Uncertainty behind the Black Sea Grain Initiative

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022 fuelled high inflation rates and a consequent global cost of living crisis. Prices of major commodities, such as oil and gas, aluminium, nickel, copper, and wheat drastically increased following the invasion. This was due to a combination of EU, UK, and US-led economic sanctions against Russia and a Russian blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports.

For instance, Ukraine supplies 45 million tonnes of grain annually to the global market, making it one of the world’s largest grain exporters. However, Russia’s naval blockade against Ukraine’s ports obstructed seaborne routes for the export of grain and other foodstuffs for months, contributing to a global food crisis. Countries within the Global South—Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, for example—dependent on imports from the Black Sea region were forced to pay higher prices for grain to offset the higher costs of overland transport and a tightened supply of grain. Prior to the war, extreme weather events and COVID-19 disrupted supply chains, severely reducing food supplies, especially to countries within the Horn of Africa. The Russia-Ukraine war only exacerbated the issue, provoking the threat of famine and humanitarian crisis in East Africa. Simultaneously, several Eastern European markets, including Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary, have been flooded by excess Ukrainian grain, sending their grain prices to the floor. 

To combat the ongoing crisis and prevent potential famine, the UN and Türkiye brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative on 22nd July 2022 between Ukraine and Russia. This allowed for the export of commercial food and fertiliser for 120 days (until 19th November 2022) from three key ports in Ukraine—Odessa, Chornomorsk, Yuzhny/Pivdennyi—after which the agreement was extended for a further 120 days until 18th March 2023. However, in March 2023, Russia only agreed to extend the deal by another 60 days until 18th May 2023, rather than the previously arranged 120 days.

While Russian agricultural exports are not directly sanctioned by Western states, international state-led and private restrictions against Russian access to financial instruments like SWIFT, logistics, and insurance are preventing the efficient export of Russian-produced agricultural goods. By halving the original extension terms of the Black Sea Grain Initiative from 120 days to 60 days, Russia aims to negotiate the removal of such restrictions. However, unilateral and privately-imposed sanctions are out of the UN’s control and negotiation abilities, making another extension of the Black Sea Grain agreement dubious. Moreover, Western-led sanctions against Russia are unlikely to be withdrawn in the short term as the war in Ukraine continues. 

Should the Black Sea Grain Initiative not receive another extension, global food prices may spike to record highs and spark a humanitarian crisis. This is especially true for governments in the Global South that may not have the financial capability to subsidise food costs for their citizens. Ukrainian and Russian agricultural producers do not anticipate the Initiative to continue forth, and have already planted less corn and wheat for the next harvest season. Ukraine’s wheat harvest and exports are forecasted to fall to 20.2 million tonnes produce and 11 million exported in 2023/24, from 25.2 million produced and 14.5 million exported in 2022/23, respectively. 

While a famous proverb promises hope for May to bring flowers, the potential end of the Grain Deal on 18th May 2023 can only bring precarity and crises for much of the world.