REPowerEU, Piano Mattei, and the Political Economy of the Mediterranean
From the Phoenicians to the First French Republic, two shores of the Mediterranean have been the cradle for many important ancient civilizations, including the Carthaginians and Ancient Egyptians. Although in modern times the post-war political alignments and government institutions look very different, the evidence of a rich common history can be seen all over Southern Europe and North Africa in the forms of enclaves, architecture, and shared cultural and linguistic norms. Following Giorgia Meloni’s state visits to Algeria and Libya, this spotlight considers how Italy’s Piano Mattei (Mattei plan) can be an opportunity for the rest of the European Union (EU) to successfully implement the REPowerEU energy plan and potentially rekindle trans-Mediterranean trade and cooperation, beyond natural gas and energy markets.
Immigration, Energy Markets, and Fratelli d’Italia: What is Piano Mattei?
In simple terms, Piano Mattei represents Italy’s de facto foreign policy in the Mediterranean under Giorgia Meloni’s tenure as President of the Chamber of Deputies (the official title of the head of the Italian government). The origins of Mattei can be found in Fratelli d’Italia’s (FdI) manifesto for the 2022 Italian general election, which stresses FdI’s belief that Italy must once again become a leader in energy markets. Piano Mattei takes its name from Enrico Mattei – founder of Italy’s state-owned hydrocarbons agency: Ente nazionale idrocarburi (Eni). During his time in the Chamber of Deputies, and later as Chairman of Eni, Mattei realised that if Italy wanted to include natural gas in its energy mix then Italy needed to cooperate with key exporters. Indeed, Mattei oversaw the signing of various bilateral agreements with many newly-independent states in the MENA region to import natural gas to Italy. Mattei’s work with Eni was also crucial to the construction of the Transmed pipeline, which channels Algerian natural gas to Sicily via Tunisia. The plans for the Transmed pipeline also included the Maghreb-Europe pipeline, which exported Algerian gas to the Iberian Peninsula until last October, when Algiers elected to not renew its export contracts with Morocco over increasing tensions over the Western Sahara conflict. This effectively ceased the flow of natural gas from Algeria to Iberia.
Giorgia Meloni formally introduced Piano Mattei last December, during the eighth iteration of the Dialoghi Mediterranei di Roma – a forum on Mediterranean politics hosted by Italy’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation alongside the Instituto per gli studi di politica internazionale (ISPI), a prominent Italian thinktank. In Meloni’s own words, Piano Mattei is a “virtuous collaboration leading to the growth of the European Union and African nations” guided by the principles of “interdependence, resilience, and cooperation”. Naturally, the namesake “Mattei” suggests that Meloni’s stance is primarily to secure energy supplies for Italy and totally eliminate the dependence on Russian natural gas. On the one hand, however, Meloni’s foreign policy in the Mediterranean also aims to build upon the European Commission’s trade ambitions with the ‘Southern Neighbourhood’: “The long-term objective of the trade partnership between the EU and its Southern Neighbourhood is to promote economic integration in the Euro-Mediterranean area, removing barriers to trade and investment” and the EU’s wider energy policy goals. On the other hand, Associazione Amici dei Bambini – an Italian children’s rights NGO – raises the concern that Meloni’s ambiguous and rhetorical references to immigration in her keynote speech at the Dialoghi Mediterranei di Roma, suggest that perhaps Meloni’s ambitions are centred on delivering campaign promises regarding trans-Mediterranean migration flows. Indeed, Meloni’s lexical and rhetorical ambiguity is often the cause for concern for some analysts (including the author of this spotlight). Whether Meloni intends to use Mattei to further her immigration policies is difficult to ascertain at this stage, and is beyond the scope of this spotlight.
Regardless of how one may interpret the scope or intentions of Mattei, one thing is certain – it can be an opportunity for all of the Mediterranean countries. For Italy (and to a large extent, Meloni) it would be a first step in re-establishing itself as a regional economic powerhouse and help move away from decades’ long economic stagnation. For Algeria and other North African countries, the prospect of increased cooperation and interdependence with the EU is an incentive for investment, potentially beyond natural gas and energy markets. In the two weeks after Meloni’s visit to Algiers on January 24 2023, Eni’s (Euronext Milan) share price increased 4.58 per-cent from €14.18 to €14.83. Year-to-date growth is around the 8 per-cent mark, at time of writing.
Limits for the European Commission and Meloni’s Government
Although a more collaborative and economically interdependent Mediterranean could have the potential to benefit states on either side, Giorgia Meloni and the European Commission need to learn from the past if they are to derive short-term economic benefit as well as long-term regional cohesion. What is meant here by “learning from the past” is that ‘switching’ who is supplying the EU with gas from Russia to Algeria, for example, does not account for the weakness in Europe’s energy strategy before the Russo-Ukrainian War. That is, relying on a weakly-integrated trade partner for a crucial commodity.
The REPowerEU plan outlines the EU’s energy policy following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Although the medium to long-term impetus is to increase the role of renewables within the bloc’s energy mix, the short-term imperative includes securing hydrocarbons from non-Russian suppliers. These two foreign policy goals are not necessarily ad diem, and in the context of the Mediterranean, actually involve compromising successful economic interdependence between the EU and its ‘Southern Neighbourhood’.
To contextualise; on January 19 2023 Resolution 2023/2506 was adopted by the European Parliament, calling upon the Kingdom of Morocco to “release all political prisoners'', including the release of Nasser Zefzafi, and to “end of the surveillance of journalists, including via NSO’s Pegasus spyware, and to implement legislation” which protects journalists. Further, increasing collaboration with Algeria (who, as above mentioned, is having its own political standoff with Morocco over Western Sahara) suggests that the short and medium-term ambitions of REPowerEU and Piano Mattei are at odds with the European Parliament’s adoption of Resolution 2023/2506. This is problematic for securing natural gas supplies to Iberia and the westernmost corners of the bloc, but potentially for regional stability in general. If the EU cannot strike the right balance between appeasing Algerian requests and reprimanding Morocco for its treatment of journalists, the prospect of tensions between the two North African states cooling off is not particularly positive. This indirectly impacts the operations of the Maghreb-Europe pipeline, and so on. Indeed, on January 23 2023 the Moroccan parliament “voted unanimously” to reconsider its ties with the European Parliament.
That said, Morocco-European relations are not exactly at an all time low – in terms of trade and commerce, at least. Trade between the EU and Morocco has increased significantly in the period between 2011 and 2021, and the North African state is the bloc’s 19th largest trading partner. Morocco is also among the top African trading partners for Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Therefore, there is still space for Morocco-Europe relations to improve within the broader scope of REPowerEU, the European Commission’s ‘Southern Neighbourhood’, and of course, Giorgia Meloni’s Piano Mattei.
Summary: Implications for the Political Economy of the Mediterranean
As the EU gravitates towards North Africa to ‘de-Russify’ its natural gas imports what diplomats and politicians should keep in mind two things: (i) the current tension between Algeria and Morocco, and (ii) diversifying gas imports is not (in the short-term) compatible with holding Morocco politically accountable for its mistreatment of journalists. It is an unlaudable conclusion, of course. But certain international relations theory – namely liberal institutionalism – would defend this claim as the theory emphasises understanding “the role that common goals play in the international system and the ability of international organisations to get states to cooperate,” as opposed to focussing strictly on power relations between states.
In the case of Mattei as a part of the EU’s ‘Southern Neighbourhood’ strategy, turning to the Mediterranean region means understanding the political tensions of North Africa in order to ensure the best outcomes for REPowerEU and Mattei, as well as avoiding antagonising the Kingdom of Morocco – even if the normative reasons for doing so are justified. Within the EU, the success of Piano Mattei in increasing Algerian gas supplies to Italy and the rest of the Transmed pipeline (which terminates in Slovenia) is intricately linked with REPowerEU’s short-term goals. Thus, as Arturo Varvelli elaborates in his commentary on the issue, Brussels and Rome ought to conduct themselves in a cooperative manner to ensure the success of Mattei and REPowerEU alike. If not, Meloni’s well-documented Euroscepticism could well be weaponised and used against Brussels, which would be a counterproductive outcome for Italy and the EU’s political legitimacy.
On these premises, then, the EU’s ‘Southern Neighbourhood’ strategy should also encompass the goals of REPowerEU to, first of all, secure alternative gas supplies, but also to cosy up to Rome and using the increased demand for non-Russian natural gas to quell Algiers-Rabat tensions. Equally, in pursuing the energy goals of Piano Mattei Giorgia Meloni should also consider using Italy’s diplomatic power to help find a solution that might reopen the Maghreb-Europe pipeline if she desires to obtain a reputation for closing deals and power brokering at the European level.
Outlook
Italian-North African gas exploration and trade deals may face significant challenges in the shape of Europe’s green energy transition.
Meloni will most likely be able to secure the ‘de-Russification’ of Italy’s natural gas supply, but whether this will hamper Rome’s green energy transition remains to be seen.
Forecasts would suggest that LNG futures prices will not fluctuate sufficiently to dampen the value of natural gas trade between Italy and its partners, Algeria and Libya, in North Africa.
Whether Meloni aims to cooperate with, or conspire against, the EU’s short and long-term energy policies remains to be seen.
At the present moment it is very unlikely that Algeria-Morocco relations will improve to the point of reopening gas flows to Iberia via the Maghreb-Europe pipeline. How the situation between both states remains a critical point for the energy policies of Italy and the EU at large.
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