Sinking shores and rising concerns: the environmental fallout of sea sand mining
Urbanisation is one of the contemporary era’s defining trends, with urban populations previously comprising 29% of the world’s inhabitants in 1950, as compared to 56% today and a predicted 70% by 2045. The astounding influx of populations into urban areas is accompanied by large-scale construction projects for infrastructure, industrial, commercial, and residential developments, which raises environmental concerns at various levels. One concern pertains to the large amounts of sand needed as a key ingredient of concrete and asphalt. In 2021, the United States, Australia, Malaysia, the Netherlands, and Germany were the largest net exporters of sand, while China, Canada, Japan, Singapore, and Italy were the largest net importers, driven by high rates of urban construction and land reclamation.
The high demand for abundant and easily accessible sand has prompted the need for sea sand mining, which involves the extraction of sand from ocean floors. However, this increasingly prevalent practice brings significant correlated environmental issues and ecological disruption. Extraction activities disturb the delicate balance of marine habitats, destroying coral reefs, seagrass beds, and other essential marine organisms. These ecosystems play a crucial role in maintaining biodiversity, providing food sources, and protecting coastal areas from erosion and storm surges. The destruction of these habitats can lead to the loss of species, damage to coastal areas, and increased vulnerability to natural disasters. Alongside habitat destruction, sea sand mining also contributes to climate change, in that the extraction process releases large amounts of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, mainly through the use of heavy machinery and transportation. Additionally, the removal of sand from coastal areas can disrupt the natural sediment flow, altering coastal dynamics and increasing the risk of erosion and flooding. These changes have huge implications for the stability of coastal ecosystems, the livelihoods of coastal communities, and the overall resilience of coastal regions in the face of climate change impacts.
Recognising the detrimental effects of sea sand mining, Indonesia banned exports of sea sand in 2003 and consolidated the ban in 2007 with regulations against illegal shipments. Prior to the ban, Indonesia was Singapore’s main supplier of sea sand for land reclamation, shipping more than 53 million tonnes on average per year between 1997 to 2002. Sand mining, coupled with persistently rising sea levels, had caused several islands in the Thousand Islands regency – located north of Jakarta – and the Riau Islands to sink underwater.
However, in late May, Indonesia lifted the ban in desperate hopes of attracting economic benefits to the country. This move comes a few years after Malaysia banned sea sand exports in late 2019, which complicated Singapore’s ambitious land reclamation plans. After Indonesia’s 2003 ban, Singapore turned to Malaysia to import sand, which by 2021 comprised nearly 63% of Singapore’s sand imports. For this reason, Malaysia’s recent ban gave Indonesia a window of opportunity to reattract revenue from sand exports to the region, especially to supplement Singapore’s expansion plans. Mining permit holders are now permitted to collect and export sea sand, provided that domestic demands have been met. Environmentalists, including Indonesia’s former Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Minister, Susi Pudjiastuti, have condemned the reversal of the sea sand mining ban. Greenpeace Southeast Asia labelled the move as ‘greenwashing’, inasmuch as the Indonesian government claims their decision will aid in improved sustainable marine resource management and control sea sedimentation; yet, activists believe the new regulation will only ‘further enrich oligarchs’ and ‘increase state income from the fisheries sector’. This is especially true insofar as the potential for food scarcity, as sea sand mining will erode coastal communities’ primary source of sustenance – the sea – while prioritising commercial exploitation and extraction of marine resources.
Addressing the negative impacts of sea sand mining requires a comprehensive approach to sustainable urbanisation, industrial practices, and environmental management. This includes promoting alternative construction materials, implementing stricter regulations on sand extraction, and investing in research and innovation for sustainable infrastructure development. Additionally, it is crucial to raise awareness among policymakers, industry stakeholders, and the public about the environmental consequences of sea sand mining and the importance of adopting environmentally responsible practices.
Image rights: "Sand Extraction at Cliffe Fort" by Shiro Kazan
Uncertainty behind the Black Sea Grain Initiative
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022 fuelled high inflation rates and a consequent global cost of living crisis. Prices of major commodities, such as oil and gas, aluminium, nickel, copper, and wheat drastically increased following the invasion. This was due to a combination of EU, UK, and US-led economic sanctions against Russia and a Russian blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports.
For instance, Ukraine supplies 45 million tonnes of grain annually to the global market, making it one of the world’s largest grain exporters. However, Russia’s naval blockade against Ukraine’s ports obstructed seaborne routes for the export of grain and other foodstuffs for months, contributing to a global food crisis. Countries within the Global South—Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, for example—dependent on imports from the Black Sea region were forced to pay higher prices for grain to offset the higher costs of overland transport and a tightened supply of grain. Prior to the war, extreme weather events and COVID-19 disrupted supply chains, severely reducing food supplies, especially to countries within the Horn of Africa. The Russia-Ukraine war only exacerbated the issue, provoking the threat of famine and humanitarian crisis in East Africa. Simultaneously, several Eastern European markets, including Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary, have been flooded by excess Ukrainian grain, sending their grain prices to the floor.
To combat the ongoing crisis and prevent potential famine, the UN and Türkiye brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative on 22nd July 2022 between Ukraine and Russia. This allowed for the export of commercial food and fertiliser for 120 days (until 19th November 2022) from three key ports in Ukraine—Odessa, Chornomorsk, Yuzhny/Pivdennyi—after which the agreement was extended for a further 120 days until 18th March 2023. However, in March 2023, Russia only agreed to extend the deal by another 60 days until 18th May 2023, rather than the previously arranged 120 days.
While Russian agricultural exports are not directly sanctioned by Western states, international state-led and private restrictions against Russian access to financial instruments like SWIFT, logistics, and insurance are preventing the efficient export of Russian-produced agricultural goods. By halving the original extension terms of the Black Sea Grain Initiative from 120 days to 60 days, Russia aims to negotiate the removal of such restrictions. However, unilateral and privately-imposed sanctions are out of the UN’s control and negotiation abilities, making another extension of the Black Sea Grain agreement dubious. Moreover, Western-led sanctions against Russia are unlikely to be withdrawn in the short term as the war in Ukraine continues.
Should the Black Sea Grain Initiative not receive another extension, global food prices may spike to record highs and spark a humanitarian crisis. This is especially true for governments in the Global South that may not have the financial capability to subsidise food costs for their citizens. Ukrainian and Russian agricultural producers do not anticipate the Initiative to continue forth, and have already planted less corn and wheat for the next harvest season. Ukraine’s wheat harvest and exports are forecasted to fall to 20.2 million tonnes produce and 11 million exported in 2023/24, from 25.2 million produced and 14.5 million exported in 2022/23, respectively.
While a famous proverb promises hope for May to bring flowers, the potential end of the Grain Deal on 18th May 2023 can only bring precarity and crises for much of the world.
Red metals reach the red: Peruvian protests impact the global copper supply
As the world gears up to mitigate the far-reaching effects of climate change—many of which are already being felt—investment into zero-emission technologies is growing to complement more than 70 countries’ mid-century net-zero emission targets. Copper will be a key component to energy-efficient technologies, including electric vehicles, charging infrastructure, solar PV, wind, and batteries. For this reason, copper demand is projected to double over the next 10 years and more than triple by 2050; but this may have detrimental social, political, and economic impacts on the surrounding contexts of copper mines, which may, in turn, have repercussions on the global supply and cost of copper.
Peru, for instance, holds the world’s second largest reserve of copper, which contributes to 4% of Peru’s entire GDP; however, local communities that live around the Apurímac-Cusco-Arequipa Road mining corridor continue to be the poorest in Peru. The mining industry has foregone environmental and health restrictions, while increasing inequality in mining districts, thus contributing to existing socioeconomic tensions among local Peruvian communities, for instance against the Antapaccay mine in Espinar, the Las Bambas mine in Cotabambas, and the Cuajone mine in Moquegua. Such enmities have been exacerbated in the ongoing political crisis in Peru that began in December 2022.
The past five decades in Peru were foundational to the country’s current political crisis. Insurgency during the 1970s, multiple dictatorships, and resulting economic instability generated political and social strife, which collectively exploded upon President Castillo’s impeachment after he attempted to install an emergency government and rule by decree in December 2022.
Castillo is highly supported by Peru’s rural populations, many of whom live in the surrounding areas of copper mines, as he denounced foreign mining corporations and their negligence of environmental regulations, promised higher taxes and wealth redistribution policies, safer working conditions for miners, and nationalisation of the entire mining industry.
After Castillo’s removal, political tensions among local miner communities—as well as much of Peru’s left-wing population—rose, leading to worker strikes, protests against mines, and disruption of mining operations. This includes ceasing operations at the Las Bambas mine, which alone supplies 2% the world’s copper. The Antapaccay mine stopped production in mid-January, but has since resumed. Continued nationwide protests threaten to cut access to $4 billion worth of red metal, including copper. In 2022, growth potential of mining GDP from 2.9% to 0.3%, due to social unrest.
To re-establish the export of copper from Peru, mining companies such as Glencore, MMG Limited, and Freeport-McMoRan must enter into agreements with local communities, in conjunction with the newly formed government led by Dina Boluarte. The mining industry should address grievances in a manner that reduces poverty, prevents environmental and health impacts, and allows for inclusive employment of the surrounding communities.
Russia attacks Ukrainian Energy Infrastructure
Ukrainian energy infrastructure has suffered immense attacks by Russia since its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Since Ukraine’s attack on 8 October on Kerch Bridge, which links Russia to annexed Crimea, Vladimir Putin has increased its air strikes against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. This follows Russia’s capture of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station in Ukraine and recent attacks on the Nord Stream natural gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea, which supplies energy from Russia to Europe. According to the UK Ministry of Defence, Russia likely intends “to cause widespread damage to Ukraine’s energy distribution network”, especially as winter approaches. As of October 2022, nearly 40% of energy infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed and Ukrainians have been urged to stockpile on emergency essentials such as water, blankets, and socks.
As part of a wave of strikes since 10 October, Russian missiles have damaged the offices of Ukraine’s electric transmission company energy in Kyiv, as well as eight energy facilities in Lviv, Burshtyn, Ladyzhyn, Kryvyi Rih, Konotop, and Kyiv. The upswing in Russian military operations directed at Ukrainian energy infrastructure has and will continue to have substantial geopolitical consequences and contribute to increased tension in strategic relationships. President Zelensky claims the increased attacks are aimed at initiating a refugee exodus, especially as winter creeps closer and greater heating is required to keep households warm; the realisation of this aim will, without doubt, further burden the strained energy systems of EU countries that choose to host Ukrainian refugees. The likely increase in emigration from Ukraine into neighbouring EU countries, and even Russia, will reduce civilian resistance to Russian operations geared towards the annexation of Ukraine. With resistance warfare having been key to Ukraine’s defences in certain regions, emigration out of Ukraine will inflate Russia’s chances of success.
The weapons used in these attacks are of particular importance for analysing the conflict's geopolitical consequences. The employment of Iranian air-to-surface missiles, the Shahed-136, and the possible deployment of the Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar, short-range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles has been highlighted recently; the provision of weapons and the Russo-Iranian partnership will further antagonise Western powers and solidify the growing East-West rivalry in current geopolitics. With fresh EU sanctions placed on Iranian entities and officials, the chances of a revived JCPOA agreement, commonly known as the "Iran nuclear deal", continue to look bleak. The EU had been pushing for the revival of the deal struck in 2015. This has rapidly changed following the current civilian uprising in Iran, supply of weapons to Russia and the reluctance of the US to further negotiate. The hope the EU held for Iran rejoining the energy market and the lower oil prices this could have led to has been lost.
To combat Russian airstrikes, Ukraine has officially requested Israeli expertise in air defence, including the Iron Dome and Iron Beam. The request creates a dilemma for Israeli officials and could create new tensions in its relationship with both the West and Russia. Israeli officials must conduct a cost-benefit analysis. There is the benefit of testing the technology and gathering information on its functionality against Iranian weapons but the Israeli government must also consider the Jewish population in Russia, the Russian diaspora in Israel as well as the current Iranian position in Syria. There is a current threat of the Jewish Agency that facilitates the immigration of Jews to Israel in Russia being shut down. It would make it very tough for Jews in Russia to immigrate to Israel if they wish. That is especially important in the present as some Russian youths are searching for ways to escape being enlisted. There are also fears of further Russian involvement in Syria in support of Iran if diplomatic ties between Russia and Israel become strained, including Russia’s current neutrality towards Israeli attacks.
China’s push for hydrogen energy: The power of ambition for green infrastructure
In March 2022, China announced its target to produce approximately 200,000 tonnes per year of green hydrogen and at least 50,000 hydrogen-fuelled vehicles by 2025 to supplement its target of reaching net-zero carbon emissions by 2060. This comes after a huge push for hydrogen use during the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing. With China being the world’s largest producer of hydrogen at 33 million tonnes annually—80% being grey or blue hydrogen, widespread usage of green hydrogen is anticipated for China’s energy infrastructure.
In understanding hydrogen, there are three main forms: grey, blue, and green. Grey hydrogen is generated using fossil fuels and other high carbon-emitting sources and blue hydrogen is produced using low carbon-emitting sources such as steam methane reformation with Carbon Capture, Usage and Storage (CCUS) or other fossil fuels with CCUS. On the other hand, green hydrogen is made through the electrolysis of renewable energy sources and emits no carbon emissions.
The success of China’s move towards green hydrogen will depend on whether it can geographically connect its renewable-rich regions in the western provinces to the high hydrogen demand areas on the coast in China’s eastern provinces, as well as efficiently and cost-effectively store hydrogen during periods of high production yet low demand for green hydrogen energy. For example, while energy supply of hydrogen produced from solar energy sources usually outweighs demand during the summer months, energy demand rises during winter months due to higher electricity needs—such as for heating—and lower solar energy generation on account of shorter days during the winter. For this reason, green hydrogen energy storage is crucial to meet mismatched demand and supply periods.
In terms of transportation, hydrogen can be transported in a variety of ways depending on the transportation distance. For shorter distances, retrofitted pipelines for high-pressure gases or natural gas blending are the best options. Currently, China has two pure hydrogen pipelines in place—although both are under 500 kilometres—and one hydrogen-natural gas blending pilot project. For longer distances, hydrogen could be shipped in the form of ammonia, gas tanks, liquefied, or through retrofitted subsea transmission pipelines. However, converting hydrogen to ammonia or cryogenic liquid is still extremely expensive and nascent in terms of technology, especially as liquid hydrogen technology is only used in China’s aerospace and defence sectors. This also poses a problem for hydrogen storage in the form of liquid.
Another option is underground storage within depleted oil and gas reservoirs, salt caverns, or aquifers. However, China’s natural storage options are limited; thus, there is large scale investment into developing underground gas storage across China. Hydrogen can also be stored through gaseous storage and tube trailer technologies; however, steel containers used in China for hydrogen storage have a lower pressure capacity than that used in Europe, North America, Japan, and South Korea. Hydrogen regulations must therefore be amended to improve China’s competitive hydrogen storage ability.
While challenges for transportation and storage persist, ambition for green hydrogen energy usage across China is growing. The country now has more than 250 hydrogen refuelling stations, making it the country with the highest number of hydrogen refuelling stations globally. Moreover, investments are being poured into green hydrogen infrastructure and technology solutions in China. There is no doubt that in due time, China will be a key player in the global hydrogen industry.