 Resolution 2023/2506 was adopted by the European Parliament, calling upon the Kingdom of Morocco to “release all political prisoners'', including the release of Nasser Zefzafi, and to “end of the surveillance of journalists, including via NSO’s Pegasus spyware, and to implement legislation” which protects journalists. Further, increasing collaboration with Algeria (who, as above mentioned, is having its own political standoff with Morocco over Western Sahara) suggests that the short and medium-term ambitions of REPowerEU and Piano Mattei are at odds with the European Parliament’s adoption of Resolution 2023/2506. This is problematic for securing natural gas supplies to Iberia and the westernmost corners of the bloc, but potentially for regional stability in general. If the EU cannot strike the right balance between appeasing Algerian requests and reprimanding Morocco for its treatment of journalists, the prospect of tensions between the two North African states cooling off is not particularly positive. This indirectly impacts the operations of the Maghreb-Europe pipeline, and so on. Indeed, on January 23 2023 the Moroccan parliament “voted unanimously” to reconsider its ties with the European Parliament.
That said, Morocco-European relations are not exactly at an all time low – in terms of trade and commerce, at least. Trade between the EU and Morocco has increased significantly in the period between 2011 and 2021, and the North African state is the bloc’s 19th largest trading partner. Morocco is also among the top African trading partners for Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Therefore, there is still space for Morocco-Europe relations to improve within the broader scope of REPowerEU, the European Commission’s ‘Southern Neighbourhood’, and of course, Giorgia Meloni’s Piano Mattei.
Summary: Implications for the Political Economy of the Mediterranean
As the EU gravitates towards North Africa to ‘de-Russify’ its natural gas imports what diplomats and politicians should keep in mind two things: (i) the current tension between Algeria and Morocco, and (ii) diversifying gas imports is not (in the short-term) compatible with holding Morocco politically accountable for its mistreatment of journalists. It is an unlaudable conclusion, of course. But certain international relations theory – namely liberal institutionalism – would defend this claim as the theory emphasises understanding “the role that common goals play in the international system and the ability of international organisations to get states to cooperate,” as opposed to focussing strictly on power relations between states.
In the case of Mattei as a part of the EU’s ‘Southern Neighbourhood’ strategy, turning to the Mediterranean region means understanding the political tensions of North Africa in order to ensure the best outcomes for REPowerEU and Mattei, as well as avoiding antagonising the Kingdom of Morocco – even if the normative reasons for doing so are justified. Within the EU, the success of Piano Mattei in increasing Algerian gas supplies to Italy and the rest of the Transmed pipeline (which terminates in Slovenia) is intricately linked with REPowerEU’s short-term goals. Thus, as Arturo Varvelli elaborates in his commentary on the issue, Brussels and Rome ought to conduct themselves in a cooperative manner to ensure the success of Mattei and REPowerEU alike. If not, Meloni’s well-documented Euroscepticism could well be weaponised and used against Brussels, which would be a counterproductive outcome for Italy and the EU’s political legitimacy.
On these premises, then, the EU’s ‘Southern Neighbourhood’ strategy should also encompass the goals of REPowerEU to, first of all, secure alternative gas supplies, but also to cosy up to Rome and using the increased demand for non-Russian natural gas to quell Algiers-Rabat tensions. Equally, in pursuing the energy goals of Piano Mattei Giorgia Meloni should also consider using Italy’s diplomatic power to help find a solution that might reopen the Maghreb-Europe pipeline if she desires to obtain a reputation for closing deals and power brokering at the European level.
Outlook
Italian-North African gas exploration and trade deals may face significant challenges in the shape of Europe’s green energy transition.
Meloni will most likely be able to secure the ‘de-Russification’ of Italy’s natural gas supply, but whether this will hamper Rome’s green energy transition remains to be seen.
Forecasts would suggest that LNG futures prices will not fluctuate sufficiently to dampen the value of natural gas trade between Italy and its partners, Algeria and Libya, in North Africa.
Whether Meloni aims to cooperate with, or conspire against, the EU’s short and long-term energy policies remains to be seen.
At the present moment it is very unlikely that Algeria-Morocco relations will improve to the point of reopening gas flows to Iberia via the Maghreb-Europe pipeline. How the situation between both states remains a critical point for the energy policies of Italy and the EU at large.
Image Credits: ROSI Office Systems Inc.
All eyes on Algeria: how natural gas is shaping North-African politics
One country in North-Africa seems to be making the most out of the current energy crisis and a new era in great-power rivalry - Algeria. Great potential has fuelled massive interest in the country’s gas industry and led to a significant increase of gas revenues in the past years. As a consequence, the country is able to spend big, both domestically and abroad, and charter a more active foreign policy. The latter, however, is held under increased scrutiny by parliamentarians and senators across the Atlantic, raising questions about the risks of Algerian gas imports. Another question, which is worth asking, is to what extent Algerian gas potential can be turned into actual export flows.
This analysis will take a deep-dive into 1) the drivers of increased interest and cooperation in Algeria, 2) the outcomes so far, and 3) complications and geopolitical dynamics, after which a small outlook will be presented.
Drivers of increased interest and cooperation in Algeria
Increased interest and cooperation in Algeria and North Africa are partly driven by the war in Ukraine and the need to source new gas supplies. In a bid to curb Russian gas imports, both European and international energy companies are scrambling supplies across the globe. Before the war, Russian natural gas accounted for roughly 45% of EU imports or 155 bcm, whereas it is now standing at roughly 10% of EU imports or 34.4 bcm. That leaves a gap of roughly 120.6 bcm to satisfy demand. And while some supplies may be curbed by lowering demand through the increase of energy efficiency and the usage of other fuels, most will have to be sourced elsewhere.
Algeria, as a source of natural gas, offers much potential. It is Africa’s largest natural gas exporter and in combination with its location, the country could offer an ideal place to source gas. Algeria’s potential has led to increased interests in its gas industry. Other countries in North Africa, including Libya and Egypt, have also received increased interest. Notably, Libya secured an $8 billion exploration deal with Italian energy major Eni.
*Note that the Trans-Saharan and Galsi potential or planned pipelines.
Algerian gas market: Facts and Figures
Reserves: The country holds roughly 1.2% of proven natural gas reserves in the world, accounting for 2,279 bcm.
Production: Its production stands at 100.8 bcm per year.
Exports: In 2021 it exported 55 bcm, 38.9 bcm through pipelines, and 16.1 bcm in the form of LNG. European imports accounted for 49.5 bcm, 34.1 bcm by pipelines, and 15.4 bcm in the form of LNG.
Export capacity: Algeria has a total export capacity of 87,5 bcm: the Maghreb-Europe (GME) pipeline (Algeria-Morocco-Spain) 13.5 bcm, Medgaz (Algeria-Spain) 8 bcm, Transmed (Algeria-Tunisia-Italy) 32 bcm, LNG 34 bcm.
Aside from potential, ambition (on both sides of the Mediterranean) is another reason for interest and cooperation. Interest has come from the EU and several member states, but mostly from Italy. Instead of merely securing gas supplies, Italy aims to become an energy corridor for Algerian gas in Europe. This will boost Italian significance in the European energy market, increasing both transit revenues and investment in its own gas industry. Moreover, Rome seeks to increase its profile in the Mediterranean, mainly to stabilize the region and decrease migration flows. It views both Algeria and its national energy firm Eni as key factors in that aim.
Algeria is also looking for a more active role in the region. For the past years, the country has been emerging from its isolationism, which characterized the rule of president Bouteflika, who was ousted in 2019. With new deals and increased gas revenues it hopes to increase defense and public spending, prop-up its gas industry, which suffered from lack of investment, and stabilize its economy and the region. Aside from economic reasons, therefore, cooperation between the two sides is politically motivated as well.
What has this increased interest and cooperation so far led to?
As a result of increasing gas prices and rising demand, the Algerians have seen their revenues increase massively. Sonatrach, Algeria’s state-owned energy company, reported a massive $50 billion energy export profits in 2022, compared to $34 billion in 2021, and $20 billion in 2020. This will allow for more fiscal space and public spending. In fact, the drafted budget of 2023 is the largest the country has ever seen, increasing 63% from $60 billion in 2022 to $98 billion in 2023. Because of bigger budgets, Algeria will also be able to partly stabilize its neighbors by offering electricity and gas at a discount - something the country is currently discussing with Tunisia and Libya.
The Italian trade looks most promising and has led to multiple deals. Trade between the two countries has doubled from $8 billion in 2021 to $16 billion in 2022, whereas dependence on Algerian gas increased from 30% before the Ukraine war to 40% at the moment. Last year, Eni CEO Claudio Descalzi secured approval from Algeria to increase the gas its exports via pipeline to Italy from 9 bcm to 15 bcm a year in 2023 and 18 bcm in 2024, and last month, Italian Prime Minister Meloni, joined by Descalzi, visited Algeria to build upon that earlier cooperation. Again, two agreements were signed, one with regards to emissions reduction and the other to increase energy export capacity from Algeria to Italy.
The visit and new plans reflected ambitions from both sides. President Tebboune recently announced Algeria’s aim to double gas exports and reach 100 bcm per year and Meloni mentioned a new ‘Mattei plan’ (which refers to Enrico Mattei, founder of Eni, who sought to support African countries' development of their natural resources in order to help the continent maximize its economic growth potential, while facilitating Italian energy security). Furthermore, the Algerian ambassador stated the country’s intention to make Italy a European hub for Algerian gas, whereas Eni CEO Descalzi mentioned the possibility of a north-south axis, connecting the European demand market with the (North) African supply market.
Interest has also led to other plans, potential deals, and rapprochement. Firstly, the EU sees potential and aims to secure Algeria as a long-term strategic partner. Last year, the EU’s energy commissioner visited Algeria as part of “a charm offensive”. Secondly, the Ukraine war and Algeria’s abundance of gas supplies also seems to be the main reason for France’s rapprochement toward Algeria. In addition to this, Slovenia plans to build a pipeline to Hungary to transport Algerian gas as Algeria aims to increase electricity exports to Europe. Algeria’s future as an energy supplier could also go beyond natural gas, as last December German natural gas company VNG signed an MoU with Sonatrach to examine the possibilities for green hydrogen projects. Algeria’s future as a hydrocarbons supplier could also extend beyond Europe as Chevron aims to reach a gas exploration agreement with Algeria and is assessing the country’s shale resources.
Complications & geopolitical dynamics
Translating all that interest and cooperation into more Algerian output, and stable secure supplies for Italy and Europe, on the other hand, is a different story. There are several factors that hamper or complicate the growth of the Algerian gas industry and the potential North-South Axis. Those complications can be divided into two broad groups: (i) industry specific complications and (ii) complex (international) politics.
Industry specific complications
There are specific limitations to the technical feasibility of increasing production. Years of underinvestment, due to corruption, unattractive fiscal terms and a slow bureaucracy, have resulted in less exploration and development of new fields, which roughly take 3-5 years from the exploration phase to production. In combination with decline from maturing fields, this limits industry growth and export potential in the short-term. Internal audits show that Sonatrach can barely mobilize an additional 4 bcm per year, let alone the additional 9 bcm meant for 2024. Doing so will take a bite out of its LNG business, which currently sells for a much higher price. Exploration and development will take time and mostly affect the medium-term in 3-5 years. Furthermore, Algeria has to perform a balancing act between its exports and increasing domestic demand, which is set to grow 50% by 2028.
A North-South axis will require Italy to upgrade its gas network as well. The country will have to establish several energy corridors to demand markets in Europe and expand its domestic gas network, which requires billions of investment. In this light, some analysts point to the fact that claims about such an axis are currently rhetoric and are meant to secure investments that are needed for its own gas industry.
Geopolitics
Geopolitical considerations also may influence gas flows toward Europe. For starters, Algeria has a complicated relationship with Morocco, which according to Algiers, 'occupies’ the Western Sahara. Algeria maintains it is a sovereign territory and in 2021, this row resulted in the suspension of the GME pipeline, which runs through Morocco. While Spanish imports through the Medgaz pipeline increased from 8 bcm to 9 bcm in 2022, the closure of the GME pipeline resulted in an overall decrease of exports to Spain by more than 35%. By using gas (revenues) as a tool of statecraft, Algeria also managed to convince Tunisia in countering Morocco, after handing it economic aid.
The country’s relations with Russia might also complicate gas flows. Its relation encompasses military cooperation, including joint military exercises and weapons purchases. Algeria is the 6th largest importer of weapons in the world and roughly 70% of Algeria’s weapons are sourced from Russia. In 2023, its largest budget draft ever included a rough 130% or $13.5 billion rise in military expenditure and, in November, plans were announced to dramatically increase its acquisition of Russian military equipment in 2023, including stealth aircraft, bombers and fighter jets, and new air defense systems.
With the war in Ukraine, Algeria’s relation with Russia creates a risk of sanctions, with some U.S. senators and EU parliamentarians being particularly vocal on this. As a result of sanction risk, Sonatrach included a clause in its gas contracts, which allows for currency denomination change every 6 months, reflecting warrines of U.S. sanctions and dollar-denominated gas trade. Its recent application to BRICS, will increase the country’s capacity to charter its own foreign policy, without endangering security and trade ties to Beijing and Moscow.
Outlook
Significant rises in Algerian export output, outside of its current commitments, are not likely in the short-term.
Ambitions with regards to a potential North-South axis are largely rhetorical and meant to increase investment and gather broader regional and European-wide support for an energy corridor.
Sanction-risks remain low. Because of Algerian significance to the European gas market, the EU and its member states will likely try to maintain good ties with the North-African country.
The effect of future massive weapons purchases from Russia will likely have a negative effect on relations with the EU, but it is unclear whether that will immediately impact (future) gas flows.
Increasing gas revenues and bigger budgets will decrease the risk of domestic instability. As a consequence, Algeria has the possibility to charter a more active foreign policy - something we are currently already seeing. The main goal of such a foreign policy will be to stabilize its immediate neighborhood.